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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate and understand why and how consent is 
manipulated in societies where severe coercion seems to be effective in securing power. 
This text therefore analyses the role and nature of coercion and consent – of armed 
conflict and news production - in Colombia: a society where severe coercion seems to be 
both effective and profitable. Part 1 of the thesis studies the role of coercion from the 
Spanish Conquest and Colonial Period to the current regime in terms of the political, 
social and economic interests that predominate in each period, in terms of the role of 
armed groups – the main instruments of coercion - in the implementation of these 
interests, and in terms of the resistance to these pressures. Part 2 analyses the role of 
consent in terms of historical interests in Colombian media production, in terms of the 
role of media organisations – the main instruments of consent - in the implementation of 
these interests, and in terms of dissent. Part 3 focuses on current Colombian news 
production because this is the main method through which official information related to 
the present armed conflict is currently being transmitted to the public and because 
Colombian news production seems to bridge the gap between coercion and consent: by 
framing and promoting armed conflict. 
Part 1 uses historical sources, academic articles, human rights reports and nine personal 
interviews with representatives of the Colombian Armed Forces, guerrilla groups and 
human rights organisations to represent the broadest possible political spectrum. Part 2 is 
based on political pamphlets and literature, newspaper and magazine articles and leaflets 
and 14 interviews with representatives of mass media conglomerates, alternative 
movements and media groups. Part 3 uses a sample of 851 current news stories to 
understand the nature of a hypothetical frame that contextualises the actions of the FARC 
– the main guerrilla group - as illegitimate challenges to proper authority.  
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The General Conclusion uses theoretical insights into coercion and consent based on 
Classical Marxism, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Max Weber to interpret this 
information and reaches five conclusions. The first is that coercion and consent are two 
sides of the same coin: coercion and consent require one another. The second conclusion 
is that coercion is not completely effective because the terrain of physical and mental 
power (coercion and consent) is continually being challenged and contested: by rival 
leaders and factions and by resistance groups and alternative movements. The third is that 
the central aim of both coercion and consent in peripheral societies such as Colombia is 
to implement the ruthless interests of US and European banks and businesses and 
regional counterparts – to monopolise and maximise power and profits at all costs, human 
and environmental – so that more of one (coercion or consent) does not imply less of the 
other. The fourth conclusion is that consent is manipulated in order to consolidate 
coercion and maximise profits. The fifth is that current Colombian news production 
bridges the gap between coercion and consent - by legitimizing and producing and 
promoting armed conflict, by defining and dividing us and them, by framing the 
discourse and actions of the opposition as illegitimate challenges to proper authority, and 
by turning Colombian people against one another and against themselves - the internal 
enemy. This is the role and nature of consent in societies such as this where severe 
coercion might seem to be effective but isn’t. 
Key words: North; South; America; Colombia; war; Marxism; media; journalists; news; 
frame 
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Preface 
Why and how is consent manipulated in societies such as Colombia where severe 
coercion seems to be effective in securing power? 
 
The latest Amnesty International report on Colombia (January-July, 2007) refers to 
the continuing conflict between ‘army-backed paramilitaries, guerrilla groups and 
security forces,’ suggests that ‘all parties to the 40-year-old conflict have committed 
violations of International Humanitarian Laws (IHLs), including war crimes and 
crimes against humanity,’ and claims that at least 280 people - ‘mostly peasant 
farmers’ – had been ‘extra-judicially executed by members of the security forces,’ 
and had been presented by the Colombian Armed Forces as ‘guerrillas killed in 
combat’ in the twelve-month period ending in June, 2007.  
 
This report contrasts dramatically with the democratic image of the Colombian 
regime that BBC radio broadcast around the world in November, 2004: ‘Welcome to 
Talking Point. I’m Bridget Kendall and today we’re bringing you a very special 
program from Bogotá, the capital of Colombia in Latin America. After 40 years of 
civil war it’s no wonder that Colombia has got a reputation for violence. It’s had one 
of the highest murder rates in the world, one of the highest rates of kidnapping and 
the attempts by the government to battle against left wing guerrilla insurgents on the 
one hand and right wing paramilitary groups on the other has been complicated by 
the fact that both armed groups are thought to be deeply embroiled in drugs 
trafficking and production’ (Talking Point, November, 2004). 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to understand this violent contrast between extremely 
pessimistic human rights reports that suggest that all parties to the conflict commit 
horrific human rights abuses and eternally optimistic media images that present the 
Colombian regime as democratic and neutral and bravely battling ‘against left wing 
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guerrilla insurgents on the one hand and right wing paramilitary groups on the other’ 
(ibid). The principal hypothesis is that this phenomenon can be understood in terms 
of the nature of – and interplay between - coercion and consent, armed conflict and 
media production, armed groups and media organisations. The main question is this: 
why and how is consent manipulated in societies such as Colombia where severe 
coercion seems to be effective in securing power?  
 
The reason behind this interest in Colombian armed groups and media organisations 
is that these seem to be the main instruments used in the manufacture of coercion and 
consent. This thesis suggests that one of the main roles of Colombian media 
organisations is to ‘frame’ the armed conflict and to contextualise the discourse and 
actions of the Colombian opposition as illegitimate challenges to proper authority.  
 
Part 1 of the thesis focuses on the roots and nature of the Colombian armed conflict. 
Part 2 concentrates on the roots and nature of Colombian media production in 
general. Part 3 studies Colombian news production in particular: because Colombian 
news production seems to be the most important method through which political and 
social messages related to the current armed conflict are being transmitted to the 
public. News production should therefore provide crucial insights into the current 
nature of the interplay between coercion and consent.         
 
‘Coercion’ is defined as physical oppression or ‘the application to another of 
physical or moral force’ (www.webster-dictionary.net). This definition is applied to 
the actions of the armed groups – the main instruments of coercion – in past and 
present regimes. ‘Consent’ is defined as ‘acquiescence, compliance, approval, 
permission’ (ibid) and this definition is applied to media organisations, the main 
instruments of consent. This thesis therefore focuses on the relationship between the 
political, social and economic nature of Colombian armed groups and armed conflict 
and the nature of Colombian media organisations and media production, the critical 
issue being this: what is the nature of the interplay between the apparently 
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contradictory concepts and roles of coercion and consent, armed conflict and media 
production, armed groups and news organisations in Colombia? Does more of one 
(coercion or consent) indicate less of the other? 
 
Aims and methods 
 
This thesis has three parts. The aim of Part 1 is to understand the nature of coercion 
and of the Colombian armed conflict in terms of: 1. the political, social and 
economic nature of the interests that predominate in each historical period, 2. the 
role of armed groups – the main instruments of coercion - in the implementation of 
these interests, and 3. the nature of the reaction or resistance to these interests and 
pressures. Part 1 is based on four broad historical periods: 1. The Spanish Conquest 
and Spanish Colonial Period (1499-1781), 2. Independence movements (1781-1832), 
3. Conservative and Liberal rule (1832-1953) and 4. Dictatorship (1953-8), National 
Front (1958-78) and current regime (1978-). This part of the thesis is based on two 
claims: 1. that central interests – mostly based in Spain in the 16th - 18th Century, in 
the UK in the 19
th
 Century, and in the US and Europe since the beginning of the 20
th
 
Century – have invested in and have influenced armed conflicts in peripheral regions 
such as this, and 2. that the armed conflicts that characterise each  historical period 
from the Spanish Conquest to the current regime have common characteristics and 
that an analysis of these characteristics can shed some light on the nature of 
coercion.  
 
Part 1 is based on historical sources, academic articles and human rights reports that 
have been selected in order to represent the broadest possible political and social 
spectrum. Nine personal interviews have been conducted in the course of this 
research into the roots and nature of the current armed conflict: a Colombian human 
rights researcher and a field worker, four representatives of the Colombian Armed 
Forces (an official of the Colombian Ministry of Defence, a member of DAS, the 
Department of State Security and two army recruits) and three of the armed 
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opposition (the ELN, the FARC and the EPL) have all been interviewed. These 
interviews have been summarised in Appendix 2. Personal interviews are used in this 
part of the thesis because they provide insights into the deep and intricate nature of 
the armed conflict and of coercion in Colombia and because they have permitted the 
subjects of this research to voice their own views. This is preferable to using them as 
objectified subjects of scientific classification (Foucault, 1972). The radical Cuban 
historian, Moreno Fraginals recommends personal interviews and ‘living sources’ in 
La historia como arma (History as a weapon, 1999) because they ‘enrich the 
historical instrument’ and ‘open up the extraordinary world of the past’ and because 
they penetrate ‘the ominous cloud of silence’ (ibid: 14). The sources in this thesis 
have not been named because Colombia is dangerous: the anonymity of the subjects 
of these interviews is necessary because it protects lives.  
 
The aim of Part 2 is to understand the nature of consent and of Colombian media 
production in terms of: 1. the interests that predominate in media organisations and 
production in the same broad historical periods, 2. the role of media organisations – 
the main instruments of consent - in the implementation of these interests, and 3. 
dissent, and the reaction or resistance to these interests and pressures. This part of 
the thesis is based on three claims: 1. that central interests have influenced the 
development of media organisations and media production in peripheral  regions such 
as this, 2. that the media organisations and production that characterise each  
historical period from the Spanish Conquest to the current regime have common 
characteristics and that an analysis of these characteristics can shed some light on the 
nature of consent, and 3. that these media organisations play a crucial role in the 
legitimization of coercion through the labelling of social groups and through the 
definition of friend and enemy.  
 
Part 2 is based on historical sources, academic articles, political pamphlets and 
literature, newspapers and magazines, flyers and graffiti which have been selected in 
order represent the broadest possible political and social spectrum. The main source 
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of historical pamphlets and newspaper and magazine articles has been the 
microfilmed archives in the the two main libraries in Bogotá: Luis Arango Library 
and the National Library. More recent political texts have been collected from street 
stalls, marches and protests. Fourteen interviews have been conducted in the course 
of this research into the roots and nature of current media production: a 
representative of a foundation for the freedom of the press  (FLIP), a director of one 
of the main Colombian newspapers (El Espectador), two journalists who produce 
and present news items in Colombian radio conglomerates, a former coordinator of 
Colombian communist party communications, two representatives of the main 
communist newspaper (El Voz), an Afro-Colombian researcher, a representative of 
an indigenous people (the Embera), two directors of a national organisation of 
popular communication, two national coordinators of community radio and the editor 
of a community newspaper have all been interviewed. These interviews are 
summarised in Appendix 2. Personal interviews are used in this part of the thesis as 
before in order to penetrate ‘the ominous cloud of silence’ that shrouds media 
production (ibid).   
 
The printed texts and images on which this thesis is based were collected in 
Colombia between September 2003 and June 2007. The 19 personal interviews were 
conducted between December 2003 and November 2006. The subjects of these 
interviews were not selected at random. The interviewees had official roles in armed 
groups, human rights organisations, mass media organisations, alternative political 
and social movements or alternative media groups and were encouraged to compare 
and contrast theory and practice, the official line of the organisation and their own 
personal experience and perspective. The chronological order of the interviews 
reflects crucial factors such as the importance and interest of the issues that had been 
selected, access to the interviewees, willingness to be interviewed, and the physical 
threat posed to either or both interviewer and interviewee. The interviews with the 
demobilised leaders of the main guerrilla groups, the EPL, the ELN and the FARC 
(Interviews 15-18) for example were postponed until near the end of this period of 
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fieldwork – until May and August 2006 - because the Colombian regime has always 
treated leaders and members of the Colombian opposition as military and 
paramilitary targets. By this stage the researcher had assessed and accepted the threat 
of death and other dangers posed to both interviewer and interviewees and had 
decided to proceed: to penetrate one more ‘cloud of silence’ (Moreno Fraginals, op 
cit), one more source of courageous resistance.  
 
The interviews are set out in chronological order in Appendix 2. This part of the 
thesis will present the rationale behind the sequence of interviews. The first 
interviewees (Interview 1, October 2003) were selected in order to provide general 
insights into the provisional themes of this research: mass media and alternative 
media representations of the current armed conflict and of the human rights abuses of 
the Colombian regime and the nature of the resistance. The next two interviews 
(Interview 2 and 3, February 2004) were conducted in order to understand the role 
and nature of the Colombian Armed Forces and police, the most powerful armed 
group in the current conflict. The graduate of a military academy was not 
interviewed until March 2005 (Interview 12). He was selected because the crucial 
principle of ‘coercion’ had emerged from the data. This interview is therefore 
designed to provide insights into the nature of coercion and into the mentality of the 
Colombian army.  
 
In March 2004 the representative of Voz, the main communist periodical was 
questioned (Interview 4) in order to understand the nature of the main political 
opposition – and resistance - to the coercion of the Colombian regime. This interview 
was followed up in June 2005 because the researcher had met the son of the 
assassinated director of the newspaper in a forum that commemorated the murder of 
another brilliant and courageous intellectual: Dario Betancur, a historian who had 
taught at the Universidad Pedagogica (Pedagogical University) in Bogotá. Dario had 
pioneered research into the emergence of the drug cartels and their rapid and ruthless 
accumulation of political and economic power and had paid the price in blood. 
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Research into the armed resistance to the intolerable coercion of this regime is 
reflected in the interviews with the leaders of the main guerrilla groups (Interviews 
15 - 18). These interviews were postponed until May and August 2006 because of the 
danger of reprisals. 
 
The representative of FLIP, the foundation for freedom of speech in Colombia was 
interviewed in April 2004 (Interview 5). She was selected because the crucial 
principle of ‘consent’ had emerged from the data. This interview added insights into 
the nature and limitations of consent and the problems of censorship. The role and 
nature of the production and limitations of consent were further explored in the 
interviews with representatives of mass media conglomerates (Interviews 6 and 8, 
May and June 2004). The valuable interview with the director of El Espectador, one 
of the main Colombian broadsheets (Interview 14) finally occurred in July 2005 
thanks to the efforts of a previous interviewee. Interview 9 in January 2005 occurred 
in spontaneous response to the displacement of Embera people into a street close to 
the home of the researcher (Image 26). This stimulated the interviews with the 
ccordinator of the human rights database (interview 10) and the human rights activist 
in Cazuca (Interview 11). The interview with the representative of Afro-Colombian 
rights (Interview 13, May 2005) is designed to reveal more insights into the horrors 
of severe coercion on the part of the Colombian regime and into the courage of 
cultural resistance. The theme of the relationship between alternative political and 
social movements and alternative media groups emerged in response to interviews 
with representatives of community radio and alternative Internet sites (Interview 6) 
in May 2004.        
 
These 19 interviews are designed to provide fragmented but vivid personal visions of 
the traumatic historical processes that are the subjects and objects of this 
investigation of coercion and consent in Colombia. The interviews in themselves 
represent the unpredictable and fluctuating nature of the ongoing political and social 
processes that have reflected and influenced the thoughts and life of the researcher, 
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the nature and structure of this research, and the selection of the final theme of the 
thesis: the interplay between coercion and consent. The interviews will be used in 
Parts 1 and 2 and in the General Conclusion to this thesis in order to add insights into 
the role and nature of coercion and consent from the perspective of the participants 
in this relentless political struggle.          
 
Part 1 suggests that coercion is based on the consent that media organisations 
promote and Part 2 suggests that consent is based on the coercion that armed groups 
produce. These are the crucial issues in Part 3 of this thesis which interprets 851 
current stories (2003-4) that have been collected from eight mainstream and 
alternative media organisations that operate in Colombia (television, radio, 
newspapers and news magazines) in order to understand the nature of the interplay 
between coercion and consent in as much depth and detail as possible. Part 3 focuses 
on the similarities and differences between different sources of Colombian media 
production in order to understand the current promotion and implementation of 
political, social and economic interests by labelling friend and enemy and by 
contextualising violence as illegitimate challenges to proper authority on the part of 
the current enemy, the FARC.  
 
Part 3 focuses on the framing of the three main current sources of violence in 
Colombia: 1. the Colombian government and Armed Forces that represent the legal 
or rather legitimized political, social and economic interests of the current 
Colombian regimes, 2. the paramilitaries that represent their illegal and illegimate 
interests, or 3. the FARC that represent the main armed resistance or reaction to 
these interests. Parts 1 and 2 suggest that current mass media organisations and 
production might attribute most human rights abuses  to the FARC guerrilla group – 
framing their actions as illegitimate challenges to proper authority  - rather than to 
the Colombian Armed Forces or paramilitaries because of the interplay between 
coercion and consent: because of the political, social and economic nature of 
Colombian media organisations (the main instrument of consent) and because of the 
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multiple roles of the Colombian Armed Forces (the main instrument of coercion) as 
the main authors, agents, subjects and sources of news stories, massacres and 
selective assassinations. Images collected from Colombian newspapers and 
magazines illustrate the symbiotic relationships - between foreign Presidents and 
their Colombian counterparts, between US and Colombian Armed Forces, between 
international and domestic businesses, and between the Church and the army – that 
Colombian armed groups and media organisations seem to reflect, represent and 
promote. Smiles and gung-ho subtitles such as ‘These are the Rambos’ anchor these 
images (Barthes, 1964a) and push this point home (Image 15).  
 
Role and nature of theory 
 
The aim of Part 1 is to understand the roots and nature of coercion in societies such 
as Colombia. The mission in Part 2 is to understand consent. The aim of Part 3 is to 
understand the nature of the interplay between coercion and consent and between 
armed conflict and news production. The General Conclusion uses four theoretical 
insights – based on the theories of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and 
Max Weber – in order to interpret the information in Parts 1 to 3 of this thesis and in 
order to address the final issue: why and how is consent manipulated in societies 
such as Colombia where severe coercion seems to be effective in securing power?  
These insights into coercion and consent centre on notions about the nature of power: 
about the nature of capitalism and colonialism (Marx), about the nature of leadership 
(Gramsci), and about the nature of legitimization (Althusser and Weber). Karl Marx 
has been selected because he provides important insights into the nature of coercion. 
The insights of Antonio Gramsci (2005) have been used because he focuses on the 
nature of consent. Louis Althusser (1971) and Max Weber (1919, 1930, 1949, 1962, 
1968) have been selected because they provide important insights into the interplay 
between coercion and consent and into the role of consent in the legitimization of 
coercion. This part of this thesis will attempt to clarify how these four theorists have 
influenced the selection and analysis of the historical information that is presented in 
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Parts 1 and 2 of the thesis and the analysis of current news production that is 
presented in Part 3 of this thesis.  
 
1. Marx 
 
The historical research into the nature of coercion in Colombia and of the Colombian 
armed conflict that appears in Part 1 of this thesis reflects the theories of Karl Marx. 
He also interprets societies in terms of coercion – in terms of the relationship 
between ‘the oppressor’ and ‘the oppressed’ (Marx and Engels, 1955: 2) – and in 
terms of capitalism and colonialism, human rights abuses and social struggle. Capital 
(Marx, 1996) provides vivid examples of the role and nature of coercion in capitalist 
accumulation in peripheral regimes like the Colombian regime. He refers to the 
ruthless methods that were employed in the ‘chief moments’ of the primitive 
accumulation of capital: ‘the discovery of gold and silver in America, the ... 
enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of 
the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for 
the hunting of black-skins’ (ibid: 739).  
 
Marx describes the severe human rights abuses that the English committed in India 
and that the Puritans inflicted on the indigenous peoples in New England. He claims 
that the English ‘manufactured a famine’ in India between 1769 and 1770 ‘by buying 
up all the rice and refusing to sell it again except at fabulous prices’ (ibid: 741) and 
that the Puritans in the US paid a reward of ‘100 pounds for a male Indian scalp’ in 
1774 and 50 pounds for the scalps of indigenous women and children (ibid: 741). 
Marx also refers to the ruthless role of monopolies in the accumulation of profits, 
claiming that the East India Company monopolised political power in India and had 
‘the exclusive monopoly of the tea-trade as well as of Chinese trade in general, and 
of the transport of goods to and from Europe’ (ibid: 740), that the ‘higher employees’ 
had the monopolies of ‘salt, opium, betel and other commodities’ and that these 
British employees ‘fixed the prices and plundered at will’ (ibid: 741). He criticises 
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the role of the ‘international credit system’ and national debt that he describes as ‘the 
capitalised blood of children’ (ibid: 744) because it is based on ‘undisguised looting, 
enslavement and murder’ (ibid: 742).  
 
Limitations of Marx 
 
Part 1 of this thesis suggests that peripheral regimes such as the Colombian regime 
have used – and continue to use - similar levels and methods of coercion in order to 
maximise profits and accumulate resources in central regimes such as Europe and the 
US: but admits that Classical Marxism has theoretical limitations. Hoffman (1984: 2) 
summarises these limitations in terms of: ‘instrumentalism’ (the treatment of the 
State ‘as an instrument of a dominant class’), ‘reductionism’ (‘the concept of politics 
as a superstructure, an epiphenomenon derived from an economic base’) and 
‘catastrophism’ (‘the assumption that relations between bourgeoisie and proletariat 
will increasingly polarise as an inevitable consequence of capitalist crisis, so that 
‘the need to allow for conscious political intervention from above or below becomes 
redundant’).  
 
Part 1 on the other hand insists that the Colombian State is ‘an instrument of a 
dominant class’ (cf Hoffman, 1984: 2) and that the concept of political or social class 
or group is important although the  classification of political and social groups might 
not be clear cut. Part 1 accepts the argument that the boundaries between one 
political or social class or group and another - between the regime and the opposition 
to the regime, between coercion and resistance to coercion, between the perpetrators 
and the victims of human rights abuses – do depend in the end on discourse (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001). This thesis admits that one might mutate into the other – that 
perpetrators could be perceived and presented as victims; victims as perpetrators - 
because social groups and individual members of social groups are both agents and 
objects of coercion. But this thesis insists that these political and social labels are 
useful in order to understand the nature of – and interplay between - coercion and 
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consent. Part 1 also insists that economic factors are important (cf Hoffman, 1984), 
that the principal aim of coercion in Colombia is the maximisation of profits, and 
that this is the main cause and characteristic of the Colombian armed conflict and of 
past and present human rights abuses. Part 1 of this thesis admits that ‘relations 
between bourgeosie and proletariat’ have not ‘polarised’ (cf Hoffman, 1984: 2) but 
suggests that social struggle and resistance is crucial. Part 1 privileges the resistance 
to the severe coercion and human rights abuses that are attributed to the Colombian 
regime but does not ‘privilege the proletariat’ as a social class and as the principal 
instrument of social reform (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 22) 
 
The historical information in Part 1 implies that the concept of coercion is limited 
because coercion has elements of consent and because power is also based on 
consent: on political parties and social groups, on political and religious ideologies, 
on strategic alliances and personal interests. This is reflected in the short conclusions 
that are presented at the end of each historical section in Part 1 and that summarise 
the role and nature of coercion in each historical period and the influence of consent 
on coercion. Part 2 accepts the limitations of the concept and use of coercion and 
concentrates on the concept and use of consent.  
 
2. Gramsci 
 
The historical research into the nature of consent in Colombia and of Colombian 
media production that appears in Part 2 of the thesis reflects the theories of Antonio 
Gramsci. He also interprets societies in terms of consent – in terms of the nature of 
the relationship between ‘the leader’ and ‘the led’ (Gramsci, 2005: 258) – and in 
terms of the relationship between ‘political’ and ‘civil’ groups (ibid: 53). The prison 
notebooks (Gramsci, 2005) suggest that regimes are based on consent rather than 
coercion. He describes the State in terms of ‘hegemony’: an alliance that is based on 
consent and ‘protected by the armour of coercion’ (ibid: 263). He claims that that the 
State ‘has and requests and educates consent’ (ibid: 259). Gramsci argues that all 
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States are ethical in that one of their most important functions is to ‘raise the great 
mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) 
which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence 
to the interests of the ruling class’ (ibid: 258). He suggests that ‘the greater the mass 
of the apolitical, the greater the part played by illegal forces has to be’ (ibid: 229): 
claiming that consent is crucial because the less consent there is inside the State the 
more coercion the State requires in order to fulfil its goals. Gramsci concludes that 
‘there do exist rulers and ruled’ and ‘leaders and led’ and that ‘the entire science and 
art of politics is based on this primordial’: suggesting that the State is based on 
consent rather than coercion.  
 
Limitations of Gramsci 
 
The historical information in Part 2 implies that the concept of consent is limited 
because consent has elements of coercion and because power is also based on 
coercion. This is reflected in the short conclusions that are presented at the end of 
each historical section in Part 2 and that summarise the role and nature of consent in 
each historical period and the influence of coercion on consent. Part 1 and Part 2 
suggest that coercion and consent are inter-related, that the same political, social and 
economic interests that have invested and continue to invest in Colombian armed 
groups and armed conflict in Part 1 have also invested and continue to invest in 
media organisations and production in Part 2, that power and profits perform a 
crucial role in the interplay between coercion and consent and that that these two 
concepts are two sides of the same coin.     
 
3. Althusser  
 
The historical research into the nature of coercion in Colombia and of the Colombian 
armed conflict that appears in Part 1, the historical research into the nature of 
consent in Colombia and of Colombian media production that is described in Part 2 
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of the thesis, and the research into the interplay between coercion and consent that 
appears in Part 3 reflect the theories of Louis Althusser.  
 
Althusser (1971) defines and distinguishes the role and nature of Repressive State 
Apparatuses (RSAs) and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) that correspond to the 
instruments of coercion and consent that are studied in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of this thesis.    
 
The role of Repressive State Apparatuses is to secure ‘by force (physical or 
otherwise) the political conditions of the reproduction of relations of production 
which are in the last resort relations of exploitation’. These Repressive State 
Apparatuses include ‘the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the 
Courts, and the Prisons’. The role of the police, the courts and the prisons is to 
implement the laws of the State. The purpose of the army is to ‘in tervene directly as 
a supplementary repressive force in the last instance’. The Head of State, the 
Government and the Administration are ‘above this ensemble’. The ‘class State’ is 
reflected in these Repressive State Apparatuses and in ‘orders of repression’ that 
have included ‘the massacres of June 1848 and of the Paris Commune’, State 
censorship, imperialist wars and the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.  
 
These Repressive State Apparatuses use a range of methods – ‘from the most brutal 
physical force, via mere administrative commands and interdictions, to open and 
tacit censorship’ – in order to create ‘the political conditions for the action of the 
Ideological State Apparatuses’.  
 
The role of Ideological State Apparatuses is to secure the reproduction of ‘the 
relations of production’ behind ‘a shield’ that is provided by Repressive State 
Apparatuses. In contrast to the Repressive State Apparatuses that function ‘massively 
and predominantly by repression’, the Ideological State Apparatuses ‘function 
massively and predominantly by ideology’.  
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These ideological apparatuses communicate the ruling ideology, ‘which integrates 
into its music the great themes of the Humanism of the Great Forefathers  ... the 
Greek Miracle ... the Glory of Rome, the Eternal City ... the themes of Interest’.  
 
The Ideological State Apparatuses include the Religious ISA, the Educational ISA, 
the Family ISA, the Legal ISA, the Political ISA, the Trade Union ISA, the 
Communications ISA (that includes press, radio and television) and the Cultural ISA 
(that includes literature, the arts, and sports). The political apparatus subjects 
individuals ‘to the political State ideology’. The communications and cultural 
apparatus ‘crams’ citizens ‘with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism 
and moralism’. The religious apparatus recalls that ‘man is only ashes, unless he 
loves his neighbour to the extent of turning the other cheek to whoever strikes first. ’ 
Althusser claims that ‘no class can hold State power over a long period’ unless it 
operates through the Ideological State Apparatuses but that these apparatuses are 
both ‘the stake and the site’ of class struggle.  
 
Althusser suggests that the Ideological State Apparatuses have increased and 
diversified since the Middle Ages. He argues that the main ideological State 
apparatuses at that time were the Church and the family, the political apparatuses 
(‘the Estates General, the Parlement, the different political factions and Leagues, the 
ancestors of the modern political parties, and the whole political system of the free 
Communes and then of the Villes’) and the ‘proto-trade unions’ that included the 
guilds. He suggests that the Church accumulated a large number of roles in the field 
of education and culture, publishing, communications and theatre.  
 
Althusser claims that the Educational ISA is the most important Ideological State 
Apparatus in ‘capitalist social formations’ as a result of ‘a violent political and 
ideological class struggle against the old dominant Ideological State Apparatus’ 
because ‘the bourgeoisie has been and still is able to accommodate itself to political 
Ideological State Apparatuses other than parliamentary democracy.’ 
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He suggests that the Educational State Apparatus ‘drums into’  children either the 
ruling ideology (in subjects such as ethics, civic instruction, philosophy) or ‘know-
how wrapped up in ruling ideology’ (French, arithmetic, literature)’ and that 
‘somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children’ is ejected ‘into 
production’. Others are trained to be technicians, ‘intellectuals of the collective 
labourer’, agents of ‘exploitation or repression’, or ‘professional ideologists’.   
 
Althusser concludes that ‘each mass ejected en route is practically provided with the 
ideology which suits the role it has to fulfil in class society’, that the Educational 
ISA is coupled to the Family ISA, and that the Educational ISA has therefore 
replaced the Religious ISA as the dominant Ideological State Apparatus.  
 
Limitations of Althusser 
 
This ‘structuralist’ model of Ideological State Apparatuses (1971) was however not 
accepted by Marxists such as Callinicos (1976), Anderson (1976) and Thompson 
(1978), because it seemed to underestimate the materialistic base of capitalist society 
(Therborn, 1980). Callenicos criticised Althusser’s ‘unrepentant’ theoretical 
approach to Marxism (1976). Anderson (1976) rejected Althusser’s approach 
because it focused on philosophical analysis rather than economics and in that sense 
disengaged Marxism from material realities and revolutionary politics. The social 
historian, E. P. Thompson rejected the author, the model and the approach (1978). 
He accused Althusser of idealism, defining the model as ‘a break from disciplined 
self-knowledge ... into the self-generation of knowledge according to its own 
theoretical procedures: that is, a leap out of knowledge and into theology’ (ibid: 
204). He even suggested that the model was saturated with Stalinism and was 
designed to stifle dissent on empirical grounds, presenting it as ‘a general police 
action within ideology’ and as an ‘attempt to reconstruct Stalinism at the level of 
theory’ (ibid).   
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It is crucial to understand on the other hand that the Ideological State apparatus is a 
model, a hypothesis: one that can be tested, adapted, accepted or rejected in different 
political and social, historical and geographical contexts. It only acts as ‘a leap out of 
knowledge into theology’ (Thompson, 1978: 204) if the researcher permits this to 
happen.       
 
4. Weber 
 
Max Weber also interprets societies in terms of coercion and consent: admitting that 
the State is founded on coercion or ‘force’ but claiming that coercion is ‘certainly not 
the normal or the only means of the State’ (1919: 1). He interprets the State in terms 
of consent and legitimization because the State ‘claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (ibid: 1): and therefore uses 
consent to legitimize coercion. He describes three forms of authority or types of 
leadership or sources of legitimization or consent: ‘traditional authority’ that is based 
on ‘a claim by the leaders and a belief on the part of the followers, that there is virtue 
in the sanctity of age-old rules and powers’ (Ritzer, 1995: 132) – ‘charismatic 
authority’ that  reflects ‘devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary 
character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or 
ordained by him’ (Weber, 1968: 215) - and ‘legal or rational authority’ that rests on 
‘a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rules to issue commands’ (ibid).  
 
Refining Weber 
 
Part 3 of this thesis suggests that Colombian news production in particular – and 
Colombian media production in general - might interpet, operationalise and 
legitimize the authority of the Colombian State: by framing the actions of the 
resistance as illegitimate challenges to proper authority. The role of the General 
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Conclusion is to use the information on coercion in Part 1 of the thesis, on consent in 
Part 2, and on coercion and consent in Part 3 of the thesis to understand the interplay 
between coercion and consent in as much depth and detail as possible and in order to 
address the central issue: why and how is consent manipulated in societies like this 
where severe coercion seems to be effective in securing power?  
 
Theories of power that will not be used in this thesis 
 
This discussion will refer to four important insights into the nature of power – based 
on post-colonial theories, feminist theories, Foucault and Herman and Chomsky – 
summarizing points of interest and briefly indicating why these four theories will not 
be used in this thesis. 
 
1. Post-colonial theories of power    
 
Edward Said produced two of the most important post-colonial texts, Orientalism 
(1979) and Culture and Imperialism (1994). Orientalism (1979) criticised the 
stereotypes that western colonists applied to colonised societies in the east. Orientals 
in positions of power were described as despotic; other Orientals were presented as 
sly and obsequious. This political discourse divided the world into ‘ the familiar 
(Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’).’ Culture and 
imperialism (1979) on the other hand is less polarised, claiming that the relationships 
between coloniser and colonised were less clear cut, and that this has resulted in 
‘overlapping territories’ and ‘intertwined histories’. Said (2003) concludes that much 
post-colonial research is based on the principle that although ‘a native could never 
aspire to the condition of the white man,’ the experiences of the ruler and the ruled 
can’t be ‘so easily disentangled’.   
 
Influential post-colonial theorists such as Bhabha have studied contradictions in the 
nature of colonialism, hybrid post-colonial identities, and the negotiation of post-
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colonial concepts such as national identities, community interests and cultural values 
in ‘the narratives of cultural and political diaspora’, in ‘the major social 
displacements of peasants and aboriginal communities’, in ‘the poetics of exile’ and 
in ‘the grim prose of political and economic refugees’ (1994: 5).  
 
Nicola Miller has investigated the post-colonial construction of nationalism in South 
American societies. She claims that indigenous movements in this region have 
‘mostly wanted to renegotiate, rather than reject, a role in the existing nation -states’ 
and that other movements have ‘regarded nationalism as a crucial defence against the 
encroachments of international capital and its avatars’. Andersen (1983) has looked 
at the role of newspapers in building these ‘imagined communities’. Sommer (1991) 
has studied the construction of national consciousness in 19
th
 Century love stories.    
 
Post-colonial studies have therefore concentrated on the cultural dimensions of 
imperialism and colonialism, claiming that culture is ‘essential to the production and 
maintenance of colonial relations’ and currently looking at ‘continuities and 
discontinuities between colonialism and globalization’ (Rizvi, 2005).   
 
Why post-colonial theories will not be used in this thesis 
 
Post-colonial theories provide important insights into the use of stereotypes, into 
contradictions in the concept of colonialism, into hybrid identities and into the 
negotiation of cultural values.  
 
But post-colonial research tends to distrust claims to truth, attributing this to the 
imperial will to power and knowledge (San Juan, 2011). It has focused on the 
cultural dimensions of inequalities between nations rather than on material processes 
– such as the use of Colombian armed groups and media organisations to monopolise 
and maximise power and profits at all costs – that is the main issue in this thesis.  
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Post-colonial research has permitted subaltern voices to be heard. Partha Chatterjee 
for example has criticised exclusively colonialist and nationalist historiographies, ‘by 
bringing in the peasantry as a subject of history, endowed with its own distinctive 
forms of consciousness and making sense of and acting upon the world on its own 
terms’ (2000: 10).  
 
This thesis admits that this is a worthy end. This thesis will also listen to subaltern 
voices – to the voices of the dispossessed – in order to describe and interpret the 
horrific human rights abuses that continue to be committed in Colombia and in 
peripheral regimes and that are used to maximise power and profits. This thesis will 
study popular discourse since the rebellion of the comuneros (1781), using personal 
interviews to penetrate ‘the ominous cloud of silence’ that has suffocated subaltern 
voices (Moreno Fraginals, 1999), and providing insights into expressions of dissent 
on the part of popular political and social movements and alternative media groups.                
 
Post-colonial research has had a stronger influence on literary theory than it has had 
on political theory, investigating the culture ‘of former colonies of the European 
empires, and their relation to the rest of the world’ (Makaryk, 1993: 155), looking at 
the emergence of new voices in national discourse, and looking into attempts on the 
part of post-colonial writers to resurrect national cultures and to combat 
preconceptions about these cultures. This preoccupation with national identities has 
been the target of much criticism of post-colonial theory, not least as it has 
occasionally diverted attention away from class divisions and social conflict (Ayubi, 
2001; San Juan, 2011). 
 
This thesis will therefore turn to other political theories such as Classical Marxism, 
Gramsci, Althusser and Weber as the basis of understanding how social classes, 
groups and individuals have used stereotypes – ‘us’ and ‘them’, Christian and 
infidel, Conservative and Liberal, Friends and Enemies of the State – to manipulate 
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consent and legitimize the use of severe coercion and massacre to maximise profits 
at all costs.  
 
The exclusive use of four theories in this thesis – Classical Marxism, Gramsci, 
Althusser and Weber – might seem to be parsimonious and minimalistic, limited in 
scope and circular in logic, but this thesis suggests that these theories are useful tools 
that have been used to highlight the important political and economic interests that 
have invested in coercion (Part 1 of the thesis), in consent (Part 2) and in current 
news production (Part 3 of the thesis).  
 
This thesis will privilege the victims of human rights abuse in Colombia – 
concentrating on the causes and consequences of these atrocities in terms of coercion 
and consent, Classical Marxism, Gramsci, Althusser, and Weber – rather than the 
contradictions in the abuse of colonial power, the hybrid identities and the 
negotiation of values that post-colonial theories have highlighted.  
 
Post-colonial theories tend to merge ruler and ruled – perpetrator and victim – but 
this thesis in contrast will focus on colonialism and neo-colonialism rather than post-
colonialism, attempting to attribute responsibility to specific international 
institutions and individuals and their Colombian counterparts, and trying to 
understand and celebrate the nature and role of popular resistance to ruthless State 
and corporate interests.             
 
2. Feminist theories of power  
 
Feminists have conceptualized power in terms of a resource to be redistributed, in 
terms of domination, and in terms of individual or collective empowerment (October 
19, 2005).  
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The first feminist conceptualization of power – power as a resource to be distributed 
– implies that power is ‘possessed by individuals in greater or lesser amounts’ 
(Young, 1990: 31) and that power should therefore be redistributed so that men and 
women have equal power to do good.  
 
The second feminist insight into power – power as domination – implies that power 
is unjustly exercised over people. Phenomenological feminists such as Simone de 
Beauvoir claim that the woman is ‘defined and differentiated with reference to the 
man’, that he is ‘the Subject, he is the Absolute’ and that ‘she is the Other’ 
(Beauvoir, xxii).  
 
Radical feminist theorists suggest that men are defined as powerful and women as 
powerless, that ‘difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination’ 
(MacKinnon, 1989: 219).  
 
Socialist feminists claim that power is unjustly exercised through economic 
exploitation, socio-economic marginalization, cultural imperialism, and violence 
(Young 1992: 183-193). Poststructuralist feminist theorists such as Sandra Bartky 
have applied Foucault’s insights into power and disciplinary society to feminine 
norms – such as diets, gestures, make-up – and the process through which women 
become the instruments of their own subjection.  
 
She observes that ‘it is women themselves who practice this discipline on and against 
their own bodies’.  
 
The third feminist conceptualization of power – power as empowerment – suggests 
that women might understand and use power differently, to ‘enhance, rather than 
diminish, the power of others’ (Miller, 1992: 247-248). 
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Goldstein (2001) has applied feminist theories to armed conflict, asking why 
societies have assembled ‘groups of fighters who were primarily, and usually 
exclusively, male’. He studies the possible causes of these male-gendered war roles: 
sexist discrimination (despite the historical success of women in war), gender 
differences in anatomy and physiology (different testosterone levels, size, strength, 
and brains), innate gender differences (male bonding, childhood gender segregation), 
cultural construction of tough men and tender women, and men’s sexual and 
economic domination of women.      
 
Why feminist theories will not be used 
 
Feminist theories of power have provided valuable insights into different 
conceptualizations of power – in terms of a resource that should be redistributed, in 
terms of domination, in terms of individual or collective empowerment – or in order 
to understand gender differences in the nature and role and consequences of coercion 
and consent, armed groups and media organizations.     
 
This thesis does not deny the usefulness of this broad range of feminist theories of 
power but will concentrate on power as domination in the socialist sense – unjustly 
exercised through economic exploitation, socio-economic marginalization, cultural 
imperialism, and violence (Young 1992: 183-193) – because once again this seems to 
be the primary role and consequence of the abuse of and interplay between coercion 
and consent that are the main issues in the thesis.  
 
The thesis suggests that exploitation, marginalization, culture imperialism and 
violence do not in general discriminate between Colombian men, women or children, 
although their effects would be different: this being the possible subject o f another 
(excellent) thesis.     
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3. Foucault 
 
Foucault has provided important insights into power and how it has been normalized 
– turned into rules and taken for granted – in ‘modern’ societies.  
 
Foucault looked at the methods that modern institutions use to define and control 
problems such as madness (1961), criminality (1975) and sexuality (1976).  
 
Foucault’s Madness and civilization (1961) studies the modern concept and treatment 
of mental illness, defining the mental asylum as ‘a juridical space where one is 
accused, judged, and condemned’ (ibid: 269), and portraying the psychiatrist as ‘a 
Judge who punishes and rewards in a judgment that does not even condescend to 
language’ (ibid: 291).  
 
Foucault’s Discipline and punish (1975) looks at the emergence of the modern 
prison, comparing the terrible torture that the French monarchies inflicted on 
transgressors to a republican timetable for French prisoners, and suggesting that 
modern societies are based on high levels of discipline and surveillance.  
 
Foucault’s History of sexuality (1976) suggests that modern scientific disciplines 
also define and control sexuality, describing the emergence of a ‘political, economic 
and technical incitement to talk about sex’ that is implemented through ‘analysis, 
stocktaking, classification and specification’ (ibid: 23-4) 
 
Why Foucault’s theories will not be used in this thesis 
 
Foucault’s theories have provided valuable insights into the nature of power and 
knowledge in ‘modern’ societies, suggesting that discipline has replaced monarchy 
as the primary method of social control and that coercion and consent – the principal 
themes of this thesis – are not so easily disentangled.       
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On the other hand Foucault’s insights into the nature of power in central modern 
societies that are based on high degrees of consent are not relevant to this thesis that 
studies peripheral societies such as Colombia that are based on high degrees of 
coercion.    
 
This thesis will therefore concentrate on the repressive and violent nature and role of 
coercion and human rights abuse in Colombia, on the massacres that have been and 
are being committed to maximise profits at all costs, rather than on the normalisation 
of discipline: because nothing is ‘normal’ in Colombia; normality is transitory; 
consent in peripheral societies such as this one is subservient to severe coercion and 
immediate profit. In Colombia the political body is plundered, raped and enslaved 
rather than merely disciplined.   
 
4. Herman and Chomsky 
 
The propaganda model of Herman and Chomsky suggests that mass media 
organisations in the US serve – rather than moderate – the interests of State and 
corporate power. The first hypothesis represented in the propaganda model is that the 
media portrayal of events tends to reflect the consensus among the political and 
economic elite in the US and to exclude rival accounts of events. The second is that 
mass media news coverage tends to be filtered.  
 
The propaganda model also describes five important filters or influences on news 
production: 1. the size, ownership and source of profits of the most powerful mass 
media conglomerates, 2. the influence of advertising as a source of income, 3. 
dependence on the information that governments, businesses and official sources 
supply, 4. the use of flak to distract audiences, and 5. the use of ideological 
principles such as anti-communism, ‘the miracle of the market’ or ‘the war on 
terror’.   
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Herman and Chomsky used case studies and content analysis to support this 
hypothesis: US mass media coverage of religious victims in South America, of 
elections in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Kenya, Mexico, Russia, 
Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia, and US coverage of armed conflict in Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam.  
 
Herman and Chomsky have investigated US media usage of the term ‘genocide’ to 
describe events in East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo and Turkey. They have also claimed that 
the propaganda model could be applied to US coverage of domestic anti-
globalisation protests and labour disputes because media coverage reflects and 
promotes - rather than challenges - elite interests.  
 
Herman and Chomsky have however been subject to endless criticism. Herman 
himself has sadly admitted that ‘many liberals and a number of academic media 
analysts of the left did not like the propaganda model’, suggesting that these critics 
resented the ‘wholesale condemnation of a system in which they played a respected 
role’ and that these intellectual collaborators have regretted but tolerated its 
inequalities, justified mass media production in terms of consumer demands, 
distrusted ‘global analyses and global solutions’, highlighted ‘individual struggles 
and small victories’ on the part of a few journalists, and dismissed the model on the 
basis of clichés such as ‘conspiratorial, simplistic, etc.’ (1996).   
 
Why Herman and Chomsky’s theories will not be used 
 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model provides useful insights into political and 
corporate influences on the ‘manufacture’ of consent in the US: the economic 
interests of mass media conglomerates and advertisers, the dependence on official 
sources, the use of flak to distract audiences and the use of ideological principles 
such as the war on terror. The propaganda model was not used explicitly in this 
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thesis because Herman and Chomsky focus on US – rather than peripheral – mass 
media production. Their research concentrates on the actions of the military-
industrial complex in the US rather than on the main subject of this thesis: the 
actions and discourse of the military-media complex in peripheral societies such as 
Colombia.   
 
This thesis therefore discusses the manufacture of consent in Colombia – a peripheral 
regime – and the relationship between the manufacture of consent and the 
manufacture of coercion: in order to understand why consent is necessary in 
extremely coercive and profitable regime such as this.  
 
Elements of the propaganda model are implicit rather than explicit in this thesis 
which systematically looks at the political and economic interests of the Colombian 
government and mass media conglomerates, the nature and role of advertising and 
official sources, and the use of one crucial ideological principle or mechanism: the 
defining and dividing of ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on a frame that contextualises the 
actions and discourse of the opposition as illegitimate challenges to proper authority.  
This thesis also suggests that armed political and economic interests in peripheral 
regimes such as Colombia have an extremely strong ideological influence on news 
production because Colombian journalists are assassinated and underpaid and can 
therefore be easily manipulated. 
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Part 1 
 
Coercion 
 
‘Every statue whether of Faidherbe or of Lyautey, of Bugeaud or of Sergeant Blandan – 
all of these conquistadors perched on colonial soil do not cease from proclaiming one 
and the same thing: We are here by the force of bayonets’  
(Fanon, 2001: 66). 
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Introduction 
The aim of Part 1 is to understand the nature of coercion – of ‘the force of bayonets’ 
(ibid: 66) - in Colombia. Part 1 analyses coercion in terms of three basic elements of the 
Colombian armed conflict: 1. the nature of the interests that predominate in each 
historical period, 2. the role of armed groups  – the main instruments of coercion - in the 
implementation of these interests, and 3. the nature of the reaction or resistance to these 
interests. Each of the four chapters in Part 1 focuses on a different historical period from 
the Spanish Conquest to the present time. This part of the thesis suggests that central 
interests – mostly based in Spain in the 16th - 18th Century, in the UK in the 19th Century, 
and in the US and Europe at present – have invested in and have influenced armed 
conflicts in peripheral regions such as Colombia. Part 1 concentrates on coercion but 
includes elements of consent - political parties and social groups, political and religious 
ideologies, strategic alliances and personal interests – because coercion is based on 
consent and vice versa. This factor is reflected in the short conclusions that are presented 
at the end of each historical section in Part 1 and that summarise the role and nature of 
coercion in each historical period and the influence of consent on coercion. This issue 
will be explored in more depth and detail in  the General Conclusion that analyses the 
role of both coercion and consent and the interplay between them in as much depth and 
detail as possible. The role of Part 1 is to provide the historical information on coercion 
that the General Conclusion demands. 
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Chapter 1 
Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period (1499-1781) 
The first part of Chapter 1 analyses the nature of the interests that predominated at the 
time of the Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period in terms of the centralisation 
and monopolisation of production and transportation, in terms of the accumulation of 
profits and resources in the centre of the Spanish Empire and in terms of the coercion of 
indigenous and African people. The second part assesses the role of armed groups – 
Conquistadors and Spanish militias – in the implementation of these interests. The third 
part of Chapter 1 analyses the nature of indigenous, African and Afro-Colombian 
resistance to these interests and pressures.  
The main role of Chapter 1 is to accumulate information on - and insights into - the role 
and nature of coercion in the Conquest and Spanish Colonial period (1499-1781) in order 
to understand the roots and nature of coercion and armed conflict in Colombia. The short 
conclusion that is presented at the end of this historical section summarises the role and 
nature of coercion in this historical period and the influence of consent on coercion. This 
issue will be addressed in depth in the General Conclusion.    
1. The political, social and economic interests that predominated in this period 
This part of the thesis suggests that the interests of three central colonial institutions – the 
Spanish monarchy, the Catholic Church and the European bourgeoisie – coincided and 
predominated in this historical period (1499-1781), motivating the Conquest and 
colonisation of this region and the accumulation of gold and natural resources and credit 
in the centre of the Empire: and that these interests are the principal source of coercion in 
this period.     
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The Spanish Monarchy and the Catholic Church (1499-1781) 
Borja Gómez (1998) discusses the nature of the strategic alliance between the Spanish 
monarchy and the Catholic Church that precipitated the conquest of the southern part of 
Europe. Until the middle of the 15
th
 Century the two main rulers of the Spanish peninsula 
had different priorities. The House of Aragón had focused on Mediterranean expansion 
and the House of Castilla had concentrated on internal consolidation. But the marriage of 
Fernando and Isabel in 1469 changed this state of affairs, uniting these two kingdoms and 
creating a common purpose that reflected the interests of the Catholic Church: the united 
Spanish monarchy and the Church cooperated in the elimination of the 800-year-old 
Islamic and Jewish presence in Granada in the south (ibid: 24). By the end of the 15
th
 
century they had succeeded. The Spanish monarchs had conquered the rest of the 
peninsula and had introduced the most powerful and ruthless Catholic institution of 
coercion and consent: the Sacred Office of the Inquisition.  
Fernando pressured the Church into giving him the power to elect his own inquisitors. 
The notorious Tomás de Torquemada operated as Inquisitor-General between 1483 and 
1498. Cisneros, the Archbishop of Spain consolidated Catholicism as the national 
religion and Spain played a crucial role in the Council of Trent and the Counter-
Reformation against the Protestant kingdoms. Medieval tradition insisted that Jews and 
Muslims were agents of Satan. The re-conquest of Granada - where Christians, Jews and 
Muslims had previously co-existed - reinforced this obsession because these communities 
impeded the process of colonisation. The conquered peoples had two choices: to be 
converted to the True Faith or to be expelled. Large numbers of religious converts 
continued to practice their previous religions and the declarations and manuals of the 
Spanish Inquisition focused on methods of tracking them down and punishing them 
severely. The manual or bible of the Inquisition that was reprinted in 1562 declared that 
‘if they wish to abjure Jewish rituals but not Judaism and refuse penitence they will be 
hunted down like heretics by bishops and inquisitors, handed over to the secular 
authorities, and burned at the stake’ (ibid: 26). In 1540 the Archbishop of Toledo 
estimated that 50,000 of these ‘new Christians’ had been burnt to death in the previous 20 
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years; the total population of Spain at that time being only seven million people. Their 
land and property were seized by the Catholic Kings.  
Mario Calderón, Jesuit priest and Colombian human rights researcher (betrayed by the 
Colombian army and brutally murdered by paramilitaries in May 1997) claimed that the 
Catholic Church played a crucial role in the colonisation of the region: that the Spanish 
colonial regime and the Church had a symbiotic relationship. Spanish rulers presented 
cardinals and bishops as candidates to ecclesiastical posts and recognized the prestigious 
role of the Catholic Church in the promulgation of ‘the Faith’ (Calderón, 2002: 28). The 
Spanish colonists supported the Church in ‘the construction of temples, in the use of 
missionaries, in the protection of material benefits, in the publication of books and in 
religious education’; the Church supported the Spanish colonists in ‘the domination of the 
people’ (ibid: 27).  
Tirado Mejía (1988) highlights the crucial economic role of the Catholic Church in the 
process of colonisation. The Jesuit missions of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Century monopolised 
agriculture in the eastern plains (Llanos Orientales) of Colombia. Half the farmland was 
divided among the indigenous people. The Jesuits called this half, the field of man. The 
other half – the field of God – belonged to the Church. The ranches in the region of Meta 
supplied Bogotá and Tunja in the centre of the colony. Orinoco produced tropical fruit, 
cocoa, cinnamon, vanilla and oils. Casanare supplied textiles. The Jesuits maintained 
precise records: accounts, balance sheets, deeds, receipts. Between 1767 and 1770 they 
possessed 59,458 heads of cattle, 22,726 sheep, 98 mules and 13,618 horses. Jesuits had 
massive economic power inside the colonial structure because of their monopolisation of 
land and fisheries and mines, because of the liquid capital that they could transfer 
between missions, and because they could use their property as collateral. The Company 
of Jesús in Antioquia in 1776 valued their ranch at 2,000 pesos, the mansion at 150, and 
their 48 slaves at 6,222 pesos. One peso represented 1% of a pound of gold in this 
historical period (1499-1781); the value of these 48 slaves – the minds and bodies and 
degradation and misery of these people - therefore added up to around 30 kilos of pure 
gold.  
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This colony – which the Spanish had named Nueva (New) Granada – attempted to slake 
this insatiable central thirst and greed: producing 17.91% of all the gold mined in the 
world in the 16
th
 Century, 39.01% of all the gold in the 17
th
 Century, and 24.69% of all 
the gold produced in the 18
th
 Century: gold exports amounted to 85% of the total value of 
exports from this region in this period.  
The Spanish Empire 
Spanish colonisation revolved around the production and transportation and accumulation 
of profits and resources in the centre of the Spanish Empire. Spanish rulers monopolised 
Spanish ports, routes, shippers, traders and commerce with other empires and colonies in 
order to maximise their profits. Individual ships did not have permission to transport 
cargo from Spanish colonies; foreign fleets had to be accompanied by Spanish ships; 
shorter routes carried the death penalty; high taxes inflated prices out of all proportion to 
costs. Contraband soon outstripped legal exports and introduced the current culture of 
illegal trade. Internal transportation was limited in order to make it cheaper to buy the 
wheat imported from Spain than the grain transported from the plains of Bogotá in the 
centre of the colony (ibid: 100). Limited internal transportation isolated local markets and 
fuelled imports. As late as the 19
th
 Century, José María Samper – the leader of two 
political parties - bitterly complained about the delays in the deliveries from Spain: 
because Spanish imports ‘arrived in Cartagena on the Caribbean coast, traveled upstream 
along the Magdalena River to Honda (an affair of 800 kilometres or five to six months) 
and had to be carried from Honda on the banks of mules or [Afro-Colombian] people, 
crossing the central and western ranges of the Andes, passing along 500, 800, 1000 or 
more kilometres by impossible routes, and reaching Quito 20 months or two years after 
leaving Spain’ (Samper, 1969: 121).  
Spanish colonial production was geared to export: the western regions mainly produced 
minerals; the hotter regions concentrated on meat; the central and eastern regions mostly 
produced textiles. In the decade from 1784 to 1793, imports from the centre of the 
Empire – luxurious textiles and upper class clothing, precious metals, fine spirits and 
grain – valued at around 20 million pesos; the colony of Nueva Granada ‘paid’ for these 
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imports in agricultural products (2 million pesos) and 18 million pesos – 80,000 kilos – of 
pure gold (Ospina Vásquez, 1955: 38). 
The coercion of indigenous people  
Tirado Mejía highlights the ruthlessness of the socio-economic institutions that the 
Spanish colonists inflicted on the indigenous populations in order to maximise 
production: the reservations that regional rulers assigned to the indigenous leaders who 
collaborated and paid tribute to the Spanish Crown; the indigenous ranches, plantations 
and missions that paid taxes to the Catholic Church; and the forced labour (la mita) 
which he defines as ‘the obligation to work’ for minimal pay and for a determined period 
of time ‘in important economic sectors such as mines’ and that he describes as ‘worse 
than slavery’ because ‘the master did not lose anything if his victim died of hunger or of 
any other forms of abuse’ (ibid: 26). Countless, uncounted indigenous people died deep 
underground and in exile as a result. Forced labour in distant mines fragmented 
indigenous communities irreparably: cultures disappeared for ever because foreign 
interests have always prevailed ‘over rights and over people’ (ibid). 
The coercion of African people 
The Spanish crown awarded slaving licenses to individual traders until 1580. From then 
on the main slaving nations were Portugal, Holland, France and – last but by no means 
least – the British Empire. The Portuguese mainly traded in slaves from Angola and the 
Congo. The other three nations also ravaged Guinea. In 1594 around half of all 
international ships brought black slaves to labour in the mines. This created two 
important businesses: foreign companies which transported ‘tonnages’ of slaves from 
Africa to Cartagena on the coast; and local wholesalers who sold the slaves off in their 
markets in piezas (pieces, lots) of up to 100. Tirado Mejía suggests that the local 
wholesalers probably treated them more benignly than the foreign transportation 
companies did because they were more conscious of the loss of value if they damaged 
their human resources.  
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Moncada Roa (1979) assesses the critical economic role of African people in early 
capitalist accumulation in general and in the region in particular. Black people 
represented both the means of production and the financial capital in the Spanish 
Colonial Period: because liquid capital could be transferred from mines to ranches in the 
form of black slaves. The value of slaves exceeded the value of agricultural or mineral 
installations because slaves were both the energy and the instrument of production. The 
conditions on the slave ships reflect Spanish colonial attitudes. These voyages lasted 
upwards of two months and only about 18% of the prisoners arrived alive on the other 
side (Borja Gómez, 1998). Alonso de Sandoval, a 17
th
 Century Jesuit priest recalls how 
much the slaves suffered in those death ships: ‘so crushed, so horrible, so mistreated’, 
chained from hand to hand, shackled foot to foot, manacled neck to neck, trussed up like 
chickens, ‘below decks, locked in, never seeing the sun or the moon’ (ibid: 107).   
Tirado Mejía (1988: 48) describes the subsequent treatment of these people, the 
transformation of human beings into sub-human resources: the coercion and humiliation 
and de-humanization that their Spanish masters employed to annihilate personalities, 
local African identities and immediate traces of resistance to their economic interests. He 
relates that as soon as the remnants disembarked in the Spanish colonial slave-port of 
Cartagena, the palming procedure began. This consisted of the measurement of slaves – 
using the palm of the hand as a measure – and of rigorous medical examinations. The 
administrators not only tested them for diseases or physical defects but also counted and 
checked the condition of their teeth. Next the governor, the representative of the shipper 
and the medical officer ‘catalogued’ and ‘assigned an economic value to each of the 
pieces’ (ibid). Then the slave was branded on the right breast with the royal seal. The 
customer, purchaser and subsequent master repeated the process with his personal seal on 
the breast and sometimes on the face. He used liquid metal to do this: this was designed 
not only to provide excruciating pain and horror, not merely to mutilate and humiliate but 
also to demonstrate that all of these good white people had paid their import duties and 
taxes – as loyal subjects of the Spanish Crown – and that the sale of these wretched black 
people was all legal and above board. In any case African people had no soul. The Pope 
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had seen to that. The Laws of the Indies of 1578 demonstrate – and reinforced - colonial 
attitudes towards black people  
‘Item, if a negro is absent from his master and does not return to serve him, and if he 
returns inside a month, his genitals will be amputated and he will be displayed in public 
as an example to the others’.  
Tirado Mejía claims that slavery survived because – and as long as - it was profitable. He 
suggests that economic factors - such as ‘the rise of the proletariat’ that ‘did not require 
an investment of food and clothes’, the importation of Spanish spirits (aguardiente) in 
Cartagena in 1794 that reduced the production of honey and the expulsion of indigenous 
people from their land at the start of the 19
th
 Century – ‘liberated cheap salaried labour 
that could compete against the slaves’ (ibid: 59-67). In 1851 there were still 16,468 slaves 
in this region, 1,725 of them labouring in the foreign gold mines in Choco.   
2. The role of armed groups in the implementation of these interests 
Conquistadors and Spanish militias 
This part suggests that the main armed groups and instruments of coercion in this period - 
the Conquistadors and Spanish militias - played a crucial role in the implementation of 
Spanish colonial interests: through the massacre and slavery of indigenous and African 
people and through the central accumulation of gold and mineral resources and 
agricultural products.   
The Conquistadors set wild dogs on the indigenous people, tortured and raped them, 
promised them freedom if they would give them their gold, and burnt them alive. Three 
Spanish commanders predominated in this region: Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, 
Sebastián de Belalcázar and Nicolás de Federmann. Federmann marched from the north 
of Colombia to the centre and eastern plains (Llanos Orientales). Belalcázar explored the 
west. Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada became obsessed with the myth of El Dorado: the 
golden man, the land of gold. From 1536 to 1537, he set out to indoctrinate the 
indigenous peoples through ‘the sword and the cross’ (accompanied by 800 troops, 80 
horses and his priest and chronicler, Friar Domingo de las Casas) on a 700 kilometre 
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quest of El Dorado and the source of the Magdalena River. He survived 166 expeditions 
though mosquito infested swamps, finally discovering the sacred lake of Guatavita 
(Image 1) on which the El Dorado legend had been based. Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada 
founded Bogotá, the Colombian capital in 1538 and used it as a base to annihilate the 
local Chibcha people and melt down their sacred ornaments. Part of this gold has been 
used to decorate the local cathedrals. Some of the un-melted relics are in the gold 
museum of the Bank of the Republic. 
Spanish rulers used these armies and militias to control local populations, to implement 
socio-economic institutions such as the missions and the slave trade, to settle feuds 
between themselves, to annihilate or defend themselves from opposition to their interests 
and ambitions, to appropriate and defend land and monopolies and to crush resistance – 
indigenous uprisings, the African ‘palenques’ (refuges), and finally the popular 
movement of ‘comuneros’ (below).  
3. The nature of the resistance to these interests and pressures 
Indigenous resistance 
During the Conquest and genocide, indigenous people used armed resistance against the 
Spanish armies and the horses and lances and savage dogs that the Spanish militias used 
to hunt them down and tear them to pieces. The greed of these Spanish heroes reached 
such heights – or plummeted to such depths – that in 1530 the indigenous people in the 
north of Bogotá had to pay taxes in gold to defray the expenses of the Spanish troops. 
This was ‘tantamount to financing their own invasion’ (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 90). The 
Spanish colonists called these people, Muiscas (moscas, flies) because of the density of 
the population. The genocide has been total.  
In the 17
th
 Century an indigenous leader named Gaitana mustered an army of around 
6,000 Paez, Pirama, Guanaca and Yalcon people to revenge herself on the Spanish 
commander, Pedro de Anasco who had burnt her son alive in front of her. Finally she 
caught hold of him, gouged out his eye balls and led him around the indigenous markets 
by the nose like a pig. Later she collected around 15,000 people – which included Pana 
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and Pihao people – but this phase of armed indigenous resistance petered out because one 
of their leaders panicked. Calarca, a chief of the Pihao people resisted Spanish occupation 
in the south of the capital for six years. Tundama, an indigenous leader defended the 
Boyacá region (North of Bogotá) against sporadic Spanish rape and pillage. The heroic 
Spanish commander, Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada clubbed him to death.  
Indigenous resistance has however tended to be cultural rather than armed because to 
survive as an indigenous group means to live close to Nature in environmental and 
cultural terms. The nature of this cultural resistance will be explored in Part 2 of this 
thesis because Part 1 concentrates on coercion rather than consent.  
African resistance 
Morena Fraginals (1999) suggests that black people in the region passed through a 
process of ‘de-culturalisation’ which he defines as ‘a conscious process through which 
one proceeds to undermine the culture of a particular human group in order to facilitate 
the appropriation of the natural riches in which they live or to use them as cheap 
unqualified labour’ (ibid: 25). He claims that the Spanish colonists had ‘no interest in 
turning slaves into martyrs’, that the Spanish had ‘neither philanthropic nor perverse 
interests’ but only ‘economic ones’, and that the Spanish colonists merely intended to 
eradicate ‘the elements that obstructed the established system of exploitation’ (ibid: 25). 
He lists the human elements that the colonist wished to eliminate as social cohesion, 
solidarity, dignity and identity. In order to destroy these social elements the large mines 
and plantations did not collect people of the same ethnic origin (ibid: 28). They gathered 
people who spoke different languages or dialects, had different religious beliefs, and 
hated other groups for historical reasons. The new slaves ranged between 15 and 20 years 
old on average and around 72% of them were male – and all of this for economic reasons 
– because the co-existence of men and women, mothers and children ‘threatened the 
prison structure of the mine or plantation’ (ibid: 32).       
But in spite of these careful precautions on the part of the colonists, the diabolical 
conditions in the mines, the low standards of living or rather dying - the prison bars, 
chains, leashes and whips - compelled these black inmates to escape at all costs. Moreno 
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Morena Fraginals describes the suicide pacts and mass poisonings in the Cuban sugar 
plantations (1999). Borja Gómez refers to black mothers such as Mónica de la Cruz 
(Mónica of the Cross, resident of Santa María de Barbacoas, 1778) who murdered her 
own baby and made a pact with ‘the devil’ as a method of resisting or retaliating against 
white hypocrisy (1998: 134-5). He describes the practice of cimaronismo: fleeing to ‘far 
off hidden places’ and constructing palenques which he defines as ‘settlements that 
became free territories that had their own economy and society’ (ibid: 135). Black rebels 
used these refuges to organise armed groups to defend themselves against the Spanish, to 
collect provisions, to punish old masters and to free the other slaves, their brothers. 
Liberated African slaves incinerated Santa Marta in 1529, rose up in Antioquia in 1598 
and 1706, rebelled in Cartagena between 1619 and 1696, and set up palenques from 
Atlantico to Valle del Cauca (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 58) 
Palenque was the term used to describe ‘settlements of runaway slaves with specific 
organisations, methods of defence and later assaults against Spanish authorities’ (ibid). 
One of the strongest was San Basilio that surged in 1600 around a nucleus of 30 blacks 
commanded by Domingo Bioho, exiled monarch of an African State in Guinea. He was 
so powerful that the local Spanish rulers permitted him to dress in ‘high class’ Spanish 
clothes. The governor of the slave port of Cartagena arranged peace negotiations with 
Domingo but betrayed him: disgracefully breaking the truce and brutally hanging him on 
16
 
May, 1621. 
But Afro-Colombian resistance – like indigenous resistance – has tended to be cultural 
rather than armed because to survive as an Afro-Colombian means to preserve African 
beliefs and customs. The nature of this cultural resistance will be explored in Part 2 of 
this thesis because Part 1 concentrates on coercion rather than consent.      
Conclusion  
The role and nature of coercion, 1499-1781   
Chapter 1 has suggested that the main role of coercion (of physical oppression) at the 
time of the Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period (1499-1781) was to 
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implement the political and economic interests of the Spanish rulers and the Catholic 
Church - to centralise and monopolise production and transportation, to control local food 
supplies and markets, to accumulate gold and minerals from the west of Colombia and 
meat from the central regions and textiles from the east of Colombia, to gear the local 
economy to extraction and export – and to maximise the power and profits of the Spanish 
Empire and a parasitical Catholic Church (Tirado Mejía, 1993).  
The nature of this coercion reflected these same interests. The Spanish authorities 
claimed that the periphery owed the centre: in one decade of colonisation (1748-1793) the 
colony had to extract and export 2 million pesos of agricultural products and 18 million 
pesos (80,000 kilos of pure gold) in order to defray the ‘debt’ that local rulers had 
accumulated through the import of ‘luxury’ goods - ‘upper class’ clothes and ‘fine’ 
spirits, precious metals and grain – that could have been produced locally. Spanish rulers 
set up socio-economic institutions (reserves, missions, mita) to maximise indigenous 
production, and ‘introduced’ around a million and a half black slaves to the American 
colonies. More than six million died on the slave ships (Tirado Mejía, 1993). The main 
instruments of coercion during this historical period were the Conquistadors and Spanish 
militias who used the cruelest of all methods imaginable in order to maximise profits and 
stifle resistance (Ayala Poveda, 2003).  
This coercion was based on elements of consent: the religious discourse produced by the 
Catholic Church that legitimized the severe human rights abuses that the Empire inflicted 
on its victims. This issue - the interplay between coercion and consent from the Spanish 
Conquest to the present - will be explored in more depth and detail in the General 
Conclusion. 
41 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Independence movements (1781-1832) 
The first part of Chapter 2 analyses the nature of interests at the time of the Independence 
movements (1781-1832). The second part assesses the role of armed groups – of Creol 
armies – in the implementation of these interests. The third part of Chapter 2 analyses the 
nature of the resistance to colonial interests and pressures. The main role of Chapter 2 is 
to provide insights into the role and nature of coercion and armed conflict at the time of 
the Independence movements (1781-1832) in order to supplement the information 
presented in Chapter 1 and in order to accumulate insights into coercion and armed 
conflict in Colombia. The short conclusion that is presented at the end of this historical 
section summarises the role and nature of coercion in this historical period and the 
influence of consent on coercion. This issue will be addressed in depth in the General 
Conclusion. 
1. Interests  
This part of the thesis suggests that the interests of the Creols – the descendants of the 
Spanish rulers who were born in the colonies – predominated in this historical period 
(1781-1832), that these interests reflected the colonial interests of the British Empire: and 
that Creol and British interests became the principal source of coercion in this region.   
The Creol Independence movement 
 
García (1980) suggests that the South American independence movement led to little if 
no social change because Creol leaders replaced Spanish colonial leaders: Creol and 
British colonial coercion replaced Spanish colonial  coercion. He claims that ‘the only 
new thing’ that emerged from the war was ‘an enormous and limitless military 
bureaucracy’ and that there was ‘no fracture of the old’ Spanish colonial scheme or 
alteration in class hierarchies but rather ‘a simple reclassification and insertion’ (ibid: 
26). The ‘Republican military’ replaced ‘the Spanish military’. The ‘merchant 
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bourgeoisie’ replaced the ‘Spanish merchants’ and also ‘monopolised relations with the 
outside world’. The ‘educated Republican class’ replaced the ‘educated aristocratic class’ 
and ‘the soil and subsoil of precious metals continued to be the factors that conditioned 
social status’ (ibid: 26). Antonio Nariño (Image 2) came to the same sad conclusion in La 
Bagatela, the newspaper which he had set up to inspire the other members of his masonic 
lodge   
‘We have got nowhere. We have changed masters but not condition. The same laws, the 
same government with some appearance of liberty, but in reality the same vices, the same 
titles, the same dignitaries, Eminences and delusions in those who command us. In a 
word, we have conquered our freedom in order to become what we were before’ (La 
Bagatela, 11-8-1811).    
Official Colombian historians such as Llévano Aguirre have portrayed the ‘dawn’ of the 
Colombian republic as ‘a new and magnificent scenario’ that was ‘full of possibilities’ 
because ‘the old dispute between the rich and the poor continued’ and ‘the doors of the 
nation and its benefits remained open’ (1966: 12). In practice this did not happen. The 
new republic reflected a change in the ownership of the land rather than in the treatment 
of the local people. The republic did not abolish slavery until the middle of the 19
th
 
Century. The Creols – descendants of Spanish rulers – betrayed popular leaders and 
popular resistance movements such as the comuneros who rebelled en masse against 
Spanish monopolies, taxes and arbitrary seizure of indigenous land in 1781.  
The two most important Creol leaders and generals were Simón Bolívar and Francisco de 
Paula Santander. Bolívar promised to create the richest nation in the world: not in ‘size 
and wealth’ but in liberty and glory (1975: 164). Bolívar’s allies preached centralism. 
Santander’s allies promoted federalism (1983). Santander plotted to assassinate Bolívar. 
José Prudencio Padilla - the brave admiral who had liberated the Caribbean coasts from 
the Spanish fleet - participated in this plot and was executed by Bolívar. José María 
Cordoba – one of the courageous heroes of the war of independence - also rebelled 
against Bolívar and was also killed.  But Santander – the ringleader – had too much 
power, and was merely exiled. 
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Santander was elected president in 1832; General José Sardá died in an attempt to 
assassinate Santander in 1833. José María Obando unleashed a brutal campaign on behalf 
of Santander and in the name of federalism from 1839 to 1841. Obando had been 
implicated in the assassination of Antonio José de Sucre, Bolívar’s successor in 1832.  
This information suggests that although the Creol Independence movement (like all 
political and social movements) suffered from internal conflicts and intrigues, the Creols 
did put their lives on the line in the pursuit of a concept of independence based on 
nationalism and the republic rather than Spanish Catholic imperialism. Creol 
commanders such as Antonio Ricaurte refused to surrender or retreat and died in the heat 
of battle. Female leaders of the Independence movement - such as Policarpa Salavarrieta 
and Antonia Santos – were executed during the Spanish Reconquest in 1819. Policarpa 
had spied on the Spanish command and had organised armed resistance groups; Antonia 
had collected and had distributed supplies to the Creol troops. Both displayed courage 
and commitment to the cause.         
The armed conflicts that flared up in the first half of the 19th Century in Colombia 
reflected the conflict of interests between the supporters of Bolívar and the central power 
and the allies of Santander and regional power. This split in consent (ideological conflict) 
caused a split in coercion (armed conflict) and permitted the leaders of these two factions 
to mobilize armies and militias and to acquire massive swathes of power and land in the 
region. This conflict between central and regional interests also characterised the conflict 
between Conservative and Liberal parties and leaders (1832-1953) that is analysed in 
Chapter 3. 
The British Empire 
The commercial banks and financial firms of London that had displaced their competitors 
in Amsterdam as centres of world finance during the Napoleonic Wars issued bonds of 
more than 21 million pounds from 1822 to 1825 to finance these ‘wars of independence’ 
at nominal interest rates of 6% and actual rates of 8-10% (Tirado Mejía, 1993: 126). The 
General South American Mining Association invested 21 million in exploration; 
Francisco Antonio Zea who arrived in London in 1820 to ‘represent’ the republic 
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‘borrowed’ two and a half million pounds at high interest rates and collateral; two more 
commissioners arrived in 1824 and borrowed 4.75 million dollars. In 1855 the Colombian 
government offered to sell 30,250,250 hectares of Colombian land at half price and to 
donate 100,000 hectares free of charge – in addition to mines - in part payment of this 
debt. Other offers included 500,000 hectares of Llanos Orientales (the eastern plains) and 
all the unfarmed land at the head of the Magdalena River which included the richest 
source of quinine in the Republic. The Cartagena Anglo-Colombian Mining Association 
had a concession for all past, present and future mines around Cartagena.  
In 1825 the British Empire received the right to use British ships to transport goods from 
and into Colombia. In 1826 the US received the same privilege. Colombian ships no 
longer monopolised and profited from the transportation route and the Colombian fleet 
disappeared.  
‘Independence’ in this region can therefore be defined in terms of more independence 
from Spain from 1810 onwards, more dependence on the British Empire until the 1900s, 
and more dependence on the United States in the 20
th
 Century. ‘Spanish feudalism’ ceded 
to ‘mercantile’ and ‘capitalist-manufacture’ values and ‘colonial possessions’ began to be 
valued not only in terms of ‘the precious metals that they produced for the treasury’ and 
‘the necessities of the upper strata of the feudal system’ but also in terms of ‘the 
expansion of markets for national industries’ and ‘the production of primary materials for 
the metropoli’ (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 94)  
2. Role and nature of armed groups   
Creol armies 
This part suggests that the Creol armies – the instruments of armed struggle and coercion 
that emerged in this period - played a crucial role in the implementation of Creol and 
British colonial interests: through the forced recruitment of local, indigenous and black 
populations in their armies and through the accumulation of more than 21 million pounds 
of debt to London banks between 1822 and 1825 and millions more in British investment 
using millions of hectares of fertile land and gold mines as collateral. The Creol cause 
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had little popular support. They rounded up recruits, force-marched them ‘with their 
hands tied together for fear that they would escape’, handed them weapons and horses 
after they had arrived at the battlefield (Bushnell, 1969: 284). Desertion was rife: ‘armies 
were reduced to half between Cali and Popayan and to a third between Bogotá and 
Cucuta’ (ibid). 
3. Resistance 
Los comuneros 
Popular rebellion began in 1781 as a reaction to the excessive taxes that the Spanish 
leaders had imposed. At the start of the uprising the interests of local social classes 
coincided because exorbitant colonial taxes affected all of them. However the interests of 
Creol leaders soon separated from those of ‘the people’ whom Tirado Mejía (1988: 118) 
classifies as slaves ‘who desired their freedom to the detriment of their masters’, 
indigenous peoples ‘dispossessed of their land that had been confiscated or robbed by 
landowners’ and artisans, merchants and small owners from the region of Santander who 
demanded not only ‘suppression of taxes’ but also ‘the radical change and independence 
from the colonial regime’ that would permit an expansion in production and trade’ (ibid). 
The comuneros criticised colonial domination and aspired to independence, expressed the 
natural right of the people to rebel against tyranny, denounced the miserable conditions of 
the indigenous peoples, presented the rebellion in continental and indigenous terms, 
referring to the Tupac Amaru indigenous resistance uprising that had flared up in the 
south of the continent, aimed to occupy Bogotá, claimed that the Spanish authorities 
could not stop the movement because it had popular support and military allies, and 
warned the religious authorities that their attitudes and actions did not have popular 
support (Aguilera Peña, 1998). Their leader, Antonio Galán had these words scrawled 
across his banner (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 119) 
‘the union of the oppressed against the oppressors’ 
They marched towards Bogotá to protest but the Spanish viceroy and Catholic 
archbishop, Caballero y Gongóra met them en route and signed an agreement (las 
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capitulaciones de Zipaquira) in the town of Zipaquira. He promised not to raise taxes, to 
permit local people to cultivate their own crops, to initiate free trade (to open internal 
markets) in tobacco, to improve roads and bridges, to appoint local people to colonial 
posts and to return land and salt mines to indigenous people. Juan Francisco Berber, the 
Creol leader of the movement dissolved the army of 20,000 comuneros and betrayed the 
cause. He informed the Spanish viceroy that he had been pressured and threatened ‘by a 
storm of insolent people’ (Rincón: 22). The Archbishop broke his promises and ordered 
Antonio Galán, the popular leader to be hung, drawn, quartered, and ‘displayed to the 
multitudes’ (ibid: 25). 
The rebellion of the comuneros differed radically from the Creol Independence 
movements because the comuneros represented the rights of both campesinos (small 
farmers) and indigenous peoples rather than the power and privilege of Creol leaders. 
Secondly the comuneros rebelled in order to save lives: Spanish colonial coercion – 
oppressive taxes and monopolies of agriculture and trade – threatened the survival of 
these local people and had pushed these indigenous peoples to the abyss of extinction. 
The campesinos merely demanded more rights: less oppressive taxes and the right to feed 
themselves and to develop local infrastructure; the indigenous people only requested the 
land and salt mines upon which the survival of their cultures depended.  
But the comuneros – unlike the Creols - did not demand independence from Spain: the 
cries of the supporters in the streets of Socorro were, ‘Long live the King and death to 
bad government’ (www.mediosparalapaz.org,2005). The agreement (las capitulaciones 
de Zipaquira) - that the comuneros presented to the archbishop - represented the 
members of this popular movement as ‘loyal and faithful vassals’ whose ‘principal 
objective is to liberate ourselves from the burden of taxes’ (ibid). Chapter 2 on the other 
hand suggests that Creol movements had anti-monarchic and nationalistic ambitions that 
represented the powerful interests of Creol leaders and the British Empire: that the Creols 
implemented an interest in power rather than an interest in social reform. The Creols – 
the regional descendants of the Spanish rulers - had become aware of the mineral and 
natural riches of the continent and had developed a sense of nationalism that would 
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provide them with more power and privilege. This analysis of the social characteristics of 
the Creols will be explored in more depth and detail in Part 2, Consent. 
Conclusion  
The role and nature of coercion, 1781-1832   
Chapter 2 has argued that the Creol armies – the instruments of coercion that emerged in 
this historical period (1781-1832) - implemented the political and social interests of the 
Creol leaders. These interests coincided with the interests of the British Empire rather 
than those of the comuneros: the popular resistance movement that did not have Creol 
support and had been decimated during the Spanish Colonial Period. London banks 
issued bonds of 21 million pounds sterling to finance the replacement of an ‘educated’ 
Spanish ruling class with an ‘educated’ Republican class (García, 1980). The nature of 
this coercion reflected these same interests. Creol leaders and officers seized control of 
‘the soil and subsoil of precious metals’ that ‘continued to be the factors that conditioned 
social status’ (ibid: 26). 
This coercion was based on elements of consent: Creol leaders used the discourse of the 
French revolution and political pamphlets and newspapers in order to recruit support and 
soldiers. This issue - the interplay between coercion and consent from the Spanish 
Conquest to the present - will be explored in more depth and detail in the General 
Conclusion. 
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Chapter 3 
Conservative and Liberal rule (1832-1953) 
The first part of Chapter 3 analyses the nature and alliance of interests of Conservative 
and Liberal leaders and of the British Empire at the time of Conservative and Liberal rule 
(1832-1953) in the opening of peripheral markets and in ‘the production of primary 
materials for the metropoli’ (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 94). The second part assesses the role of 
armed groups– of Conservative and Liberal armies and militias – in the implementation 
of these interests. The third part of Chapter 3 analyses the nature of resistance to these 
interests and pressures in terms of the role of communist and socialist movements, 
protests and marches.  
The main role of Chapter 3 is to provide insights into the role and nature of coercion and 
armed conflict at the time of Conservative and Liberal rule (1832-1953) in order to 
supplement the information presented in Chapters 1 and 2 and to accumulate insights into 
coercion and armed conflict in Colombia. The short conclusion that is presented at the 
end of this historical section summarises the role and nature of coercion in this  historical 
period and the influence of consent on coercion. This issue will be addressed in depth in 
the General Conclusion.  
1. Interests 
This part of the thesis suggests that the interests of Conservative and Liberal leaders and 
the British Empire and the US coincided and predominated in this historical period 
(1832-1953) consolidating the colonisation of the region, maximising the accumulation 
of resources and credit in the centre of the Empire and opening up peripheral markets: 
and that these interests are the principal source of coercion in this period. The main 
argument is that the interests of Colombian political parties reflected British and US 
interests.     
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Conservative and Liberal leaders 
This historical period of more than a hundred years can be divided into six phases: 1. 
Conservative utopian rule (1810-62), 2. the Liberal utopian phase (1863-85), 3. the 
Regeneration (1886-1909), 4. the Conservative republic (1910-29), 5. the Liberal republic 
(1930-46) and 6. La violencia (1946-53). The violence which occured in that last 
historical phase (1946-53) reached such unspeakable levels of cruelty that both 
Conservative and Liberal leaders lost all credibility, sloped off into exile, and only 
returned after a dictatorship had been established which transcended – or rather crushed - 
party loyalties. Each phase can be defined in terms of coercion and conflict between 
Conservative and Liberal leaders and campesinos (small local farmers) which they press-
ganged or pressured into combat. Conservative and Liberal leaders created ideological 
principles and debates – centralism vs. federalism, the Church and Catholicism vs. 
Masonism, Protestantism and atheism - in order to define, organise, legitimize and 
channel their political, social and economic interests and in order to recruit and motivate 
the armed groups that maximised their power and profits through massacres, systematic 
assassinations and diabolical cruelty.  
Conservative and Liberal leaders used different ideological labels to implement their 
plans in each of the six phases of their rule (1848-1953). Conservative utopian leaders of 
1810-1862 referred to the Spanish colonial period in nostalgic terms and in terms of 
central control of the regions. In the first congress in 1821, Bolívar and Nariño, leaders of 
the War of Independence and future Presidents of the republic announced that the nation 
required central institutions that ‘shared out the duties of the Republic’. Liberal utopian 
leaders on the other hand separated the powers of the Catholic Church and the Colombian 
State in the Constitution of 1853, expelling the Jesuits in 1849 and 1861, and confiscating 
‘their’ property and estates. The Conservatives opposed the education of campesinos 
because they perceived schools ‘as irrelevant, dangerous and a product of the urban upper 
classes (Safford, 1982). In the Constitution of 1863 Liberal leaders promised 
humanitarianism, separation of Church and State, freedom of speech and expression, 
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secular public education, free trade and a federal system of independent states and 
regions. 
The Regeneration (1886-1909) represented and legitimized itself through the most 
powerful elements of Conservative utopianism: through the unification of Church and 
State, the establishment of religious education, the abolition of civil marriage and the 
formation of the Colombian Armed Forces. The Conservative Constitution of 1886 
reinstated God and the Catholic Church as supreme authorities, unified Church and State 
and proposed that education should conform to Catholic morals and dogmas. Church 
leaders supported Conservative leaders. In the midst of the War of the Thousand Days – 
that raged between the Conservative and Liberal parties between 1899 and 1903 and 
caused the death of 80,000 Colombian people (Ayala Poveda, 2003), Ezequiel Moreno, 
bishop of Pasto, on the southern border defined the armed conflict between these parties 
as ‘religious’: he proclaimed from the pulpit that the good Catholic Conservatives had to 
‘defend the religion’ and ‘fight the battles of  the Lord’ against their Liberal enemies. 
This fine bishop redefined freedom as ‘the corruption of tradition’ and equality as ‘the 
denial of all authority’ that - together with fraternity - has spilt ‘torrents of human blood’. 
He defined Enlightenment as ‘the absence of God, religion, conscience, obligation and 
shame’ and progress as ‘becoming brutes that devote themselves to material possessions’ 
(www.arbil.org, 2009). The Catholic Church beatified him: declared him to be a saint.           
The Conservative republic of 1910-1929 reflects the same  policies and strategic 
alliances. Raymond Williams claims that the survival of the Conservative and Liberal 
parties depended on their capacity to produce ‘formulae of agreement’ in their ‘moments 
of crisis’. The ‘moments’ of crisis in this period were: the indigenous rebellion of Quintín 
Lame (1914-18), organised labour protest and the massacre in the banana zone (1928), 
the formation of the Colombian Socialist Party and the Communist Party and the first 
Socialist rebellion in the coffee zone of Libano in 1929 (Williams, 1991: 32).  
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Conservative and Liberal leaders cooperated in the process of colonisation: in the 
centralisation and monopolisation of resources and in the construction of transport routes. 
Liberal President Alfredo López Pumarejo promised agrarian reform: redistribution of the 
land that had been appropriated – or robbed - from indigenous peoples and from small 
farmers (campesinos) by military officers, members of militias, and large landowners. 
His ‘revolution on the march’ suggested that the land should belong to the people that 
were prepared to farm it: that the owners of the land should be the workers on the land. 
This increased agricultural production, raised rural salaries and created strategic armed 
alliances between urban and rural leaders and the campesinos that depended on them for 
the right to live.  
The British Empire 
Gold remained the main export until 1850; booms in agricultural products – tobacco, 
quinine, indigo, rubber, cotton and coffee – followed (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 218). These 
products led to monopolies and mass production because of limited transportation routes 
and access to markets. The British Empire imported most of these products in the 19
th
 
Century and invested in railroads and mines that served colonial purposes. Because of 
these bonanzas in mineral and natural resources Colombia lagged behind other Latin 
American countries in terms of foreign trade and industrialisation (Stafford and Palacios, 
2002: 18-27). Here are the approximate quantities of raw materials exported at the height 
of each boom: two million kilos of cotton in 1870, one million kilos of indigo in 1871, 
eight million kilos of tobacco in 1875, six million kilos of quinine in 1881 and 150 
million kilos of coffee in 1926 (Tirado Mejía, 1988).   
In 1911 the main factories produced only textiles and beer. The First World War, 
protectionism and increased international markets made land purchase and 
industrialisation more attractive to Colombian leaders (ibid: 306). This placed pressure on 
agrarian structures and the first wave of protests ignited in January 1918: 100 workers 
were imprisoned in Medellín, labourers in banana plantations presented their petitions to 
United Fruit, oil workers protested in Barrancabermeja (Image 7). The regime clamped 
down hard. In his second term of office (1942-5) President Alfonso López Pumarejo 
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confiscated the German breweries – because of their alleged Nazi roots - and his son, the 
future President, Alfonso López Michelsen appropriated them. This is the basis of one of 
the main current Colombian monopolies: the Santo Domingo conglomerate: a powerful 
political and economic alliance currently owned by Julio Mario Santo Domingo 
Pumarejo and his family.    
2. Role and nature of armed groups 
Conservative and Liberal armies and militias 
This part suggests that the main armed groups and instruments of coercion in this period 
– Conservative and Liberal armies and militias - played a crucial role in the 
implementation of the interests of Conservative and Liberal, UK and US interests: 
through massacres and selective assassinations and poverty and through the accumulation 
of mountains of resources – hundreds of millions of kilos of cotton, indigo, tobacco, 
quinine, coffee, rubber, sugar, bananas – and credit in the UK and the US.  
Williams (1991) suggests that Colombian party leaders used ‘armed conflict’ to ‘settle 
their rivalries’ and used political issues ‘such as the relationship between the Church and 
the State or the abolition or not of slavery or central or federal political organisation’ as 
‘pretexts’ (Williams, 1991: 20). He claims that these conflicts were played out by 
‘gentlemen of the same lineage’ (ibid) so that often their original land was returned to 
them ‘at the end of the game’. The Liberal leader, José María Samper argued that 
Colombian Presidents ‘predicted conflicts in order to create them’ and set up military 
dictatorships in order ‘to annul the advantages that people should expect from a republic’ 
(1984: 194). He refers to these Colombian dictatorships as ‘the panacea that caused a 
thousand acts of violence and violent reactions’ (ibid).  
Tirado Mejía (1988: 198-9) attributes these armed conflicts to economic crises, to greed 
and  poverty, to the unequal distribution of bureaucratic booty, to local speculators 
(gamonales) and lenders who invested in arms, battles and massacres (Image 3). He 
refers to a joint venture between a foreign manager, a Liberal leader and a member of the 
Conservative government who all invested in the sale of ‘cattle, beasts of burden, coffee 
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and leather’ to the troops (ibid: 200) on the principle that ‘business is business’ and 
transcends ethics.     
The Conservatives who owned gold mines and plantations in the regions of Cauca, 
Antioquia, Choco and Barbacoas rebelled against the Liberals in 1851 because the 
abolition of slavery opposed their economic interests. Liberal ‘Gólgotas’ rebelled against 
Liberal ‘Draconianos’ in 1854 because free trade served the interests of ‘the merchants’ 
and protectionism served the interests of ‘the artisans’ (Tirado Mejía, 1988). The 
Draconian general, José María Melo recruited 20,000 artisans and led a successful coup 
against an alliance of Conservative and Liberal leaders. The Conservative leader, Julio 
Arboleda shot 20 Liberal leaders dead in the main square in Popayan in the west in 1861. 
He acted as President in 1862 and was assassinated in the same year. From 1863 to 1885 
there were more than 50 armed revolts and more than 40 different constitutions were 
drafted (Ayala Poveda, 2003). Liberals initiated the insurrection of 1895 against the 
Regeneration because of the imprisonment of Liberals, the confiscation of Liberal land 
and the censorship of Liberal newspapers (Rincón, 1973). The Conservative general, 
Rafael Reyes subdued these forces. The Liberal general, Rafael Uribe Uribe initiated ‘the 
War of the Thousand Days’ because the Conservative ‘hegemony’ denied them ‘more 
civilised methods’ (ibid: 41).  
In only one battle - Palonegro – that lasted a mere (endless) 15 days, from 11 to 25 May 
1900, around 2,476 men were killed and about 4,882 were wounded in hand to hand 
combat (Tovar Pinzón, 2001: 145). The Conservative and Liberal officers rode horses. 
Press-ganged campesinos brandished machetes and chopped one another to pieces. This 
mass amputation machine – this lopping off of live limbs – maintained the political, 
social and economic status quo: ‘those above gained political, social and economic 
advantages and those below suffered from wounds, griefs and miseries’ (ibid: 146).  
In 1895 the US invaded: using an armed group to crush a popular uprising on the isthmus 
of Panama and hanging Pedro Prestan, the black leader of local opposition to US 
economic interests. José Manuel Marroquin became President in 1898 and seized power 
again in 1900. His Conservative regime initiated the transfer of Panama to the United 
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States in return for a million dollars. The US premised this acquisition (theft) of Panama 
on access to Colombian oil. In 1922 another Conservative President, Pedro Nel Ospina 
closed the deal: he sold Panama for 25 million dollars. It wasn’t his to sell. 
The first half of the 20
th
 Century was characterised by an alliance of Conservative and 
Liberal governments and party leaders against the labour and socialist movements that 
arose in response to inhumane labour conditions and tended to be regional or local rather 
than national. Conflicts revolved around two central principles: massacre of leaders and 
campesinos, displacement of local populations and seizure of resources on the one hand; 
on the other, the massacre of labour protesters and the defence of foreign and regional 
monopolies based on coercion, inhuman labour conditions and misery. This unarmed 
resistance - to the coercion of the Colombian government, the ruthlessness of 
international oil, banana and coffee monopolies and the brutality of the Colombian 
Armed Forces – will be analysed in the next part of this thesis: in the context of the 
democratic societies of artisans, the labour movement, the socialist and communist 
movements, the marches and the protests. 
In 1948 this lucrative market in armed conflict, massacres and coercion finally collapsed. 
The bloody period between 1948 and 1958 is referred to as La Violencia because 
Violence rather than Conservative and Liberal leaders reigned. The practices of these 
political leaders seems to be the main cause. Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals 
Borda and Eduardo Umana Luna (1962) on the other hand attribute this violence to a 
broad range of factors: direct causes (ethical factors, disrespect for human life, problems 
in political representation, electoral fraud, political hate campaigns, conflict between 
political parties and absence of negotiation, recent events, institutional and infrastructural 
factors), recent causes (assassination of the Liberal leader, Gaitán, police persecution and 
rape in Tolima, civil resistance, the dictatorship of 1953, strict censorship), institutional 
factors (political corruption, armed groups, public violence between politicians, injustice 
and impunity, systematic violent oppression, political discrimination, inflammatory 
media) and infrastructural elements (conflict rather than solidarity between rural 
populations, sectarianism and fanaticism, traffic in arms, armed persecution of rural 
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populations, poverty, hunger, prostitution). Sánchez Gómez focuses on the interplay 
between armed conflict and poverty that reinforced ‘the structures of domination’ and the 
‘clear delineation of basic identities’ between the two traditional parties (1984: 29) and 
the fact that the incorporation of campesinos in national politics had always occurred 
through armed mobilisation rather than through participation in economic booms. García, 
one of the leaders of the Colombian socialist party stirs one more ingredient into this 
heady mixture of political, social, economic and ideological grievances, revenge:   
‘This uninterrupted succession of partisan crimes – the sons of the victims of  yesterday 
being the transgressors of today and the sons of the victims of today being the 
transgressors of tomorrow – builds up the dregs of resentment, sadistic cruelty and cold 
hatred in the soul of the people. This is the inheritance that the parties have handed down 
to the people: hatreds, blood feuds, repulsion’ (Prologue to Viento Seco, Caicedo, 1953).  
This is the final evidence and result of Conservative and Liberal coercion (1832-1953): 
up to half a million Colombians were massacred between 1948 and 1953 and more than 
two million people displaced (Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, Umana Luna, 1962). 
3. Resistance  
Indigenous resistance 
In the early 20
th
 Century Quintín Lame – a charismatic indigenous leader - reclaimed the 
rights that these people had been denied for more than three hundred years. El Indio 
Quintín Lame - The Indian Quintín Lame - tells his tale: when he was five years old he 
witnessed his sister being raped by government officials; at ten years old he laboured in 
the plantations of the local landowner (Arboleda, 1973). In 1901 he was recruited by 
Conservative allies of the Colombian dictator, José Manuel Marroquin, and compelled to 
participate in the ‘War of the Thousand Days’ that crushed the Liberal insurgents. After 
he returned from the war he suffered the anger of local landowners who demanded higher 
production and burnt the crops of the indigenous people who rebelled.  
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He sought legal advice and ‘at last Quintín Lame understood the true state of indigenous 
affairs’: learning that ‘since the remote times of the Spanish Conquest’ – and based on a 
decision that the King of Spain had made in 1671 – his people had ‘been treated like 
objects’, had been ‘sold off with the land’ and that they, the Indians were ‘the inmates of 
an ancient mission’ (ibid: 71). Quintín Lame roamed the indigenous settlements of Huila 
and Tolima collecting signatures for a petition to be presented to the President. In August 
1914 he found himself in Bogotá, the capital of the republic: ‘His long hair was hanging 
down to his belt. He was carrying a wooden staff with a golden handle and he was 
wearing a red woollen cloak’ (ibid: 104). He found cheap lodgings in the barrio (district) 
of Las Cruces and stayed there all year until the Minister of Foreign Relations deigned to 
receive him. The Minister of War treated him like a lunatic and gave him an old uniform 
as a sign of disrespect. Quintín Lame continued to wear it as an act of defiance. He 
returned to Tierradentro and proposed that an independent indigenous republic should be 
founded. Quintín Lame spent his life in and out of prison, using his legal talents and 
eloquence to defend himself from life imprisonment. In 1917 he assembled 50,000 
indigenous people in Tolima. In Cauca he was betrayed, beaten up and sentenced to four 
years, three months, and 14 days of hard labour. He survived this and worse.  
His epitaph has been carved on his tomb  
‘I am a defender – in the strongest sunshine and in the mind of God and men – I am one 
of those who have protected the tribes and the indigenous hosts of the Guanani race and 
the Guanani land: [I represent] the dead, the dispossessed, the weak, the ignorant, the 
illiterate, all the people who have been abandoned so sadly and so shamefully by 
civilisation’ 
This apocryphal tale of the life of a heroic indigenous man who rebelled against ruthless 
Colombian authorities suggests that ‘civilisation’ has been based on coercion, massacre 
and marginalisation rather than consent. The instruments of consent of the Colombian 
regime have represented indigenous people as ‘weak, ignorant and illiterate’ in order to 
legitimize coercion, dispossession, and Death. Indigenous resistance has been cultural - 
and based on a relationship with Nature – because in order to survive as an indigenous 
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person or people this Natural culture must be preserved. The nature of this cultural 
resistance will be explored in Part 2 of this thesis because Part 1 concentrates on coercion 
rather than consent.     
Democratic societies of artisans, labour movement, socialist and communist  
movements, marches and protests 
The indigenous rebellion of Quintín Lame and labour, socialist and communist 
movements, marches and protests represented the main unarmed resistance to the 
interests of the Conservative and Liberal parties and of the UK and US in this period.  
In the middle of the 19
th
 Century, Colombian artisans began to protest against the cheap 
British manufactured products that flooded the local market. Their livelihood and lives 
had been controlled and protected by powerful guilds that defined the rights and duties of 
both master and apprentice. The apprentice had to respect his master, permit himself to be 
corrected, attend mass and learn to read and write. Foreign artisans had to justify their 
change of residence and prove that they could fulfil their duties. Laws of distance and 
demarcation prevented unfair competition by limiting the members of each guild to the 
same road or barrio and production satisfied popular consumption. Imported products 
threatened these local economies.       
The artisans organised ‘democratic societies’ in clubs in the principal cities and 
demanded protection rather than free trade. Restrepo (1963) claims that ‘in sections of 
these clubs, Colombian artisans railed against the rich, the aristocrats and the 
Conservatives’ (ibid: 204) and that they were the prophets of socialism and communism 
in Colombia. They gained transitory power in 1854 through the military coup of General 
Melo. This provoked Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, one of the founders of the Colombian 
Conservative party and a future President of Colombia into declaring that, ‘the 
businessmen of this province [Antioquia] have enthusiastically accepted the idea of 
[officially] annexing the Republic to the United States’ and into suggesting that although 
this step might be ‘a little inconvenient’, it is ‘the only remedy that we can find to the 
barbarism that eternally threatens to devastate this country’ (Tirado Mejia, 1988: 148). 
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Thousands of artisans were massacred by the alliance of Conservative and Liberal leaders 
and generals (Gólgotas) who supported – and profited from – British imperialism and 
‘free trade’, but the movement of artisans lived on. In 1867 Miguel Samper, the Liberal 
intellectual defined this ‘barbarism that eternally threatens to devastate this country’ 
(ibid: 148) in a little more detail 
‘The insecurity has reached such a pitch that it is considered an act of aggression to be 
called rich … because trades such as tailoring, shoemaking and carpentry direct their 
hostility at the more well-off classes to whose selfishness they attribute their poverty’ 
(1969: 20).    
The most radical pioneers of socialism and communism in Colombia were Raúl Eduardo 
Mahecha (1884-1940), Ignacio Torres Giraldo (1892-1968) and María Cano (1887-
1967). Raúl Eduardo Mahecha was drafted into the Conservative army during the ‘War of 
the Thousand Days’ and promoted to lieutenant. After the war, he opened up business on 
the Atlantic coast but could not compete against British trade monopolies. As a result he 
came into contact with the labour unions in Calamar and Cartagena. He organised the 
strike against the US-owned Tropical Oil in Barrancabermeja in 1924 and was sentenced 
to 17 months in prison. On his release he, Ignacio Torres Giraldo and María Cano set up 
the Colombian Revolutionary Socialist Party. He returned to Barrancabermeja in 1927. 
Tropical Oil offered him a bribe of 25,000 dollars but he refused to betray his comrades. 
He was beaten up and sentenced to prison. On his release he participated in the protest 
against US-owned United Fruit in 1928. María Cano’s family owned and directed El 
Espectador, the main Liberal newspaper in Medellín. In 1925 she was elected symbol (La 
flor: the flower) of the Colombian labour movement. She travelled around Colombia, 
inspiring the Antioquian miners, the oil protesters in Barrancabermeja and the banana 
workers in Uraba. She carried a red flag with three eight’s painted on it, symbolising the 
main goals of the labour movement at that time: eight hours of work, eight of rest and 
eight hours of study. María Cano played the role of orator, social agitator and leader of 
protests against UK and US companies.  
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Torres Giraldo, the third of these socialist leaders argued that her importance did not lie 
‘in the practical field of the organisation of labour unions and their preparation for the 
revolutionary struggle’ nor ‘in the methodical dissemination of material on the conflict of 
classes and the popular conquest of political power’ but rather in her role ‘as an agitator 
of new ideas among the wide masses that slumbered in colonial dreams’ (1980: 56). He 
described her as a lamp ‘that cut through the shadows of ignorance’ and whose glow 
‘woke up the the multitudes who vegetated in the resignation of their beliefs’, as ‘a 
hurricane that lit the flame of rebellion in the blood of rebellion’ and as ‘an intuitive 
messenger of the great Soviet Revolution that has started to transform the world’ (ibid).  
The strike against US-owned United Fruit in Uraba on the other hand ended extremely 
badly. On 6 October 1928 the union that represented the 25,000 employees of United 
Fruit - that has been rebranded as Chiquita - issued a series of demands: social security, 
emergency medical care, hygenic housing, paid Sundays off and pay increases for 
workers who earned less than 100 pesos per month. United Fruit denied the request. 
Thousands of protesters marched towards the nearest town, Santa Marta, were met by the 
Colombian army, and massacred.  
Torres Giraldo ascribed the tragic failure of the protest to the isolation of the region 
because ‘both the plantations and the railway were monopolised by the United Fruit 
Company’ (1980: 106) and concluded that ‘to plan a serious strike it is necessary to 
create committees in different zones’ and ‘to unite these committees in a central 
command that can convert itself at the right time into the central strike committee’ (ibid: 
108). 
Sánchez Gómez (1981) presents the uprising in Libano (Tolima) in 1929 as the first 
armed Socialist insurrection on the American continent. It had its roots in the movement 
of artisans that supported the Liberal general, Melo and demanded protection rather than 
free trade. Libano in the north of the Tolima region had been colonised by Antioqueñans 
in the 19
th
 Century and transformed into the third largest source of coffee in Colombia: 
after Fredonia (Antioquia) and Rionegro (Santander). It was so prosperous that it 
attracted US and German investors such as Von Mellenthin who owned two of the seven 
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local mills. This colonial presence fuelled a ‘nationalistic sentiment’ that played a role 
not only in the rebellion of 1929 but in the struggles that followed (ibid: 32). Sánchez 
Gómez points to other causes of the uprising: reductions in local salaries, oppressive 
labour conditions, and the slump in the international price of coffee that preceded the 
Wall Street Crash in the United States. Libano campesinos had to defend themselves 
against two crucial threats: ‘unemployment’ and ‘hunger’ (ibid: 46). They did not see 
their situation as radically different ‘from that of the oil workers or of the banana zone’ 
(ibid). This unarmed resistance – like the protest in Uraba - was brutally crushed by the 
Colombian army. This paved the way to the armed resistance in the next historical 
period. 
Socialist Republic and laws of Los Llanos 
Popular armed resistance in Colombia reached its height in the Socialist Republic of Los 
Llanos that was set up by Guadelupe Salcedo in 1952 in the midst of La Violencia and 
during this slaughter of more than 100,000 Conservative and Liberal campesinos. This 
independent republic in the west of Colombia was guarded by 20,000 soldiers. The first 
law of the Llanos (‘La Primera Ley de los Llanos’, 11 September, 1952) threatened to 
confiscate the property of landowners – either Conservative or Liberal – who 
‘sympathised’ with ‘the Dictatorial government’ and declared the intention of ‘organising 
the civilian population, providing the resistance with military structure and signalling ... 
the necessity of promoting the planning of production in the zones where the guerrilla are 
active’ (www.mediosparalapaz.org, 2005). The second law of the Llanos assumed that 
the republic had been ‘liberated’ and had achieved ‘a great revolution’ and established a 
central guerrilla command (ibid). The republic however was betrayed by Liberal party 
leaders who promised arms and political and economic support but betrayed the cause 
and fled into exile (Isaza, 1959). On 15 September, 1953 the leader, Guadelupe Salcedo 
dismantled the republic and signed a pact with the Dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla. Other 
guerrilla commanders accused him of selling out because he had not demanded 
reparations. He was gunned down by the Bogotá police four years later.           
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Conclusion  
The role and nature of coercion, 1832-1953   
Chapter 3 has suggested that the main role of coercion (of physical oppression) at the 
time of Conservative and Liberal rule (1832-1953) was to implement the political and 
economic interests of the leaders of these parties and their local and foreign counterparts 
– to accumulate resources and credit in the UK and the US - and to open up the 
Colombian market to UK and US products. The nature of this coercion reflected these 
same interests. The main instruments of coercion during this historical period were the 
Conservative and Liberal armies and militias that played a crucial role in the 
implementation of political and economic interests through massacres and selective 
assassinations. Party leaders used armed conflict to ‘settle their rivalries’ (Williams, 
1991: 20). The indigenous rebellion of Quintín Lame, the democratic societies of artisans 
and the socialist and communist movements, marches and protests represented the main 
unarmed resistance to these interests and pressures: these movements were brutally 
crushed by national and local authorities.  
This coercion was based on elements of consent: party leaders and their local 
representatives used political issues ‘such as the relationship between the Church and the 
State or the abolition or not of slavery or central or federal political organisation’ as 
‘pretexts’ (ibid: 20) to legitimize these severe human rights abuses. This issue - the 
interplay between coercion and consent from the Spanish Conquest to the present - will 
be explored in more depth and detail in  the General Conclusion.     
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Chapter 4 
Dictatorship (1953-8), National Front (1958-74) and current regime 
The first part of Chapter 4 analyses the current nature and alliance of US and European 
and Colombian interests, the centralised accumulation of resources and credit and the 
peripheral concentration of debt and poverty. The second part assesses the nature, 
relationship between, and role of armed groups – US and Colombian Armed Forces and 
paramilitaries – in the implementation of these interests. The third part of Chapter 4 
analyses the nature of resistance to these interests and pressures in terms of the role of 
armed communist and socialist groups.  
The main role of Chapter 4 is to provide insights into the current role and nature of 
coercion and armed conflict in Colombia based on the information presented in Chapters 
1 to 3. The short conclusion that is presented at the end of this historical section 
summarises the role and nature of coercion in this historical period and the influence of 
consent on coercion. This issue will be addressed in depth in the General Conclusion.  
1. Current interests  
This part of the thesis suggests that the interests of Colombian governments and of the 
owners of Colombian economic conglomerates and the interests of the US government 
and of international investment currently coincide and predominate, maximising the 
accumulation of resources and credit in the US and in foreign banks and businesses, 
flooding the Colombian market with foreign products, erasing small local businesses and 
creating massive poverty: and that these interests are the principal source of coercion at 
present and the main causes and characteristics of the current armed conflict.  
It is important to understand on the other hand that the Colombian armed conflict is not a 
simple tale of oppression and greed pitted against mass poverty and victimhood. The 
current armed conflict should instead be understood in terms of a broad range of powerful 
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interests – political and economic alliances and monopolies, international and domestic 
investment of capital, drug cartels, legal and illegal armed groups – that are indifferent to 
the massive human rights abuses that are the main consequence but not the main aim of 
these interests. This part of the chapter will analyse the role and nature of these interests 
in terms of the maximisation of profits and in terms of massive human rights abuses. The 
next part of this chapter will assess the use of armed groups – the main instruments of 
coercion - in the implementation of these interests.  
Political and economic alliances and monopolies 
The first source of coercion in Colombia is the alliance between government and big 
business interests. Colombian politics could perhaps best be described as a family 
business. Mariano Ospina Rodríguez became the first Conservative President of 
Colombia in 1887. His son, Pedro Nel Ospina became President in 1922; and his 
grandson, Mariano Ospina Pérez, in 1946. Alfonso López Pumarejo (Liberal President) 
was elected in 1934 and again in 1942; his son, Alfonso López Michelsen (Liberal), in 
1974. Misael Pastrana (Conservative) became President in 1970 (after his allies switched 
off electric power stations and ‘re-counted the votes’, i.e. manipulated the results). His 
son, Andrés Pastrana (likewise Conservative) became President in 1998.  
The Pumarejo-Michelsen-Santo Domingo dynasty demonstrates the murky nature of the 
business of Colombian politics. President Pumarejo used the Second World War as a 
pretext to appropriate – or rather steal - the German breweries in Colombia in the 1940s. 
His son, President Alfonso López Michelsen, inherited them and monopolised national 
beer production. This became the basis, the liquid capital of one of the four main 
Colombian companies that exists at the moment: the Santo Domingo conglomerate. Julio 
Mario Santo Domingo Pumarejo, President Michelsen’s cousin is the current head. In 
2000 the Santo Domingo empire had around 8,000 million dollars in fixed assets and had 
monopolised not only all the beer produced in Colombia, Panama, Bolivia and Peru but 
also packing, plastics, forestry, planes and petroleum helicopters in Colombia (Silva 
Colmenares, 2004). This conglomerate includes the two main television and radio 
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conglomerates: Caracol TV and Caracol radio. The national airline has been sold to a 
Brazilian conglomerate and the beer to SABMiller that has its head office in London.  
But Santo Domingo is not the richest conglomerate. The main conglomerate, El Grupo 
Antioqueño is based in Medellín and had 11,448 million dollars in fixed assets in 2002. It 
controls the production of coffee, chocolate, tobacco (sold to Philip Morris in 2003), 
cement, coal, construction, textiles, gold, minerals, private armed guards (paramilitaries) 
and retail outlets (ibid). El Grupo Antioqueño has set up banks and finance companies to 
fuel its own operations. The geographical position of the conglomerate (in Medellín, 
centre of illegal drug cartels) and the location of branches of its banks - in the tax havens 
of Panama and the Cayman Isles - suggest that money laundering is one of its more 
lucrative sidelines.  
The Sarmiento Angulo conglomerate has 7,676 million dollars invested in construction, 
banks and finance companies. Ardila Lulle has 2,719 million. He owns Postobon (the 
half-billion dollar Colombian monopoly of soft drinks), textiles, banks, finance 
companies, insurance companies and the other main television and radio conglomerates: 
RCN TV and RCN radio. La Casa Editorial El Tiempo completes this picture of the 
political, social and economic power of the Colombian conglomerates. The main owners 
of this media conglomerate are: the current Vice-President (Francisco Santos), the current 
Minister of Defence (Manuel Santos) and the current Minister of the Environment. It has 
770 million dollars in shares. Silva Colmenares describes this as ‘monopolistic State 
capitalism’ (1977).  
International investment 
The second source of coercion is international investment: the massive foreign capital 
that is invested in oil, minerals and ‘natural resources’ (the annihilation of the natural 
environment). One international human rights commission (El Tribunal Permanente de 
Los Pueblos, Bogotá, 21-23 July 2008) has claimed that international investment 
increased more than ten-fold between 1978 and 1985, from 65 million to 670 million 
dollars per year. This human rights tribunal claimed that this investment - ‘concentrated 
principally in the field of minerals and oil’ – has imposed ‘a brutal and ruthless 
68 
 
hegemonic model of accumulation based on narco-paramilitary violence and State 
terrorism’ (ibid). Colombia is the fifth main source of oil in South America and has the 
largest coal resources. It is the principal source of emeralds in the world. In 2002, 3.28 
billion dollars of petroleum, 1.97 billion of precious metals and stones, 1.01 billion 
dollars of coal, 283.3 million of iron and nickel, 8.85 million dollars of platinum and 4.29 
million dollars of marble and granite were extracted and exported (Torres, 2002). In 2003 
Colombia exported 806,307 million dollars of coffee and 228,473 million dollars of 
sugar, 387,543 million dollars of bananas and 682,283 million dollars of flowers 
(Colombian Ministry of Trade statistics).  
The drug cartels 
The third source of coercion is the drug cartels. Ricardo Rocha, UN commissioner of 
drug control (laundering of drug money, confiscation and sale of drugs) has calculated 
that the Colombian drug trade generated around 32 billion dollars in utilities and 10 
billion dollars in foreign shares between 1982 and 1998 (Semana, May 2000). Colombia 
remains the main supplier of heroin to the US and processes about 80% of all the cocaine 
that is produced in the world (World Bank report, 2002). The Colombian drug cartels and 
the regime have the same interest in the abuse of coercion and the use of violence to 
maximise power and profits at all costs. In the 1980s these drug cartels invested heavily 
in paramilitary groups that were used to displace campesinos, rob land, ‘guard the 
ranches of the large landowners and drug traffickers, train personnel for cocaine 
laboratories, attack leftist militants and neutralize political opposition to drug traffic’ 
(Ramirez Tobon, 1997). The violence of Pablo Escobar and the Medellin cartel during 
the 1980s was horrific; he paid his sicarios (child assassins) to exterminate the police in 
Medellín; he assassinated politicians and journalists; he detonated 120 car bombs 
between 1989 and 1993; and blew up a a passenger plane in full flight. The oppressive 
nature of the drug cartels and their alliance to government and big business will be 
analysed in the next part of the thesis: in terms of the use of armed groups – the main 
instruments of coercion – in the implementation of the interests of government and big 
business. This part ends instead in an analysis of the human rights abuses that are the 
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main consequence of the interests that predominate in the current period - political and 
economic alliances and monopolies, international investment, drug cartels – that aim to 
maximise power and profits at all costs.         
Human rights abuse 
The massive centralised accumulation of resources and profits has been – and is being - 
implemented through severe coercion. This ruthless oppression is reflected in the 
assassination of around 1,336 Colombian labour leaders between 1991 and 1999 
(CINEP). More than 2,000 were exterminated between 1991 and 2004 (Escuela Nacional 
Sindical). More than two million people have been displaced from oil and mineral 
regions in the last 25 years. There were more than 6,000 assassinations there between 
1995 and 2002 (Sintraminercol, 2004). Between 2001 and 2004 poverty increased from 
30.5 million to 33.7 million Colombian people. Extreme poverty affects – or rather 
murders - 18.9 million people per year. 16.7 million Colombians have minimal health 
care (PCDHDD, 2004). 
Colombian children also suffer. The US-based human rights group, ‘Watchlist on 
Children and Armed Conflict’ (www.watchlist.org, 2004) claims that between 15,000 and 
30,000 of them live on the street, that 15% of the under-fives suffered from 
developmental disabilities in 2002, that 4,000 children are killed with ‘small arms’ (guns 
and knives) every year, that between 20,000 and 35,000 are involved in the sex trade, and 
that between 35,000 and 50,000 Colombian girls and young women were trafficked 
abroad – exported to Spain and the US - in 2000. More than 150 children and young 
people were murdered in the barrio of Cazuca (see Interview 2) in the first nine months 
of 2003. There are between 11,000 and 14,000 child soldiers: more than a third have 
participated in the killing. Some have drunk human blood (www.watchlist.org, 2004).  
The interviews with the human rights researcher, the human rights activist and the editor 
of the community newspaper suggest that the contrast and conflict between the 
investment of capital and the accumulation of resources on one side and the tragedies of 
poverty and marginalisation on the other are the principal causes of violence in 
Colombia: that the main armed groups – the Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries 
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– channel this resentment and desperation into more coercion and more profits. The 
human rights researcher (Interview 10) claims that most human rights abuses occur in 
regions of low population, high international or local economic investment, and minimal 
presence of State institutions and that the principal causes and consequences of the armed 
conflict – non-distribution of economic resources, unemployment, recruitment into armed 
groups, violence – are factors that interact ‘in a synergetic process’.  
The human rights activist (Interview 11) agrees that marginalised rural regions and urban 
districts are breeding grounds of violence. The district of Cazuca that she describes is a 
microcosm of past and present armed conflicts and is located inside the capital city. Rural 
populations have been displaced into this slum that has been constructed on the perimeter 
of an industrial sand pit. Some of the residents are too traumatised to refer to the past. 
Others continue the current conflict: on one side are the paramilitaries; on the other the 
guerrilla. Some are professional killers (sicarios) that sell their lethal services to the 
highest bidder. Others use violence because they are themselves victims of violence: of 
physical and sexual abuse. In 2003 a judge sentenced a 17-year-old resident of Cazuca to 
28 years in prison for the assassination of 37 people, including his 13-year-old girlfriend. 
In court he claimed that he had killed 137 – not 37 - and that the local police and 
paramilitaries had supplied him with his lists of targets that included leaders of social 
movements and other undesirable social elements.  
The district of Kennedy is another microcosm of resentment and violence.  In the 1960s 
J. F. Kennedy, his wife Jacqueline and Alberto Lleras Camargo assembled here to 
promote international collaboration in the ‘Alliance for progress’ and the ‘war against 
communism’ (Image 6). They promised social housing: instead the local people had to 
build their own houses, pay for their parcels of land and pay rent. Municipal authorities 
appropriated houses, refused to provide public services (water, electricity, sanitation, 
health care or a school for the children) and attempted to evict the residents. The local 
people have defended themselves against all these threats and have constructed their own 
infrastructure and economy that is partly based on contraband – stolen property and 
counterfeit brands - because ‘the production and sale of legal products has been 
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monopolised’. The editor of the local newspaper (Interview 19) suggests that gangsters 
(pandillas) are one of the main sources of violence in urban districts. The larger cartels 
have more than 50 members. In addition to contraband, they organise robberies, drug 
dealing and prostitution and liaise with local authorities, businessmen and police in the 
implementation of ‘social cleansing programs’ (limpieza social): the culling of 
undesirable social sectors, especially people who live in the street (Images 23 and 24). 
Prison is another sub-culture and sub-economy in Colombian cities that is based on the 
same social hierarchies, central accumulation of privileges and marginalisation as 
‘outside’.    
2. Current role and nature of armed groups 
This part suggests that the three main armed groups and instruments of coercion in the 
current regime – US and Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries – play a crucial 
role in the implementation of the interests of foreign companies, Colombian 
conglomerates and drug cartels. It focuses on the historical relationship between the US 
and the Colombian Armed Forces and the paramilitaries and on the ruthlessness of these 
groups in the implementation of these interests.   
The US and Colombian Armed Forces 
The current relationship between the US and the Colombian Armed Forces has its roots 
in the US reaction to the Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe and the threat of international 
communism and in a series of acts, treaties and programs (Buitrago, 1994: 20). The Act 
of Chapultec (1945), the Truman Plan (1946) and the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (1947) united North and South American armies at the end of 
World War II. The Act of National Security (1947) and the actions of the CIA promoted 
the hegemonic role of the US in the region. Bilateral programs of military aid between 
1952 and 1958 brought South American armies into the ‘operative and technological 
orbit’ of the United States. Colombian officers participated in training courses in the US 
and in the Canal Zone in Panama (1951-4). The Cuban revolution reinforced Cold War 
policies and the US attributed political and social unrest in the region to ‘communist 
conspiracies’ rather than socio-economic factors (ibid: 26).  
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These perspectives were reflected in the logic of ‘friends and enemies’ and in the concept 
of the internal enemy that the US introduced in the south. Southern regimes implemented 
psychological tactics and techniques – persecution, abduction, detention, torture, 
‘disappearances’ – that the US army taught and teach them in military schools such as the 
infamous School of the Americas. Diabolical cruelty is justified in terms of the ‘irregular’ 
nature of these internal conflicts. In the 60s and 70s the United States orchestrated 
military coups and established military dictatorships in the regimes that they considered 
Left: the coup in Brazil in 1964, in Argentina in 1966 and 1976, in Chile in 1973, and the 
coups in Peru in 1962 and 1968. Between 1960 and 1970 the US invested 60 million 
dollars in Plan Lazo: the Colombian ‘counter-insurgency’ campaign. Their armies 
targeted the tiny agricultural settlement of Marquetalia (Image 5) that was guarded by a 
communist militia and had therefore been defined as an ‘independent republic’. US 
military advisors planned and supervised the massacre. Planes dropped napalm 
(insecticide) on the campesinos. 16,000 soldiers waded in, rounding up survivors and 
shooting them in cold blood. Eighteen children died in one night. In the town of Neiva, 
more than a hundred ‘political prisoners’ were rounded up and one of them, ‘Jubin 
Sánchez, was tortured with electric current until the blood ran out of his ears’ (Villegas et 
al., 1974). Hundreds of such cases of US-sponsored coercion and terror have been 
documented in the Colombian human rights classic, El libro negro de la represión 
(Image 9). One report refers to police brutality in the female dorms at the National 
University in April 1972. This is María Lucia Patino’s memory of the intrusion  
‘The policeman that had me by the hair started to hit me … another policeman ordered 
him to hit me in the face and breast and genitals. I lost consciousness. After I came round 
I saw that one of us had a broken arm; another had her face smashed in. She had lost all 
her teeth.’  
Her room mate, Luz Stella Fuentes recalls that she ‘arrived at the dorm after it was all 
over. The doors and walls were soaked in blood. The windows were shattered and 
spattered with blood.’ The same source reproduces this US military report that puts these 
atrocities in their international perspective  
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‘Our civilian-military action doctrine has been accepted by the Colombian Armed Forces. 
The years 1970-75 will be crucial in the determination of the viability of the present 
system. The permanent close contact between the United States and Colombian Armed 
Forces will be of mutual benefit’ (1970).  
This ‘permanent close contact’ (ibid) between US and Colombian Armed Forces is a 
crucial factor in the accumulation of resources and human rights abuses  in the region 
(Image 15). In 1994 the Intercongregational Commission of Justice and Peace reported 
that more than 70,000 Colombian people had died from political violence since 1974. 
More than three million campesinos’ had been displaced from oil and mineral zones. The 
same report accused Argentina of 9,000 political assassinations in eight years of 
dictatorship and attributed 2,666 political assassinations to Chile in 17 years of 
dictatorship. These statistics – Colombia, 70,000 political assassinations in 20 years; 
Argentina, 9,000 political assassinations in eight years; Chile, 2,666 political 
assassinations in 17 years – places this humanitarian crisis in an international perspective. 
CINEP (the Jesuit human rights organisation) has announced that there were 37,089 
victims of political violence in Colombia between 1998 and 2000. In only one year 
(2003) there were 4,447 victims of political violence. Around 1,339 of these executions 
were attributed to ‘agents of the State’: this euphemism refers to the Colombian Armed 
Forces. About 1,140 of these victims of State-sponsored assassination programs were 
supposed to be ‘under State protection’.  
OMCT (The world organisation against torture) has analysed 350 legal cases against 
Colombian army officers accused of political assassinations, disappearances, massacres 
and tortures between 1977 and 1991. Ten of them were temporarily relieved of 
command. The others have total impunity and the licence to kill for the highest bidder. 
OMCT concludes that ‘terror has been installed in every space; it has invaded every 
sector of society. Silence has been imposed as the unique and fundamental principle of 
social cohesion’ (1992). Desde Abajo (a Colombian human rights periodical) claims that 
the current role of the US Armed Forces in Colombia is to direct and instruct the 
Colombian Armed Forces: ‘to process the intelligence that emanates from the radars and 
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planes, to support land operations and to design strategies and tactics’ (Desde Abajo, 5-
2005: 4). They claim that US officers in Colombia see themselves as ‘our owners and 
lords’ and that the US army ‘launches raids, makes threats, issues orders’ and determines 
quotas: that the US decides the type and number of Colombian political and social 
leaders to assassinate, campesinos to massacre and street people to cull (ibid). 
In September 2008 the website of Semana magazine (www.semana.com) leaked 
information on the mysterious disappearance of 46 young people between 17 and 32 
years old from around Bogotá (Ciudad Bolivar and Soacha) and from the Colombian 
coffee region (El Eje Cafetero) in the previous six months. The report claimed that the 
Colombian army had murdered them in order to meet international and national quotas of 
corpses, to legitimize billions of dollars of US military aid and to pretend that the 
paramilitaries had been defined as enemies rather than friends – and loyal allies - of the 
current Colombian President and US-sponsored regime.  
Two US strategies – Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota – currently monopolise the arms 
and drugs trade between Colombia and the United States. Petras (2002) compares the US 
military role in the 1960s to its current role. In the 1960s military operations were ‘based 
on the threat of international communism’. In 2000 on the other hand ‘the justification 
includes the threat of drugs. Both instances demonstrate total denial of the historical and 
sociological basis of the conflict’ (ibid: 45). Plan Colombia monopolises the illegal drug 
routes that pass to the US through countries that operate as strategic political, social and 
economic allies of the United States (ibid: 82-3). In 2001 Ruiz (CINEP) dissected the 
latest US aid package of 1.19 billion dollars. More than 80% of the total had been 
awarded to the Colombian Armed Forces; only 3.15% of this aid is to be donated to – or 
rather embezzled from – the populations that have already been traumatized and 
displaced. United Technologies sold 18 Black Hawk helicopters to the regime for 228 
million dollars and Textron of Texas charged 60 million dollars for upgraded Huey 
helicopters that date back to the horrors that the US inflicted on defenceless villagers in 
Vietnam. Both United Technologies and Textron invested almost two million dollars in 
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both Republican and Democratic political campaigns between 1996 and 1998 in order to 
secure such juicy – blood-splattered – contracts (www.narconews.org, 2003).      
The interviews with representatives of the Colombian Armed Forces – the Ministry of 
Defence official, the member of DAS (Colombian Department of State Security), the two 
recruits and the graduate of military high school – support the hypothesis that the 
Colombian army is (like Colombian politics) a ruthless business. The official (Interview 
2) claims that more than half the population suffers from hunger and that the inhabitants 
of rural areas or of poor urban districts see the army as the only way out. The Colombian 
Armed Forces mainly operate in isolated regions and unscrupulous officers hire their 
soldiers out as mercenaries and hit men. The representative of DAS (Interview 3) 
admitted that the main role of the Colombian Department of State Security is to 
implement the interests of current regimes. These interests include the assassination of 
political opponents. DAS is close to the drug cartels and paramilitary groups. The two 
recruits have experienced the ruthlessness of the Colombian army: the cruelty of military 
training (Image 17) and the use of soldiers to clean (massacre) campesinos and to 
transport illegal drugs. One of the recruits describes military hierarchy: the commanders 
who polish the public image of the army; the officers who profit from human rights 
abuses and illegal drug trade; and the others, those who lay their lives on the line because 
they have no money, ethics are an unaffordable luxury, and they no choice but to believe. 
The graduate of the military high school describes the culture of the military school that 
educates future officers: the army is presented as a career. Students are trained in all 
aspects of military and militarised society. They are rewarded for infiltrating circles of 
friends, informing on them, and betraying their trust. Successive US and Colombian 
governments and armies have collaborated in the creation of this military culture. El 
Tiempo (the main Colombian newspaper) for example highlighted the intimate 
relationship between these two regimes, noting that in the course of President George W. 
Bush’s visit to the capital, the current Colombian President, Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
‘placed his right arm across his chest and pledged allegiance to the United States as the 
Stars and Stripes played in the background’ (El Tiempo, 12-3-2007: 1-2).  
76 
 
Paramilitary allies 
The relationship between US and Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries is intimate 
and crucial in the implementation and legitimization of coercion because the 
paramilitaries deflect attention from the diabolical cruelty that current international 
political, social and economic interests and policies entail.    
The US Yarborough Mission to Colombia in 1962 heralded in Phase 1 of the US 
sponsorship of paramilitarism (1962-80). The US army issued two instructions: that the 
Colombian civilian population must set up and support paramilitarism, and that these 
same people must simultaneously be the main target of paramilitary counter-insurgency. 
CINEP describes this strategy as ‘the war against social movements and against positions 
that do not conform to the status quo’ (2004: 17).  
This banner at the entrance to the port of Puerto Boyacá at a bend in the Magdalena River 
corresponds to Phase 2 in the local roots and nature of paramilitarism (1982-9) 
‘Welcome to Puerto Boyacá, land of peace and progress,  
anti-subversive capital of Colombia’ (ibid) 
The second phase of paramilitarism involved these six elements: 1. the creation of an 
army brigade (the 14
th
 Brigade) to supervise (oppress) the Middle Magadelena region and 
the assignation of a batallion (Batallon Barbula) to the oil town of Barrancabermeja, 2. 
the consolidation of the North American discourse of the ‘internal enemy’ that had been 
defined as the civilian population, 3. cooperation between the US and Colombian Armed 
Forces at the highest levels, 4. collaboration between military and civil administration, 5. 
that local businesses and ranches should fund operations and 6. that local Liberal 
politicians allied to government ministers should support the paramilitary program or 
rather pogrom. The main paramilitary group changed its name from MAS (No more 
kidnappings) to AUC (Units of self-defence).  
Paramilitaries represented and became big business. The Colombian 14
th
 Army Brigade 
supplied the arms. ACDEGAM (the association of ranchers and farmers in the 
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Magdalena region) provided the funds and logistics. MORENA (the local paramilitary 
political party) spread the good news through political circles. Drug cartels and 
paramilitaries from other regions participated in this luscious joint venture (Images 13 
and 14). The Colombian army and paramilitary groups patrolled the region together. 
Israeli and British mercenaries were paid to share state-of-the-art military methods to 
torture, kill, cull and control local populations in the name of profits and progress.  
Paramilitaries terrorise the main cities and regions of Colombia in order to monopolise 
and maximise power and profits. The banana region of Uraba for example experienced a 
boom in banana production from 1974 to 1985: in 1974 Uraba supplied 4.5% of the 
world banana market; in 1985 it supplied 11.5%. In the 1960s and 1970s, United Fruit 
displaced 41.29% of the indigenous population. In the 1980s drug cartels and owners of 
banana plantations used paramilitaries to displace the campesinos. The paramilitary 
agenda in this region was to ‘protect the community from the guerrilla, guard the ranches 
of the large landowners and drug traffickers, train personnel for cocaine laboratories, 
attack leftist militants and neutralize political opposition to drug traffic’ (Ramirez Tobon, 
1997).  
Villarraga (1994) attributes the disproportionate number of murders in Cucuta on the 
Colombian-Venezuelan border to paramilitary influences. In 2000 the population of 
789,250 inhabitants (last census) suffered 759 homicides; in 2001 there were 640 
murders; in 2002, 1079; and in 2003 721 homicides were committed: the majority of the 
victims were dragged out of their houses and gunned down in the street. The main 
businesses in Cucuta are drug traffic linked to other forms of contraband such as 
chemicals (used in drug production) and arms. The main victims are ‘common people’ 
who had once ‘had some kind of relationship with the guerrilla’, relatives of ‘those 
presumed to be presently linked to the guerrilla’, social leaders, union members ‘who 
were militant or who had had sympathy with the Left or who were dedicated to the 
political or social struggle or who defended human rights’ as well as ‘delinquents’ and 
‘social offenders’ (ibid: 133).  
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US, European and Colombian governments, Armed Forces and paramilitaries have 
shared economic interests at the cost of local communities. In some territories the 
Colombian Armed Forces have sided with one group of paramilitaries against another. 
Uribe Alarcón (1996), for example, attributes the high levels of violence in the emerald 
region of North Boyacá to the conflict between the two main factions or clans: the Borbur 
and the Coscuez communities (Image 12). The local rural population is miserably poor 
and isolated from national institutions such as schools and hospitals. The leaders of the 
Borbur faction have connections with national and regional governments, the Colombian 
Armed Forces and the National Bank (ibid: 117). They allied themselves to the 
paramilitaries of Gonzalo and Henry de Jesus Perez during the 1980s. The Coscuez 
faction had connections with the drug trafficker, Rodriguez Gacho and his paramilitaries. 
The conflict between these factions is ruthless: entire families are targeted and 
assassinated member by member, grandmother to granddaughter, leaving the perpetrator 
to last. In other territories the Colombian Armed Forces and their paramilitary colleagues 
– many of whom are also members of the Armed Forces – collaborate.  
Here is an eye witness account of the recent results of this joint venture in the Afro-
Colombian coastal region of Choco         
‘My husband was dragged out in his underwear. His shirt was unbuttoned and he was 
barefoot. As I left the house to go to my neighbours’ houses, I heard people crying. The 
corpses of my husband and our three neighbours had been thrown into the gutter. Soon 
after that, soldiers passed by on the other side of the river. They cut off the heads of two 
of the men. They threw one of the heads away and they played football with the other 
one’ (Giraldo, 1997: 27). 
Implementation of interests 
These armed groups play a crucial role in the implementation of the interests of foreign 
companies, Colombian conglomerates and drug cartels. There is a direct geographical 
correlation between the location of international oil and mineral conglomerates on 
Colombian soil, the investment of Colombian drug cartels in land and infrastructure, the 
massacres and displacements of local Colombian populations, the location of US ‘anti-
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narcotics’ bases and the re-insertion - or rather re-deployment - of Colombian 
paramilitaries (Sintraminercol, 2004). Two legal measures have played a crucial role in 
the legitimization and promotion of massacres and displacements: the Constitution of 
1886 that donated the sub-soil to the Colombian State (i.e. to foreign banks and 
companies, current members of government, their families and their business associates) 
and the Code of Mines of 1947 that gives companies the right to construct, instal and 
maintain sites, elements and equipment to explore, exploit and extract billions of dollars 
of mineral resources. Two million people have been displaced from these oil and mineral 
regions in the last 25 years. There were more than 6,000 assassinations there between 
1995 and 2002 (ibid). 
 
The oil regions attracted the drug cartels which bought up territories on the banks of the 
Magdalena river, in almost all of the municipalities in the south of Casanare and in the 
north and West of Meta: the main areas of massacre and displacement are the ones which 
receive the most petroleum royalties and their land has soared in value as a result of oil 
infrastructures and land rental (Friends of the Earth, 2001). Foreign oil companies – 
backed by immense international and national political, social and economic and military 
power and local paramilitary death squads – massacre the indigenous people and 
campesinos and natural environment and animals. Occidental oil company has poured 
five billion barrels of hot contaminated water into the forests and the sacred lake in the 
Lipa region: the Guahibo people has been reduced to malnutrition, alcoholism and 
prostitution. BP has polluted and drained the Orinoco region: mountains, lakes, rivers, 
tropical forest, plains, animals, birds, reptiles have been massacred.  
The main mining union (Sintraminercol, 2004) has analysed the relationship between the 
location of US ‘anti-narcotics’ bases and the presence of oil and mineral resources in 
different Colombian regions. The first anti-narcotics base is in the south of Bolivar in the 
middle of a dispute between small local miners, Platinum Western and Anglo-Gold for 
one of the richest goldfields in the world. Anglo-Gold merged with Ashanti Goldfields of 
Ghana in April 2004 to become the world’s largest gold producer with 26 mines on four 
continents that produce around 7.5 million ounces of gold every year. The Cano-Limon-
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Covenas pipeline runs through here. Harken Energy has an oil well in this region. The US 
President, George W. Bush served on its board of directors from 1986 to 1990. The 
second base is in Tolima. This is also rich in gold and precious stones. The third narcotics 
base is in Norte de Santander. The Occidental oil pipeline operates there. This is a 
massive coalfield. Nearly all of the coal is exported to the United States.  
3. Current resistance 
M-19, EPL, ELN and FARC 
Part of the resistance to the coercion of the Dictatorship, National Front and current 
regime has been armed, the four most powerful armed political opposition groups that 
have existed in Colombia since 1953 being: the M-19, the EPL, the ELN and the FARC. 
This part of the thesis analyses armed resistance to coercion. Part 2 of the thesis on the 
other hand analyses the unarmed resistance of alternative political, social and cultural 
movements and media groups in order to understand the nature – and limits - of consent 
rather than coercion.  
El Eme (M-19) 
Álvaro Fayad Delgado led the M-19, the FARC and the ELN guerrilla groups. He 
participated in the Betancur peace process but was shot dead in Bogotá in 1986. Álvaro 
claimed that the M-19 was unique because it broke ‘the bipartite Liberal Conservative 
monopoly of the popular consciousness’, compelled the ‘oligarchy’ to commit electoral 
fraud, created ‘the most cohesive organisation of landless campesinos’ in Colombian 
history and caused ‘the greatest mobilisation of land occupation’ (Alape, 1985: 315).  
Fayad argued that the Colombian campesino movement – expressed itself through 
guerrilla warfare – and had started to threaten the system of large-scale land ownership. 
The M-19 group lacked the political and ideological sophistication of other Leftist armed 
groups but had managed to ‘mobilise the masses in the anti-oligarchic struggle’ (ibid: 
316). He also insisted that the M-19 group had distanced itself from Classical Marxism 
because - as another assassinated leader, Jaime Bateman once said - ‘there are so many 
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principles’ that should be implemented in Classical Marxism that ‘you end up canceling 
every activity’.  
The three most important symbolic acts of the M-19 group were to steal Simón Bolívar’s 
sword in 1974, to rob five thousand arms from the military base in Canton in 1979, and to 
occupy the Dominican embassy in 1980. The group stole the sword in order to capture 
and channel nationalistic sentiments. The theft of arms was designed ‘to abort attempts to 
implement a dictatorship’ (ibid). The Turbay regime had already raised the number of 
tortures, employed psychologists and doctors to refine torture methods, trained their 
torturers in US military schools and directed torture at the civilian population. The 
occupation of the embassy promoted human rights forums and mobilised a political 
campaign against the US and its doctrine of the ‘internal enemy’. 
The EPL 
Oscar William Calvo represented both the Colombian communist party and the EPL in 
the Betancur ‘peace’ negotiations (or rather massacre of political dissidents). He was 
assassinated in Bogotá in 1985 during these not so peaceful ‘negotiations’  
Calvo claimed that the EPL surged from the expulsion of militant elements from the 
Colombian communist party in 1962, arguing that the communist party had stifled 
spontaneous ‘armed political struggle’ (Alape, 1985: 298). The other important factor in 
the birth of the EPL was the official state repression of revolutionary groups and the 
systematic assassination of popular leaders. In 1966 the EPL decided to create armed 
instruments of ‘popular power’ in rural regions using Maoist principles. In 1967 they 
decided to create a ‘revolutionary army’ rather than a mere ‘military arm of the 
communist party’. In the 1970s the movement spread to the cities and to more rural areas. 
The main aim of the EPL was to create ‘articulation’ between ‘rural and urban guerrilla’, 
between ‘guerrilla groups and mass movements’ and between ‘open political struggle and 
armed struggle’ (Images 10, 11 and 35). 
The demobilised communist leader and activist (Interview 16) described the 
organisational structure of the EPL. This group was based on the three crucial elements 
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of Classical Marxist struggle: the party, the military wing and the masses. The first 
element is the party which provides political direction through communist leaders who 
have ‘a clear vision of the way forward’ and who can therefore ‘control the course of the 
armed social revolution’. These leaders pass through a process of ideological formation 
and pre-militancy that tests their capacity as leaders. The second element is the military 
wing. Their role is crucial because ‘substantial social change has always been preceded  
and precipitated by violence’ and because the leaders of the traditional parties ‘will not 
surrender their power’ and ‘will not fight for us’ especially ‘if they promise to’. The 
military wing is responsible for waging this war against the traditional parties. The last 
element is the masses: ‘those that sympathize with our cause and will participate in the 
revolution and in the seizure of power’. She herself operated on the political and social 
level, rising to the central committee of the main energy union in the strategic oil town of 
Barrancabermeja during the most bloodthirsty era of paramilitary expansion in the region, 
organising a massive power cut, setting up communist cells in Ecopetrol, the State oil 
monopoly, collecting funds. She risked her life on many occasions. Once she was 
arrested for stealing from a supermarket (to finance communist activities). She had 
weapons and communist materials and a stash of money in her house. Another time she 
had to talk a paramilitary chief into not assassinating her. Her actions demonstrate high 
levels of intelligence, commitment, courage and faith. Both she and the demobilised EPL 
leader (Interview 15) sincerely believed that they would win: that armed communist 
groups would seize total control of the State. The commander describes the high level of 
political, military and social power of the movement. In the 1980s armed EPL groups had 
the discipline and elasticity required to attack, retreat, regroup, and attack once more. It 
had 2,000 soldiers, eight or ten urban groups and two rural groups, 1,000 popular leaders, 
a radio station and an international political front. The EPL had commandos who 
specialized in infiltrating enemy installations and blowing them to pieces.  
These two interviewees attribute the demobilisation of the EPL to problems on the three 
classical levels: political, military and social. Some of their leaders had ‘personal 
interests’; others had been too naïve; some, the best of them, had been and would be 
assassinated by the State. The Colombian army and paramilitaries operated ruthlessly, 
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infiltrating and massacring urban cells, mopping up the armed groups in the country. 
Finally, most important of all, ‘the majority of Colombian people did not want 
revolution’.  
The coordinator recalls the feeling of sadness, of being betrayed by the leaders      
‘I felt happy at the start of the peace negotiations. I didn’t feel pain as others did. I 
thought that everything that had happened before, that everything that we had done, had 
been for this. I didn’t realise that our leaders had mounted this façade in order to betray 
us. The truth sank in as I listened to old comrades making speeches in the public squares 
and saying that I had betrayed them and had made a deal with the paramilitaries’ 
(Interview 16). 
The EPL commander on the other hand ends on a more optimistic note 
‘Our country is not so hopeless. It is a nation in construction; Colombia is evolving. Rich 
countries have already stagnated and died; rich people are cold and indifferent to other 
people and to life. We at least are still alive. Our problem is that we have to create new 
forms of resistance and revolution because our lives are shit: we live in material and 
spiritual poverty; we are nearly animals but nearer to vegetables. We need to develop the 
politics of being human, need to return to primary sources, to the most basic natural 
elements, need to be ethical and to respect life. This is the source of indigenous 
resistance. Any social group or movement that resuscitates this fundamental human 
principle of respecting life and other people has a positive social impact’ (Interview 15).  
This – ‘the politics of being human’ (ibid) - is the ideal behind the alternative political, 
social and cultural movements that will be analysed in Part 2.   
The ELN 
The roots of the ELN are in the José Antonio Galán Brigade that originated in  the 
international communist party conference in La Habana in 1963 at the end of the Cuban 
revolution. Their leaders claimed that ‘popular expression had no other choice’ but ‘class 
struggle’ and ‘prolonged popular war’ (Alape, 1985: 282). The ‘decisive figures’ in their 
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movement were Che Guevara and Camilo Torres. Camilo (Image 8) helped to create an 
ideological fusion between Christianity and Marxism that captured ‘national sentiment’ 
(ibid: 281). The clandestine condition of the ELN - ‘always in the enemy’s gun sights’ – 
has inhibited its educational and ideological base (ibid: 284). Its main aim is create a 
popular revolutionary army that can seize State control.     
The demobilised leader of the ELN and the FARC claims that the murder of one of their 
leaders radicalised the movement in the late 1970s (Interview 18). He himself started to 
participate in military operations: ‘recovering finances’ (robbing) and ‘retaining’ 
(kidnapping) high profile corrupt businessmen on the grounds that they should pay for 
their crimes against the Colombian people. At the end of the year he accompanied a 
group of fourteen militants, twelve of them women, to work with the masses (trabajar 
con las masas) in the sparsely populated rural regions in the north of the Valle de Cauca. 
The main problem that the ELN faced there – and continues to face – is the fact that their 
movement is ‘profoundly and inevitably intellectual and idealistic’.  
The FARC 
The origin of the FARC is in the Liberal self-defense groups that operated in the region 
of Tolima during La violencia (1948-58). In the 1960s the communist party had a strong 
influence on these groups which had allied themselves to campesino movements in the 
south of Tolima (Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, El Pato, Guayabero) and in Sumapaz and 
Rio Ariari. Senator Álvaro Gómez Hurtado (son of the Conservative President, Laureano 
Gómez) labelled these small farm settlements ‘independent republics’ and argued that 
‘the nation’ should incorporate them ‘by force’. In 1964 the army targeted Marquetalia: 
situated in the north of Tolima and protected by an armed communist group. The US 
army planned this mission (massacre) as part of Plan Lazo, aiming to eradicate 
‘communist influence’ in the region. In this case the ‘internal enemy’ referred to 48 
badly-armed campesinos. The US supplied the means and the methods: the tactics that 
they had developed in Vietnam (the propaganda and the napalm), the combat planes and 
the munitions. The Colombian Armed Forces employed 16,000 soldiers (Image 5).  
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In 1965 the armed communist group that had defended Marquetalia had their first 
conference: and decided to form a southern unit (Bloque Sur) in order to protect agrarian 
settlements and movements in the south of Tolima. Their tactic was to be mobile: in order 
to avoid the Colombian army. The members of this group had their second conference in 
Meta. They decided to call themselves FARC: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia. They set up their central command (‘Estado Mayor’) and decided to form 
armed nuclei in the regions that would finally seize control of the country. The third 
conference occurred in Guayabero, Tolima. Here they organised their fourth armed front 
in the Middle Magdalena. Their sphere of influence ran from Boyacá to Santander. Once 
more they stressed the necessity of mobility: the Quindio group had almost been 
annihilated because the majority of FARC forces had been concentrated in one region. 
The FARC organised their fourth conference in April, 1971 in El Pato, Tolima. By then 
they had 780 combatants, planning to return to the Cordillera Central (the central 
mountain chain) and to open a new front in the region of Uraba. Fronts rather than 
settlements remained the main instruments of their territorial expansion.  
The FARC played a key role in regions such as Medio Magdalena before paramilitary 
massacres and purges began in the 1980s. De Rementeria (1986) attributes the extreme 
violence in Medio Magdalena to its strategic importance: the region lies on the main river 
(the River Magdalena), borders five of the most important economic regions in Colombia 
(Antioquia, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, Boyacá and Cundinamaraca) and 
Barrancabermeja, the richest oil city in Colombia is situated in the centre. Small farms 
are not profitable because the region lacks roads; ranching has made it ‘a region of 
colonisation’ and ‘the absence of State jurisdiction or its reduction to policing leaves the 
resolution of the social conflict between landowners and small farmers to their capacity 
to accumulate and unleash social, political or military power’ (ibid: 336). The State has 
not provided ‘roads, energy, communications, markets, commercial centers, health, 
education, credit or farming technology’ (ibid: 337). The official role of the Armed 
Forces is to defend ‘national territory’ (ibid: 341). Local army commanders are corrupt: 
some are local landowners; their soldiers torture, execute, murder and steal (ibid: 343). 
Drug traffickers have used their economic power and military and paramilitary violence 
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‘to force campesinos to abandon their land’ (ibid: 345). De Rementaria argues that the 
FARC on the other hand ‘defended the interests of small farmers and redistributed land’ 
(ibid: 345).  
In 1985 the FARC entered politics and formed their own party: La union patriotica (UP). 
Their main proposals were: to cancel the permanent state of emergency, to dissolve two-
party politics, to initiate democratic electoral reform based on the popular election of 
mayors and governors, to initiate urban and rural reform based on State housing and the 
return of land that politicians had appropriated, to oppose the IMF and the payment of the 
so-called national debt, to reduce investment in the military and the police, and to 
nationalise natural resources such as petroleum, coal, gas and uranium and other 
monopolies such as the banks. Between 1986 and 1988 the Colombian State assassinated: 
two UP senators, three members of the House of Representatives, six deputies, 19 
councillors, three mayor’s candidates, one ex-mayor and 1000 members. More than 
5,000 members of the UP have been murdered by the Colombian army and their 
paramilitary colleagues since 1986.  
Representativeness of the FARC 
Perhaps the most important issue to be addressed in terms of armed resistance to the 
severe coercion of the current Colombian regime is the role and nature and 
‘representativeness’ of the FARC in political and social terms, the main questions being: 
does the FARC represent the interests of particular sectors of the Colombian population, 
and – if so – which sectors does the FARC represent, and how does the FARC represent 
them?  
The response depends on political and social interests and perspectives and on personal 
experience. The official FARC line is that ‘popular expression’ has ‘no other choice’ but 
‘class struggle’ and ‘prolonged popular war’ (Alape, 1985: 282) because of the 
ruthlessness of US and European and Colombian business interests. The main proposals 
of the UP reflected this ideological position: to cancel the permanent official State of 
Siege – that legitimized coercion and to reduce the investment in the army and police that 
implemented coercion - to democratize Colombian politics, to initiate urban and rural 
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reform based on State housing and the return of land, to oppose the IMF and the payment 
of the so-called national debt and to nationalise natural resources and other monopolies. 
The response to these proposals – the assassination of more than 5,000 unarmed members 
of the UP and the absence of social reform – suggests that members of the FARC must be 
armed in order to survive and that these peaceful methods have failed.  
De Rementeria (1986), Jaramillo Salgado (1998) and the demobilised leader of the ELN 
and FARC guerrilla groups (Interview 18) claim that the FARC has support in rural 
regions because the group has provided a measure of ‘security’ and ‘justice’ in the total 
absence of State institutions (Jaramillo Salgado, 1998: 2), because the FARC has 
redistributed land and subsidised campesinos, and because the group has pressured 
businesses to respect labour rights. The FARC has a presence in about 400 of the 1071 
municipalities in Colombia (ibid: 2) but most of these communities are remote - located 
in the plains, forests, mountains and borders – rather than in the cities.  
More than 70% of the Colombian population lives in cities. More than three million 
Colombian campesinos have been displaced to the cities in the last 20 years. There, in the 
cities, the government, big business, Armed Forces and mass media organisations invest 
billions of dollars in the assassination of members of the FARC, in the massacre of 
FARC supporters, in media campaigns that demonise the FARC (see Part 2 and Part 3 of 
this thesis) and in the suppression of political and social reform. The Colombian regime 
defines ‘enemies of the regime’ as ‘friends of the guerrilla’ (see Parts 2 and 3 of this 
thesis) – does not distinguish armed and unarmed resistance – and treats supporters of the 
FARC as members of the FARC and therefore as legitimate targets of selective 
assassination and massacre. Representatives and members of alternative political and 
social movements do not therefore support the group in public: but the FARC has 
infiltrated these movements as part of the ‘combination of all forms of struggle’ 
(Jaramillo Salgado, 1998: 1) and has supported urban mobilisations such as the one that 
defended the rights of the inhabitants of Patio Bonito in Kennedy (Interview 19). 
Interviews with representatives of other guerrilla groups (Interviews 15-18) on the other 
hand suggest that the FARC has persecuted and sometimes decimated other communist 
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groups. The personal accounts of demobilised members such as ‘Johanna’ (Peralto and 
Patino, 2004) suggest that the FARC can be ruthless against transgressors. Her four 
youngest brothers were murdered one by one in order to punish her because she escaped. 
FARC groups – such as the notorious Ricardo Franco Front – have committed horrific 
crimes against alleged traitors. Hernando Pizarro Leon-gómez – the brother of Carlos, the 
assassinated hero of the M-19 - executed around 200 of his own men in the Cauca region 
in 1985, because he believed that his group had been infiltrated by the army.  
This analysis of the representativeness of the FARC in political and social terms has 
referred to a broad range of political and social perspectives: the official FARC line, the 
rural and urban populations, the Colombian regime, the alternative political and social 
movements, the other guerrilla groups and the demobilised members of the FARC. This 
information suggests that guerrilla groups such as the FARC operate on an infinite 
number of levels – both armed and unarmed, both violent and peaceful, both idealistic 
and opportunistic, both in personal interest and in self-defence – and that the level and 
nature of FARC support fluctuates and is impossible to measure precisely.     
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Conclusion  
The role and nature of coercion, 1499 - present 
Part 1 has suggested that the abuse of coercion and the human rights abuses that the 
current Colombian regime perpetrates have historical roots: that the regime committed 
massacres during the Spanish Conquest and Colonial Period, during the period of 
Independence, during Conservative and Liberal rule, that the murders continue, that the 
principal cause and consequence of this severe coercion is the accumulation of profits 
and resources, credit and power, and that peripheral (Colombian) perpetrators represent 
and implement foreign interests (Images 21 and 22). The nature and strength of this claim 
is assessed in more depth and detail in the General Conclusion. Part 2 of this thesis 
analyses the complementary role and nature of consent. 
But one important issue should be addressed at this stage - between Part 1 of the thesis 
that focuses on the historical role and nature of coercion in Colombia - and Part 2 of the 
thesis that focuses on the complementary role and nature of consent in Colombia.  
The issue is this: why does this thesis focus on media organisations and production as the 
main instruments of consent rather than other important instruments of consent such as 
the Church, the legal system, and other institutions ‘which look as if they have nothing in 
common with the political power, and as if they are independent of it, while they are not. 
These institutions include the family, the university, all teaching systems, institutions of 
knowledge, of foresight and care, such as medicine’ (Foucault, 1971). 
This thesis admits that all these instruments of consent are important. This text focuses on 
media organisations and media and news production because researchers have access to a 
large amount of information about the role and nature of media organisations (through 
official reports and through interviews with editors and journalists) and to large numbers 
of texts that provide information both on historical events and on the role and nature and 
interests of the media organisations that produce this information.  
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The role and nature of the Church, the legal system, the family, the education system, 
institutions ‘of knowledge, of foresight and care’ (Foucault, 1971) in the production of 
consent is less accessible but also important. This thesis treats the Church both as an 
instrument of consent and as an instrument of media production in Part 2, Chapter 1 of 
the thesis. This chapter analyses the mutual interests of the Spanish Empire and Catholic 
Church, the censorship that the Spanish Inquisition implemented and the production of 
bulls, tracts and sermons that demonised local populations and legitimized Conquest and 
coercion. The thesis also assesses the role of the Church in the legitimization of 
Conservative party coercion in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Century and assesses the use and abuse 
of legal and education systems until present times. Part 2, Chapter 4 analyses the role and 
nature of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 that promised so much in terms of consent 
and freedom but delivered so little.  
Further analysis of these important instruments of consent – and coercion - is beyond the 
scope of this thesis but is recommended to other researchers. Once more this thesis 
reminds its readers that the General Conclusion analyses the role and nature of the 
interplay between coercion and consent and that the summaries at the end of each 
historical period in Part 2 will therefore refer to the role of coercion in the production of 
consent just as Part 1 has already referred to the role and nature of consent in the 
production of coercion.                   
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Part 2 
 
Consent 
 
‘Every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the 
great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) 
which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces of development, and hence to the 
interest of the ruling classes’  
(Gramsci, 2005: 258) 
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Introduction 
The aim of Part 1 has been to understand the nature of coercion and of the Colombian 
armed conflict in terms of the interests that predominate in each historical period, in 
terms of the role of armed groups – the main instruments of coercion - in the 
implementation of these interests, and in terms of the resistance to these interests and 
pressures. The aim of Part 2 on the other hand is to understand the political, social and 
economic nature of media organisations and media production and consent in Colombia 
in terms of three basic elements: 1. the interests that predominate in media organisations 
and production in the same broad historical periods, 2. the role of media organisations – 
the main instruments of consent - in the implementation of these interests, and 3. dissent, 
and the resistance to these interests and pressures. Each of the four chapters in Part 2 
focuses on a different historical period from the Spanish Conquest to the present time. 
This part of the thesis suggests that central institutions have invested in and have 
influenced the development of media organisations and media production in peripheral 
regions such as this.  
Part 1 of the thesis focused on coercion but included elements of consent - political 
parties and social groups, political and religious ideologies, strategic alliances and 
personal interests – because coercion is based on consent and vice versa. Part 2 on the 
other hand will concentrate on consent but will include elements of coercion: because the 
same interests that invested in coercion and the maximisation of profits through 
massacres and armed conflict in Part 1 have invested in consent and the maximisation of 
profits through assassination of journalists and pressures on media production in Part 2. 
Part 2 also suggests that Colombian media organisations play a crucial role in the 
legitimization of coercion through the labelling of social groups and through the 
definition of friend and enemy. This is reflected in the short conclusions that are 
presented at the end of each historical section in Part 2 and that summarise the role and 
nature of consent in each historical period and the influence of coercion on consent. 
These issues will be explored in more depth and detail in  the General Conclusion that 
analyses the role of both coercion and consent and the relationship between them in as 
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much depth and detail as possible. The role of Part 2 is to provide the historical 
information on consent that this discussion requires. This part of the thesis is based on 
historical sources, academic articles, political pamphlets and literature, newspapers and 
magazines, flyers and graffiti that represent the broadest possible political and social 
spectrum and on fourteen interviews (Appendix 2) that are designed to penetrate the 
‘ominous cloud of silence’ (Moreno Fraginals, op cit) that shrouds the roots and nature of  
Colombian media organisations and the relationship between alternative political, social 
and cultural movements, alternative media groups and alternative media production.  
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Chapter 1 
Media production – and the production of consent - at the time of the Spanish Conquest 
and the Spanish Colonial Period (1499-1781) 
The first part of Chapter 1 analyses the nature of the interests which influenced media 
production at the time of the Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period: the mutual 
socio-economic interests of the Spanish monarchy and the Catholic Church that are 
reflected in the role of Spanish authors and intellectuals and of censorship in the 
implementation of these interests. The second part assesses the role of the printing press – 
one of the most important instruments of consent among the Spanish rulers (another 
being the pulpit) – in the implementation of these interests. The third part analyses the 
nature of resistance to these interests and pressures: the denunciations of the Spanish 
‘saints’ and the cultural resistance of indigenous and Afro-Colombian people at the time 
of the Spanish Conquest and Colonial Period. The main role of Chapter 1 is to 
accumulate information on - and insights into - the role and nature of consent in the 
Conquest and Spanish Colonial period 1499-1781) in order to understand the roots and 
nature of consent and news production in regions such as this.  
Chapter 1 addresses two crucial issues. The first issue is: how did the Spanish printing 
press promote and legitimize coercion in this period? The second is: how did current 
Colombian mass media organisations and audiences develop from the Spanish printing 
press and the narrow circle of rulers which the Spanish printing press addressed? The 
short conclusion that is presented at the end of this historical section summarises the role 
and nature of consent in this historical period and the influence of coercion on consent. 
These issues are addressed in depth in the General Conclusion.    
1. Interests that predominated in media production in this period 
This part of the thesis suggests that the socio-economic interests of two central colonial 
institutions – the Spanish monarchy and the Catholic Church – coincided and influenced 
media production in this historical period (1499-1781) and that these interests are the 
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principal source of consent. The Spanish printing press promoted these interests by 
labelling indigenous and African people as the enemy. Spanish authors and intellectuals 
collaborated in this ‘holy’ Spanish mission and Spanish authorities practised strict 
censorship for the same reason,     
The Catholic Kings 
The information in this part of the thesis suggests that the Spanish rulers and the Catholic 
Church had mutual interests in media production and that both institutions used the media 
of the Conquest and Colonial Period to define ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’, to promote and 
legitimize the armed conflict – between Spanish and indigenous, baptised and unbaptised, 
pure and impure, white and black, Spanish and Creol, friends and enemies – and to 
implement central political, social and economic interests. Spanish Colonial leaders used 
papal decrees, religious pamphlets, chronicles and the first newspaper (1792) to 
legitimize and promote genocide, slavery and profits.  
The ship’s log that Christopher Columbus compiled in his first voyage describes this 
territory as a gift from God to the Catholic kings of Spain. He joyously declares not only 
that ‘all Christianity should feel good and celebrate and be grateful to the Holy Trinity’ 
but also that ‘all Christians should benefit’ (Marquinez Argote, 1994: 15). The last part of 
that promise (that all Christians should benefit) was not even fulfilled in his case: the 
Catholic Kings ordered his arrest at the end of his third voyage and stripped him of power 
and privilege; on his fourth voyage – through Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama 
– he died. The three Conquistadors – Quesada, Belalcázar, Federmann - met similar fates 
on their return to Spain. The Spanish Empire appropriated the land and property that the 
military leaders had seized on their behalf and these ‘loyal vassals’ died in exile and 
agony.  
The Catholic Church supported the Spanish rulers in the colonisation of the continent as 
Part 1 of this thesis has claimed. Pope Alexander VI appointed these rulers as the 
‘Catholic Kings’ in 1496: in official recognition of their role in the Great Brotherhood of 
Catholicism (La Gran Hermandad) that targeted heresies such as Protestantism, in the 
Spanish Inquisition (1480), in the Conquest of Granada (1492) in the massacre and 
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expulsion of Muslims and Jews and in the voyages of discovery, conquest, genocide and 
colonisation (1492-). The Pope declared that the indigenous people should submit to the 
Catholic faith and that ‘their land should pass to Spain’ (Marquinez Argote, 1994: 20). 
Both Church and Empire portrayed and treated the local people as ‘subhuman and 
barbaric’ (ibid). Spanish Catholic attitudes decimated indigenous populations. There were 
more than four million indigenous inhabitants in this region at the start of the Conquest 
and genocide. In 1560 there were around one million, one hundred indigenous people; by 
1580, less than 600,000 people had survived (Borja Gómez, 1998: 220).  
This had such a disastrous effect on production and profits that Pope Paul III passed a 
Bull in 1547 that declared that the indigenous people actually had ‘souls’ and could 
possibly be classified as human beings. The African people on the other hand 
unfortunately did not quite qualify. This racism powered the slave trade. Spanish colonial 
laws prohibited the employment of black slaves in the arts and professions in order to 
minimise social integration and maximise gold production (Mosquera Perea, 2003: 99-
103). 
The role of the intellectual in the Spanish Catholic Empire 
Catholic priests played a crucial role in the ideological conquest - as the authors of 
historical chronicles and religious tracts that promoted and legitimized the Spanish 
Conquest and Colonial Periods - the main point in this part of the thesis being that 
Catholic priests acted as the agents of consent in this period and supported the agents of 
coercion, the Spanish soldiers. Friar Pedro de Aguado stated that his main intention was 
to record the heroic deeds of the Spanish commanders and to collect geographical and 
cultural information that might be useful in the process of colonisation. He dedicates his 
chronicle to Spain and to the ‘heroes’ that she has produced. Spain is represented as the 
motherland. The Spanish soldiers are her children.  
In the middle of the 16
th
 Century, Carlos V of Spain addressed a letter to regional 
administrators in which he used the Church and the Faith to legitimize these colonial 
interests to himself and to his representatives, informing them that ‘our principal 
intention and end has always been and is that the said indians be instructed and 
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indoctrinated in the matters of our Sacred Catholic Faith, reach spiritual enlightenment 
for the salvation of their souls and be well treated and protected in their lives and homes 
and live in good law and order as free men and people and as vassals of ours’ (Tirado 
Mejia, 1988: 54).  
Catholic intellectuals used their limitless – or rather limited - imaginations to manipulate 
and align biblical master frames to suit the current purpose and to maintain the credibility 
and solidarity of Christian colonists. The Bible had reduced the world to three continents 
(Europe, Asia and Africa), had inexplicably omitted the American continent (in addition 
to unimportant regions such as Australia, the Arctic and Antarctica), and had promised 
the Faithful that the Twelve Apostles had spread The Good News to the four ‘corners’ of 
the Earth. To maintain credibility, the intellectuals of the Catholic Church classified 
indigenous people as the descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel who had angered 
the God of the Old Testament because of their wickedly disrespectful idolatry and had 
been rightly punished with exile and slavery.  
Spanish chroniclers such as Juan Friede legitimized the abuse of human rights on 
empirical grounds by denying the humanity of indigenous people: on one occasion Friede  
decided to punish ‘the indians’ of a particular ‘village and land’ because ‘more than of 
any other part’ they ‘have neither judgement nor reason, are more like brutes than human 
men, and have no known lord but only idolatry’ (Borja Gómez, 1998: 52).  
The Churches of the Counter-Reformation adopted measures to increase the power of the 
Church through the appointment and training of priests, through the use of missions and 
missionaries, through the use of  catechisms that had been designed to define and 
manipulate the customs and behaviour of indigenous peoples, the education of their 
children and the administration of their communities, and through the use of Catholic 
institutions and measures such as baptism and funeral rites, marriage and regular 
confession to stifle indigenous culture, eradicate mortal sins and stigmatise not only 
sexual desire but also women: whom the chronicler and priest Juan Rodriguez Freide has 
unkindly portrayed as ‘weapons of the Devil’ who dedicate their lives – having nothing 
better to do with their time - to ‘being cruel, God help us’ (ibid: 272).  
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Rama (1984) describes the religious, administrative, legal and cultural roles of 
intellectuals in colonial cities that reflected the absolute monarchies of European nation 
states. Power radiated from the royal palace through strict concentric circles of 
hierarchical social structure. Higher social classes lived closer to the centre. The 
Elizabethan intellectual Thomas More described these ideal cities  
‘He who knows one of the cities will know them all, so exactly alike are they except 
where the nature of the grounds prevents’ (Utopia, 1516).  
Spanish rulers used these ideal cities as military and intellectual bases to dominate the 
indigenous people in the plantations, to ‘manacle the slaves in the mines’ and to conquer 
the indigenous opposition (ibid: 15). Urban intellectuals adopted positions that 
legitimized the interests and actions of themselves and of the rulers that they represented 
and to implement colonial programs based on the divine rights of Kings and Christians. 
Borja Gómez portrays these Spanish colonial cities as ‘centres of commercial, 
institutional and missionary activity’ which produced  ‘expeditions of pacification and 
penetration’ and led to ‘dreamlike meetings with the strange mysteries’ of a world that 
had been ‘abandoned by God’ and therefore designed and manipulated ‘by Satan’ (1998: 
47).  
Censorship 
The Spanish rulers used strict censorship. Manuscripts had to be published in Spain and 
had to ‘overcome the physical, intellectual, financial and bureaucratic obstacles that the 
social institutions of the period imposed on them’ (Fals Borda, 1956: 45). The publication 
of a book in Spain during the 16th Century ‘had all the characteristics of the heroic’ 
because ‘the authors that achieved this had to tolerate and overcome the physical, 
intellectual, financial and bureaucratic obstacles that the social institutions of the period 
imposed on them’ (ibid). In 1521, the Spanish Catholic monarchy announced that ‘we 
hereby declare that no bookseller or merchant or any other person of any social position 
whatsoever should bring or smuggle or have or sell any book or print or impression of 
those vetoed and prohibited by the Holy Inquisition of whatever language or quality or 
material under pain of death, loss of all wordly goods and that those books will be 
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publicly burned’ (quoted in Ayala Poveda, 2003). Printed documents in this period had to 
be stamped with the words, in the name of the King, Our Lord. This phrase merged 
‘political and religious’ terms and ‘divine and political mandate’ (Silva, 2004: 42).  
The Spanish Inquisition which had been set up in Cartagena on the coast in 1569 
therefore prohibited the unauthorized publication of texts. Spanish rulers controlled 
intellectual production as closely as they controlled mineral and agricultural production 
in this period limiting media production to papal decrees, religious tracts and chronicles. 
In 1735 the Jesuits finally introduced the printing press to the region, using it to publish 
religious pamphlets. The Spanish Colonial regime set up the Royal Press in Bogotá in 
1782. They used it to support the execution of Antonio Galán, the popular leader of the 
comuneros, to accuse him of ‘sedition, theft, incest and murder’ and to demand that his 
‘name and memory’ be erased from the list of ‘those happy vassals’ that ‘had the grace to 
be born in the dominions of the King’ (Ayala Poveda, 2003: 56-7).  
The terms of Galán’s sentence reflected his demonisation. The authorities not only 
hanged and quartered him, displayed his body parts, burnt his remains, cursed his 
descendants; they also ordered that ‘his house be razed to the ground and his land sown in 
salt’ and that ‘his notorious name and detestable memory be obliterated so that only hate 
and resentment remained’ (Borja Gómez, 1998: 300). This is the post-mortem treatment 
that Church authorities meted out to witches.  
2. Role of media organisations in the promotion and legitimization of these interests 
The demonisation of the Other 
This part suggests that the production, definition and demonisation of the Other, the 
enemy – in this case and in this period, indigenous and black populations – promoted the 
interests of the Spanish Colonial rulers and Catholic Church. Borja Gómez (1998) 
suggests that ‘the invention of the enemy is necessary’ in all cultures because ‘it 
facilitates the fluidity of identity; it is the image in the mirror that has to be denied’ (ibid: 
50). He argues that the identification of the new enemy increased in importance as ‘the 
enemies of the Faith were cleaned from the Peninsula’, that finally on the other side of 
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the ocean they found the infidels, and that ‘assuming this messianic condition as regards 
peoples moved by the Devil’ permitted the conquerors and the colonists to transcend the 
notion of original sin, current guilt and personal damnation (ibid: 58-9). Catholic 
definitions of ‘nature’ and of ‘sins against nature’ such as ‘cannibalism, sodomy, human 
sacrifices and bestialism’ legitimized the massacres and theft (ibid: 65). The priest and 
chronicler, Rodriguez Freile summed up the importance of this sacred mission  
‘The monarchy that the Devil had set up in the world from the sin of Adam to the 
redemption of Our Lord has been destroyed but features of the common enemy remain 
especially among gentiles and pagans who lack knowledge of the true God and who 
worship Satan with rituals and ceremonies’ (1984: 32)  
Catholic priests and chroniclers glorified the heroic deeds of the conquerors and the 
genocide of the infidels. The chronicle of Friar Pedro de Aguado for example describes a 
heroic encounter between one of these daring crusaders and an impossibly large ant-eater. 
He also demonises the local people and their culture. He describes tobacco and coca as 
‘the instrument through which the Devil’ controlled the indigenous people, and claims 
that these substances ‘got them drunk and deprived them of their natural judgement’ in 
order to ‘make them worship false idols and adopt false opinions’ (1906: 444).  
El carnero - the chronicle of Juan Rodriguez Freyle, the son of one of the commanders – 
provides first hand historical information on the Conquest, on internal conflicts and on 
local customs. The preface depicts the indigenous people as treacherous, but admits that 
the colonial process ‘should not be copied’ because it poses a threat to the ‘Christian 
soul’ (1926: 1). Papal decrees, religious pamphlets and historical chronicles demonised 
not only indigenous people but also ‘blacks, Jews, women’ and ‘other hosts of Satan’ 
such as Muslims and Protestants (Borja Gómez, 1998). Catholic intellectuals such as Juan 
Gines de Sepulveda (1548) legitimized the destruction of defenceless indigenous 
populations and propagated the Christian religion that legitimized the massacres. He 
provided the Spanish Catholic rationale behind genocide and slavery  
‘The first cause is that barbaric, uncultured and inhumane people are naturally serfs and 
therefore refuse to be influenced by wiser, more powerful and more perfect people. The 
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second is to erase the terrible apathy, the horrendous unnatural crime of devouring human 
flesh and the demonic cults. The third is to save the innocent mortals that these barbarians 
have burnt alive. The fourth cause is the obligation to propagate the Christian religion’ 
(Borja Gómez, 1987: 153-4)  
3. Resistance to these interests and pressures 
Not all the Catholic priests supported the massacres and the slavery, their main medium 
of protest being the sermon. Friar Montesino tried to appeal to the Christian conscience 
of the Spanish colonists: ‘are these not men? Do they not have rational minds? Do they 
not feel pain as you do? Do you not feel this?’ (Marquinez Argote, 1994: 30). Friar 
Bartoleme de las Casas accused the Spanish colonists of having terrorised the region ‘like 
the cruellest wolves and tigers and lions that had suffered from hunger for many days’ 
and of having destroyed the indigenous people. His greatest regret was that the 
indigenous people were ‘capable and docile’ and ‘so apt to receive our sacred Catholic 
faith’ (ibid: 40). The Church appreciated this mixture of compassion and religious zeal: 
and promoted him to sainthood. 
The Catholic priest, Pedro Claver (1580-1640) denounced the treatment of the African 
slaves that arrived at the port of Cartagena in a manuscript entitled ‘The rites and 
superstitions of the Ethiopians’. He provided free food and medical care, converted them 
to Catholicism, campaigned against slavery, died of the plague and was promoted to 
sainthood in 1888 by Pope Leon XIII.  
The resistance of the indigenous people on the other hand has tended to be cultural and 
based on Nature. The nature of this cultural resistance is analysed in Part 2, Chapter 3 
that explores the transcendence of the pamphlets of the indigenous leader, Quintín Lame 
and in Part 2, Chapter 4 that analyses current indigenous cultural production. Black 
resistance is also analysed in Part 2, Chapter 4 through an analysis of Chango, el gran 
putas (1983): the masterpiece of the great Afro-Colombian author, Manuel Zapata 
Olivella.   
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Conclusion  
The role and nature of consent, 1499-1781 
Chapter 1 has suggested that the main role of both consent (persuasion) and coercion 
(physical oppression) at the time of the Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period 
(1499-1781) was to implement the mutual socio-economic interests of the Spanish rulers 
and the Catholic Church. The nature of consent - papal bulls, historical chronicles and 
religious tracts - reflected these shared interests. The authors and intellectuals of this 
period collaborated in the portrayal of indigenous and black people as the enemy and 
legitimized or rather glorified the massacres and slavery. This chapter on the other hand 
suggests that consent was mainly limited to the Spanish rulers and to the heads of the 
Catholic Church: that indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities resisted annihilation 
and dehumanisation, that indigenous and black traditions, cultures and beliefs somehow 
hung on in spite of – or perhaps because of - centuries of coercion. The nature of this 
cultural resistance will be explored in more depth in Part 2, Chapter 3 and 4. 
Consent was based on severe coercion rather than vice versa: the Spanish Empire and 
Church authorities used the Spanish Inquisition to impose strict censorship in order to 
promote the religious discourse – the sanctification of the One, the demonisation of the 
Other - that legitimized these severe human rights abuses. This issue - the interplay 
between coercion and consent from the Spanish Conquest to the present - will be 
explored in more depth and detail in the General Conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 
Media production – and the production of consent - at the time of the Independence 
movements (1781-1832) 
The first part of Chapter 2 analyses the nature of Creol interests in media production at 
the time of the Independence movements (1781-1832). The second part assesses the role 
and nature of political pamphlets and newspapers – important instruments of consent 
among Creol leaders - in the implementation of these interests. The third part of Chapter 
2 analyses the nature of resistance to colonial interests and pressures – in the chants, 
slogans, banners, proclamations, speeches and political pamphlets of the comuneros – in 
the translation of the Rights of Man, in the principles that the Creol leader and 
‘Liberator’, (Simon Bolívar, ‘El Liberador’) expressed in the speech that he made in the 
Congress of Angostura in 1819 and in the final message he sent to the Creols before he 
disappeared into exile in 1830. The main role of Chapter 2 is to present insights into the 
role and nature of consent and media production at the time of the Independence 
movements (1781-1832) in order to supplement the information presented in Chapter 1 
and to accumulate insights into consent and media production in Colombia.  
Chapter 2 addresses two crucial issues. The first issue is: how did Creol pamphlets and 
newspapers promote and legitimize the armed struggle and the coercion in this period? 
The second is: how did current Colombian mass media organisations and audiences 
develop from the Creol printing press and the narrow circle of Creol leaders that the 
printing press addressed? The short conclusion that is presented at the end of this 
historical section summarises the role and nature of consent in this historical period and 
the influence of coercion on consent. These issues are addressed in depth in the General 
Conclusion.   
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1. Interests in media production  
Creol interests = British colonial interests 
This part of the thesis suggests that the interests of the Creols – the descendants of the 
Spanish rulers born in the colonies – influenced political pamphlets and newspapers in 
this historical period (1781-1832) and that these interests are the principal source of 
consent. Creol authors and intellectuals influenced media production in this period by 
promoting and legitimizing Creol interests and by labelling the Spanish Empire as the 
enemy. This permitted the Creols to use the land and its resources as collateral in London 
banks and promoted the political, social and economic interests of the Creols and of the 
British Empire. 
In contrast to the massive popular support that the comuneros represented, the future 
President of the Republic, Antonio Nariño (Image 2) used his newspaper, La Bagatela to 
preach to the narrowest of circles: the members of his masonic lodge. Creol leaders did 
not create a popular uprising based on the highest degrees of consent: they used a mixture 
of forced recruitment and lies, incorporating the popular discourse of the comuneros and 
importing the rhetoric of the French Revolution, translating the Rights of Man and 
promising to liberate black slaves – but simultaneously and secretly planning to cull the 
African population (Bolívar, private letter to Santander, 1812) and replace the Spanish 
regime (García, 1980). The debts that the Creols accumulated as a result of 
Independence, two and a half million pounds at high interest rates and collateral from 
London banks, and the proposed sale of 30,250,250 hectares of Colombian land, indicate 
that the Creols liberated the Colombian people and their land from the Spanish in order to 
sell these human and natural resources to the British.  
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2. Role and nature of media production  
The Spanish press 
In 1791 the Royal Press printed the first important newspaper, El Papel Periodico. This 
paper supported Spanish rule and railed against the French Revolution (Silva, 2004). The 
first editorial stated that the paper did not question Spanish rule. The newspaper practiced 
censorship because ‘some material is not appropriate for all times or all countries’ (II, 
46). Antonio Caballero y Góngora was the main proponent and sponsor of the newspaper. 
He was the Spanish Viceroy and Catholic Archbishop who had brutally betrayed and 
annihilated the comuneros.  The editor was Manuel Socorro de Rodriguez, the founder of 
a salon that disseminated the scientific principles and practices of the European 
Enlightenment. The editor described his narrow readership of 400 subscribers as ‘the 
most healthy and educated part of the nation’ and as ‘all the Enlightened people of the 
New Kingdom from the Viceroy and the Bishop down’ (III, 86). The paper published 
articles related to three central issues - political issues (‘the government of the people’), 
moral issues (‘the regulation of customs’), and economic issues (I, 1). He described his 
paper as ‘the only method’ through which ‘a wise people can transmit authority and 
culture to the rest of the universe’ (I, 23).    
This newspaper played an important role in the manipulation of consent at the end of the 
Spanish Colonial Period: in terms of ‘the approval of the monarchical government’, in 
terms of ‘the ratification of the colonial pact’ and in terms of ‘the legitimization of a 
profoundly segregated hierarchical society’ (Silva, 2004: 103) because the nature of 
consent had started to split at the highest levels of colonial rule: between the recent 
Spanish rulers and the Creols, the older Spanish colonial families. The European 
Enlightenment posed the strongest challenge to Spanish colonial rule because this 
rational intellectual movement emphasised ‘determination and courage to think without 
the direction of another’ (Kant, 1784: 1) and precipitated ‘scientific explorations’ in this 
region. The Botanic Expedition (1783) unearthed vast mineral and botanic resources: 
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20,000 plants that included quinine and indigo. These natural treasures fuelled the 
ambitions of the Creol leaders.  
This thesis suggests that Spanish Catholic authorities used the first newspaper (El Papel 
Periodico) to increase the consent and support of the Creols and to use Creol scientific 
research to maximise profits. This strategy did not succeed because the newspaper fuelled 
Creol ambitions and resistance to Spanish coercion instead. Three members of the 
Botanic Expedition – Francisco Antonio Zea, Fermin de Vargas, Jorge Tadeo Lozano – 
played important roles both in the newspaper and in the Independence Movement. The 
Spanish colonial regime banished Francisco Antonio Zea to Madrid where he was 
appointed head of the Botanic Gardens. He collaborated with Simón Bolívar in the 
publication of El Correo de Orinoco in 1818 - a newspaper that promoted the struggle for 
Independence – and became Vice-President of the new republic under Bolívar in 1819.  
Fermin de Vargas published his ‘Political thoughts’ in 1790 in which he blamed the King 
of Spain for not developing the industrial potential of the region – ‘the agriculture, the 
trade and the mines’ - and competing against other American nations (Vargas, 1968). 
Jorge Tadeo Lozano became President of the First Republic in 1811 and recommended 
federalism based on four States: Cundinamarca (the centre), Cartagena (the main port), 
Popayan (the gold mines) and Quito (the South). Antonio Nariño published the 
newspaper but used the same printing press to publish the Rights of Man. He used the 
press to recruit Creol support, and became President of the Republic in 1812. 
Creol pamphlets and newspapers 
This part suggests that the production, definition and portrayal of the enemy – in this 
case, the Spanish Colonial rulers – promoted Creol and British colonial interests. The 
political pamphlets of Camilo Torres, landowner and President added ideological fuel to 
the  ‘Independence’ movement. The final paragraph of Memorial de agravios – the list of 
grievances against Spanish paternalism that Torres compiled – illustrates the interests of 
the Creols, the bastard offspring of the Spanish Empire 
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‘Oh [how I wish] that the heavens would listen to the sincere wishes of the chief and not 
misunderstand him. Oh that other less liberal principles and ideas don’t produce the 
funereal effects of an eternal separation [between Creol and Spanish rulers]’ (1999: 43)    
Nariño, another Creol leader and intellectual author of this ‘Independence’ movement set 
up the Patriotic Press in 1791. Nariño published the first newspaper, El papel Periodico 
from 1793 to 1797 but was sentenced to prison for 16 years for the publication of the 
Rights of Man: a stirring intellectual product of the French Revolution that he imported 
and translated in order to recruit and inspire Creol allies. Nariño published his own 
newspaper, La Bagatela from 1811-1812 for the same purpose. He aimed this newspaper 
at narrow  audiences – at the members of the Masonic salon that he headed – and used 
this paper to promote the Creol cause. On 19 September 1811 La Bagatela called the 
Creols to arms:  
‘Open your eyes for God’s sake. The hour has come; our ruin is inevitable if we don’t 
unite’.  
In contrast, the next issue – after the Creols have seized power – illustrates his cynical 
use and abuse of media power. This issue insists on ‘strong government’ because ‘all the 
advantages of revolution are also disadvantages’, because ‘every citizen wants his 
opinion to prevail and dominate’ and because ‘this is the time of conspiracies and visceral 
discord where passions acquire extraordinary force and energy’ (19-9-1811). Nariño also 
used La Bagatela to fight a political battle against the current President, Jorge Tadeo 
Lozano, director of another newspaper, El Correo Curioso. Lozano was executed in 1816 
after the Spanish royalists recaptured Medellín and Popayan. The noble general, 
Francisco de Paula Santander, director of El Patriota (1823) also became President. 
Media and politics, Presidents and newspapers are links in the same clunky historical 
chain.    
3. Dissent   
The rebellion of the comuneros failed because consent was limited to the Spanish rulers 
and used to maximise the profits of the Spanish Empire. The regime responded with 
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severe coercion: the leader, Antonio Galan was hung, drawn and quartered and the rebels 
were massacred. The comuneros did, however represent popular feeling: expresssed 
through public protests, marches, chants, slogans, banners, proclamations, speeches and 
political pamphlets. These were the roots of the speeches, pamphlets and newspapers that 
the Creols used to support their Independence movement.  
Perhaps the most important texts of the Creol Independence movement were the Rights 
of Man that Nariño translated from French into Spanish and the speech that Bolívar made 
in the Congress of Angostura in 1819. The Rights of Man claimed that ‘men are born free 
and equal in rights’, that ‘social differences can only be founded on a common good’, 
that ‘the object of every political association is the conversation of natural rights’ and that 
‘these rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression’ (www.hrc.org). 
These rights were not implemented in the Creol republic. This thesis suggests that 
consent has always been based on coercion in peripheral societies such as Colombia – 
rather than coercion on consent and human rights – and severe coercion has been 
implemented in order to maximise profits at the expense of ‘natural rights’ such as 
‘liberty, property, security’ and resistance to coercion (www.hrc.org).    
But members of the Independence movement did demonstrate immense courage – did put 
their lives on the line in the pursuit of nationalism and the republic - and did attempt to 
incorporate the main intellectual principle of the Enlightenment: ‘determination and 
courage to think without the direction of another’ (Kant, 1784: 1). This thesis suggests 
that Creol leaders had the determination and courage to rebel against the Spanish Empire 
and the Catholic Church but did not have the determination and courage to rebel against 
the British Empire and economic dependence.   
The speech that the Creol leader, Simon Bolívar made to the Congress of the new 
republic in 1819 (www.simon-bolivar.org, 2009) highlights the nature of the consent that 
united Bolívar and his supporters – the limitations in the power and authority of  ‘El 
Liberador’ (‘The Liberator’) – and the limits of his definition of liberty and justice. In the 
beginning of this speech he describes himself as a mere ‘wisp of straw’ in ‘the hurricane 
of the revolution’ and claims that he did not have the power to choose between good or 
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evil because ‘irresistible forces’ - that he defines as ‘the regime of the former rulers’ and 
‘the influence of religion and of foreign domination’ – had ‘directed events’ (ibid: 2009). 
In the next part of the speech he declares that the ‘most perfect government’ – that he 
defines as the maximisation  of ‘happiness, social security and political stability’ – must 
be based on a ‘hereditary’ Senate: because the candidates ‘must be prepared’ to fulfil this 
political role and because he doesn’t trust elections. He suggests that only monarchies 
have maintained ‘power, permanence and prosperity’.  
The last message of Simón Bolívar (10 December, 1830) - before he slipped off into 
exile, disappointment and death - suggests that the independence movement suffered 
from internal conflicts. He presents himself as a victim of ‘persecutors’ who had trampled 
on his reputation and his ‘love of freedom’ and had pushed him to the doors of his tomb. 
He asked ‘the people to obey the government in order to free themselves from anarchy’ 
and begged the army ‘to use their swords to defend social guarantees’ 
(www.analitica.com, 2002).         
This thesis suggests that the resistance of the comuneros failed because the Spanish 
colonial regime did not tolerate dissent and reacted to the rebellion with severe coercion 
and ruthlessness. Creol resistance to the Spanish regime, on the other hand, did succeed 
because Creol leaders such as Bolívar were courageous and committed to the cause and 
had advanced military skills and had press-ganged sufficient local soldiers to demolish 
the Spanish armies: the main instruments of coercion.  
But Creol consent was limited to Independence from the Spanish Empire. The Creol 
Independence movement suffered – as all political and social movements do - from 
dissent: based on centralism and federalism (see above), personal interests and the need 
to defend themselves from each other. Creol leaders used their armies and militias – the 
main instruments of coercion – to settle these internal conflicts. Santander and his allies 
prevailed – unsurprisingly - because they had allied themselves to the power of the 
British Empire.    
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Conclusion  
The role and nature of consent, 1781-1832 
Chapter 2 has suggested that both consent (persuasion) and coercion (physical 
oppression) at the time of the Independence movements (1781-1832) implemented the 
socio-economic interests of the Creol leaders that coincided with the interests of the 
London banks.  The nature of consent – the political pamphlets and the newspapers – 
reflected these interests because it glorified the struggle for ‘Independence’. Creol leaders 
and officers seized control of ‘the soil and subsoil of precious metals’ that ‘continued to 
be the factors that conditioned social status’ (García, 1980: 26) and used this as collateral 
to maximise power and profits.  
Creol leaders performed all the main functions of coercion and consent: the same person 
– Nariño, Bolívar or Santander – performed an infinite number of powerful roles: 
President of the Republic, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, director and editor 
of political pamphlets and newspapers, author of massacres and human rights abuses and 
political discourse. This issue - the interplay between coercion and consent from the 
Spanish Conquest to the present - will be explored in more depth and detail in  the 
General Conclusion.      
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Chapter 3 
Media production – and the production of consent - at the time of Conservative and 
Liberal rule (1848-1953) 
The first part of Chapter 3 analyses the nature of Conservative and Liberal interests in 
media production (1848-1953). The second part assesses the role and nature of political 
pamphlets and of political themes in literature, newspapers and magazines and radio 
stations – important instruments of consent among literate party leaders - in the 
implementation of these interests. The third part of Chapter 3 analyses the popular nature 
of resistance to these interests and pressures: oppositional literature, socialist and 
communist marches, protests and newspapers. The main role of Chapter 3 is to present 
insights into the role and nature of consent and media production at the time of 
Conservative and Liberal rule (1848-1953) in order to supplement the information 
presented in Chapter 1 and 2 and in order to accumulate insights into consent and media 
production in Colombia.  
Chapter 3 addresses two crucial issues. The first issue is: how did Conservative and 
Liberal media production promote and legitimize coercion in this period? The second is: 
how did current Colombian mass media organisations and audiences develop from this? 
The short conclusion that is presented at the end of this historical section summarises the 
role and nature of consent in this historical period and the influence of coercion on 
consent. These issues are addressed in depth in the General Conclusion.  
1. Interests in media production  
This part of the thesis suggests that Conservative and Liberal party leaders invested 
heavily in political pamphlets and literature, newspapers and magazines and radio 
stations in this historical period (1848-1953) and that these interests are the principal 
source of consent. Party leaders, authors and intellectuals influenced media content, and 
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media production promoted and legitimized these interests by labelling the other party as 
the enemy. This permitted the party leaders - and the landowners that represented the 
political, social and economic interests that both parties shared - to appropriate, 
monopolise and colonise the land. The British Empire profited greatly from the lethal 
combination of coercion (battles, massacres, selective assassinations) and consent in this 
historical period, ‘importing’ (appropriating) the lion’s share of: two million kilos of 
cotton in 1870, one million pesos of indigo in 1871, eight million kilos of tobacco in 
1875, six million kilos of quinine in 1881 and 150 million kilos of coffee in 1926 (Tirado 
Mejía, 1988).    
Political interests 
The main media owners, directors, editors, authors and journalists in this historical period 
were – as in the previous period – the political and military leaders themselves. Between 
1819 and 1910 thirteen Colombian Presidents had played important military roles. Three 
of them – Simón Bolívar, Melo and Acosta – had organised military coups. Between 
1830 and 1952 sixteen Colombian Presidents had practised law. Between 1862 and 1952 
sixteen Conservative and Liberal Presidents had owned, directed, edited and campaigned 
through newspapers. These numbers – 13, 16, 16 - illustrate the importance of 
Conservative and Liberal investment in coercion and consent: all of these institutions – 
political parties, armed groups, media organisations – having elements of both. Villegas 
et al (1974) similarly claim that Francisco de Paula Santander – President of Nueva 
Granada (1832-7), military commander in (‘hero’ of) the War of Independence, lawyer, 
newspaper owner, director, editor, author - represents ‘the double tradition of legality and 
repression’ (consent and coercion) in Colombia because he used laws ‘to represent his 
own interests and the interests of the minority that he represented, but the moment that 
these laws become an obstacle they are gently laid aside and the legal point is replaced by 
a sword’ (ibid: 3). 
Censorship 
Extreme censorship – including the threat of assassination, imprisonment and bankruptcy 
– influenced media production and ensured that intellectual production reflected and 
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implemented party interests. The Liberal Constitution of 1863 proposed the defence of 
‘human life’ and stated that there should be ‘freedom of press’, freedom of ‘oral and 
written expression’ and free ‘national and international circulation of printed material’ 
(Cruz Santos, 1979: 194). The Constitution of Núñez and Caro (1886) in contrast 
rectified this ‘absolute freedom’ and stated that ‘the press should be free [only] in times 
of peace but is responsible if it threatens personal honour or social order or public 
tranquillity’ (ibid: 203). The government of Rafael Núñez unleashed strict measures 
against the press such as Law 61 (1888) that punished ‘crimes of social disorder’ with 
prison, exile, or loss of political rights. More than a dozen Liberal newspapers were 
suspended including El Espectador, and intellectuals and journalists had their land 
confiscated and were exiled. Between 1893 and 1896, the governor of Antioquia 
suspended El Espectador and imprisoned Fidel Cano for his role as owner, director, 
editor and author. In 1896 the paper received indefinite suspension. It reopened on 2
 
January 1913 on a note of conciliation between Liberals and the Conservatives and listed 
‘intemperance of language’, ‘absence of serenity in the judgement of official actions’, 
and ‘the adoption of methods of journalistic opposition inspired by impatience or 
imposed by injustice and oppression’ as principle causes of armed conflict in general and 
of ‘the War of the Thousand Days’ in particular.  
In 1916 Church leaders allied to the Conservative party threatened to excommunicate 
Liberal readers of El Espectador. In 1949 the Conservative regime of Ospina Pérez 
appointed 37 military and civilian censors and ordered them to monitor 16 publications in 
Bogotá and set up an office of ‘prior’ censorship. In 1950 Liberal newspapers refused to 
publish the fact that the pro-Fascist Conservative, Laureano Gómez had declared himself 
President. They didn’t use his name until 1952. In 1952, Gilberto Alzate Avendano, 
Liberal and director of the newspaper, Diario de Colombia complained that 80% of his 
material had been prohibited. This material included an article published in El Siglo, the 
principal Conservative paper. On 6 September 1952, Conservative mobs burned down the 
offices of El Tiempo and El Espectador and the houses of two Liberal leaders: Alfonso 
López Pumarejo and Carlos Lleras Restrepo.  
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2. Role and nature of media production 
This part suggests that the production, definition and portrayal of us and them, our party 
and their party, friend and enemy in this period of Conservative or Liberal rule promoted 
the interests of the political and military leaders of the party and the traders, mine owners 
and landowners that supported the party and that the party supported.   
Political pamphlets 
Party leaders published political pamphlets that created and moulded the identity and role 
of the party around the private political, social and economic interests that have been 
discussed in Part 1 of the thesis, that defined the problems that the nation faced and that 
proposed solutions. The Conservative intellectual, Restrepo Jaramillo defined the main 
difference between Conservative and Liberal politics: ‘Conservatives believe that the 
right of the individual is above the State’ but Liberals believe that ‘the individual has the 
rights that the State makes him conscious of’ (1936: 282). He accused the Liberals of 
authoritarianism, of prohibiting public manifestations of Catholicism, promoting 
secularism and suppressing freedom of speech,  arguing that the Liberals ‘prohibited the 
priests from the free expression of their ideas and doctrines’ (ibid).  
José Eusebio Caro – the Conservative intellectual who founded, moulded and promoted 
the party through newspapers such as El Granadino (1840) and La Civilización 
(Civilisation!, 1849) and bitterly opposed the Liberal abolition of slavery - argued that the 
‘classic English gentleman’, whom he defined as the cultured businessman, would be a 
more appropriate role model for Colombian leaders than the ‘Spanish feudal lord’ 
(Jaramillo Uribe, 2001). The Conservative President Rafael Núñez, who had acquired his 
political and philosophical education in England, agreed: admiring the English gentleman 
because of his ‘skills in business’, his realism, his distrust of ‘rigid ideological systems’ 
and his ‘practical attitude’ towards religion (ibid).  
Other Conservative leaders such as Sergio Arboleda respected Spain more: ‘the good 
customs, admirable family structures, respect for authority, consideration for women, 
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virtuous clergy and uniform religious beliefs’. Arboleda added that the Spanish Colonial 
regime had succeeded in placing ‘Christianised Indians and Negroes on the road to 
civilization’ (1951: 194).  
José María Samper, leader and intellectual of both parties, attributed the armed conflicts 
in this period to a series of factors: to the Spanish Colonial regime, to ‘the most 
incongruous mixture of races’ (1861: 201), to the foreign debt (ibid: 204), to corrupt, 
racist US diplomats (ibid: 206), to limited suffrage (ibid: 234), to the army that he 
describes as ‘the personification of violence’, and to army recruitment that he describes 
as ‘passionate, brusque, blind, savage and highly hateful’ (ibid: 235). Rafael Uribe Uribe, 
leader of the Liberal army focused on the political, social and economic roots and nature 
of the problems in this region: the principles of ‘minimum government and maximum 
freedom’ -  laissez faire and free trade - that permitted Europe and the United States to 
become rich and to feed Colombians with ‘ephemeral idealism’ (1974: 24-5).  
He insisted that the most important functions of the Colombian State should be: ‘to 
maintain order, peace and obedience’ and ‘to promote prosperity’ (ibid). He was hacked 
to pieces by Conservative enemies in Bogotá in 1914.   
Rafael Uribe Uribe listed the main problems in Colombia as: 1. the absence of internal 
peace, 2. the fact that there is no fundamental order that Colombians ‘accept and defend’, 
3. corrupt diplomatic representation, 4. high foreign debt and interest on loans, 5. high 
taxes and levels of alcoholism, 6. low education and literacy, 7. Presidential elections that 
are based on ‘sectarian passions’ rather than political principles, 8. the conflict between 
the two political parties that should instead be unified and act as ‘organs of propulsion’, 
and 9. the ruthlessness of local leaders (1974: 74-90).  
Nieto Caballero summed all of this up: blaming the fact that ‘the bad person is all-
powerful as long as he is rich’ (1931: 111).    
Conservative and Liberal leaders and intellectuals both attributed regional poverty and 
misery to racial inferiority: therefore legitimizing the political, social and economic 
interests of themselves and their party by claiming that – because of their connection to 
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the centre of the Empire - they were superior. Santamaría argued that the indigenous 
people were so ‘degenerate and inferior’ that the Spanish Conquistadors had only needed 
‘a handful of men’ to dominate them (ibid: 4): suggesting that the local people were 
responsible for their own genocide. He indicated that ‘the negro element’ was ‘inferior, 
crude and incapable of transcending ‘the common social level’ (ibid: 4-5). Here are the 
hysterical subtitles of Chapter 1 of his masterpiece, La Raza (The race, 1919)  
‘The savage – impossibilities – poor of spirit – negro element – zambos and mestizos – 
white race – climate and food – vices characterize us – be careful!’  
His final claim is that the mass of the Colombian people ‘is subject until death – and for 
the most part by ignorance – to an unhygienic and deficient system of alimentation’ (ibid: 
6).  
Laureano Gómez, Conservative intellectual and leader (1932-46) made a presentation in 
the Municipal Theatre of Bogotá that the leaders of both parties attended and admired. 
Here he asserted that ‘the spirit of the negro’ is in ‘a perpetual infantile State’ and that the 
indigenous race is ‘savage’ and ‘indifferent to the palpitations of the national life’ (1970: 
46-7): indigenous people are ‘drunk on the melancholy of their paramos and forests’, he 
informed his illustrious audience, and ‘resigned to misery and insignificance’ (1970: 46-
7). He similarly used his Conservative paper, El Siglo to incite his allies to massacre his 
Liberal opponents.  
Laureano Gómez played a pivotal role both in the assassination of the Liberal leader, 
Jorge Gaitán and in the bloodbath that ensued. Hundreds of thousands of Colombian 
people were brutally raped, tortured, murdered and mutilated as a result. His political 
pamphlets, pamphlets, speeches and editorials supplemented the orders that he issued to 
his militias. Gómez orchestrated La Violencia of the Conservative Party in Colombia: the 
final hopeless apocalpytic feud between communities that the parties had labelled 
Conservative or Liberal. The copies of El Siglo which stirred up this murderous rage are 
not available in the national library: they have been erased from the historical record.        
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Political themes in literature 
 
Colombian political literature also tends to reflect the interests of the leaders of the 
parties. María – first published in 1867 - promoted 19th Century Conservative values 
through idyllic scenes of bucolic prosperity in the Valle de Cauca. Jorge Isaacs, the 
author of this novel portrays ‘the most notable of his father’s ranches in hot terrain’: the 
plentiful cattle and horses and sugar cane, the ‘expensive and beautiful’ sugar mill, ‘the 
luxurious home,’ and ‘the well-dressed slaves,’ who are ‘affectionate and submissive 
with their master’ (ibid: 23). The master ‘treats them affectionately’ - although ‘he 
doesn’t stop being the master’ - and is ‘jealous’ of the good behaviour of their 
(stereotypically promiscuous) wives (ibid). The author is the hero of his own Romantic 
novel which became the first ‘best seller’ in the history of South America (Preface to 
2005 edition). He is - always has been- in love with María. She is his gorgeous Jewish 
sister: she is adopted; and she has been converted to Catholicism (like Jorge Isaac’s 
father). The novel depicts their innocent love that blossoms in the hot Colombian 
hillsides. He meets his romantic Conservative chums, visits the deathbed of a black 
princess who has been kidnapped in Africa and sold into slavery but kindly liberated by 
daddy, and attends jolly hunting trips in which our hero murders a lamb-eating tiger and a 
doe: and he does all of this for María.  
At the beginning of the novel, Jorge has to say hello to all his friends because he has just 
come back from Bogotá. In the middle Jorge must say goodbye to all his friends because 
he is off to London. At the end of the novel, Jorge has to come back from London and 
say goodbye to María once more - and forever - because she is dead. The contrast 
between the utopia that Jorge Isaacs constructs in the private world of this romantic 
novel, and the ruthlessness of his public life, illustrate the role of Colombian literature in 
the manipulation of consent and the denial of coercion. The author, Jorge Isaacs 
represented the Conservative party in the Colombian House of Representatives between 
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1866 and 1869, became governor of the Cauca region in 1876, declared himself President 
of Antioquia in 1890, and commanded a Liberal army in 1890.  
 
Manuela (Díaz, 1858) illustrates conflict inside the Liberal party: between the 
representatives of the merchants and free trade (Gólgotas) and the representatives of the 
artisans and of protectionism (Draconianos). The protagonist, Demostenes represents 
free trade. He travels to a Colombian village and falls in love with the beautiful Manuela. 
Don Tadeo, the local Draconian landowner however is extremely protective of her. He 
definitely doesn’t want Demostenes to ‘open her market’. The diabolical Don Tadeo 
burns Manuela alive to stop the marriage and Demostenes, her ‘open-minded’ fiancé is 
devastated. The defeat of Demosthenes suggests that ‘the utopian Liberal vision did not 
match the political, social and economic realities of that period’ (Williams, 1991: 29). 
The literate Demostenes loses his arguments with the illiterate Manuela. This suggests 
that sophisticated urban literate culture – rather than simple rural oral culture – has failed 
the Colombian people.  
Other Liberal novels such as Viento Seco (Caicedo, 1953) attribute all the atrocities to the 
other side. The novel begins with a massacre by the end of which, ‘only a few houses – 
those that had belonged to the Conservatives and had been marked with blue crosses – 
remained intact’ (ibid: 37). The protagonist, Antonio Gallardo staggers towards Cali in 
the west of Colombia, witnessing the horrors of La Violencia, the rapes, the torture, the 
massacres and mutilations, and losing more and more: his daughter, his wife, his illusions 
and finally his life. The author, Caicedo focuses on the alliance between the Conservative 
leaders – the intellectual authors of the massacres – and the Conservative police, who 
blocked the roads, checked the documents, and mopped up the very few survivors. The 
Liberals are portrayed as the innocent victims of cold Conservative calculation and 
diabolical cruelty.  
The other classic novel of La violencia - Condores, no enterran todos los dias (Condors, 
don’t bury all the days, 1974) – also demonises the Conservative party. The author, 
Álvarez Gardeazabal explores the character and murderous activities of El Condor, a 
134 
 
notorious landowner (Image 3) who committed atrocities in the name of the party in the 
Valle de Cauca during La violencia. Every day, as the bodies of his victims pile up 
around him, our faithful Colombian Conservative killer reads El Siglo (the Conservative 
newspaper) and listens to La Voz Catolica (the Catholic radio station). At the end of the 
Violencia he is rewarded with amnesty.  
Pax (1907) on the other hand blames both parties. Its author, Marroquin - son of the 
Conservative President who orchestrated the US theft of Panama - presents the armed 
conflict between Conservatives and Liberals in terms of the personal ambitions of corrupt 
leaders. The main character, General Landaburo epitomises local Colombian warlords 
(caudillos, gamonales) that invest in and thus create these armed conflicts (Image 3). The 
last scene in the novel – the final apocalyptic battle between the two factions – ends in 
the death of the hero. The Catholic priest has the last word that is the name of the novel: 
Pax (Peace). Marroquin is suggesting that the only peace between Conservatives and 
Liberals is the peace after death: pacification rather than peace of mind or social reform.  
Other Colombian novelists such as Nieto and Botero attribute all the atrocities to the 
indigenous population. Ingermina (Nieto, 1844) is the tale of Alonso de Heredia: the 
brother of the Spanish conquistador, Pedro de Heredia. Alonso falls in love with 
Ingermina, an indigenous princess and – finally – marries her. The novel celebrates the 
noble Spanish Colonial mission: that placed ‘Christianised Indians and Negroes on the 
road to civilization’ (Arboleda, 1951: 194). Lejos del nido (Botero, 1924) describes the 
crimes of Mateo Blandon, an indigenous thief and pimp who kidnaps white women and 
sells them into slavery. He is one of those savage hordes that are subject to insane rage 
and must be put down like rabid dogs: there is no hope of civilising them.    
The principal intellectual authors of these horrors – the Presidents of Colombia – portray 
themselves rather predictably as heroes of their own stories. One of their novels is 
immodestly named, Los elegidos (The chosen ones, 1976). This is President Alfonso 
López Michelsen’s ‘masterpiece’ about the Colombian ruling classes in the 1940s. The 
upper classes at that time apparently modeled themselves on their British counterparts: 
‘not only the language but also the decor of the mansion, the style of clothes, the alcohol 
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that they drank and the red tobacco … everything palpitated with the desire to assimilate 
British customs’ (ibid: 33).  
 
Upper-class British culture could be seen as the screen of indifference that has distanced 
British colonists and their Colombian counterparts from the atrocities that their armies 
and militias have committed in the name of profits and progress: as the main method at 
that time of legitimizing and promoting monopolies based on massacres.  
During the classic British dinner party, the Colombian doctor defines ‘the new nobility’ 
in Liberal terms as ‘the wealth that emanates from industry’ (ibid: 36). The protagonist is 
an exiled German businessman whose property is confiscated because of his alleged Nazi 
connections: this mirrors the actions of the Presidential author, Alfonso López Michelsen 
and his Presidential father, Alfonso López Pumarejo. The property that they confiscated 
(robbed) during the Second World War – the German breweries – provided the liquid 
capital of the billion-dollar economic and media conglomerate that Julio Mario Santo 
Domingo Pumarejo (Michelsen’s ‘noble’ cousin) currently possesses.  
Newspapers and magazines 
Newspapers and magazines played an important role in propagating and implementing 
the aims of party leaders, intellectuals, owners, editors and columnists: because generally 
the same person or members of the same family performed all these roles simultaneously 
and used these media to implement personal interests and political campaigns.       
Conservative newspapers 
José Eusebio Caro used his newspapers to found the Conservative party and to promote 
Conservative interests. He published a letter in the first issue of El Granadino (6-3-1840) 
that addressed ‘the young people of his age’ and announced his intention to enlist in the 
Conservative army in order to ‘punish’ the Liberals because they had ‘monopolised the 
Constitution and the laws’. He claimed that the Liberals could only muster ‘two or three 
thousand troops’ in Bogotá and that the Conservatives would prevail. In 1849 José 
136 
 
Eusebio Caro and Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, a future Colombian President published La 
Civilización. This newspaper presented the manifesto of the party.  
La Luz (1881) was set up by Rafael Núñez to promote his own Presidential election 
campaign and to prepare the ground for the Regeneration. It presents itself as ‘a political, 
literary and industrial paper’ and claims that the two political parties – Conservatives and 
Liberals – are necessary in ‘free’ countries because divisions are ‘natural’ in the 
administration of collective interests. He invites both parties to present ‘clear’ political  
programs (15-2-1881).  
Francisco Paulo Pérez published the main Medellín paper, El Colombiano in 1912 in 
order to promote Conservative politics and alliances in the Antioquian region. His paper 
immediately criticises ‘Liberal changes to the constitution’, claiming that these changes 
have provoked (or should provoke) violence because they have ‘undemocratically 
undermined the contributions of past Conservative regimes’ (23-7-1912).  
El Siglo (1936) was set up and edited by one (future) Conservative President, Laureano 
Gómez and later directed by another (future) Conservative President, Belisario Betancur. 
It promoted God, the Catholic religion, blind faith, self-sacrifice, and a sense of divine 
purpose in the struggle against ‘our Liberal enemies’ (1-2-1936). The first editorial states 
that the role of the newspaper is to serve ‘national interests in their highest and most 
noble sense’ and to promote ‘the moral and material progress’ of the nation because ‘the 
Conservative doctrine has a kind of divine halo, an intrinsic force’ and stimulates ‘denial 
and sacrifice, disinterest and heroism’. In 1940 Laureano Gómez, his Conservative allies 
and El Siglo supported Fascism in Europe. They claimed that ‘the twenty cowardly 
governments of Latin America have put themselves into the hands of Masonic atheistic 
democracy’ but that ‘the voice of Laureano Gómez’ would resuscitate the golden age: the 
glorious ‘Catholic Hispanic Empire’.  
The Lloreda family set up El Pais in Cali in 1950: the first editorial (12-5-1950) 
recommended that Conservatives and Liberals should unite in order ‘to obtain total 
pacification of the nation’. 
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Liberal newspapers 
The Liberal party set up El Aviso in 1848 to publish its manifesto, to attract members and 
supporters, and to promote Liberal policies. Fidel Cano published El Espectador in 
Medellín in 1887, promising to promote Colombian literature and national industries and 
to publish ‘recent, reliable and abundant’ international and national news (22-3-1887). It 
criticised the limitations of press freedom prescribed in the Constitution of 1886. El 
Tiempo (1911) was set up by Alfonso Villegas, Eduardo Santos and Roberto Posada Peña 
to promote Liberal politics in the Colombian capital. Three future Presidents have had 
important roles in the paper:  Eduardo Santos, Carlos Lleras Restrepo and Alberto Lleras 
Camargo. El Tiempo (30-1-1914) presented itself as ‘an organ of culture that aspires to 
popularise doctrines and principles, to instruct, and to inform about the world and life’. It 
promised to represent ‘the highest patriotic ideals’, to  detach itself from ‘the old parties’ 
and: to place patriotism above partisan passions.  
The Montes family published El Heraldo in Barranquilla in 1933 to recruit Liberal allies 
on the Atlantic coast. La Calle (1957) was set up by a future President, Alfonso 
Michelsen López to promote the politics of the MRL, the radical Liberal party which 
Michelsen predictably betrayed. His first issue promises to include people that do not 
adhere to official Liberal politics and to ‘liberalise’ attitudes to ‘the realities of the 
nation’. Michelsen’s Presidential predecessor, Alberto Lleras Camargo set up the main 
Liberal magazine, Semana in 1946 in the style of Time and Newsweek. Its proposed goal 
is to synthesise ‘the thousands of stories that newspapers have no time or interest or 
capacity to investigate’ and to reach ‘a new public’ that needs to understand ‘the causes 
of events’. Felipe López Caballero directed the magazine in 1982 in order to promote the 
Presidential campaign of his father, Alfonso López Michelsen whom he charitably 
describes as ‘sober, analytical, realistic and practical’.   
Radio stations 
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Conservative and Liberal leaders invested in the development and use of Colombian 
radio stations, using them to promote narrow political, social and economic interests. In 
1923 Marconi Wireless Co. initiated telegraphic communication in Colombia through a 
20-year contract with the government of Pedro Nel Ospina (Munera, 1992). In 1928 the 
Conservative Abadia Mendez government ordered radio stations to pay 10% of their 
turnover to the State. In 1929 the regime opened its own official station: HJN. In the 
same year, international telephone companies started to operate in the cities. In 1931 
licenses were offered to commercial radio stations at 200 pesos per year; experimental 
stations paid 10. Radio stations were set up in the main Colombian cities: Bogotá (Bogotá 
HKM and La Voz de Chapinero), Medellín (HKN and HKO), Manizales (Radio 
Manizales, Ecos de Occidente, Emisora Electra and HKT) and in Cali (HKR and La Voz 
del Valle). Most names – HKM, HKN, HKO, HKT, HKR – are the letters of the license. 
There were only around 300 receivers in the capital and less in other cities. In order to 
save energy and money the hours of transmission were limited:  6.00 to 8.00 a.m., 12.00 
to 2.00 p.m. and 6.00 to 9.00 p.m. The main radio stations tuned in to international short-
wave stations in order to learn techniques of production and locution.  
HJN transmitted music, conferences, foreign and national news but - most important of 
all - served as a political tool and as a method of ‘building the nation’ through ‘modern’ 
systems of communication (Munera, 1992). The Liberal party leader, Enrique Olaya 
Herrera used radio to present his industrialisation and communication programs and to 
promote his Presidential campaign. He became President in 1930 and insisted that HJN 
remained public, changing its name to La Radiodifusora Nacional de Colombia (National 
Transmitter of Colombia). In his four years of office he used this station to promote 
national culture, to broadcast cultural programs that discussed the problems of primary, 
secondary and university education and to promote national cultural institutions such as 
the National Library, the National School of Fine Arts and the National Conservatory of 
Music. His Presidential successor, Alfonso López Pumarejo similarly had his own radio 
station, modestly named La voz del victor (The voice of the winner) and his own radio 
program, La Republica Liberal (The Liberal Republic) that he used to launch and 
promote his political campaigns such as ‘the revolution on the march’: that promised – 
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but paradoxically stifled - agrarian reform because large landowners increased production 
rather than return the land to the campesinos whom they had robbed.  
In 1936 the Liberal party used its radio stations to launch a strong political campaign. The 
Conservative party retaliated. The differences between these two parties became so 
heated that the government prohibited political broadcasts. In 1940 the Liberal party 
invested heavily in the national station, HJN. In 1941 the Liberal President, Eduardo 
Santos changed the name of this station to Radio Nacional (National Radio). In 1945 
radio stations broadcast news on a coup against the Liberal President, Pumarejo. The 
Liberal party permitted radio stations to broadcast only music and official bulletins until 
it had regained control.  In 1948 one Liberal radio station, Nueva Granada suspended its 
broadcasts to mourn the assassination of the popular Liberal candidate, Gaitán. His 
supporters used the microphones in other radio stations to stir up popular struggle against 
the Conservative regime. Two Conservative radio stations in Cali - Radio Pacifico and La 
Voz del Valle - were burned down.  
Private companies understood the political power and advertising potential of these radio 
stations. In 1948, the main Medellín textile company (Coltejer) bought two big radio 
stations: La Voz de Antioquia (that belonged to a coffee company) and Radiodifusora 
Interamericana (owned by a Liberal newspaper). These are the origins of the current 
Santo Domingo media conglomerate that is strongly allied to the Liberal party. Santo 
Domingo Pumarejo, the current ‘owner’ of the conglomerate is a cousin of the Liberal 
President. In 1949, the main Medellín tobacco, beer and chocolate companies bought up 
Radio Medellín. These are the origins of the RCN conglomerate: that is strongly allied to 
the Conservative party. In the same year the government invested in a ten-kilowatt 
transmitter that connected the two main cities in Colombia: Medellín and Bogotá.  
3. Dissent  
Indigenous cultural resistance 
Indigenous people have used two methods to resist colonisation. The first has been 
armed, sporadic, desperate and doomed. The second is cultural. This part of the thesis 
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will analyse the life and transcendental discourse of the great indigenous leader, Quintín 
Lame in order to understand the limitations of consent in Colombian society and the role 
and nature of indigenous cultural resistance.    
Quintín Lame, the most important indigenous leader in the 20th Century tried to create an 
independent indigenous homeland. He preferred the second method of resistance: 
attempting to negotiate with the authorities, creating political and spiritual alliances 
between and inside indigenous communities, calling meetings in the remote settlements 
of Huila and Tolima to discuss tactics, collecting signatures and presenting petitions to 
the President, defending himself in the law courts in spite of the tortures and the long 
terms of imprisonment and hard labour, disseminating his magical pamphlets among 
indigenous populations. His most important text is: Las luchas del Indio que bajo de la 
montana a la valle de las civilizaciones (The struggles of the Indian who descended from 
the mountain to the valley of the civilisations, 1939). The introduction to this pamphlet 
states his intentions: to protect the future of his race that ‘still sleeps in ignorance’, to 
resist colonisation, and never to forget ‘the tenderness of our parents’.  
He does not trust the Colombian State, claiming that ‘the Indian has been hated, insulted, 
chained, imprisoned and robbed of his language and his labour by the descendants of the 
Spanish who arrived on 12 October 1492 to occupy this soil, to make their fortunes’, to 
rob them, ‘to trample them under their boots’, and to ‘rope us up and drag us around the 
bull-ring’. He accuses ‘the white men’ of hating him because they could never tame him 
(1939: 73). He compares indigenous people to bees that collect nectar from ‘the flowers 
in the garden of the Sciences’ and stresses the transcendental importance of the 
relationship between Man and Nature that is at the heart of indigenous resistance. He 
describes knowledge as ‘a large garden which few [white] men have seen’ and suggests 
that indigenous people have access to fundamental truths because  
‘Even the littlest Indian of all has seen [the garden of knowledge] up close … in those 
infinite moments of communication that lie between the springs and the streams, in those 
infinite moments in which the tiger snarls and the lion roars and the serpent hisses’ (ibid: 
71)  
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The struggles of Quintín Lame, the transcendental discourse, the heroic resistance of the 
indigenous peoples in this region suggest that consent in Colombian culture is extremely 
limited, that ‘civilization’ is based on the marginalization of alternative cultures and 
‘Natural’ life styles, and on coercion, massacres, torture, brutality.     
Socialist and communist media production 
The main grassroots resistance to Conservative and Liberal pressures on  mass media 
organisations and reproduction and on the implementation of  party interests originated in 
the Colombian labour and agrarian movements, in the socialist and communist groups 
that complemented them and in the alternative media of consent - chants, slogans, 
speeches, political pamphlets and communist and socialist newspapers, banners and 
marches – that their supporters used to rally opposition to coercive regimes.  
The three pioneers of Colombian socialism and communists were Raúl Eduardo Mahecha 
(1884-1940), Ignacio Torres Giraldo (1892-1968) and María Cano (1887-1967). These 
three organised rallies and tactics and participated in protests. María Cano – cousin of the 
Liberal owner-editors of El Espectador – turned herself into the symbol, the charismatic 
flor (flower) of the Colombian labour movement and used her speeches to radicalise 
resistance to the Conservative regime 
‘Companions, get to your feet. Let’s get ready to defend ourselves. Let us be one heart, 
one embrace. Close files and advance. One moment of vacilation, of indolence, and 
another wave of oppression will wash over us’ (Torres Giraldo, 1980: 150).  
Torres Giraldo and Raúl Mahecha developed the tactics that could be used to make these 
protests more effective. Giraldo attributed the failure of the banana protests in Uraba and 
the subsequent massacre to ‘the isolation of the region’ and the fact that the US-owned 
United Fruit had monopolised not only the production of bananas but also transportation 
routes and food supplies (ibid: 106). He argued that to plan a ‘serious’ strike ‘it is 
necessary to create committees in different zones and unite these committees in a central 
command that can convert itself at the right time into the central strike committee’ (ibid: 
108).  
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In La cuestion sindical en Colombia (The question of labour unions in Colombia, 1973) 
he addresses the crucial issue in social reform, the problem of psychological and social 
enlightenment 
‘The worker that enters the modern business for the first time, principally the young 
woman who is incorporated in the factory of light production brings many illusions with 
her that tenaciously resist the impositions of her new life. These illusions are necessary 
for her but it would be inhuman not to see them as the last resting place of the sensitivity 
of people who have surrendered themselves to the alienation of production, to those 
whose personalities have been switched off, to those people who have been reduced to 
parts of the machine’ (ibid: 26)    
The Colombian socialist and communist parties also used newspapers to raise 
consciousness among their members and raise recruits to the cause. Sánchez Gómez 
(1981) suggests that the popular uprising in the coffee plantations of Libano, Tolima in 
1929 not only had its roots in previous protests - such as the movement of artisans that 
supported the Liberal general, Melo in 1854 and that rebelled against the German 
colonisation of Bucaramanga in 1879 – but also had its origins in the recent visit of María 
Cano to the region, in the ‘printed fliers or manuscripts, with faulty spelling, that 
circulated through ranches and districts’ (González Sánchez, 1982: 71) and in the 
newspapers that circulated among the labour movement. Newspapers such as El Obrero 
(The Labourer) that appeared in the port of Barranquilla and El Camarada (The 
Comrade) that circulated in the port of Tumaco supported the artisans; nearly all labour 
unions were artisan until 1940. The foundation of El Comunista in the port of Cartagena 
in 1910 led to the creation of the Colombian socialist party in 1921.  
The Colombian Socialist Party did not demand ‘the abolition of the State, of the status 
quo, of property or of capital’ (Torres Giraldo, 1978: 665). Their leaders merely asked 
the State to eliminate monopolies and privileges. The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) 
that was founded in 1926 was much more radical. The Bucaramanga branch of the party 
produced Vox Populi (Voice of the people) which survives as El Voz (The Voice). 
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Medellín published La Justicia. Cali produced La Humanidad which was the voice of the 
labour union movement and of revolutionary socialism in the west of Colombia.  
María Cano published articles in La Justicia. The first issue focuses on the role of the 
land that it presents as ‘the agrarian inheritance of all Colombians’ and as the main 
source of ‘the intense anguish and unhappiness that strangles all the children of 
Colombia’ (9-1-1932). This issue promises ‘the revenge of the proletariat’ because it is 
‘tired of social injustice’ and free of ‘financial motives, selfishness and personal 
aspirations’. María Cano addresses ‘the traitor Mahecha’. She claims that he supported 
the Liberals and the ‘bourgeoisie’ and ‘the bastard interests of the northern bandits’, that 
he abandoned the labourers in the banana region and that he should have ‘died at the feet 
of their flag’.  
Radical themes in literature 
Radical literature in this period resisted Conservative and Liberal discourse. Vargas Vila 
(1860-1940) - persecuted by the Church for accusing a priest of child abuse, ex-
communicated and exiled at the age of 25 to Paris and Spain - openly challenged the 
hypocrisy and cruelty of the political leaders in Colombia and the US. In De sus lisas y 
sus rosas (1957) he criticised repressive Colombian Presidents and their ruthless 
practices. He claimed that the dictator, Rafael Reyes sent troops to the banana plantations 
in the hot regions (la tierra caliente) in the south of Bogotá to displace the campesinos - 
to ‘tear them from their homes’ and to ‘hurl them out of their plantations into the desert’ 
(ibid: 195) – in order to monopolise banana production on the coast. President Reyes then 
made speeches ‘on the excellency of the banana and on the imperial necessities of 
displacement’ (ibid). In Césares de la decadencia (1962) Vargas criticises the culture of 
Colombian leaders: the pettiness and the abstraction that they use to dull social 
consciences and to legitimize the massacres to themselves and to their business 
associates. He describes Caro, the intellectual of the Colombian Conservative party in 
these terms 
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‘Caro was a despot by nature as others are by circumstance. The two inseparable 
elements in him were Tyranny and Grammar. The adverb was more important to him 
than the man in his sentence of death’.  
In this same text he presents the final root of all resistance 
‘The greatest of all loves is the love of humanity, this love holds the secrets of the most 
voluptuous regions, no love has brought more beautiful souls to the altar of sacrifice: 
Socrates, Jesús, Giordano Bruno and José Marti, they all died for this love’ 
In 1919, César Uribe Piedrahita published Toa, a savage indictment of colonial 
exploitation, massacre and displacement:  
‘I’m leaving this cursed land. They are going to finish us all off. They killed Serrano and 
the other lads, they got Eraso and Doctor Gómez. They’ve killed everyone. There are no 
Indians left’ (ibid: 137).  
José Eustasio Rivera published La Vorágine (The Vortex) in 1924. This novel criticises 
the barbaric methods involved in the colonisation of the Amazon region, and the horrific 
human rights abuses which the owners of the plantations and local army officers 
perpetrated against indigenous peoples. Rivera had a diplomatic position in Mexico, Peru 
and Cuba from 1921 to 1928. In 1922 he charted the frontier between Colombia and 
Venezuela and in 1923 he denounced the rubber plantations that he encountered and their 
brutal treatment of the local indigenous population. The authorities ignored him. La 
Vorágine can therefore be seen as another attempt to penetrate indifference to the human 
rights abuses  that are the source of their power. In 1926 he wrote another novel, La 
Mancha Negra (Black stain) that criticised North American oil interests and atrocities in 
Colombian regions. He was assassinated in 1928 in New York. His manuscript 
disappeared. The narrator and protagonist of his surviving masterpiece, La Vorágine is 
Arturo Cova, who admits from the start that he has already ‘gambled his heart’ and ‘lost 
to violence’. He and his pregnant lover, Alicia abandon Bogotá, ‘city of prejudices, 
lawyers and judges’ and discover the roots of colonial culture in the plantations that ‘mix 
the blood’ of the local people with ‘the juice of the rubber’ (ibid: 304).  
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Barrancabermeja (Jaramillo Arango, 1934) denounces the inequalities of life in 
Barranca, the US oil base on the Magdalena river. Its subtitle and main theme is: ‘of 
pimps, ruffians, labourers and oilmen’. The author denounces local atrocities in the shape 
of Colonel Lino Cisneros whom he describes as ‘a fat little man with the face of an 
alcoholic,’ and as ‘a murderer with a revolver and a belt of bullets,’ who ‘at night went in 
search of women, slept with all of them, and paid with his authority’ (ibid: 61). He 
blames the US – because ‘we thought we were rich so we surrendered, we handed over 
the best things we had, our essence, our dignity, our national inheritance’ (ibid: 37) – but 
he blames Colombia and himself more 
‘The Americans, the gringos, they have everything, because the law that protects them 
doesn’t protect us, but it was us who made the law’ (ibid).  
It is only in La rebelion de las ratas (Soto Aparicio, Rat rebellion, 1962) that the 
Colombian poor finally revenge themselves on their colonial oppressors because they 
have nothing left to lose. It ends in a vision of communism, in the spreading of ‘great red 
wings’  
‘A bullet came out of the office buildings, fast and sure, and buried itself in the breast of 
Rudecindo Cristancho: Number 22048. He fell to the ground [and] a red cloud 
surrounded him. He thought it was the flames that had spread. Hundreds of naked feets 
trampled over his unconscious body. He felt no more pain, no more hunger, no more 
desire to revenge himself. The men continued forward.  
They were the dispossessed, the unsheltered, the forgotten people … those who had 
escaped from the claws of misery and who had reached the outer limits of rebellion. 
Meanwhile the flames spread their great red wings over the people of Timbali’ (ibid: 
213).  
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Conclusion  
The role and nature of consent, 1848-1953 
Chapter 3 has suggested that the main role of both consent (persuasion) and coercion 
(physical oppression) at the time of Conservative and Liberal rule (1848-1953) was to 
implement the political and economic interests of the leaders of both parties in the 
accumuation of resources and credit in the British Empire and in the US. The nature of 
consent reflected these same interests. The main instruments of consent at that time were 
political pamphlets and literature, newspapers, magazines and radio stations. Chapter 3 
has claimed that media production played an important role in the promotion of coercion, 
armed conflict and profits through the labelling of us and them. Chapter 3 has also 
suggested that socialist and communist movements and media production and radical 
literature represented the main resistance in this period.        
This consent was based on elements of consent: Conservative and Liberal leaders had 
powerful roles inside media organisations: as owners and directors, censors and editors 
and authors. This issue - the interplay between coercion and consent from the Spanish 
Conquest to the present - will be explored in more depth and detail in the General 
Conclusion.  
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Chapter 4 
Media production – and the manufacture of consent - at the time of the Dictatorship 
(1953-8), National Front (1958-74) and current regime 
The first part of Chapter 4 analyses the nature of international and local interests in 
Colombian newspapers and magazines, radio and television conglomerates, reflected in 
the current role of journalists and censorship in the implemetnation of these interests 
(1953-). The second part assesses the current role of media organisations - the main 
instruments of consent - in the implementation of these interests. The third analyses the 
current nature of resistance to these interests and pressures: the role of alternative 
political, social and cultural movements, alternative media groups and alternative media 
production. The main role of Chapter 4 is to present insights into the current role and 
nature of consent and media production (1953-) and to supplement the information 
presented in Chapters 1 to 3.  
Chapter 4 addresses two crucial issues. The first issue is: how does current media 
production promote and legitimize coercion? The second is: how did current Colombian 
mass media organisations and production and practices develop out of Colombian media 
organisations and production and practices in previous historical periods? The short 
conclusion that is presented at the end of this historical section summarises the role and 
nature of consent in this historical period and the influence of coercion on consent. These 
issues are addressed in depth in the General Conclusion.    
1. Current interests in media production (1953-)  
This part of the thesis suggests that current Colombian mass media conglomerates reflect 
international trends: that international and national, political, economic and military 
interests – that operate through coercion – also influence the manufacture of consent. The 
current political, social and economic nature of Colombian journalists and pressure on 
Colombian journalism supports this hypothesis, the assassination of Colombian 
journalists being part of the local mopping up process. This part analyses the regional 
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development of commercial media conglomerates and the nature of Colombian 
newspapers and magazines, radio stations and television conglomerates.      
The regional development of commercial media conglomerates 
This part of the thesis analyses the transition between the newspapers and radio stations 
that were used to promote the narrow political, social and economic ambitions of 
Conservative and Liberal leaders, the media that promoted the successes of the 
Colombian Dictatorship, and the development of national then international commercial 
mass media conglomerates. 
Fox (1988) claims that radio and television passed through three phases in South 
America: as an instrument of official political information, as a tool of culture, and as a 
commercial enterprise. She claims that in the first phase the government introduced 
public-service and State-owned radio as ‘instruments of political information and 
propaganda’ (ibid: 11); in the second, the regime used radio as a tool of official culture 
and education; and in the third phase the pressure of the private sector prevailed.  
Commercial radio predominated as international and national industries became 
interested in using radio to advertise to the populations that had migrated or escaped to 
the cities (ibid: 13). Fox claims that US businesses received tax breaks if they advertised 
in pro-Allied mass media in this region during World War II - that more than 1,200 
newspapers and 200 regional radio stations received their daily news service through the 
Office of Coordination of Inter-American Affairs under the direction of Nelson 
Rockefeller - and that this international news had been compiled by US news agencies 
and radio conglomerates (ibid: 13). By the end of the war more than 75% of the 
international news that reached South America came from Washington where it had been 
prepared by the State Department and the Office of Inter-American Affairs.  
Communication researchers such as Cees Hamelink argued that ‘information as a 
national resource is a liberating force in the economic and cultural emancipation of a 
country, if its exploitation is guided by the principles upon which a new ordering of 
international economic relations is based’ (1979: 6). The UNESCO General Conference 
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in Belgrade in 1980 therefore decided to encourage countries in the south to develop their 
own mass media infrastructure in order to increase their access and contribution to a new 
world information and communication order (NWICO). Sean MacBride, the chairman of 
the commission defined this order as a process based on ‘more justice, more equity, more 
reciprocity in information exchange, less dependence in communication flows, less 
downwards diffusion of messages, more self-reliance and cultural identity, more benefits 
for all mankind’ (1980: xviii). Carlsson (2003) charts the death of this dream: the 
opposition of the Reagan administration, the revival of Cold War attitudes, the alleged 
inefficiency of UNESCO and its ‘politicisation’, ‘the prominence and influence of third-
world countries in UNESCO in the early 1980s’ and the withdrawal of the US (in 1984) 
and the UK (in 1985) from UNESCO because of the alleged socialistic threat to press 
freedom (Golding and Harris, 1997). The withdrawal of the two great powers from 
UNESCO decimated its budget and derailed reform (Carlsson, 2003) but communication 
researchers continue to claim that the quantitative and qualitative flow of news from the 
north to the south contributes to economic and social inequalities (Boyd-Barrett and 
Rantanen, 1998). 
 
Fox (1988) suggests that these international trends are reflected in the development of 
South American television production. In the first phase military and authoritarian 
regimes established public television. In the second phase US movie and television 
industries and programs filled ‘half of the content of South American television screens 
and movie theatres’ (ibid: 19). North and South American mass media conglomerates 
‘satisfied the demands of the governments and the ruling parties’ and ‘enabled national 
and foreign industries to reach mass markets’ and advertise their products (ibid: 5).  
Other researchers such as Bagdikian (1983) have claimed that international traders in 
commodities and arms producers have invested heavily in international mass media 
conglomerates since the 1980s and that there has been a massive massive increase in 
advertising revenues in this region. In the current historical period, the interplay between 
coercion and consent - between military and media interests, military intelligence and 
surveillance and news gathering - revolves around the technologies and techniques that 
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armed groups and media organisations produce, refine and share such as satellites and 
Internet systems.  
McChesney (2000) claims that the principal role of ‘super-powerful, mostly US-based, 
international media corporations’ is: ‘to advance the cause of the global market’ and ‘to 
promote commercial values’ (ibid: 59). Herman and Chomsky agree that the main role of 
these conglomerates is to maintain ‘an international order in which US-based businesses 
can prosper’ (1987: 6). They name ‘the advertising licence to do business’ (1988: 14) as 
one of the five principal factors in the creation of the ideological system upon which this 
political, social and economic domination depends.  
Gamson adds that this interest in attracting advertisers induces programmers and editors 
to produce content designed ‘to create a buying mood’ (1992: 377). Ted Koppel, the 
A.B.C. newsman defines his ‘ideological enemies’ as ‘declining advertising revenues, the 
rising cost of newsprint, lower ratings, diversification, and the vertical integration of 
communication empires’ (1997: 23). Hoover (1993) attributes these ‘communication 
empires’ to ‘government-sanctioned policies of deregulation and privatisation’.  
This thesis suggests that Colombian newspapers and magazines, radio and television 
conglomerates reflect these international and regional trends towards big monopolies, 
close international and national political, economic and military ties, shared technologies, 
techniques and production formats and massive advertising revenues.         
Colombian newspapers and magazines 
 
Each region has its own newspaper that provides international, national and regional 
news (CAB, 2003). Nine of the 45 newspapers of highest circulation are in Bogotá, 
four in Medellín, four in Cali, three in Barranquilla and other regional capitals have 
one or two. Ten of these 45 newspapers belong to La Casa Editorial El Tiempo and 
the Santos family. Fifteen of these papers (33%) also belong to families. In 2000 
advertising revenues were 103 million dollars compared to 92 million in 1992 (ibid: 
194). The value of newspaper sales was 43 million dollars in 1992 and 56 million in 
2000 (ibid: 196). El Tiempo had 38.8% of total revenue in 2002; El Colombiano, 
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9.6%; El Pais, 8.6%; El Espectador, 5.1%; El Nuevo Siglo had 1.4% and El Espacio, 
0.4%. In 2000 there were only 61 newspapers for 1000 Colombian citizens compared 
to 144 in Argentina, 116 in Mexico, 104 in Spain and 55 in Brazil (ibid: 198). This is 
attributed to higher poverty and illiteracy (ibid). Around 38% of men and 21% of 
women are habitual readers of newspapers (ibid). 55% of these readers are upper 
social class and 22% are lower; 22% have primary education and 60% are university-
educated. The majority of readers are between 25 and 54 years old. In 1999 average 
daily newspaper circulation was 1,224,000 (ibid: 198).  
 
In 2002 the most popular newspapers were El Tiempo (around 33% of habitual 
readers), El Espectador (18%), El Espacio (9%), El Colombiano (9%) and El Pais 
(6%). 
 
There are around 150 magazines and 450 editions in Colombia (CAB, 2003: 200). 
61% are monthly and 11% are weekly. In 2002 around 23% of magazines were 
primarily for women or men, 18% were about science or art or family life, 7% were 
about economics or finance, 7% were for children, 4% were about sport and 4% 
about cars or other forms of transportation. In 1992 magazines attracted 12 million 
dollars in revenues; in 2001, 22 million (ibid: 202). Sales were 40 million in 1992 
and 51 million in 2000. Semana earned 17.8% of total revenue in 2002; Cambio, 
9.2%; Cromos, 9.1%; Dinero, 4.9%; Motor, 3.2%; and Vanidades, 3.1%. The most 
popular magazines in 2002 were Semana (8.4% of habitual readers), TV y novelas 
(6.6%), Cromos (5%), Shock (4.6%), Soho (4.1%), Diners (3.5%), Alo (3.3%) and 
Cambio (1.7%).  
 
Herrán (1991) summed up the economic interests of the main newspaper and 
magazine conglomerate, La Casa Editorial El Tiempo. It controlled 93% of Editorial 
del Atlantico and 94% of Intermedio Editores and Tempora Impresores. Tempora 
Impresores had 75% of the shares in Printer Colombia. The editorial controlled 
26.66% of a Colombian mass media conglomerate called Gramacol. Gramacol had 
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shares in three Colombian television companies (Caracol TV, Caracol PCRC, and 
RTI) that are part of the Santo Domingo (Pumarejo) and Ardila Lulle conglomerates. 
Gramacol had 65% of Cable TV: the company that has monopolised Colombian 
cable television. The Santos family has its own television station in the centre of the 
Colombian capital: the name of their station is City TV.  
 
In 1990 El Tiempo dedicated between 50% and 65% of space to advertisements. This 
produced more than 50% of its income (Herrán, 1991). Publicidad & Mercado 
(March 2004) published the sales of La Casa Editorial El Tiempo in 2002. The 
newspaper, El Tiempo had sales of 260 billion pesos. It had shares in media 
organisations and publishing houses such as Avantel (100 billion pesos), TV Cable 
(235 billion pesos), Circulo de Lectores (30 billion pesos), Sky Colombia (20 billion 
pesos), City TV (15 billion pesos), Cinemark Colombia (12 billion pesos), Editorial 
Printer Latinoamericana (10 billion pesos), Multirevistas Editoriales (5 billion 
pesos), and Gramacol (3 billion pesos).  
 
Colombian radio 
 
Colombian radio stations manage to compete against television stations because of 
the connection of remote local stations to international, national and regional radio 
chains and conglomerates, because of international, national, regional and local 
advertising revenues, because of standardised international and national news 
formats and because of the uniqueness of the medium such as the interaction between 
presenters and audiences that characterises radio phone-ins.  
 
Radio advertising revenues did however decrease from 113 million dollars in 1994 to 
76.2 million in 2001 (CAB, 2003: 174). In 1994 radio attracted 30.8% of advertising 
compared to the 61.5% that television attracted. In 2001 radio attracted 25.8% and 
television, 66.8%. In 2002 RCN had 64 radio stations and 43% of national radio 
advertising revenue; Caracol had 61 and 38%; Oro had 14 stations and 6% of 
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revenue; Todelar, 12 and 2.7%; Super had 10 stations and 3.4% of advertising 
revenue. RCN had a turnover of 75 billion pesos in 2000; Caracol, 73 billion; Oro 
had 17 billion pesos; and Super had 1.5 billion. In 1997 there were 565 radios for 
1000 Colombian citizens compared to 2115 in the United States, 380 in the world as 
a whole and 414 in the Latin American region (ibid: 174). There are 170 stations in 
Antioquia, 77 in Valle de Cauca, 75 in Boyacá, 71 in Santander, 54 in Atlantica and 
32 in the capital (ibid: 175).  
 
In 2002 the most popular stations (ibid: 182) were Tropicana Estereo (5.9% of 
listeners), La Vallenata (4.3%), Radioactiva (2.9%), Amor Estereo (2.5%), Oxigeno 
(2.5%) and Caracol (2.2%). The popularity of these stations reflect the popular ity of 
the music that they play. Tropicana plays Latinamerican rhythms mostly from the 
Caribbean or salsa, merengue and vallenato that is produced in the US Rumba 
Estereo and Olimpica Estereo play similar music and have large audiences: most 
listeners are under 34 and middle and lower social class. La Vallenata and Radio Una 
play vallenato, the most popular music in Colombian radio stations; audiences are 
mostly female, between 18 and 44, lower-middle and lower social class. News 
programs attract older audiences of all social classes:  FM attracts upper classes; AM 
lower classes (ibid: 184).  
 
Herrán (1991) claims that most Colombian radio audiences listen to the two main 
radio conglomerates, Caracol and RCN. In 1990 Caracol had 144 radio stations (27% 
of the national total) and RCN had 106 (20%). The Santo Domingo conglomerate 
owns more than 65% of Caracol. Nieto Bernal suggests that Santo Domingo also 
controls around 66% of Petroqimica de Atlantico (petrochemicals) and of 
Corporacion Financiera del Norte and Corporacion Financiera del Santander and 
Antex Oil and Gas Company (1997: 171-4). It has between 4% and 30% of 
Promigas, Surtigas, Gases del Caribe, Gasoriente, Gasoccidente, Ferticol, Ingeser de 
Colombia, Quimicas Petroleras, Terpel Bucaramanga, Terpel Norte, Terpel 
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Antioquia and Terpel de la Sabana. It has previously owned Bavaria and 
monopolised beer and owned Avianca airlines and monopolised domestic flights.  
 
The Ardila Lulle conglomerate owns RCN, the radio conglomerate that controls 20% 
of domestic radio stations. Nieto Bernal claims that this conglomerate also owns a 
music production company (Sonolux) and has shares in a firm of publishers 
(Editorial El Globo) and in the two main regional newspapers, El Colombiano and El 
Pais. The Ardila Lulle conglomerate has shares in cable television (TV Cable) and in 
communications (Datos y Mensajes) and – to close the circle of Colombian media 
monopolies – in its rival and ally, the Santo Domingo and Caracol conglomerate. 
Ortiz-Crespo has announced that Prisa – the main Spanish radio conglomerate – has 
bought 19% of Radio Caracol. The two radio conglomerates share three radio 
stations in Chile, radio transmitters in New York and Miami and ‘sindicated Spanish 
programmes that have 72 transmitters in the United States’ (1999: 182). 
 
Colombian television 
 
The development of Colombian television reflects the same three historical trends 
that Fox (1988) highlights in this region: acting first as an instrument of official 
political information, second as an official tool of culture, and third as a source of 
advertising revenue. In 1953 the Colombian Dictatorship appointed Fernando Gómez 
Agudelo as head of ODIPE: the Presidential office of information and press. The 
army used the first Colombian television transmission on 13
 
June, 1954 to celebrate 
the anniversary of the dictatorship and promote its technological achievements. 
Balloons, banners and military parades increased the merriness of this momentous 
occasion. The size of the audience was – unsurprisingly - limited to the upper classes 
because of the low power of the signal and because only the relatively rich could 
afford the price of a television set at that time. Oscar Collazos (2004) describes the 
technological limitations of these broadcasts: photographic archives were the only 
source of visual material. The national television channel broadcast only two hours 
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of programs per day: El Noticiero Grafico (that celebrated the achievements of this 
great Dictatorship), Lapiz Magico (cartoons), Conozca los autores (contemporary 
Colombian literature) and Mares y marinos de Colombia (the natural treasures of 
Colombia that only the very rich could – but didn’t - visit).  
 
The station used actors from the theatre to recreate literary classics. The Dictatorship 
invited the Japanese drama teacher, Seki Sano to inspire creativity in the Colombian 
theatre, but promptly accused him of communism, and deported him. In 1955 the 
Dictatorship set up a national television channel and started to sell advertising space 
and to monitor and censor content. There were 100,000 television sets in 1955. The 
programs included children’s programs and classical music concerts, Noticiero 
Economico Sur-Americana (South American financial news), popular British game 
shows such as Beat the clock and Guess my line, and theatrical dramatisations of 
Colombian classics such as María and La Voragine.  
 
In 1956, Punch - the first Colombian television production company – launched its 
first program. It was called Telehipodromo: a four-hour circus of horses, contests and 
parades. In 1960 Punch broadcast game shows, sports, Colombian travel 
documentaries (Por los caminos de la patria) and canned US imports. In 1962 the 
company produced soap operas (telenovelas) such as En el nombre del amor (In the 
name of love). Soap operas were not popular: audiences preferred dramatised 
literature but the US soap company, Colgate Palmolive subsidised these experiments 
that ultimately paid off financially. In 1985 the Belisario Betancur regime set up a 
national commission to monitor television and ‘to defend the common rights and 
interests of the audience’ (CAB, 2003: 130). In 1987 this commission awarded 34% 
of air time to four production companies - RTI, RCN, Punch and Caracol - and 
annihilated the opposition. Private television channels weren’t authorised until the 
Constitution of 1991. The first three private channels were Caracol, RCN and City 
TV. The first national channels (Caracol and RCN) were set up by two economic 
conglomerates – El Grupo Santo Domingo and Ardilla Lulle – that owned radio 
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stations and newspapers, that generated considerable advertising revenue, and that 
could therefore meet the stringent economic and technological conditions of the 
Constitution of 1991. The roots, role and nature of this Constitution will  be analysed 
in this chapter of the thesis.  
 
The first local channel – City TV - is part of La Casa Editorial El Tiempo (ibid: 129). 
The Colombian State still assigns and rents television space, makes technological 
decisions, determines frequencies and acts as censor. The private channels had to 
invest in their frequencies and in the technologies and systems of production and 
transmission required by the Constitution. The main programs – in terms of financial 
and technological infrastructure, marketing and audiences – are telenovelas (soap 
operas). Their principal foreign distributor is Tepuy that targets Latinos in Miami 
(ibid: 130).  
 
Total television advertising revenues soared from 110 million dollars in 1992 to 240 
million in 2001 (ibid: 139). In 2001 Caracol attracted 31% of that revenue and RCN 
attracted 27%. In 2002 Caracol had 42.5% and RCN had 30%. City TV had 3.1% of 
advertising revenue in 2002 and Señal Colombia had 0.9% (ibid: 143). In 2002 33% 
of advertisers were from the media themselves, 9% were public campaigns (an 
increase of 3% on the previous year), 7% was for financial services and insurance, 
around 6% for personal care, cosmetics, perfume, food, business, tourism, drinks, 
tobacco, 5% for entertainment and 4% for telecommunications (ibid:  145).  
 
Caracol had a turnover of 231 billion pesos in 2001; RCN had 215 billion. In 1997 
there were 217 televisions for 1000 Colombian citizens compared to 847 in the 
United States, 280 in the world as a whole and 263 in the Latin American region 
(ibid: 150). Caracol had around 45.5% of viewers in 1999, 56% in 2000 and 67% in 
2001; RCN had 44, 58 and 61%; City TV had 4.7, 3.9 and 4%; Señal Colombia had 
5.2, 4.8 and 3.7% of viewers (ibid: 153). The most popular programs in 2002 (ibid: 
155) were national news (84%), Colombian telenovelas (73.5%), local news (45%), 
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music videos (44%), nature programs (42.5%), sports news (40%), live sports (39%), 
cartoons (38%), documentaries (34%), health and medicine (32%), national series 
(31%), comedies (30%) and game shows (29%). In 2002 the seven most popular 
prime time programs (ibid: 157) were Amantes del desierto (telenovela), Pedro el 
Escamoso (telenovela), Miss Universe (pornography), María Madrugada 
(telenovela), Caracol news, Luzbel esta de visita (telenovela) and Expedición 
Robinson (virtual reality). Around the same percentage of men and women watched 
these programs; the largest audiences were aged 40 and above and of lower social 
class.  
 
The nature of censorship 
 
The US researcher Alisky (1991) celebrates the (apparent) absence of censorship in 
Colombia. He admits that censorship laws were passed by the Colombian dictator, 
Rojas Pinilla in 1954, and that ‘for the first time in many decades, Colombian 
newspaper editors and broadcasters found censors entering their offices to prevent 
the publication of stories’ that might threaten their dictatorship’. In addition to 
‘prohibiting certain stories’, censors demanded that ‘other reports be published or 
aired as top priority news and even furnished photographs to the newspapers and 
magazines.  
 
Every radio station and network had a government agent assigned to direct the 
newsreels’ (ibid: 143). In 1955 the National Publications Enterprise (ENP) controlled 
the importation of newsprint. Periodicals that cooperated with the government could 
buy paper at a cheaper rate than others and the ENP used this preferential treatment 
to censor oppositional newspapers and news stories. El Tiempo was closed down in 
August 1955 for ‘insulting’ General Rojas Pinilla but resumed publication in 1956 
under the name Intermedio. El Siglo was similarly suspended because it had 
criticised the Dictatorship. The military authorities also closed El Colombiano and El 
Liberal down because they refused to publish ‘official reports’.  The Dictatorship 
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imposed official censorship: news blackouts on the massacre that the army had 
perpetrated in the bullring in the capital, on the murder of students, and on the deaths 
in Cali (Agudelo Ramírez and Montoya y Montoya, 1957).  
 
The regime also created a National Press Directorate (DINAPE) that could enter 
media offices to block the publication of news items. The Dictatorship compelled the 
media to prioritise the reports that the regime produced. The Conservative 
administration of Laureano Gómez (1953) proposed that Colombians who threatened 
‘the prestige of authorities or institutions’ should be treated as traitors (Romero 
Ospina, 1992). In 1954 the Dictatorship ordered newspapers not to insult government 
authorities. One constitutional reform prohibited communism: in a translation of a 
decree that US authorities had produced. Eduardo Zuleta Ángela informed ‘the voice 
of America’ in 1954 that ‘Colombia is – and continues to be – anti-communist’. In 
1955 the regime created the National Publications Enterprise that controlled the 
importation of the newsprint that newspapers and magazines required. Periodicals 
that cooperated with the government could purchase cheaper newsprint. The USSR 
donated newsprint to the communist newspaper, Voz.   
 
The Constitution of 1991 
 
This part of the thesis looks at the roots, nature and role of the Colombian 
Constitution of 1991 that promised so much in the domain of human rights and 
freedom of speech and the prohibition of censorship, but – sadly – delivered so little. 
Colombia has had around a hundred Constitutions since Nariño’s Constitution in 
1821: more than 40 of them were drafted between 1863 and 1885 (Ayala Poveda, 
2003). This particular Constitution was unique in that the 70 delegates were ‘elected 
by popular vote’ (Grabe, www.c-r.org, 2004) and represented a broad cross-section 
of Colombian political parties and groups: not only the mainstream parties – 
Conservative and Liberal – but also demobilised guerrilla groups such as the M-19, 
the EPL, Quintin Lame (the armed indigenous group) and the CRS, an ELN splinter 
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group. The delegates decided that this Constitution should ensure ‘life, tolerance, 
[convivencia], jobs, justice, equality, knowledge, liberty and peace inside a legal, 
democratic and participative frame that guarantees a just political, economic and 
social order that is committed to generating the integration of the Latin American 
community’. The 11th article proposes ‘the right to life’ and the absence of the death 
penalty; the 12
th
, that no-one will be ‘submitted to forced disappearance, torture or 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’; and the 13 th article 
guarantees to every person ‘the right of freedom of expression to spread their 
thought and opinion, the right ‘to report and receive true impartial information’ and 
the right to found mass media. The problem with the Constitution as the Jesuit 
human rights activist, Javier Giraldo stated at the time is that there is a massive 
difference between ‘declarations of rights’ on the one hand and on the other 
‘efficient methods to avoid the continuation of the violence’ (www.javiergiraldo.org, 
1991). There were up to 600 political assassinations per month before, during and 
after the five-month drafting of the document and the mass media ‘conquered the 
truth market by manipulating social needs that had no other outlet’ (Giraldo, 1991).   
 
On the one hand, the Constitution is courageous and eloquent and highlights the 
astronomical and inhumane levels of coercion that Colombian people have suffered 
and continue to suffer: ‘submitted to forced disappearance, torture or cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’ (article 12). On the other, the only 
part of the Constitution that has ever been enforced – and only through an alliance 
with the most coercive institutions of the Colombian regime – was the establishment 
of Caracol, RCN TV and City TV: the three main TV conglomerates. The Colombian 
Constitution of 1991 prohibits censorship but the statistics of the Inter American 
Press Association (1988-93) indicates the type of censorship that was practiced 
before, during and after the drafting: 47 Colombian journalists were assassinated in 
only five years.  
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Virtue and Heise (1996) have focused on political and socio-economic influences on 
South American journalists and their level of resistance to such pressures. Their team 
interviewed 466 journalists, media executives and academics in 14 South American 
cities and concluded that the main problems that journalists in this region faced were: 
1. low independence in the newsroom (28% of complaints), 2. low salaries (19.8%), 
3. low personal safety (15.5%), 4. low educational standards (11.2%), 5. low social 
status (7%), and 6. low professional ethics (4%). The problem of low independence 
in the newsrooms, personal safety, educational standards, and professional ethics 
reflects the political pressure on South American journalists. The low salaries and 
social status point to high socio-economic pressure. Journalists point to the fact that 
censorship ‘begins in the newsroom’ where stories are often killed because ‘they 
affect the outside economic or political interests of the owner, his family or friends’ 
or because ‘they involve important advertisers, the military or the government’ (ibid: 
205). Gardner (1985) concludes that ‘gifts and bribes often grease the mechanism 
and serve both the bribed and the briber. Many newspaper reporters supplement their 
incomes through this system, and regularly receive stipends from their news sources, 
both government and commercial’ (ibid: 79).  
 
Javeriana University published a similar report in Bogotá in 2004. Their conclusion 
is that a disproportionate number of recent graduates is responsible for coverage of 
the armed conflict and peace processes, and that these graduates are easily pressured 
into transmitting the ‘monolithic’ opinions and perspectives of their superiors (ibid: 
7). Official Colombian labour legislation is not implemented in any Colombian news 
organisation. Health insurance, vacations and pensions are seldom paid; staff are laid 
off at short notice; and only 13% of journalists are paid if they do overtime (ibid: 
10).  
 
The alternative newspaper, Desde Abajo insists that the threat of violence against 
Colombian journalists is still powerful because 114 Colombian journalists were 
assassinated between 1994 and 2004 and ‘in the first six months of 2006 Hollman 
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Morris from the television program, Contravia, Carlos Lozano from the weekly 
newspaper, Voz, Daniel Cornonell from Noticias Uno, Gilberto Martínez Prado from 
Colmundo Radio, and Marco Perales Mendoza, member of the Portada magazine of 
Barrancabermeja have all been threatened. William Parra of Telesur has been 
assaulted, and Hernando Palacios, a journalist from Cucuta, has been assassinated’ 
(7-2005: 18).  
 
The interviews with the coordinator of FLIP, the Colombian Foundation for the 
Freedom of the Press, the director of El Espectador and the former and the current 
mainstream Colombian journalists highlight the broad range of pressures and threats 
– and the nature of the coercion – that influences Colombian journalists and the 
nature of consent. The coordinator of FLIP (Interview 5) listed the main problems as: 
1. threats and violence against journalists from groups that ‘use violence and 
intimidation to manipulate their public image and achieve their ends’, 2. the fact that 
freedom of the press is only protected in theory because ‘in practice Colombian 
judges are corrupt or intimidated’, 3. self-censorship ‘because journalists manipulate 
news and information in order to protect themselves’, 4. dependence on sources of 
information and conflict between roles because ‘some journalists and their sources 
trade favours; other journalists sell advertising space; some journalists support 
particular political groups or business interests or act as negotiators between the 
government and armed groups and families of kidnap victims’, 5. concentration of 
media power and interests and the commercialisation of news, 6. l imited access to 
information on the armed conflict in the regions, 7. the permanent official State of 
Siege that permits the Armed Forces (which includes DAS and the police) to monitor 
the news that regional correspondents send to national news organisations, and 8. 
contracts that do not protect journalists.  
 
The director of El Espectador (Interview 14) focused on the first of these factors: 
threats and violence against journalists from groups that ‘use violence and 
intimidation to manipulate their public image and achieve their ends’. He referred to 
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the pressure of advertisements and the fact that the Grancolombiano group cancelled 
90% of the paper’s advertising revenue in 1982 in an act of revenge  against an article 
that the paper had published in which it had criticised the alliance between President 
Alfonso López Michelsen and his cousin, Jaime Michelsen that had created this 
corrupt economic conglomerate. The Medellín drug cartel used diabolical levels of 
armed coercion in the 1980s to achieve its ends, blowing up the building, 
assassinating Guillermo Cano - the owner, director and editor – in addition to the 
head of the legal team, journalists, advertisers and distributors, and gang-raping one 
of the columnists.  
 
The director added that Colombian journalists are ‘autonomous’ only in the sense 
that they represent their own personal interests; they are not ‘independent’ because 
their personal interests coincide with the political, social and economic interests of 
news organisations that represent ‘official’ government lines and depend on 
advertising revenue. One anonymous diatribe against communism, Comunista jamas 
(Never be communist) appeared in 1962. These are the chapter titles:  1. Catholics 
must collaborate, 2. Russian Imperialism, 3. I can’t be a communist because 
communism is atheist and persecutes religion, 4. Sacrilegious communists, 5. I can’t 
be a communist because communism is intrinsically perverse, 6. Communism is 
odious because of its methods of conquest, 7. Communism degrades Man, 8. 
Communism degrades women, and 9. Communism corrupts children.  
 
Doctrina Social Católica (Catholic Social Doctrine, Villegas, n.d.) which also 
miraculously appeared in the dictatorial Colombian 1960s presents the official 
position of the Catholic Church as regards ‘communism’. This text quotes two 
Catholic Popes in order to legitimize State coercion and death threats directed at both 
armed and unarmed communist groups. Pius XII (1944) declared that: ‘the Christian 
conscience can’t admit a social order that denies – or makes impossible or useless – 
the natural right to property and the benefits of consumption and of production’ 
(ibid: 56).  
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The conclusion is that ‘a Catholic can’t adopt socialist doctrine or be a member of a 
socialist party’ if ‘it defends the classical theses of traditional socialism’. The 
anonymous author ends this chapter with a quote from Pope Pius XI preaching to the 
faithful  
 
‘No-one can be a good Catholic and a real socialist at the same time’ (ibid: 58).  
 
2. Current role of media organisations and production 
 
Current Colombian mass media conglomerates 
 
The main method that current Colombian media organisations use to represent, 
legitimize and implement corrupt interests is to present Colombia as being 
‘democratic’. Posada Carbo, for example, angrily defends his country against ‘the 
false and erroneous notion of the illegitimacy of the Colombian State’ (2003: 41). He 
doesn’t deny that ‘problems of legitimacy do exist’ but claims that the ‘abuse’ of the 
term, ‘illegitimacy’ to refer to the entire Colombian State, ‘doesn’t do justice to the 
democratic conquests in our history’ and insists that ‘accusing Colombia of being 
undemocratic undermines government actions and genuine forces of reform, 
provokes international isolation and tends to justify – explicitly or implicitly – the 
criminal actions of the enemies of the State’ (ibid: 41). Official representatives of the 
Colombian State use the democratic frame to legitimize and implement the 
massacres and ‘criminal actions’ (ibid: 41) of the State itself.  
 
In May 2004 for example President Uribe addressed the Peace Community of San 
José de Apartado, declaring that, ‘in Colombia there shouldn’t be a centimetre of 
territory excluded from the presence of State institutions’ and that ‘every part of the 
fatherland should have the presence of the Armed Forces, the police and the fiscal’.  
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130 members of the Peace Community had already been massacred and assassinated 
by the army and by the paramilitary groups which the President himself had set up in 
his Convivir program. The consequences of this stirring message to the Colombian 
public and to the armed groups are predictable: two of the leaders of the community, 
their companions and their children were hacked to bits. On 21 February 2005, Jorge 
Luis Salgado, an ex-paramilitary attributed the massacre to the 17th Army Brigade 
and to the paramilitaries of Don Berna, formerly head of security (massacres and 
assassinations) in the Medellín drug cartel and currently involved in peace (business) 
negotiations with President Uribe‘The children were under the bed. The little girl 
was really sweet, about five or six years old and the baby was curious … we 
proposed to the commanders that we should leave them in a neighbour’s house but 
they said that they were a threat and that they would turn into guerrilla in the future 
… Cobra [the paramilitary leader] picked up the little girl by the hair and passed a 
machete across her throat’ (El Tiempo, 27-3-2008)   
 
El Tiempo (13-6-2005) highlights the international importance of the democratic 
image that the regime uses to legitimize its murderous interests. In June 2005 the 
Colombian government e-mailed a message to Colombian ambassadors and 
diplomats around the world, warning them not to use terms such as ‘internal armed 
conflict’, ‘non-State armed actors’, and peace communities (see above) on the 
indefensible grounds that ‘Colombia is a pluralistic democracy’ that ‘counts on 
appropriate channels to resolve problems’ (ibid: 4). 
 
In July 2005, President Uribe accused his political opponents of being ‘friends of the 
guerrilla’ because they aimed to ‘disqualify and discredit the authority of the 
government’ (El Tiempo, 6-7-2005: 6). They had criticised the recent law (de 
Justicia y Paz, of Peace and Justice) that officially granted immunity and impunity 
to the paramilitary allies of the President. These same allies retaliated with a spate of 
death threats transmitted to members of Colombian human rights organisations 
through the Internet.  
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Colombian media conglomerates maintain this democratic myth by manufacturing 
opinion polls that legitimize the pre-ordained results of elections. For example, they 
present the current President, Uribe – in spite of (or rather because of) his close 
connection to paramilitary groups – as being the most popular Colombian President 
ever: because he is ‘in possession of more than 80% popularity and acceptance’ (El 
Espectador, 13-5-1997: 10).  
 
These media organisations also resuscitate and polish up historical relics such as past 
Presidents in order to legitimize the image of the political parties that current 
Presidential candidates represent. One of his Presidential predecessors had the best 
post-mortem treatment in the Colombian media market. On 14 September 2005 the 
main headline in El Tiempo mourned the tragic death of President Turbay which 
apparently (fortunately) represented ‘the end of 70 years of political struggle’. The 
main photograph displayed his coffin wrapped in the national flag, his grieving 
family, the Presidential guards. The front page had two messages of respect: one 
from the family of Conservative Presidents, the Pastranas; and two from the family 
of the current President, Álvaro Uribe Vélez. The editorial read like this  
 
‘His personal and political trajectory is signalled by his faithful militancy beneath 
the Liberal banners. He only abandoned his official role last year to support the 
presidential re-election of Álvaro Uribe whom he considers to interpret the true sense 
of the Liberal party. The excesses that the Armed Forces committed should be 
balanced against the efficient capture of a good part of the command [of the M-19]. 
Ex-President Turbay should not be remembered as a doctrinaire but rather as a 
soldier at the service of his party. As President he always strived to defend 
institutionality in order to guarantee the stability of the nation and the appropriate 
norms of social activities’ (El Tiempo, 14-9-2005).  
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The last part of the thesis might suggest that Colombian mass media conglomerates 
do report the abuses of the Colombian political regime and are therefore not 
censored. The news stories that have been quoted from El Tiempo in this part do 
refer to a horrific paramilitary massacre in the peace community of San Apartado (El 
Tiempo, 27-3-2008), to the President’s rejection of terms such as ‘peace 
communities’ and ‘internal armed conflict’ (El Tiempo, 13-6-2005), to the 
President’s labelling of political opponents as ‘friends of the guerrilla’ (El Tiempo, 
6-7-2005) and to the editorial that has been quoted from El Tiempo and that admitted 
that the Liberal regime of President Turbay has committed excesses. These 
‘excesses’ – that ‘should be balanced against the capture of a good part of the 
command’ of the M-19 – included the imprisonment and torture and assassination of 
civilian suspects.   
 
But the main point of this part of the thesis and of the thesis as a whole is this: that 
the Colombian regime – the government and big business, the Armed Forces and 
paramilitaries, Colombian mass media conglomerates and production - frames the 
actions and discourse of the opposition as illegitimate challenges to proper authority. 
El Tiempo reports the horrors of the paramilitary massacre in San Apartado but also 
quotes the President and the ideological position of the regime: that the Dead are 
‘friends of the guerrilla’ and are therefore legitimate targets. This same position is 
adopted by the army and paramilitary commanders in order to legitimize the slashing 
of the kids’ throats.    
 
The journalists of El Tiempo win journalism prizes (Image 22) because of their 
refusal to admit the horror of all their lies and because this newspaper is owned by 
the political regime – by the Vice-President, by the Minister of Defence and by the 
Minister of the Environment (and of the fumigation of indigenous children program) 
– and can print human rights abuses because its loyalty to the interests of 
government, big business and the Armed Forces and its total indifference to the 
horrors of the regime is beyond question.  
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El Tiempo does not make the connection between the President’s Convivir program – 
in which he armed the Medellin drug cartel and prepared the displacement of more 
than three million campesinos through massacres and his personal usurpation of 
political power through selective assassinations – and the massacre of 130 unarmed 
civilians in the region that he once governed. This connection is made in human 
rights documents (CINEP, 2004). The prize-winning journalists of Colombian mass 
media conglomerates do not refer to texts such as Debt to Humanity: State 
paramilitarism in Colombia, 1988-2003 (Deuda con la humanidad: paramilitarismo 
de Estado en Colombia, 1988-2003) in which the President’s bloody rise to power 
and presidential greatness has been documented.  
 
The main point is that Colombian mass media conglomerates glorify the Armed 
Forces, tolerate the paramilitaries, and demonise the guerrilla. This last phenomenon 
is the subject of Part 3 of this thesis that uses a sample of 851 current news stories to 
understand the nature of a hypothetical frame that contextualises the violence in 
Colombia as illegitimate challenges to proper authority on the part of the latter.   
 
3. Current dissent 
 
Roots and nature of current indigenous cultural resistance 
 
ONIC, one of the main Colombian centres of indigenous research produced a report 
in 1988 on the problems of indigenous peoples from the Conquest to the present. 
These researchers divided Colombia into six macro-regions and collected the insights 
of representatives from different ethnic groups. The general consensus is that the 
principal threat to indigenous survival has been the Spanish Conquest and the 
subsequent relentless decimation of indigenous land. Rubber plantation owners 
enslaved most of the peoples in the Vaupes region. The Ocaina people resisted 
fiercely and were decimated. The Pijao people put up strong resistance to European 
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colonists but have been displaced from the Pacific coast to Tolima in the centre. In 
1988 around 60% of the population of the densely forested Southern region of 
Putumayo was indigenous; by 1998 only about 7.8% of them had survived. In 1988 
indigenous people occupied about 50% of the land in Putumayo; in 1998 they 
occupied around 20%. Colonial towns – and smuggling centres – such as Leticia, 
Puerto Inirida and Mitu have polluted indigenous regions in the south. Transportation 
routes have increased colonisation. The Macuna, Letuama and Tanimuca peoples 
have suffered less from material and ideological contamination because the north-
Western Amazon region is hard to penetrate. Colombian Armed Forces and 
paramilitary allies have systematically assassinated indigenous leaders and 
massacred thousands of indigenous people in the last 20 years.  
 
In 1886 General Manuel Mario Palacio Vargas appropriated all the land of the 
Mokana people in the Atlantico region. Christian missionaries contaminated 
indigenous cultures. International borders, ranches, farms, plantations, forestry and 
paper mills have divided and swallowed indigenous land. The Yukpa people on the 
border between Venezuela and Colombia are currently facing starvation. The land of 
the Chimila people has been swallowed up by the ranches. Oil companies such as 
BP-Amoco and Ecopetrol have absorbed swathes of territory in the Putumayo region 
and have used the army and their paramilitary business partners to massacre and 
displace indigenous populations. The Bari people in Norte Santander lost 80% of 
their land between 1913 and 1960 because of international companies such as Gulf 
Oil.  
 
The Colombian Armed Forces, paramilitaries, guerrilla groups and drug cartels are 
fighting to control indigenous land. Foreign-funded development projects such as 
hydroelectric power stations have eroded indigenous land and schools have erased 
indigenous cultures and languages. Around 59 of the 95 indigeneous groups in 
Colombia live in the Amazon region; many of them use coca leaves for social and 
spiritual purposes. The United States implements mass fumigation programs. This 
169 
 
pollutes, damages other crops and other medicinal plants, suffocates transcendental 
cultures, and murders both people and animals. US repression and annihilation of 
indigenous peoples and people is ruthless and relentless. Conflicts between 
international, national, regional and indigenous interests, and global economic booms 
in rubber, furs, quinine, gold, oil, titanium and uranium have eradicated indigenous 
land and have choked indigenous food supplies and economies. Entire populations 
have been decimated and displaced. The territories of the Embera, Wounaan, Chami, 
Katio and Eperaara-Siapidara people used to be on the Pacific coast. The Embera and 
the Chami peoples have lost their land. The Yanacona people have been pushed from 
the land to the city. The Kankuamo, Wiwa and Kaggaba people have been forced to 
live higher and higher up the slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. They suffer 
from poverty, malnutrition and sickness.  
 
Cultures, languages, identities and people have been mutilated.  
 
This coercion continues. More than 166 Kankuamo people have been assassinated by 
paramilitaries since the 1990s; fifty of their taitas (spiritual leaders) were murdered 
in 2003 alone (Voz, 14/20-7-2004). The Guajira peninsula – current desert 
‘homeland’ of the Wayuu people – has supposedly received 953 million dollars in 
subsidies in the last 25 years: there is little water to drink, few schools, more than 
half the population lives below the poverty line. Foreign coal mining interests have 
decimated the region (Image 22).  
 
The representative of the 405 Embera people displaced to Bogotá in December, 2004 
(Interview 9) sadly explained that the construction of a hydroelectric station in 1991 
has silted up their river, rotted their crops, flooded their sacred land and decimated 
their culture. The World Bank funded this ‘development’ project. Paramili taries 
assassinated a total of 17 Embera leaders to stifle their protests. The current 
Colombian regime, Armed Forces and paramilitary groups have used the region to 
negotiate ‘peace’ (pacification) and strategic political, social and economic alliances.  
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The interviewee, daughter of one of the assassinated leaders, declares that her people 
mourn the death of the river like ‘the murder of a brother or sister’ (Image 26 and 
27).  
 
On 26 December, 2005, El Tiempo, the main Colombian newspaper announced that 
eight young indigenous people in Putumayo had committed suicide in the previous 
three months. Their land had been fumigated: US companies produced the poison; 
US businesses supplied the planes; US companies supplied and trained the pilots.  
 
The main indigenous organisation in Colombia is called ONIC. This organisation 
publishes reports, bulletins and newspapers and runs radio stations. The bulletin of 
August 2003 appeals to indigenous groups to participate in a mobilisation, to resist 
displacement and ‘to protect life in all its forms’. The April 2002 edition of the 
ONIC newspaper, Unidad Indígena focuses on indigenous resistance, sea shells, an 
indigenous manifesto and a final message to a martyred ‘friend, brother and 
companion of the struggle’.  
 
ONIC and the Colombian Ministries of Communications and Culture have 
encouraged the indigenous peoples of Colombia to set up community radio stations. 
In 2000 representatives of these radio stations met in Bogotá to discuss their aims. 
The representative of the Wayuu people reported that indigenous radio stations 
should aim to strengthen autonomous political processes based on traditional 
authorities rather than to integrate indigenous people into mainstream Colombian 
culture. Their station aimed to increase communication inside their community, to 
resist Christian missionaries and mega-projects, and to speed up their reaction to 
threats and emergencies (Unidad de radio del Ministerio de la Cultura, 2000: 75).  
 
The Inga representative focused on the existential and cultural direction of the 
community (el plan de vida), on the ‘conservation and recovery of traditions’ and on 
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educational, health-related and cultural programs based on the insights of ‘the 
grandparents that know about health’ and ‘the old women that know  how to bring up 
children’ (ibid: 63). The Embera representative argued that indigenous radio stations 
should defend the image of their people from Colombian mass media campaigns 
against indigenous land reform and that suggested that their milk was contaminated. 
The representatives of the radio stations in the Amazon and Tolima focused instead 
on the role of radio stations as a method of unifying the community and international 
and national indigenous movements. Two of the delegates however questioned the 
value of indigenous radio stations. The first delegate suggested that radio is double -
edged:  simultaneously reviving and contaminating sacred places and songs that 
should never be sold (ibid: 80). The second highlighted the possibility that ‘one day 
an armed group will come in and commit a massacre or something else, or come in to 
our radio station and make us transmit their messages’ and asked the crucial 
question: ‘against this intolerance that is surely going to pass what does the 
Colombian State have to say?’    
 
It could be argued that the most important indigenous resistance movements are not 
bounded by national borders. For example in March 2005 indigenous leaders of 
Central and South American communities organised a minga (indigenous meeting) in 
the planetarium in Bogotá to present creation rituals under the stars, to share 
traditions, arts, crafts and dances, to remember atrocities such as the massacres in 
Guatemala where US-sponsored militias impaled indigenous people, tearing out 
entrails and foetuses, and to conduct debates on the possibility of peaceful resistance 
to the most recent and deadly of US threats: the implementation of a ‘free trade zone’ 
that permits foreign businesses to buy up biological property rights and to drain even 
more water, even more seeds and ever more life from the continent.  
 
This not only threatens one of the richest natural environments on this planet – 53.2 
million hectares of natural forest, 21.6 million hectares of plains, marches and desert, 
between 45,000 and 55,000 species of plant, 3,500 types of orchid, 1,815 classes of 
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bird, 3,200 species of fish, 520 types of reptile, 456 classes of mammal (Ayala 
Poveda, 2003) – but also the indigenous people and cultures that live inside of it. 
These are the roots of indigenous resistance and discourse based on the principle that 
oil is the blood of Mother Nature (U’wa people) and that to dam and damn a river is 
to block Her circulation (Embera people) so that millions of Her children (us) will 
die of thirst and disease (ibid).  
 
The roots and nature of current Afro-Colombian cultural resistance 
 
The main hypothesis in this part of the thesis is that both indigenous and African 
resistance is finally cultural. Morena Fraginals (1999) claims that black people in the 
region have passed through a process of ‘deculturalisation’ that he defines as ‘a 
conscious process through which one proceeds to undermine the culture of a 
particular human group in order to facilitate the appropriation of the natural riches in 
which they live or to use them as cheap unqualified labour’ (ibid: 25). He suggests 
that the Spanish colonists had ‘no interest in turning slaves into martyrs’, that they 
had ‘neither philanthropic nor perverse interests nor economic ones’ and that the 
Spanish colonists merely intended to eradicate ‘the elements that obstructed the 
established system of exploitation: social cohesion, solidarity, dignity, identity 
(ibid).  
 
In order to destroy these human elements the large mines and plantations did not 
collect people of the same ethnic origin (ibid: 28). They often spoke different 
languages or dialects, had different religious beliefs, and hated other groups for 
historical reasons. The new slaves ranged between 15 and 20 years old on average 
and around 72% of them were male: all of this for economic reasons. The co-
existence of men and women, mothers and children ‘threatened the prison structure 
of the mine or plantation’ (ibid: 32).       
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Slaves were mainly assigned to coastal regions such as Choco because  local 
indigenous peoples such as the Caribe had put up such relentless resistance that the 
Spanish decided to exterminate them. The representative of the Afro-Colombian 
people (Interview 15) has highlighted the three main problems that the Afro-
Colombian inhabitants of Choco continue to face. The first problem is little social 
and education reform because geographical barriers – rainforest and chains of 
mountains – have isolated the region. The second is minimal political and social 
representation because political leaders have presented themselves as Conservatives 
or Liberals, have represented the interests of the Colombian State rather than the 
interests of the region, and have controlled the local population through hunger.  
 
Drug plantations and drug routes throughout the region have turned the inhabitants 
into victims of crossfire between the Armed Forces, paramilitaries and guerrilla 
groups, none of which represent the people themselves. The Colombian State has 
used the ideological tool of the war on drugs and terrorism in order to legitimize 
armed repression and control drug production. The drug trade has created problems 
of security and a culture of materialism. The third problem is racism. There is an 
unofficial caste system in Colombia: whiter complexion means higher social class 
and more economic opportunities in the main cities.         
 
The main author that analyses black resistance in Colombia is Manuel Zapata 
Olivella. His masterpiece is Chango, el gran putas (1983) which traces the Afro-
Colombian tragedy to its cultural roots. Chango was an African ruler whose 
ruthlessness and destructiveness undermined local solidarity and resistance and 
precipitated the slave trade. The novel begins with the sound of the kora: the stringed 
instrument that an African shaman might use to present important messages and 
rituals. Zapata analyses crucial episodes in Afro-Colombian history through the eyes 
of the spirits of voodoo and the ancestors and captures the essence of their cultural 
resistance to white oppression: the music, the dialect, the gestures, the songs of 
liberation.  
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He appeals directly to the listener - ‘please don’t judge me for the blackness of my 
skin or because the sun has possessed me’ (ibid: 450) - and creates a crucial if 
anachronistic meeting between the Catholic saint, Pedro Claver and Domingo Bioho, 
the enslaved African ruler and hero of the palenque of San Basilio and of armed 
black resistance in Colombia. The saint presents his Christian solution, tells 
Domingo that he must be humble, submit to God, and learn from the ass 
 
‘If the white man insults you, clam up. If he forgets you, resign yourself to be the 
last. If he mistreats you, suffer uncomplainingly. If he denies you food, chew your 
hunger’ (ibid: 139).  
 
Benkos retorts that the priest has lost his sense of proportion, that on the one hand 
the ass is born to be dumb, but that men on the other hand ‘are supposed to 
understand’. But the main domain of current black cultural resistance is music and 
dance. Borja Gómez suggests that Afro-Colombian music ‘presupposes a spiritual 
presence’ and ‘includes dense symbolism, supernatural calls, communication 
between ancestral past and present and between this world and a parallel sacred 
world’ (1998: 151). Dance is ‘a magical, religious and transcendental dialogue’ and 
the musical instruments and the possessions that are an integral part of the carnivals 
that have survived the rape, torture, massacres and mutilations of five centuries of 
white colonialism, call up the African Gods. 
 
Alternative political, social and cultural movements, alternative media groups and 
alternative media production 
 
This part of the thesis suggests that the armed political, social and economic interests 
and mass media production that predominate in this period – the main instruments of 
coercion and consent - have created a seismic rift between official interests reflected 
and implemented through mass media discourse and popular interests and discourse 
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reflected through alternative political, social and cultural movements, alternative 
media groups and alternative media production. This does not imply that the terrain 
of mass media discourse is uncontested, that these ‘dominant meanings’ are part of 
some ‘one-sided process which governs how all events will be signified’ (Hall, 1980: 
128) or that audiences do not have the ability to ‘decode’ these mass-mediated signs 
and adopt sceptical or ‘oppositional’ positions (ibid: 138).  
 
Jaime Garzón is a prime example of a radical intellectual who infiltrated the Santo 
Domingo conglomerate and Caracol TV in the 1990s and used his programs - Quac 
Television and Zoociedad - to satirise the current President, government ministers, 
members of the Congress, the Colombian Armed Forces and the US ambassador. He 
used personas such as Godofredo Cínico Caspa (the total cynic), William Garra (the 
slick TV presenter), a maid in the Presidential palace, a receptionist in Hotel 
Colombia, a mad army major and a legendary shoe-shine boy called Heriberto de la 
Calle to penetrate the smugness and hypocrisy of mass-mediated Colombian politics. 
On one occasion Jaime interrupted the US ambassador’s smooth discourse on the 
alleged benefits of a US-dominated ‘free trade’ zone in order to laugh at him 
 
‘I know that one. That’s the one about the hen and the pig. The gringos are the hens  
and the Colombians are the pigs. You give us your eggs and we give you our 
sausages’.  
 
Finally Jaime rebelled against his own role: the Court Jester or Holy Fool who 
permitted the Colombian upper classes to laugh at themselves. He crossed the line, 
turning consent into coercion, publicly collaborated with the FARC, and met his 
Fate: in 1991 he was assassinated – gunned down in a Bogotá street - by ‘State 
security’ (confidential source of information).  
 
This part of the thesis on the other hand focuses on the other side of the seismic rift 
that separates official interests reflected and implemented through mass media 
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discourse and popular interests reflected through alternative political, social and 
cultural movements, alternative media groups and alternative media production. 
Archila (2001) has defined these alternative political, social and cultural movements 
as ‘more or less permanent collective social actions which are oriented to face 
injustices, inequalities or exclusions’ (ibid: 18) and describes the ir protests as 
‘collective social actions that intentionally express demands to the State, to private 
entities or to individuals’ (ibid). He suggests that one of the unusual characteristics 
of Colombian social movements and protests is the contrast between the apparent 
weakness of these social movements and the prevalence of their protests (ibid: 19) 
and investigates the historical influence of intellectual production on the nature of 
these movements and protests.  
 
He claims that the main intellectual influences on the Colombian social movements 
in the 1950s and 1960s were the discourses of the Cold War, the eruption of the 
Cuban revolution, the consolidation of the Chinese revolution, the material 
accomplishments of the Soviet Union, decolonization in Africa and Asia, student 
radicalism in Europe and US and popular opposition to the US massacre of civilian 
populations in Vietnam. Marxism spread through public universities and to other 
Colombian social sectors in the ’50s and ’60s. This discourse revolved around 
Leninism, class conflict and the role of the proletariat who had ‘nothing to lose but 
their chains’ (ibid). The Colombian communist party defined the role of the 
conscientious intellectual at that time: to educate the proletariat and to drive the 
revolution.  
 
The main intellectual influences on these movements in the 1970s were the 
discourses of the agrarian revolution and the theories of international economic 
dependence, the main movements being ANUC, the national movement of 
campesinos and ANAPO, the populist political alliance led by General Rojas Pinilla, 
who had headed the Dictatorship and been deposed by the Conservative President, 
Misael Pastrana (see Part 1). In 1977, ANUC and ANAPO precipitated a national 
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strike. The social movements in the 1980s organised ‘mobilizations’ - 
demonstrations, marches, road blocks, occupations – that demanded improvements in 
public services, in roads and transport, in credit and technical assistance, in regional 
and local development, and in human rights. Archila suggests that one of their main 
intellectual influences was Gramsci. 
 
Current movements could be classified as: 1. political movements such as the 
Colombian communist party and the communist youth movement, 2. movements that 
promote human rights, social reform and peace, indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
movements, 4. regional and local movements such as local residents’ committees (las 
juntas de accion communal), 5. religious, cultural, artistic and educational 
movements, 6. agrarian movements, 7. women and youth movements, and 8. labour 
and civic movements. Each of these movements has its media outlets.  
 
The strongest political opposition to the current regime has surged from the 
Colombian communist party. The interview with the demobilised coordinator of 
Colombian communist communications (Interview 17) describes the most important 
methods that the party used to drive the revolution. Political leaders of the EPL 
produced Revolución: the revolutionary voice of the party in the north of the country 
and in Antioquia. This paper published and defended party policies, included 
homages to dead comrades, and discussed crucial political issues. Bulletins that 
passed on intelligence and discussed combat strategies played an important role in 
the armed groups. Other publications aimed at these groups included Orientación: a 
theoretical magazine that presented the official Communist party line and that had to 
be studied and analysed by all members of these armed groups. The most important 
magazine that circulated among rural support groups (las juntas patrioticas) was 
called Avancemos: Let’s advance.  
 
In the 1960s the Colombian Communist party broadcast Spanish-language programs 
on Radio Tirana in Albania, on Peking Informa in China and in the former Spanish 
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colonies of North Africa. They also used other media such as occupations in 
companies and factories, kidnappings of high profile politicians and big 
businessmen, murals daubed in tar that promoted the Colombian communist 
movement, posters printed in stencil and banners that were carried on marches or 
draped across the mountains or around campuses. Other forms of communication 
were cultural: they published books of poetry and stories and they broadcast 
revolutionary songs.  
 
The main current voice of the party is its weekly newspaper, Voz. The first interview 
with a representative of Voz (Interview 4.1) focused on its historical aims. In 1957, at 
the time of the Dictatorship, they called the paper, La Voz de la Democracia (The 
voice of democracy). In 1964, during the storming of Marquetalia, the newspaper 
paper was renamed, La Voz de la proletariat (The voice of the proletariat). In 1984, 
they changed its name, this time to Voz (Voice): in order to reach the social sectors 
which emerged after the penetration of capitalism in Colombia, the industrialisation 
of agriculture, the urbanization of Colombian people and the rise of the professional 
class. 
 
The second interview (Interview 4.2) focused on the State-sponsored violence that 
Voz has suffered and heroically survived. In 1964 Manuel Cepeda Vargas – the 
director - was imprisoned for six months after the newspaper published an account of 
the bombing of Marquetalia by US and Colombian Armed Forces. The charge was 
‘criminal association’. In the 1970s President Misael Pastrana declared a State of 
Emergency, criminalised communism, and imprisoned the director. The contents of 
the newspaper were censored by his government and the paper was stamped with the 
words, this edition appears under official censorship. The next President, Turbay 
declared a State of Alert and imprisoned intellectuals. The Voz photographer was 
tortured in 1980. In 1986, President Betancur declared a ceasefire with the FARC 
and permitted the formation of the Union Patriotica (see Part 1, Chapter 4).  
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Thousands of representatives have been – and continue to be – assassinated. The 
newspaper was decommissioned in the regions; distributors and vendors were 
murdered. In 1988 under the regime of President Barco the Voz building was 
dynamited. In 1993 correspondents of Voz were assassinated in the Cesar region; 
Gaviria was the President of Colombia at that time. In 1994 Samper was declared 
President and Manuel Cepeda Vargas – the director – was assassinated. In 1996 the 
Voz building was dynamited again. In 2000 the administrator in Villavicencio was 
murdered; in 2001 the Nariño correspondent was assassinated; his replacement was 
forced into exile a few months later. In 2002 the present director survived a car 
bomb. In 2003 another correspondent was murdered; the Santander and Medellín 
correspondents escaped into exile. Part 3 of this thesis, the analysis of current news 
items related to the armed conflict, analyses Voz content in detail.    
 
The Trotskyite labour union has published Revolucion obrera (Revolutionary 
worker) since 1997. The 24 May 2004 issue has an image of red chains bursting. On 
14 February 2005 the paper condemned the fact that the same State - that ‘sponsors 
and uses’ paramilitaries - is pretending ‘to judge and punish them’.  
 
The Colombian socialist party publishes El Socialista. Its February 2005 issue has an 
illustration of protesters and banners that read ‘no more cancellation of public 
services; salary increases; solidarity with the people of Iraq; enough repression; no 
re-election’. The editorial claims that Leftist parties are more interested in votes and 
‘useless debates’ than in protecting workers and suggests that Colombian labour 
unions  collaborate with the regime rather than struggle against the threat of the 
latest US free trade agreement. The socialist party promises to defend public health 
and to call an indefinite strike, demanding: ‘adequate salaries, stable prices and 
labour conditions, democratic rights and the expulsion of Yankees from Colombian 
soil’ (ibid). The latest political alliance that challenges political, social and economic 
monopolies is El Polo Democratico (the Democratic Pole). In March 2006 the party 
organised a rally to launch their Presidential bid and to denounce the torture and 
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assassination of a candidate and university professor, Jaime Gómez. Jaime has been 
silenced by allies of the current President. Colombian human rights movements 
publish newspaper such as Caja de herramientas (Box of tools), QueQue, Periféria 
(Periphery) and Mundo Ciudadano (The world of the citizen).  
 
The 100th edition of Caja de Herramientas debates issues such as ‘Harassment and 
theft of information from APSCP’ (another human rights and social reform 
platform), ‘Justice or peace: a false dilemma’ (a critique of government-paramilitary 
‘negotiations’) and ‘Reparation for human rights violations’ (UP issues). The issue 
of QueQue on August 2005 discusses the failure of Plan Patriota (the latest US-
sponsored military campaign), the closure of a public hospital (Instituto Materno 
Infantil) because local authorities had embezzled the land, the hunger of a million 
Bogotanos and the narco-paramilitary agrarian counter-reform that had brought 
President Uribe to power. The April 2006 issue of Periféria asks the rhetorical 
question, ‘Is this the government we deserve?’ and states its ideological position  
 
‘Power stands on top of an immense cemetery where the dead and the disappeared 
are buried next to our dreams, our plans and our hopes’ (ibid).  
 
Mundo ciudadano has an illustration that blends the Statue of Liberty and a petrol 
pump that spurts blood (Image 41). The article claims that State terrorism –
perpetrated by ‘traders, landowners and bureaucrats’ - plays a murderous role in the 
accumulation of capital. The grassroots human rights collective, Memoria organised 
a ceremony on 10 December 2005. The audience placed flowers and candles on 
hundreds of ‘headstones’ in the main square, held hands and watched dancers recall 
the spirits of dead children: the most recent victims of limpieza social – State-
sponsored population control - in the district of Rafael Uribe Uribe.  Other 
alternative political, social and cultural movements and media groups have 
centralised urban coordination and regional members and audiences. The aims of the 
two directors of the national organisation of popular communication (Interview 1) 
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coincide: to deepen democratic expression, to defend human rights and self-esteem, 
to stimulate creativity, to provide access to popular channels of communication. The 
first director focuses on the need for popular action and language: desde los pobres, 
por los pobres, para los pobres (from the poor, by the poor, to the poor).  
 
The second claims that communication is both a spiritual need and a human right: 
that social reconstruction and the peace process should be based on ‘individual 
spiritual expression and communication through the medium of press, graphic arts, 
audiovisual expression, photography, video and radio’.  
 
The coordinator of urban community radio (Interview 7.1) focuses on human rights  
issues rather than news events: poverty, marginalisation and prostitution, the 
‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ role of men and women in the community and in the 
home, generation gaps, the physically and mentally challenged, participation in 
democratic processes. His main success has been in pressuring local authorities to 
respect the rights of local communities such as the access to water in the barrio of 
Rafael Uribe Uribe.  
 
The coordinator of Internet channels (Interview 7.2) concentrates on three crucial 
issues: production conflicts (concentration of ownership, conditions of employment, 
public services and financial resources), cultural conflicts (ethnic issues, social 
marginalisation) and environmental conflicts (food and water supplies, pollution). He  
coordinated the mobilization (minga) of 60,000 indigenous people in Cauca and Cali 
in March, 2004, transmitting live issues and events to 17 foreign countries  
 
El Campanazo, founded in the district of Patio Bonito in September 2001 is a classic 
example of a community paper. The December 2005 issue opposes the re-election of 
President Uribe because of the use of his paramilitaries to cull the population of the 
district. The paper criticises the Internet page of the French supermarket chain, 
Carrefour that describes local residents as ‘the destitute end of the market’ (Image 
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43). Campanazo announces the latest mobilisation against the disastrous local 
consequences of the US free trade zone and publishes a piece of graffiti scrawled on 
the walls of the National University that states 
 
‘If love does not warm us, many of us will die of cold tonight’ (ibid)  
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Conclusion 
 
The role and nature of consent, 1499 – present 
 
Part 2 suggests that the abuse of consent and the censorship that the current 
Colombian regime perpetrates has historical roots: that the regime produced texts 
that promoted massacres and maximised the accumulation of profits and resources 
during the Spanish Conquest and Colonial Period, during the period of 
Independence, during Conservative and Liberal rule, that this media production that 
promotes coercion and demonises the opposition continues, and that peripheral 
Colombian perpetrators represent and implement foreign interests (Images 15 and 
29).  
 
Both Part 1 and Part 2 suggest that there is interplay between coercion and consent, 
that these two concepts refer to complementary roles, that coercion and consent are 
two sides of the same coin. The nature and role of the interplay between coercion and 
consent – armed groups and news production – will be analysed in the next part of 
the thesis: Part 3. The nature and strength of all the claims that are presented in Parts 
1, 2 and 3 of the thesis will be assessed in more depth and detail in the General 
Conclusion.
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Part 3 
 
Coercion and consent 
 
‘Every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, 
an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’  
(Weber, 1958: 212)  
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Introduction 
Part 1 of this thesis has claimed that US and Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries 
are the principal current instruments of coercion and that their main role is to monopolise 
oil, mineral and agricultural production, to maximise profits through massacres and 
displacements of local populations, and to accumulate capital, resources and credit in 
central banks and industries at any price. Part 2 has argued that these same armed 
political, social and economic interests influence Colombian mass media conglomerates – 
the main instruments of consent - and that their principal role is to promote and legitimize 
armed interests, to monopolise media production and to maximise sales and profits 
through the advertisement of mostly US products.  
Parts 1 and 2 suggest that coercion is based on the consent that these Colombian mass 
media conglomerates generate and vice versa: and that this is the current nature of the 
interplay between coercion and consent. Part 2 suggests that the Colombian Armed 
Forces and Colombian conglomerates such as the Santo Domingo conglomerate that 
owns Caracol TV and Caracol radio, the Ardila Lulle conglomerate group that controls 
RCN TV and radio and the Casa Editorial El Tiempo that owns the main newspaper and 
the third Colombian television station have a powerful influence on Colombian 
journalists and journalism. The influence of Colombian mass media conglomerates (the 
main instrument of consent) on Colombian journalists is reflected in their use of 
‘impressionable recent graduates’ and in the fact that ‘official Colombian labour 
legislation is not implemented in any Colombian news organisation’ (Javeriana 
University, 2004). The influence of the Colombian Armed Forces (the main instrument of 
coercion) on Colombian journalism is reflected in their multiple roles as the main 
authors, agents, subjects and sources of news stories, massacres and selective 
assassinations of political opponents, local populations, and Colombian journalists. 
The principal aim of Part 3 of the thesis is to provide insights into the interplay between 
coercion and consent: the main hypothesis being that current Colombian news production 
might attribute most human rights abuses to the FARC guerrilla group – framing their 
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actions as illegitimate challenges to proper authority - because of coercion both on the 
part of the main Colombian armed groups and on the part of the Colombian mass media 
conglomerates.  
Legitimization of main hypothesis 
The first source of evidence that legitimizes the main hypothesis in Part 3 of the thesis – 
the hypothetical existence of a news frame that contextualises the actions and discourse 
of the Colombian opposition as illegitimate challenges to proper authority – is provided 
in Part 2 of the thesis. Part 2 insists that one of the main roles of Colombian media and 
news production is to glorify the regime and demonise the enemy – labelling its 
representatives as indigenous, black, infidel, Conservative, Liberal, bandit, communist, or 
terrorist – in order to legitimize and promote power and profits based on coercion and 
human rights abuse. The hypothetical existence of the news frame in Part 3 reflects this 
insight into the legitimization of coercion through the demonization of the enemy in 
repressive peripheral regimes.     
 
The second source of evidence that legitimizes the presence of a frame that demonises the 
enemy is provided in previous media studies about the coverage of oppressed groups and 
radical movements. Three recent articles, the first on the coverage of Iraqi resistance 
movements on the part of US mass media, the second on the portrayal of Israeli vs. 
Palestinian atrocities on Israeli and Palestinian television, and the third on western mass 
media coverage of protests against the World Trade Summit, should suffice to suggest 
that such a frame might exist. 
 
Ghali Hassan (www.globalresearch.ca, May 2005) claims that the western mass media 
tends to attribute responsibility to local Iraqi resistance movements rather US or western 
governments for ‘the horrendous crimes committed against the people of Iraq’. He argues 
that western journalists present representatives of the US in terms of ‘building 
democracy’ and fighting ‘terrorism’. Iraqi resistance fighters on the other hand are 
portrayed as violent ‘religious fanatics’ who do not have the support of the local 
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population. The label of ‘religious fanatics’ is effective because the western public tends 
to be sympathetic to resistance movements and intolerant of religious extremists. Hassan 
also suggests that the western media tend to attribute atrocities to these ‘religious 
fanatics’ or ‘insurgents’ although the main agents of violence in Iraq are US-sponsored 
militias and allies such as the Kurdish Peshmerga whose leaders supported the US 
invasion and Occupation, the Iranian-trained Badr Brigades, the armed wing of the 
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the INC and INA. 
To conclude, Hassan argues that this demonization of Iraqi resistance movements – 
through the label of ‘religious fanatics’ and through the large-scale attribution of acts of 
violence to Iraqi ‘insurgents’ – ‘denies the Iraqi people their legitimate right to fight for 
freedom and national sovereignty.’ He adds that this frame permits the US Left and the 
Liberals to pontificate about ‘non-violent’ resistance, ignoring the issue of the illegal 
armed occupation.  
Research into the coverage of the Second Intifada on Israeli and Palestinian has provided 
‘important insights into how journalists’ routines ensure a steady flow of culturally 
acceptable news stories that reinforce hatred between enemies.’ Wolfsfeld (2008) studies 
two journalistic routines that seem to be important in the construction of ‘ethnocentric’ 
news.  
 
The first routine is permanent and based on the fact that ‘virtually everyone involved in 
collecting and distributing information comes from the local population or from allies’. 
This includes reporters, photographers, graphic designers, editors, and sources, all using 
the same language. The second routine ‘varies as journalists construct coherent narratives 
for particular events.’ These narratives can be classified in terms of victims and defensive 
modes of reporting. If ‘we’ are the victims of violence, the press ‘gives vent to shock, 
grief and anger’; and the images and sounds coming from the scene provide ‘graphic 
proof' of the enemy's evil.’ 
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Seth Ackerman (www.fair.org, January/February 2000) suggests that this demonization 
frame is also applied to radical movements in the US. He claims that the US mass media 
in December 1999 rallied around the delegates to the World Trade Organisation in 
Seattle, framing dissent in negative terms and presenting protest as inappropriate and 
unacceptable. US media erroneously suggested that the protesters objected to trade in 
general rather than to the specific practices of the World Trade Organisation that permit 
the rich countries to exploit the poor ones. The Associated Press (11-28-1999) 
constructed an ‘us’ and ‘them’ scenario in which ‘for every campaigner lying down on a 
sidewalk this week to protest the WTO's efforts to reduce trade barriers, there is a happily 
employed Seattleite whose job depends on free commerce.’ The Washington Post 
referred to the protesters as ‘a guerrilla army of anti-trade activists’ (12-1-1999); US 
News (13-12-99) dismissed them as ‘all-purpose agitators’; The Philadelphia Inquirer 
defined these protesters as the ‘terminally aggrieved’ (5-12-1999).  
 
The US media also presented the use of tear gas and concussion grenades as an 
appropriate response to ‘violent’ activists – categorising crimes against property as 
violence – and ignoring the rubber bullets that ‘took off part of a person's jaw’ and 
‘smashed teeth’. 
 
The central hypothesis in Part 3 of this thesis – the suggestion that a news frame might 
contextualise the actions and discourse of the opposition as illegitimate challenges to 
proper authority – is therefore based on two bodies of evidence. Firstly Part 2 of this 
thesis suggests that Colombian media production has consistently demonised the enemy, 
presenting its actions and discourse as illegitimate – labelling the opposition as 
indigenous, black, infidel, Conservative, Liberal, bandit, communist, or terrorist – 
coordinating consent and coercion – and legitimizing and promoting power and profits 
based on human rights abuse. Secondly the three issues discussed here – the negative 
portrayal of Iraqi resistance movements, of the Second Intifada, and of the world trade 
protests – suggest that mainstream media in both central and peripheral regimes tend to 
contextualise or frame opposition to governmental and corporate interests as illegitimate. 
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General approach 
Part 3 consists of seven sections that assess: 1. the role and nature of this frame analysis, 
2. the role and nature of this content analysis, 3. the difference between content analysis 
and frame analysis in the context of this thesis, 4. the procedure (the construction and 
representativeness of the sample and the identification and measurement of the units of 
analysis, the frame and the variables), 5. reflection on the reliability of coding, 6. the 
results of this research (the physical context of the news items, the type of coverage, the 
relationship between Colombian mass media conglomerates and selection of sources and 
this hypothetical frame that contextualises the actions of the opposition as illegitimate 
challenges, and 7. the interpretation and importance of these results (the main influences 
on and nature and principal role of this hypothetical frame).     
Part 3 is based on 851 current Colombian news stories related to the three principal 
sources of violence at present: 1. the Colombian government and Armed Forces that 
represent the legal or rather legitimized political, social and economic interests of the 
current Colombian regimes, 2. the paramilitaries that represent their illegal and illegimate 
interests, or 3. the FARC that represent the main armed resistance or reaction to these 
interests. These stories (2003-4) were selected at regular time intervals in order to 
represent the annual output of seven mainstream media organisations (one television 
channel, one radio station, one national newspaper and magazine and two regional 
newspapers) and one oppositional newspaper (the communist newspaper, El Voz). 
Part 3 of the thesis is designed to measure the similarities and differences between 
different sources of Colombian media production in terms of: 1. the relationship between 
Colombian mass media conglomerates and the attribution of illegitimate actions to one of 
the three groups, 2. the nature of the crime or transgression or human rights abuse that is 
attributed to these armed groups in the 851 stories, 3. the relationship between these mass 
media conglomerates and sources of information (foreign, government, official 
opposition, academic institutions, business, Church, public, Armed Forces or police, 
FARC or paramilitaries) that represent the interests of the regime, and 4. the relationship 
208 
 
between these sources, the attribution of human righs abuses to these three groups, and 
the hypothetical frame that contextualises the actions of the opposition as illegitimate 
challenges to proper authority. The main hypothesis is that Colombian mass media 
organisations and sources of information such as the government and Armed Forces tend 
to attribute human rights abuses to the FARC guerrilla group and to frame their actions as 
illegitimate.  
It is important to stress at this point that the ideological terrain of Colombian news 
production is contested, that consent and hegemony (Gramsci, 2005) is ‘always a 
question of contestation’ and ‘always a matter of winning, securing and defending 
popular consent’, that ‘the terrain is in constant process’, that ‘classes can rule without 
gaining hegemony’ and that ‘moments of coercion can replace moments of consent’ 
although the acquisition and maintenance of power often requires ‘calculation, strategy, 
cooperation and compromise’ (Rojek, 2003: 117). This thesis accepts that these 
‘dominant meanings’ are not part of some ‘one-sided process which governs how all 
events will be signified’ (Hall, 1980: 128), admits that Colombian news items have ‘to 
enforce, win plausibility for’ and legitimize the ‘decoding of the event’ (ibid), and 
implies that this research focuses on production rather than on reception: and that 
members of the Colombian audience may adopt ‘dominant hegemonic’, ‘negotiated’ or 
‘oppositional’ positions (ibid: 138) to the framing and labelling process that is being 
discussed.  
Part 3 analyses the relationship between Colombian mass media conglomerates and the 
attribution of responsibility to one of the three armed groups: because this labelling 
process seems to be an important cause and characteristic of past and present armed 
conflicts - defining and dividing us and them, friend and enemy, and turning Colombian 
people against one another and against themselves - the internal enemy.  
Iyengar’s research into US audiences (1991) suggests that news production might play an 
important role in the attribution of responsibility: that problems such as poverty are 
individual and self-inflicted in episodic accounts, structural and endemic in more critical 
and sociological explanations, themselves elided by the structure of news reporting. 
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Iyengar exposed his experimental audience to 20 minutes of television news coverage of 
six public issues (poverty, unemployment, crime, terrorism, racial inequality and the Iran-
Contra drugs-for-arms scam) and discovered that subjects exposed to episodic news 
coverage (that he defined as ‘event-orientated’ reports that depict public issues ‘in terms 
of concrete instances’) tended to blame individuals rather than society in general or the 
government in general (ibid: 11). The political predisposition of the audience did play an 
important role in the nature of this attribution of responsibility to individuals: members of 
the audience who identified themselves as Republicans rather than Democrats did 
attribute more responsibility to individuals (ibid: 120). However Iyengar insisted that 
‘episodic frames of crime and terrorism’ influenced attribution of responsibility to 
individuals and reinforced support for the death penalty and for ‘military reprisals against 
terrorist nations’ (ibid: 148). He suggested that episodic frames play an important role in 
US politics because episodic coverage treats events as disconnected hence masking the 
underlying continuity and structural foundation of social problems. He also claimed that - 
‘by diverting attention from societal and governmental responsibility’ - episodic framing 
‘glosses over national problems and allows public officials to ignore problems whose 
remedies entail burdens to their constituents’ (ibid: 174).  
Iyengar concluded that ‘television news may well prove to be the opiate of American 
society, propagating a false sense of national well-being and thereby postponing the time 
at which American political leaders will be forced to confront the myriad economic and 
social ills confronting this society’ (ibid) and that TV news tends to be episodic because 
the visual nature of the medium ‘tends to place a premium on individual exemplars’ 
(Iyengar, 1996: 62). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000: 106) highlighted ‘the predominance 
of the responsibility frame’ in Dutch national media during the meeting of European 
heads of State in 1997. Their research on the other hand suggested that ‘news can be 
episodic and at the same time frame the government rather than the individual as 
responsible for social problems’ and that ‘Iyengar’s argument about the consequences of 
the episodic nature of TV news is actually culture-bound’ (ibid). Semetko and 
Valkenburg however seem to miss the main point of Iyengar’s research: that episodic 
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coverage masks the underlying continuity and structural foundation of social problems 
and is not culture-bound. 
Part 3 of this thesis studies production rather than reception of news and information on 
the current armed conflict (cf Iyengar, 1991) but suggests that Colombian mass media 
conglomerates might attribute human rights abuses to the FARC rather than to the other 
two armed groups and that - if the Colombian mass media frame the actions of the 
opposition as illegitimate challenges to proper authority – this might have an important 
effect on Colombian audiences. 
1. The role and nature of this frame analysis  
Previous research 
Goffman (1974: 10) defined frames in general terms as ‘definitions of a situation’ that 
‘are built up in accordance with principles of organisation which govern events’ and ‘our 
subjective involvement in them’ and used a bus queue as an example. The bus queue 
frame directs attention to the bus stop sign but deflects attention from the clothes, 
physical appearance and language of prospective passengers. Goffman concluded that 
people use frames to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’ the sensory information that 
surrounds them (ibid: 21). Gitlin (1980: 6) similarly described frames as ‘principles of 
selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, 
what happens, and what matters’. Neuman referred to them as ‘conceptual tools’ that 
people use to ‘convey, interpret and evaluate information’ (Neuman et al., 1992: 62). 
Snow and Benford (1992: 138) claim that ‘punctuated and encoded threads of 
information may be diverse and even incongruous’. Frames weave these threads together 
‘in such a way that what was previously inconceivable or at least not clearly articulated is 
now meaningfully interconnected’ (ibid). These researchers suggest that frames ‘enable 
the perception and communication of (social and physical) reality’ (König, 2005).  
Other researchers have defined frames in more radical terms and have suggested that 
frames limit rather than enable perception. Tuchman (1978: 156) suggested that news 
frames ‘narrow the available political alternatives’. Entman argued that they promote ‘a 
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particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment 
recommendation’ (1993: 53). Altheide (1997: 651) defined the frame in metaphorical 
terms as ‘the border around a picture that separates it from the wall, and from other 
possibilities’. König (2005) concluded that ‘because frames consist of tacit rather than 
overt conjectures, notorious difficulties to empirically identify frames arise’ and that this 
‘difficulty of measuring latent frames could partially explain the gradual theoretical shift 
towards a conceptualization of frames as being more actively adopted and manufactured’.  
Part 3 of this thesis straddles both definitions, suggesting that frames both limit and 
enable perception and admitting that frames are both ‘unconsciously used’ and 
‘consciously adopted’ (König, 2005). This research reflects Entman’s claim that the 
frame in a news text is ‘the imprint of power’ that identifies ‘the actors or interests that 
competed to dominate the text’ (1993: 55) but accepts the possibility of an unconscious 
element in the use of these frames in current Colombian news production.  
Frame analysis has been used differently in different academic fields. Entman (1993) 
optimistically suggests that frame analysis has the potential ‘to illuminate the precise way 
in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or 
communication) of information’ but sadly concludes that ‘despite its omnipresence across 
the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing 
theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves 
manifest in a text; or how framing influences thinking’ (ibid: 51-2). In contrast D’Angelo 
(2002) defends this multiplication of academic perspectives.  
 
Media studies have focused on generic frames that result from the effects of journalistic 
norms on news production. For example Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identified the 
five most common frames in current media studies: the attribution of responsibility 
frame, the conflict frame, the human interest frame, the economic consequences frame 
and the morality frame. They researched the relationship between Dutch mass media 
conglomerates and the news frames that appeared in 2,601 newspaper stories and 1,522 
television news items and concluded that ‘serious’ mass media conglomerates tended to 
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use the ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame and the ‘conflict frame’ and that ‘sensational’ 
outlets tended to use the ‘human interest’ frame. The ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame 
is the focus of interest in this thesis not only because of its prevalence but also because of 
its importance in the labelling of us and them.  
 
In social movement studies, Snow et al (1986) prompted research into the relationship 
between frames, social phenomena and mobilisation. The crucial factor is viability: the 
social and psychological acceptance of these frames. This seems to be based on empirical 
credibility or narrative fidelity. König (2005) defines empirical credibility as ‘the fit 
between a frame and real world events’ and suggests that this ‘denotes the ease with 
which audiences reconcile a frame with what they consider their — possibly mediated — 
experiences’. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) define narrative fidelity as ‘the congruence 
of a frame with the life experience of its audience’. Snow and Benford suggest that a 
frame might be more effective - more likely to ‘strike a responsive chord’ - if it ‘rings 
true with extant beliefs, myths’ and ‘folktales’ (1992: 141). Master frames for example 
‘resonate with cultural narration, that is with stories, myths, and folk tales that are part 
and parcel of one’s cultural heritage’ (Snow and Benford, 1988: 210). König claims that 
the strength of master frames such as ‘liberal individualism’, ‘ethno-nationalism’ or 
‘harmony with nature’ is in ‘their capacity to move beyond empirical scrutiny’ (2005): 
the main counter-argument being that these master frames are very much hegemonic 
taken-for-granted theses about the way the world works and only function if widely 
unquestioned. The question that remains is: how do these frames function socially and 
politically?   
 
Snow and Bedford (1988) also conducted research into the nature of the relationship or 
alignment between frames. Frame amplification denotes ‘the clarification and 
invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of 
events’ (Snow et al, 1986: 469). Frame extension adds issues or dimensions in order to 
make the frame more attractive to potential adherents who have different priorities (Snow 
and Benford, 1988: 478). Frame bridging is the ‘linkage of two or more ideologically 
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congruent, but structurally unconnected frames’ (Snow and Benford, 1988: 486) and 
frame transformation refers to the process through which the frame ‘is transformed into 
something’ that is  ‘seen by the participants to be quite something else’ (Goffman, 1974: 
44). Part 2 of this thesis suggests that the current government continually aligns its 
democratic master frame. For example in June 2005 the Colombian government e-mailed 
a message to Colombian ambassadors and diplomats around the world warning them not 
to use terms such as ‘internal armed conflict’, ‘non-State armed actors’, and ‘peace 
communities’ on the grounds that ‘Colombia is a pluralistic democracy’ that ‘counts on 
appropriate channels to resolve its problems’ (El Tiempo, 13-6-2005: 4). In July 2005 the 
President accused his political opponents of being ‘friends of the guerrilla’ who aimed to 
‘disqualify and discredit the authority of the government’ (El Tiempo, 6-7-2005: 6). 
International mass media conglomerates such as BBC World Service transmit and re-
transmit the same democratic master frame around the world 
 
‘Welcome to Talking Point. I’m Bridget Kendall and today we’re bringing you a very 
special program from Bogotá, the capital of Colombia in Latin America. After 40 years 
of civil war it’s no wonder that Colombia has got a reputation for violence. It’s had one 
of the highest murder rates in the world, one of the highest rates of kidnapping and the 
attempts by the government to battle against left wing the guerrilla insurgents on the one 
hand and right wing paramilitary groups on the other’ (November, 2004). 
This research 
This research focuses on a hypothetical frame that contextualises the actions of the FARC 
guerrilla group as illegitimate challenges to proper authority, and that influences the 
selection and presentation of Colombian news items related to the current armed conflict. 
The hypothesis that this frame does in some sense exist is based on the information in 
Part 1 and Part 2 of this thesis that suggests that the armed political, social and economic 
interests that have predominated in each historical period in this region from the Spanish 
Conquest to the present have influenced the nature of the armed conflict (coercion) and 
the nature of media production (consent), that one of the main roles of Colombian media 
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organisations is to ‘frame’ the armed conflict – by defining and dividing the Colombian 
population into us and them, friend and enemy, and by attributing responsibility for social 
ills and violence to ‘the other side’ - and that this is one of the principal ways in which 
consent is manipulated in societies such as this where severe coercion seems to be 
effective in securing power.  
Part 3 focuses on news production in particular rather than on media production in 
general because news production is the most important method through which political 
and social messages related to the armed conflict are currently being transmitted to the 
public, both in Colombia and abroad, and should therefore provide vital insights into the 
current and universal nature of – and interplay between – coercion and consent. This part 
of the thesis measures three possible attributions of human rights abuses to the three main 
armed groups that will be used to establish the existence and nature of this hypothetical 
frame that contextualises the actions of the FARC guerrilla group as illegitimate. The first 
frame attributes current human rights abuses to the government in general or the Armed 
Forces in particular. The second attributes them to the paramilitaries in general or the 
AUC (the united paramilitary group) in particular. The third frame attributes human 
rights abuses to the guerrilla in general or the FARC in particular. If this frame analysis 
and content analysis of 851 current news items attributes the most severe violations of 
human rights to the current enemy – the guerrilla in general or the FARC in particular – 
this might suggest that Colombian mass media conglomerates (the most important 
instruments of consent) produce news items that legitimize the interests of the 
government, the economic conglomerates and the Armed Forces (the most important 
instruments of coercion); and that current Colombian news production reinforces the 
democratic master frame (Snow and Benford, 1988: 210) and bridges the gap between 
coercion and consent, armed conflict and news production.  
2. The role and nature of this content analysis 
This content analysis is designed to provide insights into 1. the relationship between 
Colombian mass media conglomerates and current news production in terms of 
attribution of human rights abuses to the three main armed groups (Armed Forces, 
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paramilitaries, guerrilla) that participate in and constitute the present armed conflict, 
2. attribution in these 851 news items compared to attribution in a current Colombian 
human rights database, 3. the nature of the abuse attributed to these armed groups in 
the stories, 4. the relationship between these mass media conglomerates and the 
sources of information that these stories use or that use these stories (foreign, 
government, official opposition, academic institutions, business, Church, public, 
Armed Forces or police, AUC or FARC sources), and 5. the relationship between 
these sources and the attribution of human rights abuses to the three armed groups. 
The final role of this part of the thesis is this: to establish the existence - and 
understand the nature - of a hypothetical frame that contextualises the actions of the 
FARC guerrilla group as illegitimate challenges to proper authority.  
 
The role of this content analysis is to turn the 851 news items into meaningful units 
of analysis, the challenge being to reduce  large amounts of material into categories 
that encapsulate ‘the essence of the text’ (Liakopoulos, 2000: 167). The main 
strength of content analysis is that large quantities of information may be processed, 
categorized and analysed in a short period of time (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000: 
135-6). Content analysis is systematic - so that if each news item is treated in the 
same way the results should be reliable and replicable and valid - and the results are 
easily quantifiable and may be clearly expressed in diagrams and figures. The first 
limitation is that the definition and specification of the units of analysis may reflect 
the personal opinion of the researcher (ibid: 138-9). If the boundaries between the 
units of analysis are not clearly defined the results may reflect the inferences of the 
researcher (Winston, 1993: 61). The second is that content analysis tends to focus on 
‘products’ of the medium of discourse rather than on ‘meaning production as a 
process’ that is contextualised and integrated within wider social and cultural 
practices’ (Jensen, 1991: 4). The third limitation is that it transforms discourse into 
‘numerical analysis’ (Berger and Chaffee, 1987: 145) and focuses on rules rather 
than exceptions: each fragment of information in each of these 851 news items 
finally defies categorisation and is in that sense unique.  
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This thesis accepts the concept that language is both ‘paradigmatic’ and 
‘syntagmatic’ (Saussure, 1915), that the language of texts is both ‘constructed’ and 
‘constructive’ (Potter, 1996), that social structure is an ‘essential element’ of 
linguistic interaction rather than an ‘ornamental background’ (Halliday, 1978: 114), 
that news items both reflect and affect ideas and beliefs (Simpson, 1993: 2; 
McGarry, 1994: 41), and that these 851 news items finally defy categorisation. The 
coordinator of the database of human rights abuses (Appendix 2) supports the claim 
that qualitative rather than quantitative interpretations of human rights information 
are crucial because human rights statistics are a reflection of the values of the 
organisations that produce them, because these organisations use these statistics to 
legitimize themselves. The fact that El Tiempo juxtaposes information on mass 
graves that have been attributed to the paramilitaries in Colombia and one woman 
crying in a FARC trial in the US (Image 50) suggests that the visual context in which 
news is presented and the language of emotions may be more important than the 
number of attributions in the same news item or in all the news items in the sample. 
On the other hand the number of attributions and the issue of representativeness are 
crucial in this thesis because of the historical scope of the labelling process that it 
represents: the five hundred years of bloodshed from Spanish Conquest to current 
denial.  
 
3. The difference between content analysis and frame analysis in the context of this thesis  
 
 
Content analysis has recently been defined as ‘a technique for gathering and analysing 
the content of text’ (Neuman, 1997: 272), as ‘a set of procedures to make valid inferences 
from text’ (Weber, 1990: 9), as ‘a research technique that is based on measuring the 
amount of something (violence, negative portrayals of women, or whatever) in a 
representative sampling of some mass-mediated popular form of art’ (Berger, 1991: 25), 
and as ‘a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific 
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method’ and therefore prioritises ‘objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, 
validity, generalisability, replicability, and hypothesis testing’ (Neuendorf, 2002: 10).  
   
Content analysis is therefore a technique (Neuman, 1997) based on a specific set of 
procedures (Weber, 1990), aiming to measure ‘the amount of something (Berger, 1991: 
25) and prioritising principles such as objectivity-subjectivity, reliability, validity, 
generalisability and replicability (Neuendorf, 2002).  
Frame analysis on the other hand is not a technique: it is an attempt to understand the 
contextualisation of news and information. Frames were first defined as ‘definitions of a 
situation [that] are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern 
events […] and our subjective involvement in them’ (Goffman, 1974: 10f). Gitlin 
referred to them as ‘principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little 
tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters’ (1980: 6). Entman 
defined framing in more radical terms as a conscious process or purpose, claiming that, 
‘[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (1993: 52). 
The analysis of frames is therefore problematic because these principles of organization, 
selection, emphasis and presentation have a strong subjective element (Goffman, 1974) 
and are composed of ‘little tacit theories’ (Gitlin, 1980) that might not be manifest in the 
text so that the ‘problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation’ that Entman highlights (1993: 52) is prone to different 
subjective interpretations on the part of the author, on the part of different members of the 
audience,  and on the part of different researchers. 
  
Content analysis (method) and frame analysis (means of interpreting content analysis) 
 
König (2010) has argued that ‘the methodological underpinnings of the empirical 
identification of frames lack systematization and have consequently remained 
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underdeveloped’, that researchers have produced ‘an extensive and disparate laundry list 
of frames’ and that ‘this disparity of frames leaves one wonder, whether anything can be 
framed as a frame’ because studies have not disclosed ‘the actual process of empirical 
frame detection’. 
Framing consequently remains vulnerable to charges of uncertain methodology, not least 
in whether it describes the conscious actions of journalism or is to be found within the 
texts by a methodology as yet immature and unreliable.  
This thesis will therefore use framing as a means of interpreting the content analysis: 
the statistical results of the content analysis will either support or deny the existence 
of a particular frame that contextualizes the actions and discourse of the opposition 
as illegitimate challenges to proper authority. These results will measure the 
connection between Colombian mass media organisations and the use of sources that 
promote this ‘moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993: 
52).  
 
This thesis insists that using content analysis as a method and frame analysis as a 
means of interpreting the content analysis will maximize the reliability, the validity, 
the replicability and the generalisability of this research. It claims that all the units of 
analysis and the variables in the content analysis will be pre-determined and based 
on the principle that each news item should be treated in the same way in order to 
minimize the personal input of the researcher (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000: 138-9; 
Winston, 1993: 61). 
 
The thesis admits that qualitative rather than quantitative interpretations of human 
rights information are crucial because human rights statistics are a reflection of the 
values of the organizations that produce them in order to legitimize themselves. It 
also suggests that subtle uses of language and visual presentation might be more 
powerful than mere numbers in the attribution of blame to the other side.  
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Part 3 of this thesis on the other hand is based on the hypothesis that the use of 
content analysis as a method and frame analysis as a means of interpreting the results 
of content analysis will provide deeper insights into the framing and dividing of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  
 
4. Procedure  
 
The procedure is based on the instruction manual presented in Appendix 3 that 
defines the instructions related to the content analysis and the frame analysis in 
detail. Two parts of the process are analysed in detail: the construction and 
representativeness of the sample and the identification and measurement of the units 
of analysis, frames and variables.  
 
The construction and the representativeness of the sample 
 
The sample of 851 news items - on which this analysis of news production related to 
the current armed conflict is based - is representative of current Colombian news 
production related to the armed conflict in the sense that the sample includes all the 
news items which named and referred to the paramilitaries in general or the AUC in 
particular or to the guerrilla in general or the FARC in particular in the time period 
and on the dates defined in the instruction manual (Appendix 3). The sample was 
based on the news production of eight Colombian media organisations:  El Tiempo, El 
Colombiano, El Pais, Espacio, Cambio, Voz, Caracol TV and RCN radio. The 
systematic method of selection was similarly designed to provide a representative 
sample of Colombian news production. The collection of stories lasted from 20 
September, 2003 to 25 June, 2004 and occurred in six six-week cycles (Table 1). On 
the Saturday and Sunday of Week 1 in each cycle, the three broadsheets were 
collected and RCN radio news and Caracol TV news were recorded. This procedure 
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repeated itself on the Monday and Tuesday of Week 3 and on the Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday of Week 5. The daily tabloid, Espacio, the weekly communist 
newspaper, Voz and the monthly magazine, Cambio were picked up once in each six-
week cycle. The aim was to collect a representative sample of daily Colombian news 
production that could be compared to the news of the oppositional communist 
newspaper, Voz and the results of a database that attributed human rights abuses to 
the same armed groups in January 2004. Radio and television news was recorded at 
peak times (www.ibope.com): RCN morning news between 7.00 and 7.30 am and 
Caracol news between 7.00 and 7.30 pm (Appendix 3).  
 
The choice of media organisation, the number of stories, the time scale, the 
frequency and the selection of research methods served the same purpose: to increase 
representativeness and support ‘general statements that extend beyond the empirical 
set of observations’ (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000: 341) based on the nature of coercion 
and consent. The mass media conglomerates were chosen because of their 
importance in terms of the number of readers, listeners and viewers, their political 
ties, their connection to Colombian conglomerates, their turnover in sales and 
advertisements and their regional penetration. Here are the most important 
characteristics of each organisation in the sample presented in a simple table.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of news organisations in sample 
News outlet 
Location 
and sector 
of audience 
Founded 
Percentage 
audience in 
this sector 
Percentage 
revenue in 
this sector 
Main owners 
Official political 
sympathies 
 
El Tiempo 
National 
broadsheet 
1911 33% 38.8% 
Santos family 
(media empire) 
Liberal party 
El 
Colombiano 
Medellin 
broadsheet 
1912 9% 0.4% 
Gómez 
Martínez and 
Hernández de la 
Cuesta families 
Conservative party 
El Pais 
Cali 
broadsheet 
1950 6% 8.6% 
Lloreda 
Caicedo family 
(fat, oil, food 
conglomerate) 
Conservative party 
El Espacio 
Bogota 
tabloid 
1965 9% 0.4% 
Ardila family 
(ranchers, 
paramilitaries) 
Pablo Ardila Sierra, 
Liberal governor 
imprisoned on 
extorsion charges 
El Voz 
National 
communist 
periodical 
1957 
30,000 
readers 
Subsidised 
Communist 
party 
Communist party 
Cambio 
National 
news 
magazine 
1992 1.7% 9.2% 
Gabriel García 
Márquez is the 
main  
shareholder 
Claims to be 
independent of all 
political parties 
RCN 
National 
radio station 
1949 1.9% 43% 
Ardila Lulle 
conglomerate 
Conservative party 
Caracol 
National 
television 
station 
1991 67% 31% 
 
Santo Domingo 
conglomerate 
 
Liberal party 
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El Tiempo belongs to the Santos family which has strong ties to the presidency: Eduardo 
Santos, the founder and director of the newspaper was the President of Colombia from 
1938 to 1942, using the slogan ‘Faith and Dignity’ (betrayal and humiliation), and 
trampling on the rights of campesinos. The current Vice-President of the Republic, the 
Minister of Defence and the Minister of Environment are from the same clan. Ten of the 
45 newspapers of highest circulation in Colombia belong to the same family. El Tiempo 
is the main newspaper in the capital, Bogotá; El Colombiano, in Medellín (population, 
two million); El Pais, in Cali (population, 2.5 million): and these are the three biggest 
cities in Colombia. El Tiempo has its own TV station, City TV in addition to shares in 
Caracol and RCN, the main television and radio conglomerates; the first is allied to the 
Liberal party through the Presidential dynasty of Pumarejo and Michelsen and the second 
to the Conservative party. In 2002 RCN radio had 64 radio stations and 43% of national 
radio advertising revenue; Caracol radio had 61 and 38%. Caracol is part of the Santo 
Domingo conglomerate that boasted 8,000 million dollars in fixed assets in 2000 (Silva 
Colmenares, 2004). RCN is part of the Ardila Lulle economic empire that had 106 
million dollars of share capital in 1998 (Nieto Bernal, 1998). Both conglomerates have 
billion dollar interests in food and beverages, land and property, manufacturing, 
packaging and retailing, construction and communications, financial services and 
securities (ibid: 180-5). They have their own banks to fuel these businesses and these 
have overseas branches in tax havens that can launder illegal drug capital. 
Identification and measurement 
The units of analysis were defined as all the news items which named and referred to the 
paramilitaries in general or the AUC in particular or to the guerrilla in general or the 
FARC in particular in the pages of El Tiempo, El Colombiano, El Pais, Espacio, Cambio, 
Voz and in the main news broadcasts of RCN radio and Caracol TV in the time period 
and on the dates defined in the instruction manual (Appendix 3). The existence of the 
hypothetical frame that contextualises the actions of the FARC in particular as 
illegitimate challenges to the regime is based on the percentage and nature of human 
rights abuses that are attributed to the FARC rather than to the Colombian Armed Forces 
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and their allies and comrades, the paramilitaries – in this sample of current Colombian 
news production.  
The units of analysis (the news items) and the variables were recorded on an Excel 
spreadsheet (Appendix 4). The most important variables were: 1. the names of the 
Colombian mass media conglomerates, 2. the date of the news item, 3. the faction or 
factions (paramilitaries and/or guerrilla) that the item named and referred to, 4. one 
important topic of the news item, 5. another important topic, 6. the source or sources that 
have been quoted, and 7. the attribution of human rights abuses to the Armed Forces, 
paramilitaries and/or guerrilla. The instruction manual (Appendix 3) defines these 7 units 
of analysis and contains instructions on how to code and interpret the stories.  
The main topics of the news items were defined and coded alphabetically from 01 
Accident/Disaster to 20 Negotiation (Appendix 3). The final category, 21 Other was 
used to capture the indefinable. Two columns were allocated to topics because 
stories can have more than one topic, their relative importance being immaterial. The 
topic columns in this content analysis highlight the nature of the attribution and the 
nature of the information that suggests that the actions of a particular armed group 
are illegitimate.  This is important in this labelling of us and them, because mass 
media conglomerates could attribute a larger number of instances of lesser 
responsibility to one side rather than to the other. For example, the paramilitaries are 
frequently presented as negotiators rather than as political assassins and authors of 
massacres. News sources were also pre-defined (as foreign, government, official 
opposition, academic institutions, business, Church, public, Armed Forces or police, 
guerrilla or paramilitary sources) – because the names of the news organisations and 
the sources that are selected or vice versa (the name of the source and the news 
organisation that s/he selects) reflect the ‘imprint of power’ (Entman, 1993: 55). In 
this part of the coding process, 01 means that the source is referred to; 02 means that 
the source does not appear; 03 Other means that the reference is unclear. Sources can 
be past or present members of these organisations. In the final three columns of the 
spreadsheet, the code 01 attributes responsibility to one or more armed group: Armed 
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Forces, paramilitaries and/or guerrilla. The code 02 does not. The code 03 indicates 
that there is no attribution of responsibility or that the faction is not specified or that 
the attribution is unclear.  
 
All the units of analysis and the variables were therefore pre-determined and based 
on the principle that if each news item is treated in the same way the results should 
be reliable and replicable and valid: because it is crucial that the specification and 
definition and boundaries and application of the units of analysis do not reflect the 
personal opinion of the researcher (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000: 138-9; Winston, 
1993: 61).    
 
Examples of the coding process 
 
Here are two examples of the coding process based on the news and information on 
the armed conflict that were published in the three designated broadsheets (El 
Tiempo, El Colombiano and El Pais) on 30 September, 2003. The first news item 
attributes responsibility to the Armed Forces and paramilitaries and the second to the 
FARC guerrilla group. The title of the first news item is ‘8 combatants die’ and the 
item states that 
 
‘An injured girl of 12 and five paras presumed to be dead were the results of combat 
between the 14
th
 Brigade and the central unit of Bolivar de Caracoli in the north-east 
of Antioquia. This group had caused the displacement of 216 families because of 
internal conflict’ (Appendix 5, no. 2). 
 
This news item has been included in the sample, numbered, dated and recorded on 
the Excel spreadsheet (Appendix 4) because it appears in one of the specified 
newspapers on a designated date and names and refers to representatives of the 
paramilitaries (affectionately abbreviated to ‘paras’). The number of the news item 
appears in column one of the spreadsheet; the code (02) of the mass media 
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conglomerate (El Tiempo) which published the item appears in column two; and the 
date (30-9-2003) on which the news item is published in column three. The code of 
the main faction, the paramilitaries (02) is inserted in column four of the sheet and 
the two main topics - assault and displacement (12 and 08) - in columns five and six. 
The sources of the news item are not named although the most probable immediate 
source of information on combats is the 14
th
 Army Brigade and the Colombian 
Ministry of Defence: the sources of this news item are categorised as 02 which 
means that the name of the source does not appear in the text. The attribution of 
responsibility to the three main groups - the crucial piece of information upon which 
this research is based – is recorded in the last three columns of the spreadsheet. Here 
transgressions are attributed to the Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries and 
are recorded as 01 in the appropriate columns.           
 
The second news item has the heading, ‘Deactivated cylinders’ and claims that  ‘Anti-
explosive technicians in Cauca deactivated three cylinder bombs that members of the 
FARC had launched against the police station in Jambalo last Thursday when 
adherents of the insurgent group attempted to occupy the district. The attack left five 
people injured, amongst them a minor, and ten demolished houses’ (Appendix 5, no. 
3). 
 
This news item has also been included in the sample, numbered, dated and recorded 
on the Excel spreadsheet (Appendix 4) because it appears in one of the specified 
newspapers on a designated date and names and refers to representatives 
(‘members’) of the FARC. The number of the news item appears in column one of 
the spreadsheet; the code (02) of the mass media conglomerate (El Tiempo) which 
published the item appears in column two; and the date (30-9-2003) on which the 
news item is published in column three. The code of the main faction, the FARC (01) 
is inserted in column four of the sheet and the two main topics - threat or implication 
of assault and accidental or consequential or intentional destruction of property (12 
and 13) - in columns five and six. The sources of the news item are once again not 
226 
 
named – and are categorised as 02 - although once again the most probable 
immediate source of information on such assaults is the Colombian Armed Forces 
and the Ministry of Defence. The attribution of responsibility to the three main 
groups - the crucial piece of information upon which this research is based – is 
recorded in the last three columns of the spreadsheet. Here transgressions are 
attributed to the FARC and are recorded as 01 in the appropriate column.           
 
All the units of analysis and the variables were pre-determined and based on the 
principle that each news item should be treated in the same way: in order to 
maximise reliability, replicability and validity and to minimise the personal input of 
the researcher (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000: 138-9; Winston, 1993: 61).    
 
5. Reflection on the reliability of coding 
 
This section will present standard procedures to test inter-coder reliability, stating why 
these procedures were not followed in detail, but suggesting – as a proxy to standard use 
of inter-coder procedures – that the results of the research in Part 3 of the thesis are 
nonetheless reliable, valid, replicable, and can be generalised. 
MacNamara (2006) discusses standard procedures to test inter-coder reliability, 
suggesting that a minimum of two coders should be used and that even when one 
researcher conducts most of the research a reliability sub-sample should be used to 
guarantee that ‘obtained ratings are not the idiosyncratic results of one rater’s subjective 
judgement’ (Tinsley and Weiss, 1975: 359). He argues that these procedures should be 
applied to each of the variables, messages and issues that are being tested in the content 
analysis, proposing that two types of inter-coder relationship should be measured 
(agreement and co-variation, Neuendorf, 2002: 144), and that inter-coder reliability can 
be increased through: 1. pre-coding training, 2. pilot coding, 3. reviewing the coding 
manual, and 4. re-training if required. Haney et al (1998) also recommend periodic 
quality control checks.  
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Scott’s Pi is the accepted measure of ICR (inter-coder reliability) in communication 
studies; subtracting the degree of expected agreement due to chance from the degree of 
observed agreement. Schiff and Reiter (2004) on the other hand claim that this Pi formula 
‘under-estimates the degree of agreement when the characteristic being looked for is 
rarely present’ and therefore advocate Bayesian estimation methods.  
 
Testing inter-coder reliability is desirable but in the case of this thesis became 
impractical.  Rigorous ICR procedures could not be implemented because of limited time 
and resources and because of the pressure of collecting and recording and interpreting the 
851 news stories that appeared on Colombian TV and radio and in Colombian magazines 
and newspapers in six six-week cycles between 20 September, 2003 and 25 June, 2004.  
Other measures were implemented in order to maximise the reliability of this research: 
meticulously preparing a coding manual (Appendix 3), reducing ‘the ambiguity of word 
meanings, category definitions, or other coding rules’ (Weber, 1990: 15), ensuring that 
categories were mutually exclusive and exhaustive, guaranteeing that the coding rules 
could be – and have been – applied consistently, ensuring that other researchers would 
have coded these stories in the same way (Weber, 1990: 12), and guaranteeing that the 
results do not merely reflect the inferences of the author of the thesis.     
This content analysis has therefore been based on ‘a priori’ rather than ‘emergent’ 
coding (MacNamara, 2006): the categories were established prior to the analysis - 
and based upon a hypothesis - and the categories were ‘tightened up to the point that 
maximizes mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness’ (Weber, 1990). The hypothesis 
that informed this content analysis suggests that the type of news organisation and 
the type of source used by – or using – these media organizations might influence the 
level and nature of responsibility attributed to the three main actors in the Colombian 
armed conflict.  
 
The content analysis consisted of a representative sample of news organizations: 
eight organizations; samples collected at regular time periods; a nine-month time 
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frame. The units of analysis were unambiguous: all the news stories that referred to 
and named the three main armed groups were recorded in the Excel sheet (Appendix 
4). The other categories in the coding manual – the type of source and the type and 
nature of attribution to the three main armed groups – were discussed with the PhD 
supervisor, tested by the author of this thesis and a colleague in London University, 
and ‘tightened up to the point that maximizes mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness’  
as Weber (1990) recommends. The logical question is why these results were not 
tested for inter-coder reliability, the answer being that because of time pressure the 
separation of categories was prioritized. The results of the test are not available.  
 
On the other hand, the code 03 in the source category (indicating that the reference is 
unclear), the code 21 in the nature of attribution categories (indicating that the nature 
of attribution is unclear) and the code 03 in the type of attribution (indicating that 
there is no attribution of responsibility or that the faction is not specified or that the 
attribution is unclear) reduced the pressure on the researcher to squeeze ambiguous 
data into dubious categories and diminished the likelihood that the results merely 
reflect his inferences (Winston, 1993: 61).   
The validity of this content analysis is premised on the fact that it reflects a thorough 
understanding of the objectives of this thesis: providing deeper and more detailed insights 
into the attribution of responsibilities and transgressions to oppositional armed groups 
that are highlighted in Part 2 of the thesis and that seem to represent and implement the 
interests of coercive regimes. It is based on the fact that the categories in the coding 
manual are based on a thorough reading of relevant Colombian media content 
downloaded from the Internet. It is premised on the fact that the sample includes all the 
news stories in eight different media organisations in the designated time period.  
 
The validity of the results of this content analysis is also supported by the multiple 
sources of information – personal interviews, academic texts, political pamphlets, 
editorials, news stories, literature – that are used and discussed in other parts of the thesis. 
It is strengthened by the discourse analysis of all the 17 news stories that appeared on 30 
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September, 2003 and are translated in Appendix 5 and in the sample of 12 news stories 
that are recorded in Appendix 6.      
 
The thoroughness of this content analysis and the size of the sample - eight news 
organisations; 851 samples collected at regular time periods; a nine-month time 
frame – increase generalisability: the ability to present this ‘us’ and ‘them’ frame as 
a crucial factor in the interplay between coercion and consent. Replicability has been 
determined by ‘the full disclosure of information on methodology and procedures’ 
(MacNamara, 2006) that has included the two examples of the coding process in Part 
3, the coding manual in Appendix 3 of this thesis, the Excel sample in Appendix 4, 
the 17 news stories that are translated in Appendix 5 of this thesis, and the 12 stories 
that appear in Appendix 6. 
 
6. Results  
 
Physical context of Colombian newspapers and broadcasts 
 
The physical context of news items is important because it provides insights into the 
conscious or subconscious ideological position of the media organisation and 
audience. In Colombian broadsheets, the news items related to the current armed 
conflict tend to appear on the front page, in the editorial and opinion section, on the 
national news page, in the ‘armed conflict’ or ‘war and peace’ section, and on the 
back page as ‘last minute news’ (Appendix 5).  
 
Most of the other pages in the broadsheets are dedicated to advertisements and 
political campaigns. The Presidential election issues are flooded with political 
campaigns and advertisements and encapsulate the role and nature of Colombian 
broadsheets. The front page of the pre-election edition of El Espectador (28-5-2006) 
is labeled ‘Advertisement’. This page promotes Aguila beer and a competition to win 
6,000 million pesos in cash prizes. On the left side of the page is the luscious rear 
end of an attractive brunette wearing a small and tasteful Aguila beer logo. In the 
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centre of the page is a photograph of a bottle of Aguila wearing the same logo as the 
model. This page advertises a football competition on Caracol TV. The Santo 
Domingo conglomerate owns this newspaper and Caracol TV and used to own this 
beer company.  
 
The third page refers to the (re-)election that will take place the next day. In the 
centre of the page there is a row of small photographs of the main Presidential 
candidates from left to right starting with the current President. The headline is, 
‘Will the most popular mandate in decades win in the first round?’ Below this are the 
names of two companies that offer discounts on their products to voters.  The fourth 
page has a cartoon of the President and the candidates in the same order as before but 
scaling the side of a cliff. The election issue (29-5-2006) presents the candidates in 
the same order as before but this time the percentage of votes runs along the bottom: 
the successfully re-elected President, Uribe has gained (fabricated) 62.2% of votes. 
Below is a photograph of the re-elected vice-President, Francisco Santos, head of El 
Tiempo. His hand is where his heart is supposed to be.  
 
The main news program on RCN radio starts at 7.00 and finishes at 7.30 a.m. – 
bridges two music programs - and has this format: headlines of main stories, 
advertisements, regional bulletins, advertisements, discussion of main stories and 
interviews with authorities and protagonists. The main news program on Caracol TV 
is from 7.00 to 7.30 pm – separates the first and second half of the most popular soap 
opera on Colombian TV – and has this format: headlines of main stories, political 
broadcasts and advertisements, discussion of main stories and interviews with 
authorities and protagonists, political broadcasts and advertisements, institutional 
news, advertisements and political broadcasts, ‘la gente que quiere a la gente’ 
(‘people who love people’, a portrait of a good Samaritan, sponsored by Conavi 
Bank, whose slogan is ‘the bank that loves people’), political broadcasts and 
advertisements and ‘las buenas buenas’: fashion news presented by gorgeous 
Colombian supermodels.  
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The most frequent televised political campaign in December 2004 promoted the 
Colombian Liberal party. This modern Colombian re-make of the parable of the good 
Samaritan features an elderly woman with red lipstick in a red dress, clutching a red 
handbag and dropping her red purse in a taxi: red being the colour of the Liberal 
party. A young blushing fresh-faced Liberal candidate, who is naturally wearing a 
red handkerchief in the pocket of his suit, finds the woman’s handbag in the taxi, 
rummages in the purse, locates her telephone number, scrawled - unsurprisingly - in 
red ink, and reports the loss to the old lady. This incredibly fortunate but rather red -
faced elderly woman has stumbled on that rarest of creatures hitherto thought to be 
extinct - an honest politician – the message being that we should all definitely vote 
for the Liberals.  
 
The advertisements in December 2004 mainly promote the products of the biggest 
supermarket chain, Carrefour: a sumptuous French franchise that k indly ‘captures’ 
the ‘destitute’ end of the market in Ciudad Kennedy according to its insulting 
Internet site (Image 43). The longest ad promoted the Santo Domingo conglomerate 
that includes Caracol and the news program in its billion dollar empire. The 
advertisement catalogues the many benefits of owning a country as rich and exotic 
and profitable as this one, and generously expresses infinite gratitude to ‘those who 
aren’t here’ - the millions of massacred or displaced inhabitants - thanking them 
more than once for giving them everything       
 
‘Colombia. For the geography class, it’s a map. For 40 million people, it’s their 
country. For those who like to count, it’s eight letters, three mountain chains and two 
oceans. For visionaries, it’s 1,139,000 square kilometres of opportunities. For 
travellers, it’s all possible climates and landscapes. For athletes, it’s the national 
colours. For those who have been born, it’s hope. For entrepreneurs, it’s the future. 
For foreigners, it’s paradise. For those who aren’t here, it’s their land. For us, 
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everything, everything. Thank you, Colombia, thank you’ (Caracol TV, December 
2004). 
 
Mass-mediated political campaigns launder the images and promote the interests of 
political parties, politicians, drug cartels and high-level paramilitaries. The 
advertisements on the mass media promote Colombian conglomerates and foreign 
products - launder illegal capital, annihilate local production, legitimize national 
debt, aid, bribes - and produce the armed conflict that legitimizes severe coercion. 
The insertion of news items related to the armed conflict between songs and soap 
operas suggests that ‘the Enemy’ has interrupted the hard earned pleasure of the 
audience and that these enemies of happiness must pay the price: the breathless 
threats of the officers running up and down the artillery lines and the machine gun 
fire in the distance reassures us that the enemy has already paid that price or very 
soon will.  
 
The juxtaposition of images of macabre hecatombs attributed to the paramilitaries 
and the trial of the FARC spokesman, Trinidad in El Tiempo suggests once more that 
one side – paramilitary or guerrilla – is as bad as the other (Image 50). The good 
Samaritans in the Liberal party broadcast and in the Conavi bank ad about ‘people 
who love people’ indicate that not all of us are bad: they - ‘the friends of the 
guerrilla’ according to ‘our’ President – are spoiling it for the rest of us (Image 50). 
The most successful Colombian models in ‘las buenas buenas’ – the music and 
fashion, make-up and perfume program – demonstrate the infinite sensual delights 
that betrayal and collaboration can bring us. Resistance is not only futile, but boring.  
 
The Santo Domingo ad thanks us again and again for surrendering the right to live  
 
For us, everything, everything. Thank you, Colombia, thank you  (Caracol TV, 
December 2004)       
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Type of coverage 
 
Colombian broadsheets tend to represent the current conflict in terms of official 
bulletins from the Colombian Armed Forces, in terms of official statements from the 
Colombian government, in terms of atrocities attributed to the armed groups and in 
terms of foreign news downloaded from international news wire services and to 
interpret these news items in the editorial and opinion pages. The official  bulletins 
from the Colombian Armed Forces, the descriptions of atrocities and the foreign 
news could be classified as ‘episodic’ news coverage - as ‘event-orientated’ reports 
that depict public issues ‘in terms of concrete instances’ (Iyengar, 1991: 14) - rather 
than as ‘thematic’ news coverage which places ‘public issues in some more general 
or abstract context’ and presents these issues in terms of ‘general outcomes and 
conditions’ (ibid). Iyengar suggests that the episodic nature of US television news 
stories tends to treat events as disconnected, masking the underlying continuity and 
structural foundation of social problems, diverting ‘attention from societal and 
governmental responsibility’, acting as ‘the opiate’ of society, and ‘propagating a 
false sense of national well-being’ (ibid: 172). He claims that television news tends 
to be episodic because the visual nature of the medium places ‘a premium on 
individual exemplars’ (Iyengar, 1996: 62).   
  
The main difference between US and Colombian news coverage according to 
Iyengar’s definition and application of episodic and thematic coverage to US 
television broadcasts is that Colombian news coverage attributes responsibility 
explicitly. Iyengar’s main claim is that the audience interprets episodic ‘event -
orientated’ reports in a way that diverts attention from ‘societal or governmental 
responsibility’ (ibid) although political predisposition plays an important role. The 
Colombian Armed Forces, police and ‘authorities’ on the other hand transmit official 
bulletins which attribute explicit responsibility to a particular armed group. 
Editorials, opinion pages and ‘official sources’ interpret these bulletins, supporting 
the government line but never challenging the attribution. The difference between the 
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results of this thesis and the results of Iyengar’s research should however be 
attributed to the fact that Iyengar is investigating a range of problems - poverty, 
unemployment, crime, terrorism, racial inequality and the Iran-Contra drugs-for-arms 
scam (1991: 11) – that do not have quite the same structure as ‘A did something to 
B’: his main point being that poverty and other political and social problems seem to 
be individual and culpable rather than structural and inevitable.  
 
The news items in Appendix 5 illustrate the nature of the coverage of the armed 
conflict and of the explicit attribution of responsibility in Colombian broadsheets. 
Official news bulletins support the initiatives that the government and the Armed 
Forces transmit through official statements and editorials. The Ministry of the 
Interior for example claims that 1,370 members of the FARC and 410 ELN 
combatants have demobilised compared to only 404 members of the AUC, the main 
paramilitary units (Appendix 5, no. 15). This bulletin includes dubious statistics that 
suggest that the current Law of Justice and Peace appeals to the guerrilla - who are 
sent straight to jail to languish eternally - rather than the paramilitary friends of the 
President: who receive immunity, impunity, money, land, and the profitable 
opportunity of massacring and displacing the last of the campesinos in other parts of 
the country.  
 
The brief official bulletin that states that ‘an injured girl of 12 and five paras 
presumed to be dead’ were the results of combat between the 14th Brigade and the 
central unit of Bolivar de Caracoli in the north-east of Antioquia (Appendix 5, no. 2) 
differs dramatically from the portrayal of FARC atrocities in the news item entitled , 
‘Yesterday the victims of the bomb in Florencia were buried’ (Appendix 5, no. 4).  
 
Here El Tiempo has used ‘reportage’ to suggest that the children of consent are 
innocent victims of FARC violence and that it could have happened - and could still 
happen – to us. The last moments and details in the lives of each of the victims are 
lovingly recreated or rather fabricated - ‘the tiny corpse of Jefferson Alexander 
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Yague Castro’ and the final poignant words of Roberto Murcia, driver of taxi number 
XYC 716, ‘I’m going to be a little late and I don’t want to wake up mum’.  
 
The news item culminates in the quiet attribution of culpability to ‘the other side’  
 
‘The explosion that the authorities attributed to the FARC … left 12 dead, among 
them the kid, the taxi driver … and the teenager who had gone looking for her 
boyfriend’ (Appendix 5, no. 4) 
 
The editorials in El Colombiano and El Pais on the same day underline the moral 
behind the stories. The poor old chainsaw-massacrin paramilitaries have ‘never been 
viewed through the same lens as the guerrilla groups that maintain their romantic 
image in spite of drug traffic, kidnap, extortion and terrorist acts’ (Appendix 5, no. 
7). The poor old paramilitary President’s scheduled trip to the United States to 
legitimize severe coercion and horrific cruelty and extreme poverty and bill ions of 
dollars of military aid and bribes to himself and his colleagues  
 
‘will also be an opportunity to regain the support that the international community 
should bring to our nation in order to overcome the terrible challenges that the true 
enemies of our human rights - drug traffic and terrorism - have created for decades’ 
(Appendix 5, no. 14).  
 
Mass media conglomerates and the nature of the attribution 
 
The sample of 851 news items - collected between 20 September 2003 and 15 June 
2004 and compared to the abuses presented on a Colombian human rights database 
(CINEP, 2004) - suggests that the main Colombian television and radio stations and 
broadsheets tend to attribute severe human rights abuses to the guerrilla in general 
and the FARC in particular rather than to the Colombian Armed Forces and 
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paramilitaries (Table 2) and therefore imply that the actions of the FARC are 
illegitimate challenges to the regime.         
 
The Colombian television and radio conglomerates and broadsheets attributed almost 
no responsibility to the Armed Forces in the 851 news items collected between 20 
September 2003 and 15 June 2004 (Table 2). The database of human rights abuses 
(CINEP, 2004) on the other hand attributed 36% of abuses to the Colombian Armed 
Forces, 27% to the paramilitaries and 37% to the guerrilla in January 2004.  
 
Table 2 indicates that the evening news on Caracol TV attributed only 3% of human 
rights abuses to the Colombian army; the morning news on RCN radio attributed 4%; 
and the three main Colombian broadsheets - El Tiempo, El Colombiano and El Pais – 
only attributed 8%, 3% and 4% of responsibility. In contrast the most popular Bogotá 
tabloid, Espacio attributed 30% of human rights abuses to the Armed Forces and 
50% to the paramilitaries. The main Colombian news magazine, Cambio attributed 
39% to the army and 32% to the paramilitaries. The communist periodical, Voz 
attributed all the culpability to official and unofficial armed instruments of the 
Colombian State: the Colombian Armed Forces and the paramilitaries.  
 
Table 2: Proportion of human rights abuses attributed to three main armed groups 
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All the main Colombian television and radio stations and broadsheets in this sample 
attributed almost all the blame to the guerrilla: Caracol TV attributed 73% of human 
rights abuses to the other side; RCN attributed 78%; and the three broadsheets attributed 
65%, 59% and 69% of blame to the other side. The nature of this attribution of 
responsibility (Table 3) clarifies this trend. The most serious human rights abuses have 
been attributed to the guerrilla: 88% of cases of crimes against property or of theft; 72% 
of abductions, detentions and kidnap; 69% of forced recruitment; 64% of massacres, 
assassinations and physical violence; and 57% of cases of drug traffic. In contrast the 
human rights database attributed 39% of extreme cases of physical violence to the 
Colombian Armed Forces, 37.7% to the guerrilla, and 23.3% to the paramilitaries in the 
designated time period.          
Table 3: Nature of abuses attributed to these armed groups 
 
The sample of news items in Appendix 5 supports the claim that Colombian media 
conglomerates tend to attribute responsibility for severe human rights abuses to the 
guerrilla rather than to the Armed Forces and paramilitaries in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms, lovingly describing the victims one by one - a displaced child of nine, 
the tiny corpse of Jefferson Alexander Yague Castro. – and using the attribution to 
combine all these fragments of life and glimpses of Death   
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‘The explosion that the authorities attributed to the FARC … left 12 dead, among them 
the kid, the taxi driver … and the teenager who had gone looking for her boyfriend’ 
(Appendix 5, no. 4) 
Selection of sources and attribution 
Colombian mass media conglomerates tended to use the same three types of source of 
information and opinion on the current armed conflict: the Colombian Armed Forces, the 
Colombian government and foreign sources (Table 4). Caracol TV news coverage of the 
current armed conflict referred to Colombian army sources 29% of the time, to 
government sources in 25% of cases and to foreign sources 17% of the time. RCN used 
these three sources on 29%, 40% and 22% of occasions. El Tiempo selected the 
Colombian Armed Forces in 24% of instances, the Colombian government 30% of the 
time, and foreign sources in 19% of occasions. The communist periodical, Voz used a 
much broader range of voices: using both foreign sources and the general public on 30% 
of occasions, the government 20% of the time, and the guerrilla in 10% of cases.  
Table 4: Sources used to attribute human rights abuses to the armed groups 
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The selection of sources played a significant role in the attribution of responsibility to the 
three main armed groups (Table 5). The Colombian Armed Forces attributed 
responsibility to the guerrilla 70% of the time, the Colombian government attributed 55% 
of the blame to the other side, and foreign sources attributed 50% of human rights abuses 
to the guerrilla. The Colombian Armed Forces attributed very little responsibility to the 
paramilitaries (23%) and – predictably - almost no culpability to themselves (3%). 
Table 5: Proportion of abuses that each source attributed  
 
 
The sample of news items in Appendix 5 supports the argument that the selection of the 
sources of information and opinion played a significant role in the extreme nature of the 
attribution of human rights abuses to the FARC guerrilla group. The official statements 
and bulletins of the government ministries and Armed Forces legitimized their own 
actions and paramilitary allies by fabricating statistics (Appendix 5, no. 15) and 
attributing culpability to the other side. The portrayal of the Florencia incident in El 
Colombiano - ‘Victims and criticism of motorcycle bomb mounts’ – has all the 
symptoms of a phone-calling spree in the newsroom. Eight different sources have been 
contacted and quoted: ‘the authorities’, Amnesty International, the UN High Commission 
of Human Rights, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, the government secretary, the 
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public defender, the fiscal and the commander of the Colombian Armed Forces and chief 
coordinator of paramilitary atrocities, General Jorge Enrique Mora  
‘Yesterday as more voices criticised and condemned the motorcycle bomb of Sunday 
morning in Florencia, Caqueta, the authorities confirmed that the number of victims had 
risen to 12. The sides involved in this conflict must respect international humanitarian 
law and not use the civilian population as the main target, announced Amnesty 
International. The UN High Commission of Human Rights rejected the attack and 
insisted that the FARC secretary make an official statement on the authority of this 
atrocious act … To these recommendations must be added those of Germany which, 
through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joshua Fischer, categorised the attack as brutal … 
According to the government secretary, one of the dead is a child of nine selling sweets 
… The public defender, Volmar Perez indicated that it is imperative to subtract the 
civilian population from the conflict … The general fiscal, Juan Camilo Osario labelled 
the attack as a cowardly and very miserable method of making violence … Putting a 
bomb in a sector with a total presence of the civilian population is an act of tremendous 
cowardice, declared the commander of the Armed Forces, General Jorge Enrique Mora’ 
(El Colombiano, 30 September, 2003) 
 
7. Interpretation     
 
Introduction 
 
The frame and content analysis of the 851 news items in Part 3 suggests that the 
main Colombian television and radio stations and broadsheets tend to attribute severe 
human rights abuses to the guerrilla in general and to the FARC in particular rather 
than to the Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries, that the selection of sources 
plays an important role in the framing of the current armed conflict, and that this 
frame bridges the gap between coercion and consent and legitimizes and promotes 
the interests of the Colombian government, conglomerates, Armed Forces and 
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paramilitaries: by contextualizing the discourse and actions of the FARC in 
particular and the opposition in general as illegitimate challenges to proper authority.           
 
The main influences on this frame 
 
Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis suggest that the main influences on this frame are 
Colombian media organisations (the main instruments of consent) and the Armed 
Forces (the main instruments of coercion) and the political, social and economic 
interests that operate through them. The Javeriana report (2004) focuses on the 
influence of Colombian media organisations: the disproportionate number of recent 
graduates who are responsible for coverage of the armed conflict and peace 
processes, the fact that these graduates are easily pressured into transmitting the 
‘monolithic’ opinions and perspectives of their superiors, the fact that official 
Colombian labour legislation is not implemented in any Colombian news 
organisation, that health insurance, vacations and pensions are seldom paid, that staff 
are laid off at short notice, and that only 13% of journalists are paid if they do 
overtime. 
 
The Colombian Armed Forces on the other hand direct the most severe pressure 
against Colombian journalists because of the multiple roles of this official armed 
group - the main instrument of coercion - as the main authors, agents, subjects and 
sources of news stories, massacres and selective assassinations. The current 
mainstream radio journalist (Interview 12) has focused on the three most important 
factors – or sources of violence - that influence the presentation and interpretation of 
the armed conflict. The first source of violence is internal and implemented through 
the restrictions that are imposed on journalists by owners, directors and editors. He 
claims that the aims and values of his radio station are to defend the political, social 
and economic interests of the owners and directors whom he defines as ‘politicians 
or congressmen or businessmen that control congressmen’, to survive in the 
competitive world of Colombian business, and to increase ratings and advertising 
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revenues. Individual journalists threaten all these interests. Journalists who refuse to 
‘obey orders from above’ – who don’t respect the editorial line - are ‘silenced, fired 
or murdered’. The second source is official State institutions - the Colombian 
Department of State Security (DAS), the Ministry of Communications and the Office 
of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic - which monitor and record all 
radio broadcasts. The Ministry of Communications can close down any station or 
news program that challenges the government. The third and final source of violence 
is the threat of the legal and illegal armed groups that begins with calling cards or 
sample obituaries or anonymous phone calls and mutates into physical assault and 
assassination. The radio journalist concludes that these three sources of violence 
pressure journalists to tell lies in order to protect themselves, to compose banal and 
bland news stories and to support the army or one of the illegal armed groups or 
paramilitaries that represent and protect the image of the government, the Armed 
Forces and the police. The director of El Espectador (Interview 10) focused on the 
last of these three sources of violence: threats and violence against journalists from 
groups that ‘use violence and intimidation to manipulate their public image and 
achieve their ends’. The Medellín drug cartel used extreme violence against his paper 
in the 1980s: blowing up the building, assassinating Guillermo Cano - the owner, 
director and editor – in addition to the head of the legal team, journalists, advertisers 
and distributors, and gang-raping one of the columnists.  
 
Cifuentes Martinez (1989) clarifies the direct influence of the Colombian Armed 
Forces and police on the news frame that attributes responsibility to the enemy.  
Information on law and order is sent from local police stations to the Office of Press 
and Information in Bogotá. This office prepares two official bulletins every day and 
transmits them to the media organisations. The Colombian authorities monitor the 
media to see ‘what they are saying and showing about the police’ (ibid: 43). The 
army organises courses for war correspondents. One of the officials in charge of 
these programs claims that these courses ‘contribute to the understanding that exists 
between the media and the army’ because journalists and soldiers ‘have learned to 
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collaborate with each other, to respect one another and to differentiate between the 
scope and limitations of their respective roles’ (ibid: 44). The aim of these courses is 
to help ‘journalists to see soldiers as their colleagues’ and to help soldiers ‘to see 
journalists as their allies’ (ibid: 45). This last statement – the suggestion that 
journalists should see soldiers as ‘colleagues’ and that soldiers should see journal ists 
as ‘allies’ (ibid) – encapsulates the interplay between coercion and consent which is 
the essence of this thesis.     
 
The role of this frame 
 
Parts 1 to 3 of this thesis suggest that current Colombian news production plays four 
important roles: 1. to launder the capital and the image of the heads of the drug 
cartels and Armed Forces and paramilitaries, 2. to transmit the democratic master 
frame (Snow and Benford, 1988: 210), 3. to coordinate the interplay between 
coercion and consent, and 4. to attract foreign aid (bribes) and investment. The news 
items in Appendix 5 illustrate these four points. The President’s description of the 
guerrilla as ‘the serpent of terrorism’ (Appendix 5, no. 13) and the naming and 
shaming of the FARC in the reportage on the Florencia atrocity that ‘the authorities’ 
have attributed to the FARC - the tragic details, ‘the tiny corpse’, the message to 
mum, ‘the girl who had gone looking for her boyfriend’ (Appendix 5, no. 4) – 
substantially differ from the respectful references to paramilitaries as ‘self -defences’, 
combatants or ‘paras’.  
 
The description of these ‘paras’ in personal accounts and human rights repo rts is 
much less affectionate 
 
‘My husband was dragged out in his underwear. His shirt was unbuttoned and he was 
barefoot. As I left the house to go to my neighbours’ houses, I heard people crying. 
The corpses of my husband and our three neighbours had been thrown into the gutter. 
Soon after that, the soldiers passed by on the other side of the river. The soldiers cut 
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off the heads of two of the men. They threw one of the heads away and they played 
football with the other one’ (Giraldo, 1997: 27).  
 
The democratic master frame is transmitted through the official statements that 
describe the President’s imminent speech to the UN and the United States Congress 
(Appendix 5). In the first report, the mandate refers to the democratic ‘right of 
countries to find judicial solutions to resolve serious internal problems’, although his 
‘democratic’ government, ‘does not reject the debate on the project to release authors 
of atrocities from prison’ (Appendix 5, no. 1). These ‘authors of atrocities’ include 
his business partners in the Medellín cartel, according to a CIA report that has been 
‘leaked’ to Newsweek and is analysed in detail in www.rebelion.org, 21-01-2005. 
The name-dropping of ‘democratic’ institutions and private meetings with ‘high-
level’ collaborators is frequent: ‘The mandate will meet with Kofi Annan, secretary 
general of the UN in the morning and will travel to Washington in the afternoon to 
talk with the Secretary of State Colin Powell, leader of the House and President of 
the Senate Commission of International Affairs (ibid). It is to be hoped that his 
meeting with ‘Kofi’ went well.  
 
The second report refers to the President’s ‘powers of persuasion’ which he is 
supposed to possess and require if he is ‘to regain the international image that he 
maintained during his first year of office, deflect the hard questioning of the NGOs 
and defend his project of alternative penalties’ (Appendix 5, no. 6). The third report 
changes ‘powers of persuasion’ to ‘consummate diplomacy’ (Appendix 5, no. 7). 
Both of these skills - ‘powers of persuasion’ and ‘consummate diplomacy’ – are used 
to construct and support the democratic master frame. The last statement drives this 
democratic message home – attributes responsibility to ‘the true enemies of our 
human rights - and demands ‘the support that the international community should 
bring to our nation’ in order to ‘overcome the terrible challenges that the true 
enemies of our human rights - drug traffic and terrorism - have created for decades’ 
(Appendix 5, no. 14)  
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The third role of Colombian news production is to coordinate the interplay between 
coercion and consent. The President’s statement in El Colombiano (Appendix 5, no. 
11) – that ‘he’ is ‘ready to conquer them through military means’ and also ‘open to 
dialogue if the guerrilla demonstrate good will’ – illustrate the coordination between 
coercion and consent, armed groups and media organisations, upon which this thesis 
is based. The preference for coercion over consent - ‘military means’ rather than 
‘dialogue’ – is immediately clarified: ‘Trust requires evidence, reiterated the 
President’ (ibid). The first report in El Pais repeats this point – the fact that he ‘will 
use his speech to demonstrate that terrorist acts such as that of Sunday in Florencia 
justify a strengthened State’ – because ‘the serpent of terrorism is still alive’ 
(Appendix 5, no. 13).  
 
These repeated references to the threat of ‘terrorism’ to legitimize severe coercion 
are vital: they re-transmit the US discourse of 9/11. The second report drives this 
point home. This official editorial supports the criticism that the Presidents and 
presenters of the US and Colombia level at the UN and NGOs. It argues that ‘ these 
organisations should protect Colombians rather than support official decisions’ and 
that ‘they should produce something different from solemn declarations and 
speeches’ (Appendix 5, no. 14). Few would disagree with this. It is the subsequent 
statement, however that reveals the ruthlessness that connects the centre and 
periphery, the US and Colombia     
 
‘The journey should serve to strengthen our ties with the country that collaborates 
most with Colombia in the struggle against its worst enemies’ (Appendix 5, no. 14)  
 
This leads to the final role of news production: to maximise and legitimize foreign 
investment, aid and bribes. The BBC report on the Colombian President’s visit to the 
European Union underlines the importance of consent – of the democratic master 
frame - in the legitimization of investment, ‘aid’ and coercion  
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‘Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has defended his tough policies against 
insurgents in a speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Mr. Uribe who 
is on a five-day tour through Europe said terrorism itself was a violation of human 
rights. Some European legislators are critical of Mr. Uribe’s terrorism laws which 
expand some of the military’s powers. About 20 MEPs left the chamber holding 
scarves reading Peace and Justice in Colombia   
 
Earlier Mr. Uribe won support when he met European Commission President 
Romano Prodi in Brussels. Mr. Prodi backed Colombia’s fight against left-wing 
guerrillas despite widespread concern over human rights … The Colombian 
President said he had received assurances that preferential trade ties would be 
extended …’ (‘President faces the European Parliament’, www.bbcnews.com, 
2/10/2004) 
 
The nature of this news frame 
 
Eleven news stories collected from the three main Colombian broadsheets between 
September 2003 and May 2004 and presented in Appendix 6 have been selected in 
order to provide insights into the nature of this news frame that contextualises the 
actions of the FARC and the opposition as illegitimate challenges to the proper 
authority that is vested in the Colombian regime, in the US and Colombian 
government, in international and national big business, and in the US and Colombian 
Armed Forces. These articles have not been selected at random but the principle of 
selection is different from the method used in Appendix 5. The news items in 
Appendix 5 represent the main stories in the three broadsheets on 30 September 
2003; the reports in Appendix 6 on the other hand represent the most important 
topics of news stories throughout the complete time period (September 2003 – May 
2004) and are related to the current armed conflict: news, information and opinion on 
acts of violence and displacement of populations.     
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The first report in Appendix 6 refers to a typical Colombian family – Carlos, Cecilia 
and their eight children – who arrived in the capital one Monday, ‘leaving behind 
their farm in la Meta where they cultivated sweet potato, coffee and sugar cane’ and 
only bringing ‘the clothes they had on’ and the documents that legitimize them as 
Colombian citizens (El Tiempo, 21-9-2003).  
 
This family tragedy is lovingly portrayed in the detailed description of the ‘anguish, 
indignation and hope’ of Carlos who blames the FARC because they have destroyed 
his life, because they have victimised Carlos because of his ‘relative in the army’, 
and because they have tried to recruit his innocent son. The innocence and sadness of 
the family is expressed in the baby, Natalia – ‘the youngest and hardly six months 
old’ - ‘who still doesn’t understand the motive behind this desperate journey’. The 
heroine of the story is Cecilia, the noble, weary and long-suffering Catholic 
matriarch who devotes her existence to her rather large family: her husband and their 
eight children. The Colombian regime is represented in Church institutions that care 
for ‘the families that have nowhere to go or do, those who have left behind 
everything they have built up for years’ (ibid). This heroic but tragically displaced 
and misplaced Colombian family has ‘proceeded’ through two ‘stations’ (ibid) - of 
the Cross - and has been saved by the Catholic Church and the Colombian regime. 
The report as a whole attributes the displacement of such heroic and noble and 
religious and substantial eight-child Colombian families to the FARC and frames the 
actions of this guerrilla group as illegitimate on this basis.         
 
The second news story in contrast legitimizes the Colombian regime and Armed 
Forces and presents them as the proper authority that the FARC has illegitimately 
challenged. The story begins one ‘Tuesday at dawn and under a mantle of dense 
cloud’ as the courageous Colombian Army moves into Santa Rosa, Botacaucana, ‘in 
the south of the Colombian massif’ in order to put ‘eight days of anguish’ to a 
merciful end (El Pais, 16-10-2003). The FARC had established an ‘empire of terror’ 
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in ‘this universe of water and vegetation at the entrance to the Amazon basin’, but 
our noble President is waging a campaign of ‘democratic security’, and our highly 
disciplined Colombian army has formulated and implemented Operation Colombian 
Massif 1. Not that these Colombian people are ungrateful: Juan Camilo Botina is 
only eight years old but already understands that ‘this brings a lot of happiness , 
because the soldiers are good people who have come to do good things for our 
people’ and the campesino, Jesus Lasso is much much older but cries as his most 
wonderful dream comes true in the shape of ‘the authority that I have been waiting 
for, for 20 long years’ (ibid). These ‘300 guerrillas of the FARC and ELN and 20 
years absence of the State and Armed Forces’ have been the cause of all his hardship. 
The title of the report claims that the regime has liberated these people from the 
FARC. 
 
The third and fourth news stories in Appendix 6 refer to the same incident: two grenades 
that were detonated in two bars in the main entertainment district in the North of Bogotá, 
killing one customer and injuring 72 more. Arturo Montano Torres, 26 years old has been 
caught fleeing from the scene, has been identified as one of the assailants, and has been 
charged with the crime. The national director of police, General Jorge Daniel Castro 
Castro claimed that the FARC had ordered the assault, added that the youth had 
‘practically acted alone’, and hoped to have ‘the results’ – the rationale behind this 
accusation – ‘in the next three days’ (El Colombiano, 17-11-2003).  
Based on this extremely flimsy evidence the President announces that the guerrilla in 
Colombia has no principles and is a ‘cursed mixture’ of ‘terrorism fed by drugs’. He 
manipulates this tragic episode in order to remind his allies of his logo – ‘firm hand, big 
heart’ (Image 48) – by referring to his ‘pain’. He appeals to – and consolidates - blind 
belief in God and patriotism. He begs God to ‘give us the strength and the perseverance 
that we require to defeat these violent groups’ and claims that the brutal violence that he 
has unleashed on his own people - and labelled ‘democratic security’ - is ‘the only road 
that the Fatherland has left’. This is the same frame as before. Once again the actions of 
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the guerrilla are contextualised as illegitimate challenges to proper authority – 
represented by the official head of coercion (the chief of police) – and by the official head 
of consent (the President of the Republic).  
The fifth news item refers to a paramilitary ‘incursion’ in a remote region of Colombia in 
which ‘something like 60 of them arrived and looted the shop,’  and ‘tied up Lucho 
Camel, the owner of the shop, one of his daughters and his son-in-law and four more 
people’ (El Tiempo, 3-12-2003). Two more horrific incidents are alluded to in the same 
article – the shots that the other customers heard after they fled and the murder of a 
woman called Francy near the lemon tree – but the number of victims has not yet been 
clarified. The portrayal of the paramilitaries in such reports contrasts dramatically with 
the framing of the FARC. The story does not dwell on their cruelty. The ‘paras’ are 
deadly, but efficient, and have started to ‘negotiate with the government’ (ibid). The 
President makes no speeches; he expresses silent approval.   
 
The sixth news report in Appendix 6 repeats the claim in the second news item (El Pais, 
16-10-2003) that the main problem in Colombia is the absence of State institutions in the 
regions: this power vacuum that the FARC has unscrupulously exploited, after this 
‘bloody guerrilla incursion against the military anti-narcotics base in 1998 where more 
than 30 uniformed men died and 100 more were kidnapped’ (El Pais, 6-2-2004). The 
FARC is accused of changing Miraflores, Guaviare into ‘an epicentre of coca-based 
activities’ based on a currency exchange agency that launders drug money and a FARC 
tax office. This report suggests that the coercion that the current President’s has directed 
against the FARC and the Colombian people is superior to the previous President’s peace 
negotiations. The Armed Forces represent progress because ‘Miraflores requires social 
and economic reinforcement and State support’ and the FARC: ‘violence and drug 
traffic’ (ibid).    
The next two opinion pieces – in February and March, 2004 – defend the government’s 
decision not to exchange prisoners with the FARC, and on the same dubious grounds: 
that the FARC – the principal armed resistance to coercion at present – are responsible 
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for the 500 years of severe coercion and armed conflict that have been studied in Part 1 of 
this thesis. The issue of prisoner exchange has hit the headlines because the Colombian 
guerrilla has had the temerity to kidnap a celebrity – Ingrid Betancourt, ex-Presidential 
candidate of Colombia, proud owner of two French husbands and two nationalities - 
Colombian and French. This high-profile kidnapping has suggested that the Colombian 
regime does not have total control of its population – through either coercion or consent 
or a combination of both - and is therefore bad for business.  
The editorial uses this high profile human rights case to contextualise the illegitimate 
actions of the opposition – or, in its own words, to place ‘the problem in the context 
where it belongs’ – because the problem originates ‘in the kidnappings that the guerrilla 
have perpetrated’ (El Tiempo, 22-2-2004). The editorial defends our poor President 
against those who ‘prefer to criticize and pressure the government rather than the 
perpetrators of this drama’ (ibid).  
The main claim in this part of the thesis is that these are the borders of the frame that 
contextualises the actions of the opposition as illegitimate: the problems of Colombia 
begin and end with resistance to Colombian State coercion, and on this basis current acts 
of violence are selected and interpreted in news stories and opinion pieces such as this, 
and framed as illegitimate challenges to the Eternal Law of State and President, Big 
Business and Church. This eternal law is currently named ‘democratic security’ and as 
General Paris, the President of the last official US-sponsored Dictatorship put it - in a 
memorable interview before he passed away into the great army camp in the sky - if it 
‘has the word democratic in it,’ it should have our support (El Tiempo, 27-6-2005).         
The second opinion piece similarly begins with the issue of humanitarian prisoner 
exchange, referring to it as ‘not only immoral but also illegal’ (an important distinction to 
be made in Colombia) because ‘our’ government should not ‘accept the exchange of 
innocent hostages for atrocious bandits’ (El Tiempo, 1-3-2004). Thus he immediately 
frames or contextualises the actions of the FARC - the  afore-mentioned ‘atrocious 
bandits’ - as illegitimate challenges to proper authority. Then he defends his political 
allies, the Colombian Death Squads whom he affectionately describes as ‘self-defences’ 
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because they have kindly promised ‘to live harmlessly and surrender their hatreds and 
guns’ (ibid). In this classic Colombian political love-song, the author sings the praises of 
this war against terrorism in which ‘not a single violent act has been attributed to the 
government or blamed on its omissions,’ of this terrestrial paradise (Colombia) where 
‘nobody disappears because of the authorities, nor is tortured, nor is illegally deprived of 
liberty, nor is persecuted for their ideas or opinions,’ of this war against drugs that uses 
‘fumigations that do no damage and are giving our rivers, our forests, our paramos a new 
lease of life,’ and finally – and most important of all – of our noble Colombian army 
because ‘soon we will have to admit the most terrible injustice that has been committed 
against one of the most outstanding soldiers in Colombia’ (ibid).  
This official Colombian poet is referring to General Rito Alejo del Río, commander of 
17
th
 Army Brigade: instrumental in the development of paramilitarism and in the 
implementation of a torrent of brutal but highly profitable massacres in the President’s 
home ground of Antioquia (www.semana.com, 13-10-2009). The author himself is not 
beyond suspicion. His name is Fernando Londono Hoyos: he is an ex-Minister of the 
Interior in the Uribe regime who has been accused of using State funds to purchase shares 
in INVERCOLSA (a Colombian gas company) and of using his political influence to 
increase the value of his investment from around 12 million to 85 million dollars 
(www.lafogata.org).    
The ninth item in Appendix 6 is an interview with the Minister of Defence, Jorge Alberto 
Uribe Echavarria who apologises for recent incidents of ‘friendly fire’ but seems 
convinced that the army knows ‘how to win the war’ against the guerrilla (El Tiempo, 17-
4-2004). He refers to the reinforcements that include ‘carabineros’ (armed police) and 
25,000 ‘soldiers of the people’ (potential paramilitaries) and to successes: ‘compared to 
the first three months of 2003, there has been a reduction – in the destruction of bridges 
(from 11 to 3) and of transmitters (from 45 to 16) and all terrorist actions’ (ibid). He 
describes the paramilitaries as ‘self-defences’ and the guerrilla as ‘badly named’: in order 
once again to frame their actions as illegitimate.  
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The tenth ítem in Appendix 6 reiterates the claim in the sixth news report (El Pais, 6-2-
2004) that repeats the suggestion in the second news item (El Pais, 16-10-2003): that the 
main problem in Colombia is the absence of State institutions rather than the absence of 
ethical State institutions. This item claims that the presence of the army in the ‘urban 
perimeter’ of the capital has been beneficial because ‘kidnapping has decreased almost 
90%, attacks on the population have diminished and terrorist acts have been considerably 
neutralized’ (El Tiempo, 12-5-2004). The FARC have again been selected to appear in 
the news frame: because ‘between 1999 and 2003’ more than ‘8,000 Bogotá traders, 
industrialists and businessmen became victims of kidnapping and extortion on the part of 
the 42, 22, 52 and 53 fronts of the FARC not counting the actions of other fronts’ (ibid). 
The FARC are also implicated in the onslaught of paramilitarism in the Colombian 
capital: defined as ‘a penetration of combatants that generated selective deaths, armed 
confrontations in the streets of popular districts and the so-called debt-collection agencies 
that still operate and that have unleashed the war between paras and guerrilla’ (ibid). The 
eleventh and final news item is an exclusive interview with an influential member of the 
the Santos clan and the billion-dollar El Tiempo media empire: the former Minister of the 
Treasury and the current Minister of Defence, Juan Manuel Santos who claims that 
Venezuela is ‘approaching the abyss’ (El Colombiano, 12-5-2004). Santos accuses Hugo 
Chavez, the President of that neighbouring country of pretending to capture ‘88 presumed 
paramilitaries’ in order to ‘divert attention from internal conflict’ (ibid).  
Santos has discredited his neighbour in order to reconfirm the democratic master frame: 
suggesting once again that the Colombian regime is democratic, and that the actions and 
discourse of the FARC in particular - and of resistance groups in general – is 
undemocratic and illegitimate.  
Conclusion 
The frame and content analysis of the 851 news items in Part 3 of this thesis have 
suggested that Colombian media conglomerates attribute most human rights abuses to the 
FARC in particular and the armed or unarmed opposition in general rather than to the 
Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries, that the selection of sources plays an 
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important role in the framing of the current armed conflict, and that this frame bridges the 
gap between coercion and consent and legitimizes and promotes the interests of the 
Colombian government, conglomerates, Armed Forces and paramilitaries.  
Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis suggest that the main influences on this frame are Colombian 
media organisations (the main instruments of consent) and the Armed Forces (the main 
instruments of coercion) and the political, social and economic interests that operate 
through them. Colombian media organisations use a disproportionate number of recent 
graduates to report on the armed conflict and Colombian journalists operate under severe 
pressure: Colombian labour legislation is not implemented in any Colombian news 
organisation, health insurance, vacations and pensions are seldom paid and journalists are 
laid off at short notice (Javeriana Report, 2004). The selection of sources also played a 
significant role in the attribution of responsibility to the three main armed groups (Table 
5). The Colombian Armed Forces, the Colombian government and foreign sources 
attributed a disproportionate number of severe human rights abuses to the FARC.  
Parts 1 to 3 of this thesis indicate that current Colombian news production plays four 
important roles - to launder the capital and the image of the heads of the drug cartels 
and Armed Forces and paramilitaries, to transmit the democratic master frame (Snow 
and Benford, 1988: 210), to coordinate the interplay between coercion and consent, 
and to attract foreign aid (bribes) and investment – and the news items in Appendix 5 
illustrate these four points. The President’s portrayal of the guerrilla as ‘the serpent 
of terrorism’ (Appendix 5, no. 13) and the naming and shaming of the FARC in the 
reportage on the Florencia atrocity (Appendix 5, no. 4) dramatically differ from the 
respectful references to the Colombian paramilitaries and Death Squads as ‘self-
defences’, combatants or ‘paras’ who have kindly promised ‘to live harmlessly and 
surrender their hatreds and guns’ (El Tiempo, 1-3-2004). 
 
This thesis in general claims that the Colombian Armed Forces direct the most severe 
pressure against the Colombian people in general and against Colombian journalists 
in particular because of the multiple roles of this official armed group - the main 
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instrument of coercion - as the main authors, agents, subjects and sources of news 
stories, massacres and selective assassinations. Part 3 in particular claims that this 
extreme coercion on the part of the Colombian regime has strongly influenced the 
framing of Colombian news stories. The news items in Appendix 6 from first to last 
indicate that the discourse and actions of the Other - other political regimes or 
alternative political groups or other political ideologies or other sources of news and 
information that suggest that the regime itself is the main source of human rights 
abuses - are framed as illegitimate challenges to that extremely dubious and ruthless 
authority.     
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General conclusion 
 
Why and how consent is manipulated in societies such as Colombia where severe 
coercion seems to be effective in securing power 
 
The aim of Part 1 of the thesis has been to understand the roots and nature of armed 
conflict and coercion in Colombia. Part 2 has researched the roots and nature of 
media production and consent. The aim of Part 3 has been to understand the current 
nature of the interplay between armed conflict and news production, coercion and 
consent. The four theoretical insights that were introduced in the Preface – related to 
Classical Marxism, Antonio Gramsci (2005), Louis Althusser (1971) and Max Weber 
(1919, 1930, 1949, 1962, 1968) – will be re-introduced in this part of the thesis in 
order to understand coercion and consent and the interplay between them in more 
depth and in order to address the central issue: why and how consent is manipulated 
in societies such as Colombia where severe coercion seems to be effective in 
securing power.  
 
The information in Parts 1 to 3 of this thesis suggests why and how consent is 
manipulated: 1. because coercion and consent are two sides of the same coin, 2. 
because coercion is continually being challenged and contested, 3. because the 
central aim of both coercion and consent in peripheral regions such as this is to 
centralise, monopolise and maximise power and profits at all costs, 4. because the 
main role of consent in such societies is to consolidate coercion and maximise power 
and profits, and 5. because the main role of consent  and media production is to 
frame and legitimize and produce and promote armed conflict – to define and divide 
‘us’ and ‘them’, to attribute responsibility for social ills and violence to the other 
side, to contextualise the discourse and actions of the opposition as illegitimate 
challenges to proper authority, and to turn Colombian people against one another and 
against themselves: the internal enemy. This part of the thesis will analyse these five 
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relationships between coercion and consent, between the Colombian armed conflict 
and Colombian media production, in more depth and detail, synthesising the 
information from Parts 1 to 3 in order to support these five conclusions.       
 
1. Coercion and consent are two sides of the same coin 
 
This thesis suggests that problems in societies such as this could or should be 
attributed to the interplay between coercion and consent. Both coercion and consent 
are important causes and characteristics of these severe problems: but coercion and 
consent are two sides of the same coin. This part of the thesis summarises the role 
and nature of coercion and consent in each regime from the Spanish Conquest and 
Colonial Period to the current government and concludes that the monopolisation and 
maximisation of power and profits in such regions is not based solely on coercion or 
consent but on the interplay between them. This is the first of five insights  into why 
and how consent is manipulated in societies such as this where severe coercion 
seems to be effective but isn’t: consent is part of coercion and vice versa.  
 
The importance of coercion 
 
The information in Part 1 suggests that coercion is a crucial element in the 
centralisation, consolidation, monopolisation and maximisation of power and profits 
in regions such as this. Classical Marxism provides important insights into the roots 
and nature of such societies: in which the astronomical accumulation of resources 
and credit in central regions – such as the Spanish Empire, the British Empire and 
the US – has been based on the coercion and misery of peripheral societies such as 
this. This misery may be attributed to colonialism and may be analysed in terms of 
the relationship between ‘the oppressor’ and ‘the oppressed’ (Marx and Engels, 
1955: 2). Part 1 suggests that Colombian people are victims of coercion: that 
peripheral societies such as this suffer from ‘the plunder of continents’ (Marx, 1955), 
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from ‘the force of the bayonet’ (Fanon, 2001: 66) and from the ruthlessness of ‘the 
oppressor’ (op cit).  
The roots and nature of the armed conflict that have been analysed in Part 1 of this thesis 
highlight the problems of coercion, colonialism and oppression that Classical Marxism 
analyses. These problems include 
1. the central political, social and economic interests of the Spanish Empire and the 
Catholic Church (from the 16
th
 to the 18
th
 Century), of the British Empire (in the 19
th
 
Century) and of US and European governments, banks and businesses (from the 
beginning of the 20
th
 Century to the present) 
2. peripheral counterparts that share and implement these interests on the part of the 
Creols (1781-1832), of the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties (1832-1953) 
and on the part of the Dictatorship (1953-1958), the National Front (1958-1974) and the 
current Colombian government, economic conglomerates, drug cartels, Armed Forces 
and paramilitaries (from 1974 to the present) 
3. the use of armed groups on the part of Conquistadors, Spanish militias, Creol armies, 
Conservative and Liberal armies and militias, US and Colombian Armed Forces and 
paramilitaries, and of massacres, displacements, selective assassinations and local 
mopping up operations designed to implement these interests at all costs, human and 
environmental  
and 4. courageous and desperate resistance to these interests on the part of indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian communities, comuneros and campesinos, democratic societies of 
artisans and labour movements, socialist and communist groups and alternative political, 
social and cultural movements.        
Chapter 4 of Part 1 suggests that coercion continues to be one of the main causes and 
characteristics of the Colombian armed conflict. The principal foreign interests in this 
conflict are US and European regimes, economic conglomerates, banks and Armed 
Forces that profit most from the billions of dollars of oil, coal, emeralds, platinum, 
bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, steel, silver, zinc, coffee, sugar, bananas, flowers and 
258 
 
illegal drugs that are exported annually. The main domestic interests are the four 
Colombian conglomerates – El Grupo Antioqueño (11,448 million dollars in fixed assets 
in 2002), the Santo Domingo Empire (8,000 million dollars), Sarmiento Angulo (7,676 
million), the Ardila Lulle conglomerate (2,719 million dollars) – that have used armed 
political coercion to monopolise coffee, chocolate, tobacco (sold to Philip Morris), 
cement, coal, construction, textiles, gold, minerals, private armed guards (paramilitaries), 
retail outlets, banks, money-laundering operations, beer (sold to SABMiller), packing, 
plastics, forestry, planes, petroleum helicopters, television, radio, the national airline 
(sold to Brazil), textiles and insurance   (Silva Colmenares, 2004).  
The main armed groups and instruments of coercion in the current period are US and 
Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries because all of this has been founded on 
misery: more than two million people have been displaced from oil and mineral regions 
in the last 25 years. There were more than 6,000 assassinations there between 1995 and 
2002 (Sintraminercol, 2004). Between 2001 and 2004 poverty increased from 30.5 
million to 33.7 million Colombian people. Extreme poverty affects – or rather murders – 
18.9 million people per year. The US-based human rights group, ‘Watchlist on Children 
and Armed Conflict’ (www.watchlist.org, 2004) claims that between 15,000 and 30,000 
of Colombian children live on the street, that 4,000 children are killed with ‘small arms’ 
(guns and knives) every year, that between 20,000 and 35,000 are involved in the sex 
trade and that between 35,000 and 50,000 Colombian girls and young women were 
trafficked abroad – exported to Spain and the US - in 2000. There are between 11,000 
and 14,000 child soldiers: more than a third have participated in the killing. Some have 
drunk human blood (ibid).  
The profitable role of the US government, businesses and Armed Forces in this carnage 
can be traced to the north American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe, the 
threat of international communism, and a series of treaties and military aid programs that 
united North and South American armies at the end of World War II (Buitrago, 1994: 
20). Colombian officers participated in training courses in the US and in Panama (1951-
4). The Cuban revolution (1963) reinforced Cold War policies through which the United 
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States attributed political and social unrest in the region to ‘communist conspiracies’ 
rather than socio-economic factors (ibid: 26). The US precipitated and funded 
dictatorships in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966, 1976), Chile (1973) and Peru (1968), 
introduced the concept of the ‘internal enemy’, and taught their Southern business 
partners desirable methods of coercion: persecution, abduction, detention, torture and 
‘disappearances’. Between 1960 and 1970 the US invested 60 million dollars in a 
Colombian ‘counter-insurgency’ campaign designed to target civilian populations and  
rural settlements such as Marquetalia, napalming, bombing and murdering eighteen 
children in one night (Villegas et al., 1974). The official US report – that ‘the permanent 
close contact between the United States and Colombian Armed Forces will be of mutual 
[economic] benefit’ (ibid) – heralded in the next phase of armed coercion: based on 
paramilitaries. This precipitated the formation of the 14
th
 Brigade of the Colombian army 
in the Middle Magadelena region, the consolidation of the discourse of and against the 
‘internal enemy’, cooperation between US and Colombian Armed Forces at the highest 
levels, collaboration between military and political  administrations, financial support by 
local businesses, regional landowners and urban drug cartels and rigorous training by 
Israeli and UK mercenaries.  
Ruthless central interests – that operate through US and European banks and businesses - 
are making juicy profits out of this heady mixture of ‘plunder’ and misery (Marx, op cit). 
Colombia is the fifth main source of oil in South America and has the largest coal 
resources. It is the principal source of emeralds in the world. In 2002, 3.28 billion dollars 
of petroleum, 1.97 billion of precious metals and stones, 1.01 billion dollars of coal, 
283.3 million of iron and nickel, 8.85 million dollars of platinum and 4.29 million dollars 
of marble and granite were extracted and exported (Torres, 2002). In 2003 Colombia 
exported 806,307 million dollars of coffee and 228,473 million dollars of sugar, 387,543 
million dollars of bananas and 682,283 million dollars of flowers (Colombian Ministry of 
Trade statistics).  
This massive centralised accumulation of resources has coincided with the assassination 
of around 1,336 Colombian labour leaders between 1991 and 1999 (CINEP). More than 
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2,000 were exterminated between 1991 and 2004 (Escuela Nacional Sindical). More than 
two million people have been displaced from oil and mineral regions in the last 25 years. 
There were more than 6,000 assassinations there between 1995 and 2002 (Sintraminercol, 
2004). Between 2001 and 2004 poverty increased from 30.5 million to 33.7 million 
Colombian people. Extreme poverty affects – or rather murders - 18.9 million people per 
year. 16.7 million Colombians have minimal health care (PCDHDD, 2004).  
The personal interviews in Appendix 2 suggest that the contrast between the 
accumulation of resources and capital and credit on one side and of marginalisation and 
misery and debt on the other are the principal causes of armed conflict in Colombia: that 
the main armed groups – the Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries – have 
channelled this resentment and desperation into the armed resistance and armed conflict 
that has legitimized more coercion and more profits.  
The human rights researcher (Interview 10) claims that most human rights abuses occur 
in regions of low population, high international or local economic investment, and 
minimal presence of State institutions. The principal causes and consequences of the 
armed conflict – non-distribution of economic resources, unemployment, recruitment into 
armed groups, violence – are factors that interact ‘in a synergetic process’. The human 
rights activist (Interview 11) agrees that marginalised rural regions and urban districts are 
the breeding grounds of violence. The district of Cazuca which she describes is a 
microcosm of past and present armed conflicts, is located inside the capital city, and is 
composed of displaced campesinos who are too traumatised to discuss the past. In 2003 a 
judge sentenced a 17 year resident of Cazuca to 28 years in prison for the assassination of 
37 people, including his 13 year old girlfriend. In court he claimed that he had killed 137 
people – not 37 - and that the local police and paramilitaries had supplied him with his 
lists of targets that included leaders of social movements and other undesirable social 
elements. The editor of the local newspaper (Interview 19) suggests that gangsters are 
one of the main source of violence in urban districts. The larger cartels have more than 50 
members. In addition to contraband, they organise robberies, drug dealing and 
prostitution and liaise with local authorities, businessmen and police in the 
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implementation of ‘social cleansing programs’ (limpieza social): the culling of 
undesirable social sectors, especially people who live in the street (Image 23 and 24). 
Prison is another sub-culture and sub-economy in Colombian cities that is based on the 
same social hierarchies, central accumulation of privileges and marginalisation as 
‘outside’: prison doesn’t seem to have an outside or inside under such oppressive 
regimes.    
Part 1 of this thesis suggests – as Classical Marxism does - that peripheral regimes such 
as the Colombian regime use high levels and ruthless methods of coercion in order to 
maximise profits and accumulate resources in central regimes such as Europe and the US: 
but admits that Classical Marxism has theoretical limitations. Part 1 accepts the argument 
that the boundaries between one political or social class or group and another - between 
the regime and the opposition to the regime, between coercion and resistance to coercion, 
between perpetrators and victims of human rights abuses – do depend in the end on 
discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). This thesis suggests that one might mutate into the 
other – that perpetrators can be perceived and presented as victims, and victims as 
perpetrators - because social groups and individual members of social groups are both 
agents and objects of coercion. But this thesis also insists that these political and social 
labels are useful in order to understand the nature of – and relationship between - 
coercion and consent.  
Part 1 claims that economic factors are important (cf Hoffman, 1984), that the principal 
aim of coercion in Colombia is the maximisation of profits, and that this is the main 
cause and characteristic of the Colombian armed conflict and of past and present human 
rights abuses. Part 1 privileges the resistance to the severe coercion and human rights 
abuses that are attributed to the Colombian regime but does not ‘privilege the proletariat’ 
as a social class and as the principal instrument of social reform (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 22) 
Part 1 on the other hand does suggest that the nature of social classes – and the 
dividing line between ‘the oppressor’ and ‘the oppressed’ – is not as precise as 
Classical Marxism implies. The courageous and insightful and resourceful 
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Colombian guerrilla groups have not seized power. The Colombian ‘bourgeoisie’ has 
not ‘forged the weapons that bring death to itself’ and has not ‘called into existence 
the men who are to wield those weapons: the proletariat’ (Marx and Engels, 1955: 3). 
Part 1 finally indicates that Classical Marxism has privileged ‘the proletariat’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) and that consent is more important than Classical 
Marxism suggests. 
 
The importance of consent 
 
The information in Part 2 of this thesis on the other hand suggests that consent is a 
crucial element in such regions because the political, social and economic interests 
that have predominated in each regime from the Spanish Conquest and Colonial 
Period (1499-1781) to the current government have invested heavily in media 
organisations and media production: and because consent has played a crucial role in 
the centralisation, consolidation, monopolisation and maximisation of power and 
profits. Gramsci provides important insights into the roots and nature of such 
societies and into the crucial relationship between ‘the leader’ and ‘the led’ (2005: 
144). The massive political, social and economic interests in newspapers and 
magazines, in radio stations and in television channels – that is presented in Part 2 of 
this thesis - indicates that one of the main roles of Colombian media organisations is 
to manipulate consent and to create a close relationship between ‘leader’ and ‘led’ 
(ibid).  
 
The roots and nature of media production that has been analysed in Part 2 of this 
thesis highlights the problems of consent and leadership that Gramsci analyses. 
These problems include 
 
1. the central political, social and economic interests of the Spanish Empire and the 
Catholic Church (from the 16
th
 to the 18
th
 Century), of the British Empire (in the 19
th
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Century) and of US and European governments, banks and businesses (from the 
beginning of the 20
th
 Century to the present) 
2. peripheral counterparts that share and implement these interests on the part of the 
Creols (1781 – 1832), the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties (1832-1953) 
and on the part of the Dictatorship (1953-1958), the National Front (1958 – 1974) and the 
current Colombian government, economic conglomerates, drug cartels, Armed Forces 
and paramilitaries (1974 – present) 
3. the use of media organisations - the Church, the printing press, Conservative and 
Liberal newspapers and radio stations, US and Colombian mass media conglomerates – 
and of collaborators and censorship designed to promote and implement these interests.  
Chapter 4 of Part 2 suggests that the manipulation of consent continues to be one of the 
main roles of Colombian media production. The principal foreign influences are 
international mass media monopolies based on close political, economic and military ties 
(Bagdikian, 1983), the massive North-South flow of news, opinion, culture, 
entertainment and products, and the enormous increases in advertising revenues in the 
South American region (McCann-Erickson, 1998). The main domestic interests are the 
three principal Colombian mass media conglomerates: La Casa Editorial El Tiempo, 
Caracol and RCN Radio and TV. The fact that the current Vice-President of Colombia, 
the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Environment are owners and directors of 
the billion-dollar Casa Editorial El Tiempo and that these three media conglomerates are 
part of massive economic conglomerates suggests that Colombian media production is 
geared to political campaigns and advertisements. The statistics and reports presented in 
Part 2 of this thesis indicate that the Colombian government, the Colombian 
conglomerates, the Armed Forces and the paramilitaries (the principal agents of coercion) 
pressure Colombian journalists (the principal agents of consent) to implement these same 
political, social and economic interests: 47 Colombian journalists were assassinated 
between 1988 and 1993 (Inter American Press Association) and Colombian labour 
legislation (long-term contracts, health insurance) does not protect journalists (Javeriana 
University, 2004).  
264 
 
 
On the other hand Part 2 indicates that consent and the relationship between ‘the 
leader’ and ‘the led’ is not as unified as Gramsci implies. The seismic rift between 
‘leader’ and ‘led’ is reflected in alternative political, social and cultural movements 
and media production: in the sermons and tracts of idealistic Catholic priests such as 
Friar Montesino, Bartoleme de las Casas and Pedro Claver, in the pamphlets of 
indigenous leaders such as Quintín Lame, in the rituals, the discourse, the mingas 
(meetings) and the lives of indigenous peoples, in the music, the dances, the carnival, 
the palenques, the culture and the lives of Afro-Colombian people, in the chants, 
slogans, speeches, political pamphlets, banners and marches of comuneros, artisans, 
campesinos and labour and socialist and communist movements, in the radical 
literature of Manuel Zapata Olivella, José Maria Vargas Vila and José Eustasio 
Rivera, in human rights’ masterpieces such as El Libro Negro de la Represion, in the 
radical discourse of the priest, professor, political leader and guerrillero, Camilo 
Torres (Image 6), in the political satire of Jaime Garzón, in communist newspapers 
such as Voz, in human rights’ periodicals such as Desde Abajo, in alternative radio 
stations and community newspapers such as El Campanazo, in the graffiti that has 
been scrawled on the walls of the cities 
 
‘If love does not warm us, many of us will die of cold tonight’ (El Campanazo, 
December, 2005)            
 
The limited nature of consent is reflected in the limitations of the resistance 
movements – the indigenous and Afro-Colombian movements, the comuneros, the 
socialist and communist groups, the alternative political, social and cultural 
movements – and in the limited nature of the leaders and alternative media groups 
which propose and promise and fail to represent them. The interviews conducted 
with representatives of guerrilla groups and alternative political, social and cultural 
movements and media groups (Appendix 2) reflect problems of consent, leadership 
and commitment both inside and outside these groups. Peralta and Patino (2004) 
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have collected personal accounts of demobilised members of armed resistance groups 
which highlight the social and psychological rift between ‘the leader’ and ‘the led’.  
 
‘Mauro’ condemns the leaders of the M-19 who orchestrated the suicidal occupation 
– and precipitated the massacre - of ‘the most loyal members of that group’ in the 
Palace of Justice in 1985. He resigned from the cause: because ‘I had earned my 
freedom and I was tired of Death’ (ibid: 54). The second, ‘Luisa’ was betrayed by 
one of her superiors and was tortured by the Colombian army. FARC leaders blamed 
‘Johanna’ because one of her companions had betrayed the group. They murdered 
her four youngest brothers one by one, surrounded the small cottage where she lived 
with her mother, and moved in for the kill. The local FARC informer smuggled them 
out in his truck and saved their lives. He had had enough of ‘that crazy war’.    
 
The importance of coercion and consent 
 
The information in Parts 1 to 3 of this thesis concludes that the interplay between 
coercion and consent is important because interests of Colombian armed groups and 
media organisations coincide. Althusser provides important insights into the nature 
and role of this interplay. The concept of Repressive and Ideological State 
Apparatuses can be applied to the main instruments of coercion and consent in 
different historical periods. 
  
Applying Althusser’s terms, the main repressive State apparatuses in the Spanish 
Conquest and Colonial period were the Spanish monarchy, the Spanish 
Conquistadors and militias and the Spanish courts and prisons. The Spanish 
monarchy also acted as a political ISA (ideological State apparatus) The Catholic 
Church had a large number of ideological roles that encompassed education and 
culture, publishing, communications and theatre and that influenced the values of 
another important ISA, the Spanish Catholic family. The Catholic missions acted as 
the main educational ISAs and sources of mineral extraction and agricultural 
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production. The Spanish Inquisition acted as a repressive State apparatus designed to 
control ideological production. Guilds acted as proto-trade union apparatuses 
establishing rules that aimed to organise artisans and ensure quality of production. 
However repressive State apparatuses – the Spanish armies and militias – 
predominated in the plunder of land and resources, using massacre, displacement and 
slavery to maximise power and profits. 
The Creol armies were the main instruments of coercion at the time of the Independence 
movements (1781-1832) - implementing the political and social interests of the Creol 
leaders that coincided with the interests of the British Empire – replacing an ‘educated’ 
Spanish ruling class with an ‘educated’ Republican class and seizing control of ‘the soil 
and subsoil of precious metals’ (García, 1980).  
Using Althusser’s terms, the main repressive State apparatuses at this time were the Creol 
governments, armies and militias that replaced the Spanish monarchy. Creol leaders 
created their own ideological apparatuses that included salons, Masonic lodges and 
printing presses that produced political pamphlets and newspapers. The main Spanish 
ISA – the Catholic Church – therefore lost its central role in publishing and 
communications.     
The main role of coercion at the time of Conservative and Liberal rule (1832-1953) was 
to implement the political and economic interests of the leaders of these parties and their 
local and foreign counterparts – to accumulate resources and credit in the UK and the US 
- and to open up the Colombian market to UK and US products. The main instruments of 
coercion during this historical period were the Conservative and Liberal armies and 
militias that played a crucial role in the implementation of political and economic 
interests through massacres and selective assassinations. 
Applying Althusser’s terms, the main repressive State apparatuses at the time of 
Conservative and Liberal rule were the governments, the political parties, the army and 
militias, the courts and the prisons. The Liberal party used ideological State apparatuses 
such as printing presses and radio stations that opposed the ideological power of the 
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Conservative party and Catholic Church. The Liberals also promoted secular educational 
State apparatuses.    
US and Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries are the principal current instruments 
of coercion and their main role is to monopolise oil, mineral and agricultural production, 
to maximise profits through massacres and displacements of local populations, and to 
accumulate capital, resources and credit in central banks and industries at any price. 
Peripheral (Colombian) perpetrators continue to represent and implement central 
interests. The main instruments of coercion are the US and Colombian Armed Forces and 
paramilitaries. 
Using Althusser’s terms, the main repressive State apparatuses at present are the 
governments, the US and Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries, the police, courts 
and prisons. Coercion predominates in Colombia and therefore the paramilitaries 
represent the interests of international and national conglomerates, drug cartels and 
landowners, and protect the international image of the Colombian State and army: the 
police are part of the army because Colombia is in a permanent state of military alert. 
Power and profits are the main goals and therefore there is little ideological difference 
between the two main political parties: the Liberals and Conservatives. This thesis 
suggests that the main ideological apparatus at present is the mass media rather than the 
Church, the school or the family because it is the voice of international advertisement and 
products.          
On the other hand Althusser’s interpretation of the nature and role of State apparatuses 
seems to be more relevant to central regimes such as Europe where consent predominates 
rather than to peripheral regimes such as Colombia where coercion predominates and 
where the principal purpose of the army is to intervene immediately rather than to act ‘as 
a supplementary repressive force in the last instance’ (Althusser, 1971). 
Althusser’s claim that the communications and cultural apparatus ‘doses’ people with 
‘nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism and moralism’ and that the educational apparatus 
‘drums’ the ruling ideology into children seems to be mechanistic and extreme: 
cramming children with ideology and know-how and ‘ejecting them into production’. 
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This thesis instead suggests that the ideological mechanism is more subtle and contested, 
that the basic ideological process in predominantly coercive regimes such as Colombia is 
to create a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on a general framing mechanism that 
contextualises the actions and discourse of the opposition as violent and unacceptable.     
Part 2 of the thesis suggests that the main ideological State apparatus in each historical 
period promoted power and profits by defining and dividing ‘us’ and ‘them’ – Spanish 
Catholic and indigenous or black infidel, Creol and Spanish, Liberal and Conservative, 
bandit, communist, terrorist. The Catholic Church used papal bulls, historical chronicles 
and religious tracts in order to portray indigenous and black people as the enemy and in 
order to legitimize and glorify the massacres and slavery. The Creol literary and scientific 
salons and Masonic lodges and printing presses used the discourse of the French 
revolution and the Enlightenment to promote the Rights of Man, to enlist party support, 
and to replace the monarchy as the rulers and abusers of the land and resources. 
Conservative and Liberal party leaders and their local representatives used political issues 
such as the relationship between the Church and the State or the abolition or not of 
slavery or central or federal political organisation as pretexts to legitimize severe 
coercion and human rights abuses.  
 
The importance of these ideological State apparatuses is reflected in the fact that the 
leaders of the repressive State apparatuses – the monarchy and governments and parties 
and armies and militias and paramilitaries – have also played important roles in 
publishing and broadcasting as owners, editors, journalists, authors, censors: employing 
journalists that collaborate and assassinating those that rebel. 
 
Part 3 of this thesis suggests that current Colombian media conglomerates – the main 
ideological State apparatus that reports and interprets the current armed conflict – 
attribute most human rights abuses to the armed or unarmed opposition rather than to the 
Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries. Current Colombian news production plays 
four important roles - to launder the capital and the image of the heads of the drug cartels 
and Armed Forces and paramilitaries, to transmit the democratic master frame, to 
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coordinate the interplay between coercion and consent, and to attract foreign aid (bribes) 
and investment. The actions and discourse of the opposition is framed as illegitimate 
challenges to that extremely dubious and ruthless authority. 
 
Parts 1, 2 and 3 of this thesis therefore reflect Althusser’s insights into the connection 
between repressive and ideological State apparatuses – coercion and consent – but with 
one serious rebuttal. Consent is not based on mere transmission, on cramming children 
with ideology and know-how and ‘ejecting them into production’ (Althusser, 1971): 
‘dominant meanings’ are not part of some ‘one-sided process which governs how all 
events will be signified’ (Hall, 1980: 128). The manipulation of consent is a much more 
subtle and contested process than exists in the world that Althusser has manufactured. 
This thesis has aimed to provide more detailed and deeper insights into the nature and 
role of both coercion and consent in Colombia.  
This thesis suggests that Weber also provides important insights into this interplay: 
by implying that coercion and consent are two sides of the same coin because ‘every 
genuine form of domination’ indicates a minimum of ‘voluntary compliance’ and ‘an 
interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’ (Weber, 
1968: 212).  
 
He defines the State in terms of the monopolisation of ‘the legitimate use of  force’ 
(1919) and describes three sources of authority, types of leadership or sources of 
consent: traditional authority, charismatic authority and legal oir rational authority. 
Traditional authority is based on ‘a claim by the leaders and a belief on the  part of 
the followers, that there is virtue in the sanctity of age-old rules and powers’ (Ritzer, 
1995: 132). Charismatic authority reflects ‘the exemplary character of an individual 
person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him’ (Weber, 
1968: 215). Legal or rational authority rests on ‘a belief in the legality of enacted 
rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands’ 
(ibid).  
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Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis support these three broad methods of legitimization. The 
Spanish rulers and the Catholic Church in the Spanish Colonial Period (1499-1781) 
legitimized themselves through traditional authority. The Conquistadors legitimized 
themselves through charismatic crusades. Creol leaders such as the influential 
journalist, Nariño (President of the Republic in 1811 and 1812) and the influential 
general, Bolívar (President of the Republic and Dictator from 1819 to 1830) bridged 
charismatic leadership and legal or rational authority by appealing to Nariño’s 
translation of the Rights of Man (1794). Francisco de Paula Santander is the 
historical icon of legal authority in Colombia and is represented as ‘ the father of the 
Colombian nation and the man of the laws’: the problem being that he used ‘these 
laws to represent his own interests and the interests of the minority that he 
represented’ and that ‘the moment that these laws become an obstacle they are gently 
laid aside and the legal point is replaced by a sword (Villegas et al ., 1974: 3). This 
interplay between coercion and legitimization of coercion (consent) is reflected in 
the professions of past and present Colombian Presidents: 15 Colombian Presidents – 
from Bolívar (1819-30) to General Paris (1957-8) – have been generals; 25 
Presidents – from Nariño (1811-12) to the penultimate President, Pastrana Arango 
(1994-1998) – have been journalists; 24 have been lawyers. It could be argued that 
the cultural sophistication and coolness of the classical English colonial gentleman – 
whom Colombian Presidents such as Núñez, Camargo, Michelsen seem to have 
admired so much – encapsulates all these methods of legitimization: traditional, 
charismatic and legal or rational.    
 
This thesis on the other hand transcends Weber’s notions of legitimization by 
claiming that the main method of legitimization is not so much in the persona of the 
leader – traditional or charismatic or legal or rational – as in the nature and 
manipulation of consent and of the discourse of legitimization. This thesis in general 
suggests that the authority of the Colombian State is vested in the government, in big 
business, in the Armed Forces and in the mass media conglomerates – rather than in 
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the President as an individual as Max Weber might suggest - and that this authority is 
operationalised through media production. Part 3 of this thesis suggests that 
Colombian news production in particular – and Colombian media production in 
general - interpets, operationalises and legitimizes the authority of the Colombian 
State: by framing the actions of the resistance as illegitimate challenges to proper 
authority.  
 
This part of the thesis concludes by claiming that consent is manipulated in such 
societies because coercion and consent are two sides of the same coin. This is the 
first reason why consent is manipulated in such societies. The second reason why 
consent is manipulated is this: that coercion is not totally effective in any society 
because the terrain of physical and mental power is continually being challenged and 
contested. This is the second conclusion. 
 
2. Coercion is continually being challenged and contested 
 
The second conclusion is that coercion is not completely effective because the terrain 
of physical and mental power (coercion and consent) is continually being challenged 
and contested: by rival leaders and factions, by resistance groups and alternative 
political, social and cultural movements, by insurgency and anarchy, by military 
coups and manipulated election results. All of the leaders and factions in each of the 
five historical periods which have been analysed in Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis have 
faced and face, have succumbed and will succumb to such threats. This part of the 
thesis summarises the challenges which the leaders of each regime have created and 
confronted – the importance of consent and the danger of dissent – in each of the 
historical periods from the Spanish Conquest to the current regime. This is the 
second of the five reasons why consent is manipulated in societies such as this: 
coercion is not completely effective. The terrain of power is continually being 
contested and threatened.  
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The main threats to the leaders of each regime 
 
During the Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period, the Conquistadors and 
local Spanish rulers faced - and finally surrendered to - an infinite number of 
challenges. The main threats to their power and profits and lives included the 
pressures of the Spanish monarchy and the Catholic Church, armed indigenous and 
African resistance and rebellion, rivalry between one another, the danger of pirates 
(paramilitaries) such as Sir Francis Drake who represented the interests of the 
English monarchy and raided Cartagena, the city of gold and slavery, the popular 
uprising of the comuneros, and - finally - the armies of the bastard offspring of 
Spanish imperialism, the Creols. The Catholic Church lost power in 1767 when the 
Jesuit rulers of the richest missions, ranches and mines were forced into exile. Creol 
leaders backed by the British Empire and the London banks deposed the local 
Spanish rulers in 1811.  
 
Here are the details of these threats. The Catholic Kings ordered the arrest of 
Christopher Columbus at the end of his third voyage and stripped him of power and 
privilege. He died on the fourth. Indigenous leaders such as Gaitana revenged 
themselves on the Spanish commanders. She hunted Pedro de Anasco down - 
because he had burnt her son alive in front of her - gouged out his eye balls and led 
him around the indigenous markets by the nose like a pig. The Spanish Empire 
appropriated the land and property of the three main Conquistadors: Quesada, 
Belalcázar, Federmann. They died of disease and in exile. The Conquistadors – the 
main instruments of coercion, genocide, torture, rape and pillage in that historical 
period – depended on the Catholic Church to legitimize their actions. ‘Loathsome are 
the matters which affect the authority of the Church and the divine cult and the holy 
Catholic Faith because … of the many converts and bad Christians there are in these 
parts’ declared the bishop of Cartagena (quoted in Borja Gómez, 1998: 248). The 
first ruler of the Spanish colony, Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada himself was accused 
of being of Jewish origin: why else would he have named his first settlement after 
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the five books of Moses (La Tora) or named the territory that he conquered (New 
Granada) after his birthplace, Granada (the last refuge of Jews and Arabs on the 
Iberian peninsula)?  
 
Escaped African slaves such as Domingo Bioho set up palenques (refuges, fortresses) 
to defend themselves against the Spanish, to collect provisions, to punish old masters 
and to liberate their black brothers. They incinerated the Spanish city of Santa Marta 
in 1529, rose up in Antioquia in 1598 and 1706, rebelled in Cartagena between 1619 
and 1696, and set up palenques from Atlantico to Valle del Cauca (Tirado Mejía, 
1988: 58). Indigenous and African resistance has continued until the present. 
Charismatic indigenous leaders such as Quintín Lame have campaigned for human 
rights since the Conquest. In 1917 Quintín assembled 50,000 indigenous people in 
Tolima. His eloquent message - ‘Even the littlest Indian of all has seen [the garden of 
knowledge] up close … in those infinite moments of communication that lie between 
the springs and the streams, in those infinite moments in which the tiger snarls and 
the lion roars and the serpent hisses’ (1939: 71) – is echoed in the current discourse 
of the U’Wa and Embera people, defending the blood (oil) and veins (water) that is 
being drained from the Earth. Ruthless Colombian Presidents such as the current one 
will never tame these people (ibid: 73). They are struggling to protect one of the 
richest natural environments on this planet – 53.2 million hectares of natural forest, 
21.6 million hectares of plains, marches and desert, between 45,000 and 55,000 
species of plant, 3,500 types of orchid, 1,815 classes of bird, 3,200 species of fish, 
520 types of reptile, 456 classes of mammal – and the survival of all of us depends 
on this struggle. 
 
In 1781 an armed multitude of 20,000 comuneros threatened to depose the local Spanish 
rulers. The protesters included: slaves ‘who desired their freedom to the detriment of their 
masters’, of indigenous peoples ‘dispossessed of their land that had been confiscated or 
robbed by landowners’ and of artisans, merchants and small owners from the region of 
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Santander who demanded not only ‘suppression of taxes’ but also ‘the radical change and 
independence from the colonial regime’ that would permit an expansion in production 
and trade’ (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 118). The Creols betrayed this popular movement in 
order to seize power themselves in 1811. Antonio Nariño – the intellectual leader of the 
Independence movement and a mason – himself admitted that 
‘We have got nowhere. We have changed masters but not condition. The same laws, the 
same government with some appearance of liberty, but in reality the same vices, the same 
titles, the same dignitaries, Eminences and delusions in those who command us. In a 
word, we have conquered our freedom in order to become what we were before’ (La 
Bagatela, 11-8-1811).    
Creol rulers and commanders faced immediate threats to their power and privilege: the 
Spanish armies, the limits of popular support and the danger of desertion, the deadliness 
of Spanish revenge and – as the Spanish faced before them - the threat that the Creols 
posed to one another. The Creol cause had little popular support. They press-ganged 
soldiers and marched them ‘with their hands tied together for fear that they would escape’ 
(Bushnell, 1969: 284). Desertion was rife and the Spanish armies returned. Between 1816 
and 1819 the Spanish commanders executed Creol leaders and intellectuals such as Jorge 
Tadeo Lozano and Camilo Torres – two Creol Presidents and intellectual leaders - and 
Francisco José de Caldas, the leader of the Botanic Expedition that had explored the flora 
and fauna of the region in the 1780s and had discovered ‘treasures’ such as quinine and 
añil (natural dye) which would be produced in plantations (using slave labour) and 
exported to the ‘heart’ of the British Empire.  
In 1828 allies of Francisco de Paula Santander – lawyer, Creol commander, President of 
the republic, national symbol of legislation and legitimization – attempted to assassinate 
Bolívar, the great dictator. The attempt failed but other Creol leaders such Admiral José 
Prudencio Padilla – who had been instrumental in the sinking of Spanish warships in the 
Caribbean Sea and in the success of the War of Independence – were executed by firing 
squad. Bolívar escaped but lost support and died in 1830 in Santa Marta. The black 
leader, Marshal Antonio José de Sucre remained loyal to Bolívar’s dream of the 
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unification of the American continent and seemed destined to succeed him in power but 
he was assassinated in the same year. In 1833 General José Sarda rebelled against 
President Santander: he died in the attempt and 18 more conspirators were executed.  
The leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Century 
initiated wars and massacres that sometimes threatened the power and lives of the 
leaders themselves. They faced the additional challenge of the democratic societies 
of artisans, of mobilisations of campesinos, and of labour, socialist and communist 
movements. They used one group against another - us against them, the army against 
the people – but were finally swallowed up in the violence that they had previously 
channelled into their conflicts.  
 
The competition between national, regional and local representatives of these parties 
was often played out by ‘gentlemen of the same lineage’ so that their original land 
was returned to them ‘at the end of the game’ (Williams, 1991: 20) and it was mainly 
the campesinos who suffered. In only one battle, Palonegro (11 - 25 May 1900) 
around 2,476 press-ganged campesinos were massacred and about 4,882 were 
severely wounded (Tovar Pinzón, 2001: 145). The Conservative and Liberal officers 
rode horses; the campesinos wielded machetes. Personal rivalries between leaders 
however posed a threat and cost lives. The Conservative leader, Jul io Arboleda 
executed 20 Liberal leaders in a firing squad in the main square of Popayan in 1861. 
He acted as President of the Republic in 1862 and was assassinated in the same year. 
The Liberal general, Tulio Varon attempted to defend Tolima against the 
Conservative army during the War of the Thousand Days but was defeated in 1901. 
His Conservative rivals relished their revenge: ‘gangs of men and women battered 
and trampled and knifed and hacked at his body, stripped him, robbed him, castrated 
him’ and dragged him through the streets tied hand and foot (Jaramillo, 1987: 92). 
The local priest and rector of the school of San Simon banged on the doors of the 
houses to spread the good news and to make sure his neighbours did not miss the 
macabre delight of the funeral procession. From 1863 to 1885 there were more than 
50 armed revolts and more than 40 different constitutions were drafted (Ayala 
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Poveda, 2003). There were eight successful military coups between 1828 and 1982: 
by Bolívar (1828), by Urdaneta (1831), by Melo and Obando (1854), by Cipriano 
(1867), by Núñez (1885), by Marroquin (1900), by Reyes (1904) and by General 
Rojas Pinilla (1953).   
 
In the 19
th
 Century, party leaders opposed the democratic societies of artisans who 
protested against the cheap British manufactured products that flooded the local 
market. The livelihood and lives of these artisans had been controlled and protected 
by powerful guilds which defined the rights and duties of both master and apprentice. 
The apprentice had to respect his master, permit himself to be corrected, attend mass 
and learn to read and write. The artisans gained power in 1854 through the military 
coup of General Melo; but momentarily. Thousands of artisans were massacred by an 
alliance of Conservative and Liberal leaders and generals (Gólgotas) who supported 
– and profited from – British imperialism and ‘free trade’.  
 
In the 20
th
 Century, campesino, labour, socialist and communist movements 
threatened Conservative and Liberal interests. The most charismatic leaders of these 
movements in the first half of the 20
th
 Century were Raúl Eduardo Mahecha (1884-
1940), Ignacio Torres Giraldo (1892-1968) and María Cano (1887-1967). Mahecha 
organised the strike against the US-owned Tropical Oil in Barrancabermeja in 1924 
and was sentenced to 17 months in prison. He returned to Barrancabermeja in 1927 
and was beaten up and sentenced to prison. On his release he participated in the 
protest against US-owned United Fruit in 1928. María Cano – who was elected as la 
flor (the flower) of the Colombian labour movement – stirred up and inspired the 
miners in Antioquia, the oil protesters in Barrancabermeja and the banana workers in 
Uraba. She carried a red flag with three eight’s painted on it, symbolising the main 
goals of the labour movement at that time: eight hours of work, eight of rest and 
eight hours of study. The protest against United Fruit (Chiquita) in Uraba ended 
extremely badly. They were met by the Colombian army as they marched towards the 
nearest town, Santa Marta, and thousands were massacred. The uprising in Libano 
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(Tolima) in 1929 has been described as the first armed Socialist insurrection on the 
American continent (Sánchez Gómez, 1981). Libano had been colonised by 
Antioqueñans in the 19
th
 Century, transformed into the third largest source of coffee 
in Colombia, and monopolised by large US and German investors. This unarmed 
resistance – like the protest in Uraba - was brutally crushed by the Colombian army.  
 
In 1948 the Conservative and Liberal monopolisation of coercion and consent 
succumbed to the violence that had been manipulated and channeled into the 
accumulation of land and resources. The bloody period between 1948 and 1958 is 
termed La Violencia because violence rather than party leaders reigned: up to half a 
million Colombians were massacred between 1948 and 1953 and more than two 
million people displaced (Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, Umana Luna, 1962).  
 
Out of the ashes of La Violencia, another threat to the traditional parties loomed: the 
Socialist Republic of Los Llanos, set up by Guadelupe Salcedo (assassinated by the 
army in 1957) and guarded by 20,000 Liberal soldiers. The republic passed through 
three important phases. In the first phase, the socialists  threatened landowners who 
sympathised with the government (September, 1952). In the second, they allied 
themselves to the communists (June, 1953). In the third phase, communist guerrilla 
groups started to unite across the country. The US used the Dictatorship (1953-8) to 
eradicate popular resistance and implement oil and mineral interests in the region 
through the massacre and displacement of local populations and the selective 
assassination of protesters: whom the US army labelled the ‘internal’ enemy.  
 
The Dictatorship succumbed to the threat of Conservative and Liberal-owned banks, 
businesses and newspapers. The telegram that the Conservative party leader, Laureano 
Gomez sent to the Liberal party leader, Alberto Lleras Camargo at the end of the 
dictatorship illustrates the importance of manipulating consent because coercion and 
dictatorships are not completely effective, this manipulation of consent – and protection 
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of ‘common ideological inheritance against unchained curse tropical dictators’ (below) - 
being the crucial theme in this thesis   
‘Emotional congratulations magnificent victory. Only historical parties will be able to 
protect common ideological inheritance against unchained curse tropical dictators. For 
this noble task the country will count on my definite support.  
Your friend, Laureano Gomez 
Post-Second World War Colombian regimes have created and defended themselves 
against the threat of communist guerrilla groups and political, social and economic 
reform by using the US and Colombian army and paramilitaries to maximise profits at 
any cost. Dangers to this severe coercion have included ANAPO and the M-19 group, the 
EPL (the Maoist group), the ELN (the Cuban model) and the FARC (the Marxist-Leninist 
group). Each group has at some time eliminated high-level members of the Colombian 
government, of big business and of the army, has mobilised massive popular support, and 
has threatened to impose human rights’ reform.  
The M-19 broke ‘the bipartite Liberal Conservative monopoly of the popular 
consciousness’, compelled ‘the oligarchy’ to commit electoral fraud, organised ‘the most 
cohesive organisation of landless campesinos’ in Colombian history and initiated ‘the 
greatest mobilisation of land occupation’ (Alape, 1985: 315). The EPL commander 
(Interview 7) described the power of his movement. In the 1980s armed EPL groups had 
the discipline and elasticity required to attack, retreat, regroup, and attack again. It had 
2,000 soldiers, eight or ten urban groups and two rural groups, 1,000 popular leaders, a 
radio station and an international political front. The EPL had commandos who could 
infiltrate high security installations and blow them up. They had talented, courageous and 
dedicated agents (Interview 8) who could infiltrate labour unions, organise national 
strikes and regional blackouts and freeze the economy. ‘Decisive figures’ in the ELN 
such as Che Guevara and Camilo Torres (Image 6) helped to create an ideological fusion 
between Marxism and Christianity that captured ‘national sentiment’ (Alape, 1985: 281).  
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The FARC has more than 20,000 combatants and the power to isolate the Colombian 
capital Bogotá and seize control (private source). In 1985 the FARC entered politics and 
proposed: to cancel the permanent state of emergency, to dissolve two-party politics, to 
initiate democratic electoral reform based on the popular election of mayors and 
governors, to initiate urban and rural reform based on State housing and the return of land 
that politicians had appropriated, to oppose the IMF and the payment of the so-called 
national debt, to reduce investment in the military and the police, and to nationalise 
natural resources such as petroleum, coal, gas and uranium and other monopolies such as 
the banks. The State responded brutally: assassinating two UP senators, three members of 
the House of Representatives, six deputies, 19 councillors, three mayor’s candidates, one 
ex-mayor and 1,000 members in two years.  
 
The main threat that the current Colombian regime faces – like its illustrious predecessors 
– is itself. This self-induced problem includes the leaders of the drug cartels and the 
paramilitaries who have implemented the interests of the US and Colombian government 
and conglomerates, who have accumulated immense amounts of capital, resources and 
credit, and who demand to be incorporated into la vida civil (civil society). The most 
serious threat appeared in the 1970s and 1980s: because the US government had 
demanded the elimination of Pablo Escobar, the head of the Medellín drug cartel and the 
main resistance to US monopolisation of the cocaine business (Image 13).  
Pablo Escobar used a mixture of coercion and consent to defend himself against the threat 
of extradition and a life sentence of being manacled in some ‘high security’ prison cell in 
the US. Firstly he used coercion. He paid his sicarios (child assassins) to exterminate the 
police in Medellín: four million pesos (thousands of dollars) per body. They got 400 of 
them in the first four months of the program (Semana, May 1997). On the 30
th
 of April, 
1984, his paramilitaries assassinated Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the Colombian Minister of 
Justice; on the 23
rd
 of July, the judge in charge of the investigation met the same fate; on 
the 17
th
 of November, the director of the antinarcotics squad was killed; one month later, 
Guillermo Cano, the director of El Espectador was shot dead because he had run a 
campaign against the cartel. In 1989, they blew up a passenger plane in full flight. 
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Between 1989 and 1993, the cartel detonated 120 car bombs in Colombian cities. 
Secondly he used consent. He got elected to the House of Representatives, housed the 
Medellín poor and offered to pay off the national debt. It could be argued that the second 
method – helping poor families – threatened and antagonised US and Colombian 
governments and big business more than the high profile assassinations and massacres.         
Neither coercion nor consent could shake off the rivals to his throne. US agents and 
paramilitaries hunted him down and murdered him in 1993. But Colombian drug 
cartels and paramilitaries continue to pose a threat. The current Colombian President, 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez – intimate friend and close associate of Pablo, of the Medellín 
drug cartel and of the paramilitaries (www.rebelion.org, 21-01-2005) – has 
‘demobilised’ (re-mobilised) thousands of paramilitaries (Image 14). This has 
created a ‘time bomb’ (Semana, 19/26-9-2005). Paramilitary leaders have addressed 
the Colombian Congress and have ordered the Colombian people to be grateful to the 
paramilitaries because they have ‘routed the guerrilla’ and ‘saved the Colombian 
nation’ (Semana, 2/9-8-2004: 29). In December 2005, the Liberal leader and former 
President of Colombia, César Gaviria highlighted the large number of Colombian 
congressmen who had close ties to the paramilitaries and who supported the re-
election of the current President (El Tiempo, 12-12-2005: 4). Benedetti -  one of the 
paramilitary congressmen referred to and one of the leaders of the parties that 
supported the Presidential ‘re-election’ (re-fabrication of election results)  – replied 
that the Liberal leader ‘couldn’t go on throwing dirty water at the parties that support 
the re-election’ and should ‘name names’ (ibid). The sister of the Liberal leader who 
had challenged paramilitary control of Congress was assassinated four months later 
(El Tiempo, 28-4-2006: 1). She had been the head of a huge construction company in 
the coffee region of Pereira.  
 
The ultimate threat to societies such as this - in which severe coercion only seems to be 
effective - is the alternative political, social and cultural movements and the lingering 
dream of political and social reform. The principal current resistance is the alternative 
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political, social and cultural movements and media groups – that have been analysed in 
Part 2 – and that promote communism, socialism, human rights, social reform, peace, 
ethnic rights, regional and local issues, religious, cultural and educational reform, the 
rights of women and youth issues, labour and civic reform. The piece of graffiti scrawled 
on the wall of the National University and published in a community paper catches the 
spirit of this courageous and desperate struggle  
‘If love does not warm us, many of us will die of cold tonight’ (El Campanazo, 
December, 2005)            
The incorporation of these alternative movements and issues into democratic decision-
making processes poses the greatest threat of all – social reform – and an end to more 
than 500 years of infinitely profitable misery (severe coercion) and humiliation 
(manufactured consent). This series of serious and finally fatal threats to all Colombian 
regimes from the Spanish Conquest to the current regime suggests that consent is 
manipulated and manufactured in such societies because power is continually being 
challenged, contested and threatened. This is the second conclusion. The thirdki is that 
the central aim of both coercion and consent in peripheral regions such as Colombia is to 
centralise, consolidate, monopolise and maximise power and profits at all costs. This is 
the third reason why consent is manipulated in such societies: it is because of a mixture 
of greed and ruthlessness. 
3. The central aim of both coercion and consent in peripheral regions is to centralise, 
consolidate, monopolise and maximise power and profits at all costs 
The third conclusion is that the central aim of both coercion and consent in peripheral 
regions is to implement the greedy and ruthless interests of US and European banks and 
businesses and regional counterparts – to centralise, monopolise and maximise power and 
profits at all costs, human and environmental – so that more of one (coercion or consent) 
does not imply less of the other. All of the regimes that have been analysed in Part 1 of 
this thesis have accumulated millions of pesos, pounds or dollars of gold, tobacco, 
quinine, indigo, rubber, cotton, bananas, coffee, oil, gas, mineral resources, emeralds and 
credit (blackmail), tortured, raped, massacred and erased millions and millions of families 
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and razed hundreds of thousands of hectares of natural forest and marshland: home to the 
most transcendental people and the most magical species of mammals, birds, fish, 
reptiles, dragonflies, butterflies, trees, flowers and life on the planet. This part of the 
thesis summarises the role of both coercion and consent in the production of power and 
profits and victims in each of the five historical periods that have been analysed in Parts 1 
and 2 of this thesis. This is the third of five reasons why consent is manipulated in 
societies such as this: both coercion and consent are maximised in order to monopolise 
and maximise power and profits at all costs, human and environmental.    
The monopolisation and maximisation of power and profits at all costs 
During the Spanish Conquest and Spanish Colonial Period, the interests of the 
Spanish monarchy and Catholic Church – the central sources of coercion and consent 
in this region in that historical period – coincided. This colony - Nueva Granada 
(named after Granada, the newly conquered territory of Arabs and Jews in the south 
of the Iberian penininsula) - produced 17.91% of all the gold mined in the world in 
the 16
th
 Century, 39.01% of all the gold in the 17
th
 Century, and 24.69% of all the 
gold produced in the 18
th
 Century. Local rulers  used ruthless socio-economic 
institutions such as indigenous reserves, Jesuit missions and mita (forced labour) to 
maximise gold extraction and agricultural production and ‘introduced’ around a 
million-and-a-half slaves to fuel the economy.  
In only one decade (1748-1793) the Spanish Empire accumulated 2 million pesos of 
agricultural products and 18 million pesos (80,000 kilos) of pure gold. This repaid 
the ‘debt’ that local rulers had supposedly accumulated by importing ‘luxury’ goods 
to feed their greed.  
 
The Spanish monarchy supplied the instruments of coercion: the cruelest of 
conquistadors and the most savage of dogs that they used to hunt down the 
indgenous people who tried to escape the horror of their presence. The Church 
supplied the instruments of consent: the cynical interpretations of the Bible and 
chronicles of the Conquest, the sermons and Inquisition and hypocrisy that 
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legitimized massacres, rape, pillage and colonisation and that suffocated dissent. 
They tortured, raped, massacred, enslaved millions of indigenous and African 
people. ONIC, one of the main centres of indigenous research in Colombia produced 
a report in 1988 that summarised the problems of indigenous peoples from the 
Conquest to the present. The principal threat to indigenous survival has been the 
Spanish Conquest and the subsequent relentless decimation of indigenous land. The 
rubber plantations used most of the native people in the Vaupes region as slaves. The 
Ocaina people resisted fiercely and were decimated. The Pijao people were 
massacred and displaced from the beaches to a dried up lake in Tolima. Between 
1988 and 1998 indigenous people lost 60% of their land in the Putumayo region. 
Towns, transportation and smuggling routes and oil companies have ruined the 
region. Oil companies use paramilitaries to massacre and occupy indigenous 
territory. The US has implemented mass fumigation programs to monopolise illegal 
drug supplies. Global economic booms in rubber, furs, quinine, gold, oil, titanium 
and uranium have eradicated indigenous land and have choked indigenous food 
supplies and economies. The Embera people - displaced to the cold streets of the 
capital in December, 2004 (Image 26) – compare the death of their sacred river to 
‘the murder of a brother or sister’ (Interview 16). The World Bank funded this 
‘development project’.  
 
African peoples and people have shared the same misery: uprooted from  ancestral 
lands and transported in tonnages to Cartagena de las Indias. Alonso de Sandoval, a 
17
th
 Century Jesuit priest recalls the suffering of these ‘passengers’:  ‘so crushed, so 
horrible, so mistreated’, chained from hand to hand, shackled foot to foot, manacled 
neck to neck, trussed up like chickens, ‘below decks, locked in, never seeing the sun 
or the moon’ (Borja Gómez, 1998: 107). Portugal, Holland, France and – most of all 
- the British Empire profited from the shipping. The Spanish colonies used black 
people as liquid capital. The slaves were branded in liquid metal on the breast and 
sometimes on the face on arrival: to demonstrate that all of these good white people 
had paid their import duties and taxes. The Pope had already declared that black 
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people have no soul. The Laws of the Indies of 1578 demonstrate white attitudes to 
black immigrants  
 
‘Item, if a negro is absent from his master and does not return to serve him, and if he 
returns inside a month, his genitals will be amputated and he will be displayed in 
public as an example to the others’.  
 
During the War of Independence, thousands of local people were press-ganged into 
the armies, promised the Rights of Man, massacred by the Spanish and betrayed by 
the Creols. The British Empire made astronomical profits out of these wars of in-
dependence’ (extreme dependence), issuing bonds of more than 21 million pounds 
from 1822 to 1825 at nominal interest rates of 6% and at actual rates of 8-10% 
(Tirado Mejía, 1993: 126). Gold remained the main export until 1850; booms in 
agricultural products – tobacco, quinine, indigo, rubber, cotton and coffee – followed 
(Tirado Mejía, 1988: 218). The British Empire imported most of this: two million 
kilos of cotton in 1870, one million kilos of indigo in 1871, eight million kilos of 
tobacco in 1875, six million kilos of quinine in 1881 and 150 million kilos of coffee 
in 1926 (Tirado Mejía, 1988). In 1895 the US entered this extremely lucrative 
equation: crushing a popular uprising in Panama and hanging Pedro Prestan, the 
black leader of the resistance. José Manuel Marroquin became President in 1898 and 
seized power again in 1900. His Conservative regime initiated the transfer of Panama 
to the United States in return for a million dollars. The US premised the acquisition 
(theft) of Panama on access to Colombian oil.  
 
Conservative and Liberal party leaders represented and reflected British imperial 
interests in the 19
th
 Century. Both profited greatly from local massacres and land 
seizures that had been orchestrated by ‘gentlemen of the same lineage’ so that often 
their original land was returned to them ‘at the end of the game’ (Williams, 1991: 
20). These killing fields  - this lopping off of live limbs – maintained the political, 
social and economic status quo: ‘those above gained political, social and economic 
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advantages and those below suffered from wounds, griefs and miseries’ (ibid: 146). 
In 1948 this booming market in armed conflict, massacres and coercion finally 
collapsed.  
 
The massacres and mutilations reached such a pitch - up to half a million Colombian 
people massacred between 1948 and 1953 and more than two million people 
displaced (Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, Umana Luna, 1962) – that Colombia 
stopped being profitable. Antonio Garcia in his prologue to Viento Seco, the classic 
novel of La Violencia (Caicedo, 1953) summed up the legacy of the Conservative 
and Liberal parties 
 
‘This uninterrupted succession of partisan crimes – the sons of the victims of  
yesterday being the transgressors of today and the sons of the victims of today being 
the transgressors of tomorrow – builds up the dregs of resentment, sadistic cruelty 
and cold hatred in the soul of the people. This is the inheritance that the parties have 
handed down to the people: hatreds, blood feuds, repulsion’ (ibid).     
 
This maximisation of power and profits at all costs through both coercion and 
consent is the main cause and characteristic of past and present armed conflicts in 
peripheral societies such as this. Alonso Salazar interviewed one of these children of 
violence in Medellín in the 1980s as US-trained death squads closed in on Pablo, the 
boss (‘El Patron’) of the cartel, the city and the country    
 
‘If you want to talk about violence I can tell you about the life of my relatives or 
neighbours. All of them have fled from the old violence [La Violencia, 1946-53]. We 
have always existed between one violence and another with very few times of peace. 
The old war generated the new war. Finally we got tired of running and we made 
ourselves the kings of the world, the untouchables, who reigned through the laws of 
silence. It is better to die at once rather than feel so much violence and solitude. In 
every corner of this barrio, three or five of us have been shot dead … For me exists 
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neither past nor future. To kill the puppet and die is natural. My code is to live life 
like in the movies. My death will be both sadness and carnival. They will sit me up 
on my tomb and my friends will take photos of themselves beside me’ (1990).  
 
In the current historical period foreign companies have invested heavily in oil, 
minerals and natural resources. This investment is ‘concentrated principally in the 
field of minerals and oil, imposing a brutal and ruthless hegemonic model of 
accumulation based on narco-paramilitary violence and State terrorism’ (El tribunal 
permanente de los pueblos, Bogotá, 21-23 July, 2008). Colombia is the fifth main 
source of oil in South America and has the largest coal resources. It is the principal 
source of emeralds in the world. In 2002, 3.28 billion dollars of petroleum, 1.97 
billion of precious metals and stones, 1.01 billion dollars of coal, 283.3 million of 
iron and nickel, 8.85 million dollars of platinum and 4.29 million dollars of marble 
and granite were extracted and exported (Torres, 2002). In 2003 Colombia exported 
806,307 million dollars of coffee and 228,473 million dollars of sugar, 387,543 
million dollars of bananas and 682,283 million dollars of flowers (Colombian 
Ministry of Trade statistics).  
Epitaphs listed on the Internet site of the main Colombian food and drinks union 
(www.sinaltrainal.org) imply that foreign companies – and local franchises – 
collaborate with Colombian army and paramilitary groups in the selective torture, 
assassination and ‘disappearance’ of leaders and members of labour unions that 
campaign for higher salaries and security: Héctor Daniel Useche Berón, leader of the 
Nestle union was assassinated on 22 July 1986; Luis Alfonso Velez Vinazco 
participated in an occupation of the Nestle factory in Bugalagrande: the protest was 
crushed by army, police and special units and he was ‘disappeared’ on 30 December 
1989.  
 
Harry Laguna Triana retired from Nestle because of death threats and was murdered 
on 11 July 1993 in front of his children and workmates; Toribio de la Hoz Escorcia, 
another Nestle union leader was assassinated during his birthday celebrations on 30 
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March 1996; Alejandro Matias Hernandez, another Nestle leader was murdered on 12 
July 1996: his body reappeared in a mass burial site six months later; on 30 July 
1990, Avelino Achicanoy Erazo died from a bullet fired into his right ear during a 
strike against a Coca-Cola bottling plant; on 5 December 1996 Isidro Segundo Gil 
Gil, the General Secretary of this national food and drinks union (Sinaltrainal) was 
assassinated in the Coca-Cola plant in Uraba; on 18 November 2000 his wife was 
dragged out her house and murdered; on 20 April 1998, Guillermo Gomez Maigual 
committed suicide at the end of a two-year occupation of a plant: Coca-Cola USA 
had cancelled the local franchise, had caused 150 full-time members of staff to be 
dismissed, had re-purchased the plant and had re-hired ‘temporary workers on low 
salaries and with no unions or rights’ (ibid). United Fruit, the US-based 
conglomerate that precipitated the massacre of thousands of protesters in the 1930s 
(Part 1) has changed its name to Chiquita Brands, but not its methods. This 
‘successful’ Michigan-based company has financed and profited from the selective 
assassination and mass intimidation of its own staff and has played a crucial role in a 
multitude of massacres in the Uraba banana region by assisting in the transportation 
of 3000 AK 47 assault rifles and five million bullets and larger projectiles to 
paramilitary bases in 2001 (www.internazionale leliobasso.it).  
 
This series of insights into the accumulation of power and profits and victims in each 
regime from the Spanish Conquest to the current regime suggests that both coercion 
and consent are maximised in such regions because the central aim of such regimes 
is to monopolise and maximise power and profits at all costs, human and 
environmental. This is the third reason why consent is manipulated in such societies: 
because of greed and ruthlessness. The fourth and final conclusion is that the role of 
consent in peripheral regimes is to consolidate coercion and maximise power and 
profits.  
 
4. Consent is manipulated in order to consolidate coercion and maximise power and 
profits 
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The fourth conclusion is that consent is manipulated in order to consolidate coercion 
and in order to monopolise and maximise power and profits: and that this is the main 
reason why consent is manipulated in peripheral societies such as this. This has been 
the main role of consent in all of the five historical periods which have been 
analysed in Part 2 of this thesis. This part of the thesis summarises the role of media 
organisations (the main instruments of consent) in the legitimization and promotion 
of armed groups (the principal instruments of coercion) and in the maximisation of 
power and profits in each of the historical periods from the Spanish Conquest to the 
current regime. This is the fourth reason why consent is manipulated in societies 
where severe coercion seems to be effective in securing power: consent consolidates 
coercion, advertises and sells products, and maximises profits.    
 
The consolidation of coercion 
 
During the Spanish Conquest and Colonial Period the mutual interests of the Spanish 
monarchy and Catholic Church – the central sources of coercion and consent in this 
region in that historical period (1499-1781) – resulted in the production of papal 
bulls, sermons, historical chronicles and religious tracts that consolidated coercion 
and colonisation by glorifying the Catholic religion and the Spanish Conquistadors 
and by demonising indigenous and African people. The Spanish Inquisition and the 
local authorities imposed strict censorship and the Catholic priests – the main authors 
and intellectuals of this period – collaborated. Jesuit priests participated in the 
accumulation of mineral and agricultural resources – by setting up repressive socio-
economic institutions such as reserves, ranches, missions and mita (forced labour) – 
by using massacres as a method of monopolising the land and by employing black 
slaves as a source of energy and liquid capital. Catholic priests and chroniclers 
glorifed the heroic deeds of the Conquistadors and the genocide of infidels. The 
chronicle of Friar Pedro de Aguado describes a heroic encounter between one of 
heroes and an ant-eater and describes tobacco and coca – the substance of indigenous 
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rituals - as ‘the instrument through which the Devil’ corrupts indigenous people in 
order to ‘make them worship false idols and adopt false opinions’ (1906: 444). The 
Spanish chronicler, Rodriguez Freile legitimized and consolidated severe coercion on 
the grounds that traces of the Devil remain ‘among gentiles and pagans who lack 
knowledge of the true God and who worship Satan with rituals and ceremonies’ 
(1984: 32).  
 
In 1791 Spanish authorities published the first important newspaper, El Papel 
Periodico to consolidate Spanish rule and to publish articles on political, moral and 
economic issues. The paper practiced censorship, claiming that some material is ‘not 
appropriate for all the times or all the countries’ (II, 46) and the editor, Manuel 
Socorro de Rodriguez defined this newspaper as the only method through which ‘a 
wise people can transmit authority and culture to the rest of the universe’ (I, 23). 
Creol leaders and intellectuals predominated in the next historical period (1781-
1832) replacing the Spanish Colonial leaders and intellectuals and publishing 
material that labelled the Spanish Empire as the enemy, that legitimated their 
rebellion and that consolidated their seizure of power, land and resources that they 
used as collateral in London banks. Creol leaders performed all the main functions of 
coercion and consent: the same person – Nariño, Bolívar or Santander – could act as 
President, dictator, director, editor and author. Nariño published the Papel Periodico 
from 1793 to 1797, served 16 in prison for translating and publishing the Rights of 
Man, and published his own newspaper La Bagatela from 1811 to 1812. This paper 
addressed the members of his Masonic lodge and called the Creols to arms. The next 
issue legitimized and consolidated coercion - and advocated ‘strong government’ - 
because ‘this is the time of conspiracies and visceral discord where passions acquire 
extraordinary force and energy’ (19-9-1811).  
 
Conservative and Liberal party leaders dominated media production between 1832 
and 1953 and produced political pamphlets and literature, newspapers, magazines 
and radio broadcasts – which defined and divided us and them, our party and their 
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party, friend and enemy - and played an important role in the consolidation of 
coercion and monopolies and the promotion of the profitable massacres and armed 
conflicts that were ‘played out’ by these ‘gentlemen of the same lineage’ (Williams, 
1991: 20). The same ‘gentlemen’ played a broad range of roles – politician, 
landowner, businessman, general, editor, journalist – controlling and mediating 
between coercion and consent.  José Eusebio Caro used the first issue of El 
Granadino to announce his intention – and encourage ‘young people of his age’ - to 
enlist in the Conservative army and ‘punish’ the Liberals (6-3-1840). Rafael Núñez 
set up La Luz in 1881 to promote his own Presidential election campaign and to 
prepare the ground for the Regeneration: the massive centralisation and consolidation 
of State coercion. The Conservative leader, Laureano Gómez set up and edited El 
Siglo (1936) in order to promote ‘God, the Catholic religion, blind faith, self-
sacrifice, and a sense of divine purpose in the struggle against our Liberal enemies’ 
(1-2-1936). The Liberal party reciprocated by setting up El Aviso in 1848 to publish 
its manifesto, to attract members and supporters, and to promote Liberal policies. 
Fidel Cano published El Espectador in Medellín in 1887, promising to promote 
Colombian literature and national industries and freedom of the press. El Tiempo 
(1911) was set up by Alfonso Villegas, Eduardo Santos and Roberto Posada Peña to 
promote Liberal politics in the Colombian capital. It promised – and failed - to 
detach itself from ‘the old parties’ and ‘to place patriotism above partisan passions’ 
(30-1-1914). 
 
The main method that current Colombian media organisations use to legitimize and 
consolidate coercion and the massive monopolisation of land and resources is to 
present the Colombian State as ‘democratic’ and ‘legal’, to glorify the Colombian 
Armed Forces because they bravely defend these ‘democratic conquests’ (Posada 
Carbo, 2003: 41), to destroy the evidence of paramilitary massacres because they 
mask the culpability of the Colombian State and the Armed Forces: and to attribute 
responsibility for social ills and violence to the other side. This issue is the core of 
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the fifth and final conclusion to this thesis: that describes why and how current 
Colombian news production manipulates consent. 
 
Posada Carbo defends the image of the Colombian nation, of official institutions  and 
of the status quo of massacres and misery on the dubious grounds that ‘accusing 
Colombia of being undemocratic undermines government actions and genuine forces 
of reform, provokes international isolation and tends to justify – explicitly or 
implicitly – the criminal actions of the enemies of the State’ (ibid). Official 
representatives of the Colombian State use this same pragmatic democratic frame or 
formula to legitimize and implement the massacres and ‘criminal actions’ (ibid) of 
the State itself. This message is transmitted around the world, warning Colombian 
diplomats not to use terms such as ‘internal armed conflict’, ‘non-State armed 
actors’, and ‘peace communities’ because ‘Colombia is a pluralistic democracy’ that 
‘counts on appropriate channels to resolve problems’ (El Tiempo, 13-6-2005): 4). 
The denial of ‘peace communities’ (ibid) preceded this State-sponsored massacre 
 
‘The children were under the bed. The little girl was really sweet, about five or six 
years old and the baby was curious … we proposed to the commanders that we 
should leave them in a neighbour’s house but they said that they were a threat and 
that they would turn into guerrilla in the future … Cobra [the paramilitary leader] 
picked up the little girl by the hair and passed a machete across her throat’ (El 
Tiempo, 27-3-2008). 
 
The last turn of the screw in the implementation of coercion through Colombian 
media production is in the definition of any critics of the regime as ‘friends of the 
guerrilla’ based on the dubious premise that to ‘disqualify and discredit the authority 
of the government’ merits a death sentence (El Tiempo, 6-7-2005: 6). This is a 
chilling method of coercion and a terrifying threat that is repeated endlessly through 
mass media circles as this interview on RCN TV in May, 2006 suggests 
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‘President [suddenly rounding on the interviewer]: I never said that all the members 
of the opposition parties are in the guerrilla 
Interviewer [calmly defensive]: Did I say that? 
 
President [smiling benevolently]: Had you worried …’  
 
Army and paramilitary groups pick up on these media messages and use them to 
legitimize State coercion against alternative political, social and cultural movements 
and unarmed resistance as this chilling paramilitary threat (www.redher.org, April 26 
2008) demonstrates  
 
‘Black Eagle (Aguila Negra) fronts whose sphere of influence is the metropolitan 
area of Bucaramanga and neighbouring municipalities 
 
Declare 
 
That the FARC and ELN guerrilla who are camouflaged in terrorist CUT unions and 
NGOs that are against the TLC [the US proposal to turn the continent into a ‘free 
trade zone’/shop] and the politics of our President, Álvaro Uribe Vélez will be 
executed if they continue with these political strategies. We don’t want marches 
crying for the dead, nor Labour Day protests, we don’t want to see you in our 
territory. Our President’s policies will be implemented even if blood flows. We 
already have a placement of men ready to carry out our orders and to clean out you 
servants of the guerrilla.      
 
The following people have been declared military targets …’  
 
The fact that these paramilitaries refer to the current Colombian President, Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez as ‘our’ President, define Colombian labour unions and NGOs as 
‘terrorist’ organisations and refer to members of unions and human rights’ 
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organisations as ‘servants of the guerrilla’ (ibid) indicates that the President is indeed 
respected in the most sinister circles on the planet and that his media messages are 
getting through to his friends.     
 
The maximisation of power and profits 
 
Colombian media organisations reflect the trend and influence of international and 
national conglomerates that maximise power and profits through high-level political, 
economic and military contacts. Bagdikian highlighted this problem in 1983, 
claiming that international traders in commodities and arms producers had both 
invested heavily in international mass media conglomerates. This suggests that the 
interests and methods of media organisations and armed groups, coercion and 
consent, intelligence, surveillance and news gathering – coincide because they share 
technologies and techniques such as satellites and Internet systems. McChesney 
(2000) claims that the principal role of these ‘super-powerful, mostly US-based, 
international media corporations’ is ‘to advance the cause of the global market’ and 
‘to promote commercial values’ (ibid: 59). Herman and Chomsky agree that the role 
of these conglomerates is to maintain ‘an international order in  which US-based 
businesses can prosper’ (1987: 6) and name ‘the advertising licence to do business’ 
(1988: 14) as one of the five principal factors in the creation of the ideological 
system upon which this political, social and economic domination depends.  Hoover 
(1993) attributes the development of ‘communication empires’ to ‘government -
sanctioned policies of deregulation and privatisation’.  
 
Colombian media conglomerates and production seem to reflect these international 
trends towards big monopolies, close political, economic and military ties, shared 
technologies, techniques and formats, high investment in advertisements and 
advertising revenues, massive sales of imported and franchised products, and the 
manufacture of international cultures of consumption. The glossy advertisements of 
local franchises of foreign products such as Coca Cola, Nestle or the local products 
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of the Colombian monopolies mask the human rights abuses, the annihilation of local 
populations and production and the epitaphs of courageous union activists who have 
struggled and died (www.sinaltrainal.org).   
 
Colombian newspapers started to advertise products and accumulate advertising 
revenues around the turn of the 20
th
 Century. The first page of the first issue of El 
Colombiano - set up by Francisco Paulo Perez in 1912 to promote Conservative 
politics in Medellin - is dedicated to advertisements for beer, jewellery, sewing 
machines and local banks. El Tiempo published its first report on the massacre of 
thousands of protesters in the banana plantations of Uraba on 20 July 1929 on the 
same page as an advertisement for tins of red Alaskan salmon (ibid: 2). The massacre 
itself occurred in December 1928 and General Vasquez Cobo - the author of the 
massacre and of the letter - referred to the protest against US-owned United Fruit 
(Chiquita brands) as ‘training for future Communist agitations’ and as a ‘fire’ that 
had to be ‘put out’ (ibid). The current Colombian newspapers of highest circulation 
have been heavily monopolised (CAB, 2003). Nine of the 45 newspapers of highest 
circulation are in Bogotá, four in Medellín, four in Cali, three in Barranquilla and 
other regional capitals have one or two. Ten of these 45 newspapers belong to La 
Casa Editorial El Tiempo and the Santos family. Fifteen of these papers (33%) also 
belong to families. In 2000 advertising revenues were 103 million dollars compared 
to 92 million in 1992 (ibid: 194). The value of newspaper sales was 43 million 
dollars in 1992 and 56 million in 2000 (ibid: 196). El Tiempo earned 38.8% of total 
revenue in 2002; El Colombiano, 9.6%; El Pais, 8.6%; and El Espectador, 5.1%. In 
1992 magazines attracted 12 million dollars in revenues; in 2001, 22 million (ibid: 
202). Magazine sales amassed 40 million dollars in 1992 and 51 million in 2000. La 
Casa Editorial El Tiempo – based on the newspaper, El Tiempo - is an enormous 
media conglomerate (Herrán, 1991) which has shares in the two main economic, 
television and radio conglomerates – the Santo Domingo conglomerate (that includes 
Caracol TV and radio) and the Ardilla Lulle conglomerate (that controls RCN TV 
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and radio). La Casa Editorial El Tiempo currently owns the third television station in 
Colombia: City TV.  
 
Fox (1988) suggests that South American radio and television production passed  
through three important phases in the 20
th
 Century: as instruments of official 
political information, as tools of culture and as commercial enterprises. Commercial 
radio predominated as international and national industries became interested in 
using radio to advertise to the populations that had migrated or escaped to the cities 
(ibid: 13). US businesses received tax breaks if they advertised in pro-Allied South 
American mass media during the Second World War. By the end of the war more 
than 75% of the international news that reached South America came from 
Washington where it had been prepared by the State Department and the Office of 
Inter-American Affairs. Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen (1998) have argued that the US 
news and information that has flooded the south has contributed to economic and 
social inequalities (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen, 1998).  
 
Colombian radio and television stations reflect international trends in monopolisation 
and commercialisation. Conservative and Liberal leaders invested in the development 
and use of Colombian radio stations, using them to promote narrow political, social 
and economic interests. In 1931 licences were offered to commercial radio stations at 
200 pesos per year. Radio stations were set up in the main Colombian cities . Most of 
the names of these stations – HKM, HKN, HKO, HKT, HKR – were the letters of the 
license. The main radio stations tuned in to international short-wave stations in order 
to learn techniques of production and locution. HJN transmitted music, conferences, 
foreign and national news but - most important of all - served as a political tool and 
as a method of ‘building the nation’ through ‘modern’ systems of communication 
(Munera, 1992). The Liberal party leader, Enrique Olaya Herrera used radio to 
present his industrialisation and communication programs and to promote his 
Presidential campaign. Private companies started to understand the political and 
economic power and advertising potential of these radio stations in the middle of the 
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19
th
 Century. In 1948 the main Medellín textile company (Coltejer) bought two big 
radio stations: La Voz de Antioquia (that belonged to a coffee company) and 
Radiodifusora Interamericana (owned by a Liberal newspaper). These are the origins 
of Caracol. In 1949 the principal Medellín tobacco, beer and chocolate companies 
bought up Radio Medellín. These are the origins of RCN. In 1994 Colombian radio 
stations attracted 30.8% of advertising revenue. In 2002 RCN had 64 radio stations 
and 43% of national radio advertising revenue; Caracol had 61 stations and 38% of 
revenue.  
 
Colombian television reflects these same trends. The Colombian Armed Forces used 
the first transmission on 13
 
June, 1954 to celebrate the anniversary of the 
Dictatorship and promote its technological achievements. Balloons, banners and 
military parades increased the merriness of all. The Dictatorship broadcast only two 
hours of programs per day: El Noticiero Grafico (that celebrated national 
technological progress), Lapiz Magico (cartoons), Conozca los autores 
(contemporary Colombian literature) and Mares y marinos de Colombia (the natural 
treasures of Colombia). The Dictatorship also kindly provided a national television 
commission to monitor and censor content. In 1955 South American financial news 
and popular British game shows such as Beat the clock and Guess my line entered the 
equation. In 1956, the first Colombian television production company – Punch – 
broadcast its first program: a four-hour circus spectacle of horses, contests and 
parades. In the 1960s Punch broadcast game shows, sports, Colombian travel 
documentaries and canned US imports and produced the first soap operas 
(telenovelas). The first three private channels - Caracol, RCN and City TV – were 
authorised in 1991 and generously donated to the three main economic and media 
conglomerates, Santo Domingo, Ardilla Lulle and El Tiempo. The Colombian State 
still assigns and rents television space, makes technological decisions, allocates 
frequencies and acts as censor. Total television advertising revenues soared from 110 
million dollars in 1992 to 240 million in 2001 (ibid: 139). In 2001 Caracol attracted 
31% of that revenue and RCN attracted 27%. In 2002 Caracol had 42.5% and RCN 
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had 30%. City TV had 3.1% of advertising revenue in 2002 and Señal Colombia had 
0.9% (ibid: 143). In 2002 33% of advertisers were from the media themselves, 9% 
were public campaigns, 7% was for financial services and insurance, around 6% for 
personal care, cosmetics, perfume, food, business, tourism, drinks, tobacco, 5% for 
entertainment and 4% for telecommunications (ibid: 145). Caracol had a turnover of 
231 billion pesos in 2001; RCN had 215 billion.   
 
This series of insights into the current role of Colombian mass media organisations 
suggests that consent is manipulated in order to consolidate coercion and monopolise 
and maximise power and profits: and that this is the fourth reason why consent is 
manipulated in peripheral societies such as this. The fifth conclusion is that current 
Colombian news production manipulates consent, consolidates coercion, and bridges 
the gap between coercion and consent: and that this is how consent is manipulated in 
societies such as this.   
 
5. Current Colombian news production bridges the gap between coercion and consent  
 
The fifth conclusion is that current Colombian news production manipulates consent, 
consolidates coercion, and bridges the gap between coercion and consent - by 
framing and producing and promoting armed conflict, by defining and dividing us 
and them, by contextualising the discourse and actions of the opposition as 
illegitimate challenges to proper authority, and by turning Colombian people against 
one another and against themselves - the internal enemy. This is the role and nature 
of consent in societies such as this where severe coercion might seem to be effective 
but isn’t. The aim of this part of the thesis is to summarise the interplay between 
coercion and consent – between armed conflict and news production in Colombia - 
and to address the final issue: why and how is consent manipulated in societies such 
as this where severe coercion seems to be effective? 
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Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis and the General Conclusion suggest why consent is 
manipulated in such societies: consent is manipulated because coercion and consent 
require one another (conclusion 1), because the terrain of power is continually being 
challenged and contested (conclusion 2), because the aim of both coercion and 
consent is to implement the ruthless interests of US and European banks and 
businesses and regional counterparts at all costs (conclusion 3) and finally because 
the aim of consent is to consolidate coercion and maximise power and profits 
(conclusion 4). The information in Part 3 of this thesis supports all of these claims, 
suggesting that the current role of Colombian news production is to launder the 
capital and the image of the heads of the drug cartels and Armed Forces and 
paramilitaries, to attract foreign aid (bribes) and investment, to frame and legitimize, 
produce and promote coercion and conflict, and to maximise power and profits at all 
costs: and indicating that this is why consent is manipulated in peripheral societies 
such as this.   
 
The news items in Appendix 5 support all these points. The heads of the drug cartels 
and Armed Forces and paramilitaries are not named and shamed. The guerrilla on the 
other hand are represented as ‘the serpent of terrorism’ (Appendix 5, no. 13). The 
democratic master frame is transmitted through official statements that describe the 
President’s imminent speech to the UN and the United States Congress, through the 
diplomatic name-dropping, through the alleged ‘powers of persuasion’ and 
‘consummate diplomacy’ of the Colombian ‘mandate’, and through the democratic 
‘right of countries to find judicial solutions to resolve serious internal problems’ 
(Appendix 5). Official statements illustrate the role of Colombian news production in 
attracting foreign aid and investment and in attributing social ills and violence to the 
other side: demanding ‘the support that the international community should bring to 
our nation’ in order to ‘overcome the terrible challenges that the true enemies of our 
human rights - drug traffic and terrorism - have created for decades’ and hoping that 
this diplomatic journey ‘should serve to strengthen our ties with the country [the US] 
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that collaborates most with Colombia in the struggle against its worst enemies’ 
(Appendix 5, no. 14).  
 
Part 3 of this thesis also indicates how consent is manipulated in such societies. The 
main influences on current Colombian news production could be categorised as: the 
threat of armed groups, the political, social, institutional and economic pressures of 
media organisations, the sources of information and of opinion, the type of coverage 
and the physical context. The most important factor in the bridging of coercion and 
consent in Colombia is the Colombian Armed Forces and paramilitaries which direct 
the most severe pressure against Colombian journalists because of the multiple roles 
of these armed groups: as authors, agents, subjects and sources of news stories, 
massacres and assassinations. The mainstream radio journalist (Interview 8) 
highlights these pressures. Three separate State institutions (the Department of State 
Security, the Ministry of Communications and the Office of Communications of the 
Presidency of the Republic) monitor and record radio broadcasts in this most 
democratic of countries that has ‘avoided dictatorships of either right or left’ and has 
‘remained faithful to the principles of constitutional  government’ (Bushnell, 1993: 
284). The radio journalist explains that ‘journalists who refuse to obey orders from 
above – who don’t respect the editorial line – are silenced, fired or murdered’, that 
the threat begins with name cards, sample obituaries or anonymous phone calls and 
mutates into physical assault and assassination. The Colombian Armed Forces 
organise courses in ‘war correspondence’ which teach journalists to see soldiers ‘as 
their colleagues’ and teach soldiers to see journalists ‘as their al lies’ (Cifuentes 
Martinez, 1989: 45). These embedded journalists are designed to bridge the gap 
between coercion and consent. The Javeriana report (2004) focuses on the strong 
influence of Colombian media organisations on Colombian journalists and 
journalism: the high proportion of naïve and impressionable graduates, low job 
security and pitiful pay. Here the coercion is political, social, institutional and 
economic.  
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Part 3 suggests that the type of source had a strong influence, that Colombian mass 
media conglomerates tended to use the same three types of source of information and 
opinion on the current armed conflict - the Colombian Armed Forces, the Colombian 
government and foreign sources – and that the selection of sources played a 
significant role in the attribution of human rights abuses to the FARC on the other 
side. The news items in Appendix 5 indicate that the official statements and bulletins 
of the government ministries and Armed Forces tend to attribute culpability to the 
guerrilla and that Colombian journalists are encouraged to choose and use sources 
that condemn the other side and legitimize coercion: the eight official sources of 
opinion in one of the the Florencia articles include the commander of the Armed 
Forces who declares that ‘putting a bomb in a sector with a total presence of the 
civilian population is an act of tremendous cowardice (Appendix 5, no. 8) . He is  
promoting armed conflict. The type of coverage – the selection of official bulletins 
from the Colombian Armed Forces, of official statements from the Colombian 
government and of reports that attribute atrocities to the other side – also promotes 
coercion and armed conflict. The Colombian Armed Forces, police and ‘authorities’ 
transmit official bulletins which target a particular armed group. Editorials, opinion 
pages and ‘official sources’ interpret these bulletins, supporting the government line 
but never challenging the attribution. The editorials in Appendix 5 all lead to the 
same conclusion: consent legitimizes coercion and the President’s speech in the 
United Nations becomes ‘an opportunity to regain the support that the international 
community should bring to our nation in order to overcome the terrible challenges 
that the true enemies of our human rights - drug traffic and terrorism - have created 
for decades’ (Appendix 5, no. 14).  
 
The physical context of Colombian news items provides the deepest insights into the 
main role of coercion and consent in Colombia: the monopolisation and 
maximisation of power and profits at all costs. The prefabricated opinion polls and 
election results, the soap operas and good Samaritan stories sponsored by political 
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parties and banks, the top models and imported luxury products, all of this proclaims 
the many benefits of owning a country as rich and exotic (and mutilated) as this one 
 
‘Colombia. For the geography class, it’s a map. For 40 million people, it’s their 
country … For those who have been born, it’s hope. For entrepreneurs, it’s the future 
… For those who aren’t here, it’s their land. For us, everything, everything. Thank 
you, Colombia, thank you’ (Caracol TV, December 2004).  
 
This is the background to the framing process through which current Colombian 
news production manipulates consent, consolidates coercion, and bridges the gap 
between coercion and consent. The sample of 851 news items - collected between 20 
September 2003 and 15 June 2004 and analysed in Part 3 – does indicate that the 
main Colombian television and radio stations and broadsheets attribute most severe 
human rights abuses to the guerrilla and the FARC, minimal abuses to the 
paramilitaries and almost none to the Colombian Armed Forces (Diagrams 1 and 2). 
The sample of news items in Appendix 5 shows how consent is manipulated in 
Colombian news production in more detail. The report on the alleged FARC 
massacre in Florencia and the lingering description of the victims - ‘the displaced 
child of nine’, ‘the tiny corpse of Jefferson Alexander Yague Castro’, ‘the teenager 
who had gone looking for her boyfriend’ (Appendix 5, no. 4) – manipulates consent 
and legitimizes coercion because ‘terrorist acts such as that of Sunday in Florencia 
justify a strengthened State’ and because ‘the serpent of terrorism is still alive’ 
(Appendix 5, no. 13).   
 
The sample of 851 current news items that is analysed in Part 3 of the thesis and the 
news reports in Appendix 6 provide evidence of – and insights into – the nature of 
this framing process. The news items in Appendix 6 from first to last indicate that 
the discourse and actions of the Other - other political regimes or alternative political 
groups or other political ideologies or alternative sources of news and information 
that suggest that the government itself is the main source of human rights abuses - 
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are framed as illegitimate challenges to the extremely dubious authority of this 
murderous regime.     
 
The purpose of this framing process is to turn Colombian people against one another 
and against themselves: the internal enemy. Part 2 of this thesis – Consent - has 
explored the historical development of this framing process in great depth and detail: 
the production, definition and demonisation of the Other, of the ‘internal’ enemy, of 
‘the image in the mirror that has to be denied’ (Borja Gómez, 1998: 50). The internal 
enemy – like the faces and features of the Devil that Borja Gómez describes in such 
detail (ibid) – has changed greatly since the Conquistadors arrived in the New World, 
in the new world that immediately changed back into the old world, as these same 
Conquistadors tortured and massacred millions upon millions of indigenous people 
and all in the name of a god of love and all on the dubious grounds that  
 
‘The monarchy that the Devil had set up in the world from the sin of Adam to the 
redemption of Our Lord has been destroyed’ but ‘features of the common enemy remain 
especially among gentiles and pagans who lack knowledge of the true God and who 
worship Satan with rituals and ceremonies’ (1984: 32).  
The faces and features of ‘the common enemy’ (ibid) have changed greatly throughout 
history and throughout this thesis: these faces and features matched the indigenous people 
and the African rebels in Chapter 1 of this thesis; they changed into the Spanish ruler 
himself in Chapter 2; they separated into Conservative or Liberal campesinos in Chapter 
3; and they culminated in ‘the serpent of terrorism’ in Chapter 4. The faces and features 
of the Devil might have changed greatly: but the demonisation and elimination of the 
internal enemy has been – and continues to be - immensely profitable. It is these profits 
and these lies which fuel the armed groups and media organisations that are the main 
instruments of coercion and consent and the principal causes and characteristics of armed 
conflict in Colombia. This mixture of misery and bravery – coercion and resistance - is 
not based on ‘attempts by the government to battle against left wing guerrilla insurgents 
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on the one hand and right wing paramilitary groups on the other’ or ‘complicated by the 
fact that both armed groups are thought to be deeply embroiled in drugs trafficking and 
production’ (BBC, Talking Point, November 2004) as the democratic master frame in the 
introduction to this thesis would have – or help - us believe.   
Sánchez Sandoval sums up the role and nature of the interplay between coercion and 
consent - between armed conflict and news production - in perpetually violent and 
extremely profitable peripheral societies such as this   
‘Let us remember that the persons who have governed us, from the first to the last, have 
never known how to govern Colombia, because they have always thought, and of that 
they are sure, that this land is theirs and that the 47 million people who live here are their 
pawns. In the deepest possible sense of the word, we are their slaves. They have always 
treated this country as a field of games and battle’ (2004: 40). 
This thesis on the other hand finally presents a more hopeful message. Neither 
coercion nor consent has prevailed. Colombia still has its rebels, its natural 
paradises, its transcendental discourse. Five hundred long years of conflict - both 
armed and unarmed – attest to the courage, insight and resourcefulness of Colombian 
resistance.  
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Self-reflection 
 
In this short final section I would like to reflect on and defend myself against three 
important criticisms that could be levelled at this thesis and to suggest how this text 
could have been improved had I been permitted more access to Colombian sources 
and material and more time to analyse the results.  
 
The first criticism is that I seem to have imposed a personal moralistic interpretation 
on the information related to armed conflict and media production in Parts 1 and 2 of 
the thesis, that I have selected academic texts and political pamphlets and personal 
interviews and economic statistics and cases of human rights abuse and magazine 
and newspaper reports and political themes in Colombian literature in order to 
support rather than test the central moral principle: that consent has been and 
continues to be manipulated in Colombia in order to consolidate coercion and 
maximise profits at all costs, and that Colombian media production in general and 
Colombian news production in particular frames and promotes armed conflict. It 
could be argued that the boundaries between one political or social or moral concept 
or class or group and another – between ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’, between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, between ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’, between ‘leader’ and ‘led’, between 
‘regime’ and ‘resistance’, between ‘perpetrator’ and ‘collaborator’ and ‘victim’ – are 
not clear cut: that one concept mutates and melts into the next – ‘coercion’ into 
‘consent’, ‘us’ into ‘them’, ‘oppressor’ into ‘oppressed’, ‘leader’ into ‘led’, ‘regime’ 
into ‘resistance’, ‘perpetrator’ into ‘collaborator’ into ‘victim’ – because all of these 
concepts and values and perspectives depend in the end on the discourse that has 
produced them (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). The first criticism is that these hundreds 
of pages and hundreds of hours of research and this infinite sadness seem to have 
been invested in a personal intellectual struggle against capitalism and colonialism, 
against the Establishment and the status quo, against perpetrators of human rights 
abuse both home and abroad.  
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I will defend myself from this first criticism on the grounds that the analysis of the 
role and nature of coercion and consent that is the basis of this thesis has emerged 
from rather than been imposed on the information that I collected. I have collected an 
immense amount of information from a broad range of sources that supports the 
claim (rather than in order to support the claim) that the main aim of coercion and 
consent in Colombia is to maximise profits at all costs and I therefore challenge the 
critics to unearth evidence that contradicts this interpretation. I admit that the 
moralistic terms that I have used throughout this thesis - such as ‘coercion’ and 
‘consent’, ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’, ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ - are not clear cut 
and depend in the end on the discourse that has produced them but I insist that these 
terms are crucial in order to understand the nature of and interplay between armed 
conflict and news production that is the main theme of this research.  
 
I agree that I have adopted a passionate moral position in this thesis in the 
description and interpretation of the horrific human rights abuses that continue to be 
committed in Colombia and in other peripheral regimes in order to maximise profits 
but once again I challenge other researchers to interpret the role and nature of the 
Colombian armed conflict and news production differently. I admit that this thesis is 
an expression of my political and social conscience but I will argue that this political 
conscience and consciousness is the main strength and source of energy and 
inspiration in this text. Bauman similarly insists in his ‘postmodern ethics’ (1993) 
that moral responsibility is ‘the most precious of human rights’ and one that cannot – 
and should not - be ‘taken away, shared, pawned or deposited for safekeeping’ (ib id: 
250). He also claims - as I do - that ‘moral responsibility is unconditional and 
infinite’ and ‘manifests itself in the constant anguish of not manifesting itself 
enough’ and that it ‘is there before any reassurance or proof and after any excuse or 
absolution’ (ibid: 250). This thesis is firmly and unashamedly grounded on this 
ethical principle: and this text should also be seen as an expression of my moral 
responsibility and sensibility.     
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The second criticism of this thesis is that the historical scope of this thesis is too 
broad, that more than five hundred years of Colombian armed conflict and media 
production is too much time to analyse and assimilate, and that I have blinded myself 
and my readers to the infinite complexities and vagueness and inconsistencies, 
contradictions and paradoxes, of more than five hundred years of human existence 
and struggle and life and personal experience and values and perspectives and lives. I 
will defend myself from this second criticism on the grounds that Parts 1 and 2 of 
this thesis have focused on common characteristics of – and continuities between - 
armed conflict and media production in each historical period from the Conquest to 
the present in order to understand the role and nature of coercion and consent in as 
much depth and detail as possible. I agree that I haven’t highlighted all the historical 
inconsistencies and contradictions: how could I, and who could? I also admit that at 
times I have painted a simplistic black-and-white picture of a brutal greedy regime 
pitted against heroic popular resistance – but at other times I have suggested that 
each side has its idealists and each has suffered from internal conflict and intrigues 
and that one side mutates and merges into the other.  
 
I would argue that the assimilation of hundreds of fragmented academic sources on 
different historical aspects of the Colombian armed conflict and media production, 
the use of magazine and newspaper articles and literature and personal interviews 
and leaflets picked up in marches and protests to bring the material to life and to 
provide original insights into the nature of the conflict and the media, the personal 
and dangerous involvement in the political and social struggle, rare but crucial 
references to the resistance of the artisans in the 19
th
 Century and to the current 
relationship between alternative political and social movements and alternative 
media groups, the detailed analysis of the historical roots of the current armed 
conflict and of current news production, the use of the concepts of coercion (Part 1) 
and consent (Part 2) - that I have located in Classical Marxism and Gramsci – in 
order to understand the connection between armed conflict and media production, 
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and the final five conclusions related to the interplay between coercion and consent 
(and to Weber), are the great strengths of this thesis. Had I had more time I could 
have highlighted more historical inconsistencies but this is an endless intellectual 
process that I bequeath to future studies.    
 
The third criticism that could be levelled at this thesis is that I should have analysed 
a much more limited series of news stories and time period and number of news 
organisations but in much more depth and detail. I should have interviewed the 
editors and journalists, objects and sources of these same news stories in order to 
understand the rationale behind the selection and framing of current Colombian news 
production related to the armed conflict in more depth and detail. It could be argued 
that the collection and statistical interpretation of the 851 current news stories in Part 
3 of this thesis - in terms of the attribution of human rights abuses to the three main 
armed groups and in terms of the use or abuse of sources – represents a noble feat of 
intellectual commitment, but I have only analysed 29 news stories in detail. Have I 
avoided an in-depth analysis of the other 822 stories because the other news stories 
do not frame the actions of the FARC as illegitimate challenges?                 
 
I will defend myself from this third criticism on the grounds of time and access to 
material and sources. I did not have the chance to investigate even one news item in 
as much depth and detail as I might have liked: to interview the intellectual authors 
of a massacre, the soldiers that implemented the orders, the traumatised victims, the 
editors that selected and framed the news item and the journalists and audiences that 
interpreted it. I did not have the chance to investigate the scene of the crime; it would 
have been too dangerous and too traumatic; and that danger would have corrupted 
the sources. I do not have physical access to the other 822 news stories at present , 
also because of the danger: these stories are in Colombia at the moment, and I am 
not. Given more time I could analyse them in depth and detail.  
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Finally I have to defend myself on the grounds that I have done my best; I have laid 
my life on the line like millions of others; given more time and energy and 
opportunities I could have done so much better but who cannot or should not say the 
same? Millions of others will continue this intellectual and moral struggle.  
 
La lucha continúa. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Sources of images 
 
1. The laguna of Gautavita, spiritual centre of Chibcha people and of the legend of El 
Dorado (www.banrep.gov.co) 
2. Antonio Nariño, publisher of El Papel Periodico, editor of La Bagatela, translator of ‘the 
Rights of Man’ and President of the Republic (Semana, 31/7-6-2004: 94) 
3. Conservative ‘gamonal’ and warlord (Alvarez Gardeazabal, 1974) 
4. The role of the Catholic Church in the legitimization of the Colombian State: President 
Turbay addressing the Pope (Cambio, 19/26-9-2005: 25), General Rojas Pinilla, Colombian 
dictator and his adoring bishops (Rojas Pinilla ante el congresso, 1959: 812) and an 
embedded bishop (Colombia a traves de El Tiempo, 2003: 59)  
5. The central role of the US in the Colombian armed conflict: US and Colombian Armed 
Forces cooperating in the massacre of campesinos in the so-called ‘independent republic’ of 
Marquetalia in 1964 (Semana, 31/7-6-2004: 193), the inauguration of the ‘Alliance for 
Progress’ in 1961, attended by US President Robert Kennedy and Colombian President 
Camargo, and shooting at oil workers in Barrancabermeja (Almario, 1985: 156)  
6. Camilo Torres, priest, professor, political activist and guerrilla leader in El Libro negro 
de la represión (Villegas et al., 1974)  
7. Training manual of the school of EPL combatants (Escuela de combatientes del EPL) 
8. Conclusions of second national EPL conference  
9. Emerald mafia (Uribe Alarcon, 1996: 146) and Medellin drug cartel (Bowden, 2002) 
10. Paramilitaries: celebrating the assassination of Carlos Pizarro, leader of M-19 (Semana, 
3/10-12-2001: 1), gloating in the Colombian congress (Semana, 2/9-8-2004: 29) and acting 
as a time bomb (Semana, 19/26-9-2005) 
11. The role of the US State and army in the Colombian armed conflict: the US Secretary of 
State shaking hands with a pilot (Colombia a traves de El Tiempo, 2003: 74) and the 
glorification of two US generals who implement foreign business interests in the region. 
The subtitle is: ‘These are the Rambos’ (Semana, 11/18-9-2005). Both generals have been 
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platoon leaders in Vietnam and studied ‘peaceful’ negotiation of conflicts in Georgetown 
University 
12. The torture of Colombian recruits (Semana, 20/27-2-2006: 1) and the promotion of the 
latest ‘peace initiative’ that has been codenamed ‘Plan Patriota’ (El Tiempo, 3-5-2005: 7) 
13. Government leaflets encouraging members of illegal armed groups to demobilise and to 
betray a Farc leader   
14. Map of foreign interests and franchises in Colombia (Periferia) 
15. Foreign businesses (Diners, 13-10-2006: 1), environmental devastation in La Guajira 
region and 2,600 job losses in Dole fruit franchise (El Tiempo, 23-10-2006: 2) 
16. Photographs of role of police in ‘cleaning’ the streets of central Bogotá, in demolishing 
the barrio of Cartucho, in setting up the concrete ‘environmental zone’ and the 
‘transmilenio’ transport system, in displacing and annihilating members and sectors of the 
urban population and in laundering capital through construction contracts      
17. Victims of political assassination and social cleansing  
18. Conclusions of national indigenous congress (17/21-2-1986) 
19. Photographs of displaced Embera people in the streets of the capital  
20. Embera ritual against suicide  
21. Pressures on journalists: Francisco Santos, Vice-President of Colombia and media 
mogul) and the commander of the Colombian Armed Forces (Cromos, 4-8-2003: 17), the 
current U.S. Ambassador, William Wood and Cambio journalists (Cambio, 19/26-9-2005: 
25) 
22. Past owner-editors of El Tiempo and El Espectador hugging a bullfighter; and a prize-
winning team of Tiempo journalists 
23. Orientación, first periodical of communist guerrilla 
24. New Year cards addressed to members of the guerrilla. The first card reads: ‘This New 
Year, compatriot, is yours. Choose the best part of your life and give it to the armed 
struggle. You will struggle to erase the stain of manure from the map. You will struggle to 
terminate our present shame. We hope that the pressure of the people will prevail and that 
the wings of victory will rise. Companion, this New Year is yours. We hope that this New 
Year marks a great advance in the liberation of our people.’ The second reads: ‘The result 
of the present struggle is not important. It does not matter in the long run if some 
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movement or other is temporarily defeated. The defining principle is the decision to 
struggle and that this decision matures day by day: the awareness of the need for 
revolutionary change, the certainty of its possibility. If we fight together, we will win in the 
end. We hope that in the New Year we will renew our decision to study, sacrifice and 
struggle to serve the people. Revolutionary change is possible but only with your support.’     
25. Past US actor-President, Ronald Reagan playing the role of Rambo in  Polemica: 
Colombian communist party publication 
26. Poems published by EPL guerrilla group  
27. El socialista and El voz: weekly Colombian communist party paper 
28. FARC recruitment campaign aimed at women and communist youth bookmarks  
29. Desde Abajo: human rights’ magazine 
30. Mundo Ciudadano: human rights’ and social reform platform  
31. Periferia: magazine that addresses social issues  
32. El Campanazo and El Baluarte: community newspapers  
33. Photographs of marches, protests and army and police repression 
34. ESMAD: Colombian riot police 
35. Police repression 
36. Graffiti in the capital 
37. Images that define and legitimize the current Colombian president at different stages in 
his career. The first image is labeled ‘hard hand’ (Semana, 15/22-10-1996: 1). The second 
is ‘firm hand; big heart’ (leaflet distributed in his second presidential campaign, 2006). In 
the third image he is posing in front of the Star-spangled banner with his main US ally, 
President George Bush (Cambio, 19/26-9-2005: 25)    
38. President Uribe denies the existence of armed conflict in Colombia (Semana, 6-2-2005: 
1) 
39. Newspaper articles: paramilitary atrocities, Farc trial and criminalisation of political 
and social opposition (El Tiempo, 6-7-2005: 6). 
40. The official crest of the Republic alongside the updated crest of the plastic artist, 
Bernardo Salcedo: ‘There are no condors; there is no abundance, there is no liberty, there is 
no canal; there is no crest ; there is no fatherland’ (‘La primera leccion’ [Lesson 1], 1970, 
El Museo del Arte Moderno, Bogotá)  
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Appendix 2 
 
Personal interviews 
 
in chronological order  
 
 
Interview 
no. 
Interviewees Interview 
date 
 
1 Two directors of a national organisation of popular communication 10/2003 
2 Ministry of Defence 2/2004 
3 Member of DAS (Colombian Department of State Security) and two army recruits 2/2004 
4 Representatives of the main communist newspaper (El Voz) 
 
3/2004 and 
6/2005 
5 Coordinator of FLIP, a Colombian foundation for the freedom of the press (‘La 
Fundacion por la Libertad de la Prensa’) 
4/2004 
6 Former mainstream Colombian radio journalist 5/2004 
7 International and national coordinators of community radio and Internet 5/2004 
8 Current mainstream Colombian radio journalist 6/2004 
9 Indigenous leader of the Embera people 1/2005 
10 Human rights researcher 1/2005 
11 Human rights activist in Cazuca 2/2005 
12 Graduate of military academy 5/2005 
13 Afro-Colombian researcher 5/2005 
14 Director of El Espectador 7/2005 
15 Deombilised EPL leader 5/2006 
16 Demobilised Communist leader and activist 5/2006 
17 Demobilised coordinator of communist communications 6/2006 
18 Demobilised leader of ELN and FARC 8/2006 
19 Editor of community newspaper 11/2006 
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1. Two directors of a national organisation of popular communication  
 
Interview 1.1 
 
Background 
 
The base is in Bogotá. The organisation has set up 35 regional radio stations (in Sucre, 
Cordoba, Santander, Boyaca, Antioquia and Valle de Cauca) and a television station in 
Soacha. Each station consists of a technical teams and basic digital production equipment (a 
computer, a console, a CD reader, microphones and transmitter). The organisation also 
arranges media groups and ‘encuentros de comunicacion infantil’ in which children learn to 
recognise and fight for their rights through theatre, music, art, radio and television. 
Structure 
 
This organisation has a horizontal structure that minimises hierarchies. There is however a 
general assembly of 30 members. This assembly elects the central committee: the director, 
the secretary, the treasurer and the chief advisor. There is also a team of 12 instructors or 
media specialists. They are seen as ‘orientators’ rather than as teachers. Only five of them 
are permanent. These orientators travel around the stations and media groups, organising 
media programs 
 
Links 
 
It is an ecumenical Christian organisation that is independent of political parties and 
Churches and remains autonomous from donors in production terms 
Income 
 
Foreign NGOs and churches  
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Audience 
 
1,200,000 adults and children 
Aims 
 
The main aim is to deepen democratic expression, to fight for human rights and self-esteem 
and to release creative capacities through access to communication channels. This is a slow 
creative process that is mediated through small, anonymous silent groups. This process 
could be described as ‘guerrilla warfare through the medium of popular communication’. 
Liberation theology has become too intellectualised. He believes in popular action rather 
than verbalism: and in pacifist forms of organisation. He doesn't believe in armed struggle 
(which corrupts) or sudden revolution (because Cuba only survived through the equilibrium 
of US and Soviet forces). The organisation aims to express alternative analyses and visions 
of Colombian realities through simple (non-elitist) language. Its programs are designed to 
be ‘desde los pobres, por los pobres y para los pobres’ (‘from the poor, by the poor and to 
the poor’) 
Problems 
 
1. Economic uncertainty: they need to apply for foreign funds every year 
2. Politics and security outside Bogotá 
3. Internal leadership disputes 
4. Diffusion of neo-liberal ideas and attitudes and individualism through soap operas 
5. The lure of the drug trade and of drug consumption. 
 
Bogotá was a centre of violence in 1854, 1860-62, 1899-1902: at these times its inhabitants 
were victims of violence. Later Bogotá became a refuge from the violence, a centre for 
displaced people without rights in the 1950s and 1960s. There is too little sense of 
community; there is too much resentment and frustration and there are too many damaged 
childhoods. In 1991 the centre was raided by ‘paramilitary-style’ groups of vigilantes. He 
believes that ‘militant’ members of their programs had antagonised the authorities. 
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Personnel were assaulted and equipment was removed or destroyed. After the raid, the 
centre associated itself with ‘organised pacifist communication groups’ and with official 
churches. Their main publication differs from the approach of human rights organisations 
that aim to record each human rights abuse as it occurs. Human rights organisations are the 
vanguard. This organisation on the other hand could be described as the rearguard. These 
are two sides of the same coin. We aim to live and fight on rather than to meet our enemies 
head on or face to face. The organisation promotes ideals of love and peace: admitting that 
these are illusions but understanding that ‘without illusions we cannot live’ because life 
would be impossible’. The centres promote ‘creative power’. Their enemies are despair, 
cynicism, loss of self-esteem and apathy. They don’t see themselves as protagonists or 
heroes of the revolution. They are part of a slow process of political enlightenment and 
social and cultural change 
Interview 1.2 
Aims 
 
She believes that these media centres should nurture ‘the seeds of self-confidence, self-
respect and self-empowerment’. She believes that communication is both a spiritual need 
and an ethical right - both of which are repressed by mass media organisations - and that 
social reconstruction and the peace process should be based on individual spiritual 
expression and communication through the medium of press, graphic arts, audiovisual 
expression, photography, video and radio. She offers an alternative definition of 
‘journalism’ for the poor and the illiterate, based on oral and audiovisual expression.   
Problems 
In 1991 the central office was raided by paramilitary-style groups of vigilantes. Personnel 
were assaulted and equipment was removed or destroyed.  She described three important 
reactions to the assault in 1991. First they dissolved the original team of advisors. They 
were elitist – intellectual rather than practical – didn’t value popular expression and 
believed in armed revolution. Secondly they ended the relationship with the 36 most 
militant groups. After 1991 the selection process became stricter. They became associated 
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with ‘organised pacifist groups’ with ‘solid visible ideologies’ and with churches Thirdly 
the organisation became more subversive: initiating programs in ‘popular history, gender 
construction, womans’ rights, children's communication and ecumenism’  
 
Political awareness is developed in our workshops on popular history and expressed in our 
magazine. I admit that information on the war should be broadcast to our audiences but if 
we did that we could not survive as an organisation. Social awareness is developed in our 
other workshops; as a ‘comun-icator’ our aim is to create an awareness of ‘el comun entre 
la communidad’ (common elements on which communities could be constructed). At the 
moment our main interest lies in breaking down the barriers of intolerance which separate 
(and bind) the members of different churches; together we can develop our creative and 
spiritual capacities and help each other to find peace    
 
2. Official of the Colombian Ministry of Defence 
 
The main source of the conflict is the fact that more than half the population suffers from 
hunger and that the inhabitants of rural areas or of poor urban districts (‘los barrios 
populares’) see one or other of the armed groups as the only way out. They enlist because 
of desperation and not for ideological reasons. The three main armed groups – the Armed 
Forces, the guerrilla and the paramilitaries - are fragmented and isolated in many regions, 
cut off from the city and the central command and under the control of unscrupulous 
officers who abuse their power and hire their soldiers out as mercenaries and contract 
killers (‘los sicarios’). Killing is – and always has been - a business in Colombia. During 
the conflict between the Conservatives and the Liberals, members of one group accused 
farmers of being members of the other group, murdered them and stole their land. This 
hasn’t changed. Members of the Armed Forces change into paramilitary uniforms and kill 
farmers for money – accusing them of being members of the guerrilla – and blaming the 
paramilitaries. These crimes always go unpunished. Jealousy is rife in the army. If your 
commander thinks that you have your own mind and are too big for your boots he will get 
you killed. Human rights investigators in the Ministry receive lists of witnesses who have 
already been contacted and threatened. They compile evidence against members of the 
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Forces during the day but it disappears during the night and they never see it again. In the 
morning they start on another case. They don’t have their own offices and the commanding 
officer ignores them to the point of paranoia. The lives of these human rights investigators 
hang in the balance  
 
4. Member of DAS (Colombian Department of State Security) and two army recruits 
 
The member of DAS and the two army recruits concur that the armed conflict represents 
‘power’ and ‘business’. The DAS officer once had to investigate the case of a Colombian 
admiral who had been selling the position of US anti-drug frigates to a drug cartel on the 
coast. His superior officer cancelled the investigation. He claims that the main role of State 
Security is to protect and promote the interests of the current government. This sometimes 
involves the assassination of political opponents.  
 
The first recruit has witnessed a regional warlord (‘gamonal’) planning military campaigns 
in the local army headquarters, sweeping his hand across a map of the territory to indicate 
the areas ‘para limpiar’ (‘to clean’, to kill and clear of subversive elements). Orders are 
relayed to lower officers who send the recruits into remote villages to wipe out the 
guerrilla, murdering men, women and children. His comrades have been indoctrinated, 
trained to follow orders and to see their victims as ‘the enemy’. The fact that they have 
been ordered to kill them means that they are guilty. Besides that, his comrades came frrom 
poor families who depend on them for food and clothes, housing and schooling and with no 
other way of living or way out. They have no choice but to believe in the army. There are 
three social classes in the Colombian Armed Forces: the generals who plan campaigns and 
defend the image of the army in the media, the majors and captains that understand and 
manipulate the violence to make money, and ‘the others’, those who lay their lives on the 
line because they have no other choice. They are trained to be ruthless. Once he himself had 
to raid a brothel singlehanded, kick down the door, brandish a pistol, refuse to let his 
victims put on their clothes, and bring them all naked back to headquarters. He and his 
companions often had to carry consignments of cocaine from one location to another. The 
other recruit (displaying the bullet hole in his chest) described the cruelty of the officers, 
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the suicide of comrades and the dire consequences of falling out with his superior officer. 
They were used as cannon fodder. His cousin had learnt this too late 
 
4. Representatives of the main communist newspaper (El Voz) 
Interview 4.1 
History 
 
Founded by the Colombian Communist Party in 1957 after the dictatorship of General 
Rojas Pinilla and called La Voz de la Democracia. After the Armed Forces of the National 
Front stormed Marquetalia in 1964 the paper was renamed La Voz de la Proletariat. It 
changed its name to Voz in 1984 to reach the social sectors which emerged after the 
penetration of capitalism in Colombia, the industrialisation of agriculture, the urbanisation 
of Colombian people and the rise of the professional class   
Nature 
  
The committee of newspaper production has 12 or 13 members who meet every Thursday; 
the majority are members of the communist party. In the first part of the meeting the latest 
edition is edited for content and errors; in the second part the topics, structure and content 
of the next edition is planned. The paper suffered political and economic problems after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and of Eastern European communism; in 1991 there were 53 
employees and more than 30 journalists; in 2003 there were only 12 journalists 
 
The paper was established by the Colombian communist party but analyses and criticises 
rather than follows party policy and represents its readers rather than the party. The Soviet 
Union donated cheap news paper until the fall of the Berlin Wall  
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Income 
 
1. Communist party meetings and unions 
2. Vendors in companies, universities, campesino cooperatives 
3. Street vendors in cities 
4. Subscriptions: communist party members donate money and there are international 
fundraising programs – such as ‘El Festival de Voz’ - which accounted for 30% of turnover 
in 2002.  
5. Advertisements on the book page. According to the Colombian Constitution the 
government should advertise through all the Colombian media 
Readership 
 
100,000 editions sold annually from 1984 to 1990; slumped to 10,000 from 1994 to 1995; 
slow recovery to 30,000 in 2002  
Sources of news 
 
1. Unions 
2. Political sources 
3. Alternative news organisations such as ‘prensarural’ 
4. Analysis of mainstream news  
Relationship between editor and journalist 
 
The content is assessed, debated and edited in open critical meetings between the 13 
members of the production committee 
Aims 
 
To promote popular unity, peace, social and economic rights, and the rights of union 
members 
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Problems 
 
The main problems are: political pressure from national and local government; violence 
from State Security Forces and paramilitaries; political and economic pressure after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and of Eastern European communism.  
 
Three bombs have exploded on the premises and the journalists are permanently threatened. 
There are regions where the Armed Forces and paramilitaries block circulation. The former 
director was assassinated on 9th August, 1994; the Tolima correspondent in 2002. In the 
same year a radio-controlled device failed to explode in the office because of interference 
from the RCN transmitters        
 
Interview 4.2 
 
The newspaper was established in 1957 and was called La voz de la democracia (The voice 
of democracy). In 1962 its licence was cancelled. In 1963 it reopened as La voz proletariat 
(The voice of the proletariat). In 1964 Manuel Cepeda Vargas –the director - was 
imprisoned for six months after the newspaper published an account of the bombing of 
Marquetalia by U.S. and Colombian Armed Forces. The charge was ‘criminal association.’ 
In 1971 the newspaper was given its present name, Voz. In the 1970s President Misael 
Pastrana declared a state of emergency, criminalised the expression of ideas, and 
imprisoned the director. The contents of the newspaper were censored by his government 
and the paper was stamped with the words, ‘This edition appears under official censorship’. 
 
The next president, Turbay declared a state of alert and imprisoned intellectuals. The 
photographer was tortured in 1980. In 1986 President Betancur declared a ceasefire with 
the FARC guerrilla group and permitted the formation of the Union Patriotica. Thousands 
of its representatives have been – and continue to be – assassinated. The newspaper was 
decommissioned in the regions; distributors and vendors were murdered. In 1988 under the 
regime of President Barco the Voz building was dynamited. In 1993 correspondents of Voz 
were assassinated in the Cesar region; Gaviria was the president of Colombia at that time. 
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In 1994 Samper was declared president and Manuel Cepeda Vargas – the director – was 
assassinated. In 1996 the Voz building was dynamited again. In 2000 the administrator in 
Villavicencio was murdered; in 2001 the Narino correspondent was assassinated; his 
replacement was forced into exile a few months later. In 2002 the present director survived 
a car bomb. In 2003 another correspondent was murdered; the Santander and Medellin 
correspondents escaped into exile     
 
This onslaught of imprisonment, torture and selective assassination has inflicted 
depression, psychological terror, and self-censorship on Colombian journalists. The 
assassins have been given impunity and this has silenced the press. Mainstream journalists 
have been awarded military decorations in return for collaboration with the State and status 
quo. Thus mainstream journalists have built up a mountain of lies that have hidden the truth 
about the abuses of the Colombian State: to contradict these myths could be fatal.  
 
‘My personal mission is to tell the truth and fight for human rights but without increasing 
the conflict and the violence …      
 
5. Coordinator of FLIP, a Colombian foundation for the freedom of the press (‘la fundacion 
por la libertad de la prensa’) 
 
Aims 
 
To promote and protect freedom of the press, freedom of expression and access to the 
information that the public requires in order to participate in the democratic process; the 
values and practices of FLIP are based on principles, guidelines and agreements that have 
been established by international freedom of press organisations  
Problems of Colombian journalists and journalism 
 
1. Threats and violence against journalists from political organisations, business, corrupt 
officials, members of the Armed Forces, DAS, the police, paramilitary organisations, drug 
traffickers, guerrilla groups and other social groups that use violence and intimidation to 
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manipulate their public image and achieve their ends. Journalists in Bogotá face the threat 
of dismissal rather than physical violence 
2. Freedom of the press is only protected in theory. In practice Colombian judges are 
corrupt or intimidated; the legal system does not protect journalists from threats and 
violence   
3. Self-censorship: journalists manipulate news and information in order to protect 
themselves 
4. Dependence on sources of information and conflict between roles; some journalists and 
their sources trade favours; some sell advertising space and present false images of 
sponsors; some support particular political groups or business interests or act as negotiators 
between the government and armed groups and families of kidnap victims       
5. Concentration of media power and interests and the commercialisation of news 
6. Limited access to information on the armed conflict in the regions because of armed 
groups; journalists present the views of these groups in return for information and 
protection  
7. ‘La ley de seguridad’ (The State of Emergency) permits the Armed Forces, DAS and the 
police to monitor the news that regional correspondents send to national news 
organisations; correspondents sometimes send anonymous reports to avoid this threat  
8. ‘La ley de la prensa’ (The press law) that stipulates conditions of employment, social 
security and professional qualifications is not implemented. There are at present 30 
journalists on the state program for the protection of journalists; the program is flawed 
firstly because the process of registration requires too much information and time; if the 
claim is justified the journalist will be assassinated before he is accepted on the program. 
DAS has three roles: to issue threats to journalists, to coordinate violence against them, and 
to protect journalists from the violence that they create. The committee that decides which 
journalists should be protected has neither the will nor the power to implement successful 
security measures  
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Methods 
 
1. News alerts: up to date and detailed case studies of threats and violence against 
journalists   
2. Monthly newsletters: analysis of threats to press freedom and of individual cases 
3. Official communications: the principles and perspectives and practices of the 
organisation in relation to policies and factors that affect journalists and journalism and 
individual cases 
4. Press articles and radio and TV interviews on press freedom 
5. Seminars and conferences and workshops on freedom of expression and information 
 
Successes 
 
1. The promotion and protection of freedom of the press, freedom of information, access to 
information and democratic processes 
2. The identification and reduction of the dangers that journalists face by analysing cases 
and causes of threats and violence against journalists and by supporting the construction of 
successful self-protection mechanisms  
3. FLIP is successful because it puts its own principles into practice in a non-partisan 
manner and because it reaches most of its target audience  
Failures 
 
1. FLIP aims to reach all the journalists in Colombia but many are anonymous, part time, 
operate in remote regions and are hard to locate  
2. FLIP protects journalists that have been threatened in the course of their professional 
practice. However journalists that have been threatened for other reasons – because of non-
professional relationships with news sources, political groups, business interests or families 
of kidnap victims – are not protected. These journalists are critical of the principles and 
practices of FLIP 
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6. Two national coordinators of community radio and Internet  
 
Interview 6.1 
 
Aims 
 
1. To coordinate community radio stations in the cities  
2. To focus on human rights issues rather than news events: to discuss problems that affect 
urban communities such as poverty, marginalisation and prostitution, the ‘productive’ and 
‘reproductive’ role of men and women in the community and in the home, generation gaps, 
the physically and mentally challenged, participation in democratic processes  
3. To concentrate on communities and on communicators and on the process of 
communication rather than on the medium, the content, the message and the product: 
because communication should be an interactive process  
Size 
 
In March, 2001 the centre coordinated five urban radio stations; in 2002, 12 stations; in 
2003, 24; and in 2004, the centre coordinated 30 urban stations 
 
Structure 
 
Coordinator; horizontal organisation of media teams  
 
Income 
 
1. European mother organisation 
2. The provision of media services and skills  
 
Audience 
 
Members of communities; some programs appear on national stations   
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Successes 
 
1. Local authorities refused to construct an aqueduct in Rafael Uribe Uribe barrio; 
community connected a pipe to another aqueduct; local authorities provided a meter to 
measure and charge for water consumption. Community radio publicised the issue and the 
State relented 
2. Problem of street vendors and confiscation (theft) of their merchandise by local police 
aired  
Problems 
 
1. Lack of funds; the mother organisation only provides 12 million pesos per month; cost 
and maintenance of equipment is high   
2. Members of the media teams and of the communities that they represent have been 
threatened by paramilitaries; members aim to be anonymous; communities try to protect 
them and have organised a system of safe houses. One station broadcast a story about 
paramilitary extortion. The reporter received a public death threat. Some teams have 
continued to transmit in spite of such threats; others have discontinued        
Democratic processes 
 
Members of communities and teams meet every eight days, share ideas and present 
proposals for new community communication projects. Any member of any community can 
present a proposal; a measure of the success of the program is the social outcome of 
transmissions such as the aqueduct feature and the rapid increase in the number of 
cooperatives that have affiliated themselves  
Interview 6.2 
Nature of organisation 
 
The organisation supports social and indigenous movements through community television, 
radio and Internet sites and promotes peace  
355 
 
 
 
Structure 
 
National television coordinator in Cartagena; radio coordinator in Caqueta; Internet 
coordinator in Bogotá; and 17 regional coordinators  
 
Income 
 
60% of funds are from the provision of media services and skills; 40% are from 
international human rights and research organisations  
 
Audience 
 
Local, national and international audiences interested in community or human rights issues 
 
Aims 
 
1. To promote peace through the reinforcement of local, national and international 
communication processes  
2. To represent three types of conflict: ‘production conflicts’ (based on issues such as 
concentration of ownership, conditions of employment, public services, financial 
resources), ‘cultural conflicts’ (such as ethnic issues and social marginalisation) and 
‘environmental conflicts’ (such as pollution) 
3. To present local issues in a systematic and responsible manner so that communities can 
learn from one another and support each other; human rights and local issues are often 
misrepresented and trivialised in the mainstream media (for example, ‘la gente que quiere a 
la gente’ sponsored by ‘el banco que quiere a la gente’)    
4. To disseminate non-confrontational discourse related to the armed conflict and armed 
groups, to present issues in a way which does not endanger representatives and members of 
communities and to present a positive and practical message to audiences      
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Successes 
 
1. Organised mobilisation (‘minga’) of 60,000 indigenous people in Cauca and Cali (14-17 
March, 2004); organised system of communications to transmit issues and events; the four-
day march and protests were transmitted simultaneously to 17 foreign countries 
2. Stations such as Radio Antaqui and Radio Pajumat are in high conflict zones but address 
local problems related to agriculture and nutrition in a practical and non-confrontational 
manner    
Problems 
 
1. The communities that the centre represents are located in intense conflict zones;  
members of these communities and of the media groups have been kidnapped, tortured and 
murdered; local populations have been displaced and suffer from poverty    
2. More than 40% of community radio stations were closed down by the Ministry of 
Communications between 2002 and 2004 in order to promote private commercial stations. 
The Senator of the Department of Huila for example owns private radio stations and 
campaigns against community radio stations. New community radio stations are set up only 
where there are no other stations  
3. High taxes and high costs of equipment and maintenance   
 
7. Former mainstream Colombian radio journalist 
 
The main problem is that Colombian journalists are compromised or corrupted by their 
relationship with particular political, economic or armed groups or sources. Each of these 
groups has its own secrets and its own agendas and controls access to information. For 
example, government ministers refuse to answer controversial questions; their secretaries 
are informed that controversial journalists should not be allowed to enter the office. 
Journalists are expected to treat their sources as their superiors; one reporter once asked me, 
‘how dare you ask the minister a question like that’?  
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This affects impartial and independent analysis of the conflict. Colombian journalists do 
not have the power to interview and confront the main sources of information, to present 
the full range of perspectives on a particular issue and to form conclusions based on hard 
evidence. Another problem is that governments use news organisations to promote 
themselves and their policies. They pass their views on to the directors of news 
organisations who pass them on to their editors. This explains why current news programs 
report the crimes of the FARC rather than of the AUC and suggest that the present 
government's campaign against terrorism is successful.  
 
The main reason for violence against journalists is that they become compromised because 
of their real or alleged relationship with a particular faction and are eliminated by the other 
side. Political values are polarised and journalists are stereotyped as members of the 
guerrilla or of the paramilitaries or are caught in the crossfire. I myself have interviewed 
both the leader of the FARC and of the AUC and explained on both occasions that I do not 
represent either side and have come to hear their views but not to voice their opinions. 
Journalists have been killed because they have sacrificed their professionalism and 
independence and have lost the way; they have not acted as journalists but rather as 
intermediaries between a particular faction and the government or between kidnappers and 
the families of their victims or have accepted the patronage of corrupt politicians or 
businessmen.  
 
‘I myself am often shocked by the gulf between the rich and the poor and the cruelty of the 
civil war. In the morning I find himself in the palace interviewing ministers and in the 
afternoon in Ciudad Bolivar where there are little children living in cardboard boxes. I 
often burst into tears when I arrive home and sees my wife and children. But I don't believe 
in the FARC because their members target civilians and kidnap children in the name of ‘the 
revolution’    
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8. Current mainstream Colombian radio journalist  
 
Relationship between editor and journalist 
 
The role of the editor is to coordinate a team of journalists; each journalist is responsible for 
his or her segment of the daily news. Colombian news organisations control the news 
though editorial policies and lines. This station is ‘conservative’ in terms of its relationship 
with the government and the political Right.  
If a journalist breaks the ideological rules of the organisation he is fired. The journalist 
must read the editor's mind. I personally have been warned between three and five times in 
my career that I have stepped outside the official line; I never know if or when I will be 
dismissed. Two of my colleagues have already been dismissed because they criticised the 
State. Journalists are supposed to conform to the international and national political and 
economic and social status quo. In Colombia the mass media hide the causes of the conflict 
from their audiences in order to maintain the ignorance of the Colombian people. The 
causes of the conflict are economic, political, social and historical: our problems date back 
to the Conquest and the so-called war of ‘Independence’. If a journalist feels that he can't 
lie any more about the injustice and inequalities in Colombia he is immediately dismissed. 
The editor mediates between the directors of the news organisation and the journalists. The 
directors are businessmen or relatives or ideological representatives of the owners  
Aims 
 
1. To defend the political and economic interests of the owners. These interests reflect the 
political and economic status quo of the Colombian State 
2. To survive in the competitive world of Colombian media organisations and businesses 
3. To increase ratings and therefore advertising revenues 
 
Problems 
The main problem is the lack of freedom of expression for journalists who are more open 
minded than the owners and editors of the radio station. Journalists are more aware of 
359 
 
 
Colombian realities than national news agencies and official sources. Journalists strive to 
be critical and open but they are fired if they ‘cross the line’ in ideological terms too many 
times. The government guarantees freedom of information and expression in the 
Constitution of 1991 but in practice this doesn't happen. The transgressions of individual 
journalists threaten the survival of the organisation. The Ministry of Communication can 
close the radio station or news program down; paramilitaries can kill the journalists. In 
Colombia violence starts inside the media organisations. The journalist is threatened with 
dismissal if he doesn't obey the editorial line. After that there is the threat of closure by the 
Ministry of Communication. Finally, death - by paramilitaries, soldiers, police, or guerrilla 
– will follow. The Department of Human Rights inside the Ministry of the Interior has a 
program to protect journalists threatened for ideological or political reasons or presumed 
relation to drug traffic but this program doesn't function in practice because the government 
doesn't protect the journalists who criticise the government. The government  neither wants 
to - or can - control violence or protect journalists. Journalists face bureaucratic obstacles in 
order to enter the program which can't protect journalists in any case. To be a serious 
journalist here means to mediate between the government, big business, drug groups, 
Armed Forces, police and armed groups.  
 
Around 74 journalists are murdered each year in Colombia; most of them are in in radio 
because it is the medium with the highest penetration: radio is older than television; and 
radio is closer to the people and to the voice of the people because radio is oral and cheaper 
than television and newspapers. The Ministry of Communications and the authorities record 
all the radio news programs in Bogotá and in the capital cities of the 32 departments. The 
Department of State Security (DAS) and the Office of Communications of the Presidency 
of the Republic monitor the media in Colombia in order to control the production of news 
and information. The authorities close down ‘non-conformist’ media stations; accuse their 
journalists of being subversive or voices of illegal groups. In Colombia there is censorship 
although it is illegal and violates the constitution of 1991. The violence against journalists 
stems both from the public and private sector. FLIP - the foundation for the freedom of the 
press and opinion - is under political pressure and therefore can't publish accurate statistics.      
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The violence acts as censorship. The use of violence forces journalists to tell lies in order to 
protect themselves. These threats force them to broadcast or publish banal and bland news 
stories and to support one of the illegal armed groups or paramilitaries that protects the 
government or the Armed Forces or police. At the same time journalists are aware that 
Colombian people need to understand Colombian realities in order to protect themselves. 
People live in a fictitious world because they see the world as media organisations shape 
the world, limit it and present it to them. What the media don't present doesn't exist; 
Colombian journalists are obliged to hide information rather than inform the Colombian 
public     
 
The mass media do not report events related to the conflict in the regions because there is a 
high concentration of paramilitary groups and of drug traffickers and the mass media 
support these ‘businesses’. The mass media are concentrated in Bogotá and in the capitals 
of the 32 departments and their owners and directors and audience are not so interested in 
what occurs in the rural areas. However rural areas represent more than 72% of the land; 
most violence against the Colombian population and most massacres perpetrated by 
paramilitaries and the Armed Forces occur in these regions. The mass media don't cover 
these areas for political or economic reasons or for fear of violence. The mass media use 
the news to sell advertising space; regional news requires a lot of space in the media and 
doesn't sell advertisements. In addition rural inhabitants are not part of the illusion that the 
media wish to present to the Colombian people and don’t represent the main consumers of 
TV or radio or press; the countryside contains the highest percentage of illiterate people 
(between 8% and 12% of the total population). These people are not large consumers of 
press and TV nor of the products which the media sell through advertisements. Thus the 
farmers don’t understand the violence which surrounds them; urban populations don’t 
know about the massacres, the deaths, the battles or the forced displacement of rural 
populations. In areas such as Caqueta, Guaviare, Vichada, Guainia, Putumayo, Amazonas, 
Casanare and Arauca there is no local information because in these departments - apart 
from narcos and paras - there are also US military bases set up to ‘combat’ drug traffic and 
to guard oil pipelines and stations. In reality these are no more than occupation troops 
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whose ultimate goal is the penetration, invasion and exploitation of the Amazon basin; thus 
the information which escapes from these regions is restricted      
 
The Colombian mass media present the illusion that ‘terrorist’ groups and common 
criminals and drug traffickers with no political aim are responsible for the war. These 
organisations present news like a Nintendo game and suppress analysis both inside and 
outside the organisation. The journalist who wishes to analyse the conflict in depth is 
silenced or killed. In Colombia the media are responsible for the conflict because they act 
in favour of the Right and the governments and present the guerrilla and the Left and the 
opposition as ‘bandits’. The media owners and directors fight for the Right and the 
government. The owners and employees of news organisations are soldiers who use words 
as guns; in this sense they are also responsible for the conflict 
 
The most important factor in Colombian news production is the political, economic and 
social interest of the owners and directors of Colombian media organisations. These owners 
and directors tend to be either politicians or congressmen or businessmen that control 
congressmen. For example, Guillermo Rodriguez Daza, the director of a news program on 
Radio Unica de Todelar is also director of a political party called El Movimiento Nacional 
Progressista.  The name of the radio station, de Todelar is also the name of the family 
which owns it, Tobon de la Roche. Two congressmen represent the interests of the station. 
The Pava Camelo family own another radio conglomerate, La Cadena Radial Super and are 
related to one senator and to members of the House of Representatives. Because of these 
political interests their listeners hear fictitious news. These families have political and 
economic connections with the government. They use these connections to gain political 
power both for themselves and for members of their families and to maximise revenue from 
government-sponsored campaigns. Another important factor is the violence that is 
omnipresent in Colombia and threatens journalists.  
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Sources of violence against Colombian journalists 
 
1. The ‘internal’ violence that originates in the restrictions imposed by owners, directors 
and editors who control journalists and therefore news production. Journalists either ‘obey 
orders from above’ or are silenced, fired or murdered.  
2. The ‘external’ violence which begins with the vigilance of DAS, the Ministry of 
Communication and the Office of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic 
3. The violence of the ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ armed groups and drug traffickers. This begins 
with cards or anonymous telephone calls and threats which can be converted into physical 
attacks          
 
9. Indigenous leader of the Embera people 
 
She is the daughter of one of the ‘disappeared’ leaders of the 405 Embera people – 
grandparents, parents, children, babies - squatting in the corridors of the premises of ONIC 
(one of the main national indigenous organisations) in Bogotá. Her father – and other 
leaders and members of her people – have been murdered by presumed paramilitaries in 
support of national and international capital. The main reason for the displacement of the 
Embera people from their land in Alto Sinu is the construction of a hydroelectric station in 
1991. The World Bank and an international energy conglomerate (URRA) are responsible. 
Environmental damage emanates from the death of the river that runs through their land. 
 
The Embera people feel the death of the river like the murder of a brother or sister. The 
hydroelectric dam has clogged up the river; the mud has poisoned the fish, flooded the land, 
killed their crops of yucca and platano, and caused a plague of stinging flies and severe skin 
infections. Their sacred site – centre of faith and culture – has been erased. Before the 
disaster Embera families cooperated in the cultivation of crops; the death of the crops on 
the banks of the river – and the survival of the other crops - has created selfishness, 
bitterness, social and ethical conflicts both inside and between Embera people. It has 
fragmented their culture. Because of the hydroelectric station – and in addition to the river - 
the Embera people have lost 7,562 hectares of their most fertile land; the government has 
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offered to purchase 117,000 hectares of indigenous land at the price of 950 pesos (40 US 
cents) per hectare because ‘the Indians don’t cultivate land’ (in terms of mainstream neo-
liberal mass agricultural policies and strategies, methods and technologies). Platano feeds 
people; 950 pesos per hectare doesn’t sustain life; it kills. The government has treated the 
Embera people as if they are invisible; their leaders have been decimated. The Embera 
people have therefore decided not to return to their land until the government meets their 
demands: recognition of the land rights of the Embera Katio people, reparation for the land 
that has been lost [as their murdered leaders, friends, and family members can never be 
replaced], and government guarantees of health and nutrition.    
 
The government hasn’t negotiated with the Embera people because government officials 
are ‘on vacation’. Embera people occupied the premises of the Ministry of the Interior in 
order to draw attention to their plight but were forcibly evicted by a squadron of ESMAD: 
the riot police       
 
10. Human rights researcher 
 
He suggests that the main problem in Colombian human rights research is not in the 
collection or fabrication of statistics (although the main source and often the only source of 
human rights statistics is the Armed Forces that uses statistics to legitimate its role in the 
armed conflict) but in the interpretation of statistics. He argues that qualitative rather than 
quantitative interpretations of human rights information are crucial: human rights statistics 
are a reflection of the values of the organisations and people that produce them. This has 
created a ‘war of statistics’. Human rights organisations produce statistics in order to 
legitimate themselves; their information reflects their relationship – or level of opposition - 
to the Colombian State. A union member or a leader of a social movement may be 
assassinated for personal rather than political reasons. Armed groups use statistics on the 
human rights abuses of other groups in order to legitimate their own human rights abuses; 
the armed conflict will continue until political, economic and social institutions and 
communities learn to value individual human life in qualitative rather than quantitative 
terms.    
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Human rights organisations tend to see human rights abuses in terms of the Colombian 
State rather than in terms of the guerrilla groups; this has been reflected in their research 
and has created conflict between their researchers. The main problem in the research 
published in London and based on statistics from the CINEP database from 1988 to 2002 
(Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, 2003) is not so much in the use of biased statistics from the 
Armed Forces as in the interpretation of the information: the researchers represent the 
problems of Colombia in terms of the armed conflict and the number of homicides rather 
than in terms of the political, economic and social factors that produce these levels of 
violence; this is a reflection of the privileged and elitist economic and social background of 
the Colombian researchers themselves.  
 
High exposure to negative human rights information has created indifference and 
banalisation of abuses rather than depression and distortion of human rights information. 
The US is a negative influence in human rights terms because it promotes freedom inside 
but not outside its national borders. The main human rights abuses in Colombia occur in 
regions of low population, high international or local economic investment, and low 
presence of State institutions. The main causes and consequences of the armed conflict – 
non-distribution of economic resources, unemployment, recruitment to armed groups, 
violence – are factors that interact in a synergetic process. The levels of violence are high in 
Colombia because the present conflict has continued for three generations. Repetition of 
violence has desensitised both the perpetrators and the public; perpetrators have therefore 
increased levels and forms of human rights abuse – torture methods, multiple massacres, 
mutilation of corpses - in order to catch public attention, terrorise local communities, and 
manipulate audiences. In other countries, bank robbers grab the money and run; in 
Colombia, they open fire. There is a strong sense of revenge that intensifies the levels and 
forms of violence; three generations of violence have multiplied the manifestations of 
violence in the present generation.        
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11. Human rights activist 
 
There are around 400,000 inhabitants in Cazuca in the South of Bogotá. The majority are 
temporary people who have been displaced from different regions of Colombia by the 
armed conflict. The locals live on the perimeter of an industrial sand pit. The land 
continually shifts as the bulldozers dig under their makeshift shelters and the landslides and 
floods could kill them all off. They are perched on top of a sand castle like a swarm of ants. 
Many of those who have been displaced have already been traumatised by their extreme 
experiences of the violence in the countryside; very few of them talk about it. Cazuca itself 
is extremely violent; there are high levels of physical abuse behind closed doors and out in 
the street, incest, sexual abuse and prostitution; nearly every day bodies are dumped in the 
local lake, La Laguna de Terrero and all of these murders are attributed to – and dismissed 
as – ‘limpieza social’ (social cleansing programs). This term refers to the assassination and 
annihilation of ‘los desechables’ (social garbage): prostitutes, homosexuals, drug users, 
rebels and street people.  
 
But not all the perpetrators are police or paramilitaries or mercenaries employed by local 
administration or businesses as in the ‘limpieza social’ programs in other parts of the 
capital; murders are committed for other reasons also – robbery, jealousy and revenge – but 
all of them are blamed on social cleansing programs. This is a taboo issue; to talk about it is 
suicidal. The young woman who denounced the murderer of her best friend to the police 
was murdered by the same man.  
 
More than 40 NGOs operate in Cazuca – many funded by US and European human rights 
organisations – but most programs serve the neo-liberal interests and profit motives of 
foreign countries, of the Colombian government, and of the organisations themselves - 
rather than the needs of the local people. These organisations represent and replace the 
Colombian State in Cazuca. Their main aims are to increase public order, economic 
production and employment opportunities - to incorporate the residents in mainstream 
international and national institutional and economic structures – and to implement neo-
liberal economic policies. The government has delegated its responsibilities to 
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paramilitaries and human rights organisations.  
 
There is a ‘barrio’ (district) of paramilitaries next to Cazuca to assist in the implementation 
of government policies. There are low levels of public and private investment in the 
infrastructure of Cazuca: limited transportation, sanitation, health care and education. There 
are high levels of child prostitution because the children have to feed their families. Social 
research programs offer personal income, employment and intellectual satisfaction to 
foreign researchers. Their recommendations are not implemented. Effective social 
programs are scarce and social change is limited. She herself is part of a campaign called 
‘Bogotá sin indifferencia’ (Bogotá without indifference). This is a program that aims to 
counter social indifference to human rights issues in the capital. She sees the public 
representations of  Bogotá sin indifferencia – the media campaigns and the signs around the 
capital – as political progress that aims to stimulate the social conscience of higher income 
urban residents and to encourage them to understand their own role in economic and social 
marginalisation. There are immeasurable cultural differences between the North and the 
South of the capital. The South is a recruitment camp for the guerrilla and the 
paramilitaries. Last year a 17 year old from Cazuca was sentenced to 28 years in prison for 
murdering 37 people, including his 14 year old ex-girlfriend. He screamed at the judge that 
he’d killed at least 137   
 
12. Graduate of military academy  
 
He attended a military school, El Colegio Simon Bolivar for four years. The school focused 
on discipline, physical appearance and tidiness; there were military ceremonies and 
marches, physical exercises and punishment. In addition to mainstream subjects, the 
students studied military orders and military ranks, the use of arms and of ambushes. They 
developed leadership skills, learned to interpret military symbols and badges, and to sing 
national anthems and military songs. They had to salute the teachers because of their 
military background. There was also an official network of student informers that spied on 
their classmates and reported their misdemeanours to the teachers. The school promoted the 
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Armed Forces as a professional career and as a method of making money rather than as an 
ethical option. Politics and the issue of the guerrilla were rarely referred to.  
 
The teachers and students were more conservative than in other high schools. They were 
narrow minded and there was very little experimentation or hedonism. Around 10% of 
students later became army officers either because of their aggressive nature or because that 
was the easiest choice of career. He himself wanted to be a soldier because of the heroic 
stories of the Independence. However he found the culture of domination – the discipline 
and orders – superficial and meaninglessness. He found he could lead groups of classmates 
through irreverence and humor rather than through intimidation.  
 
13. Afro-Colombian researcher  
 
The first problem that Afro-Colombian communities in the Pacific Choco region face is the 
lack of foreign and state investment. British, US and Antioquian companies have used the 
region as a cheap source of fruit and gold. Their methods of extraction have poured lead 
into the rivers and ocean. Their methods of colonisation have caused pollution, poverty, and 
prostitution. My proposal - to preserve the region as a natural reserve based on alternative 
forms of energy, to use the rivers as transportation routes, to provide alternative medicines, 
and to create ecological tourism – has been ignored. Slavery wasn’t abolished until 1851 
and the first high school in Choco wasn’t open to Afro-Colombians until 1912. 
Geographical barriers – the rainforest and chains of mountains – have isolated the region 
from social and economic reform.   
 
The second problem is the lack of political representation. Local leaders have presented 
themselves as Liberals or Conservatives and have represented the interests of the 
Colombian State rather than of Choco. They have controlled the local population through 
the threat of starvation. Drug plantations and drug routes through the region have made the 
inhabitants the victims of crossfire between the Armed Forces, paramilitaries and guerrilla 
groups, none of which represent the people themselves. The Colombian State has used the 
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ideological tool of the war on drugs and terrorism in order to legitimise armed repression 
and control drug production. The drug trade has created problems of security and a culture 
of materialism. The third problem is racism. Mainstream Colombian culture stereotypes 
Afro-Colombian people as lazy drug abusers: but black people slaved for hundreds of years 
in the mines and the main drug abusers are white and middle class. There is a caste system 
in Colombia: whiter complexion means higher social class.         
     
The fourth problem is the lack of local identity. People from different African regions were 
separated in the slave ships to limit the chance of rebellion and to decimate the original 
African languages. Portugal, France, Holland and England transported thousands of people 
from Africa to Colombia to supplement indigenous labour. Indigenous people had almost 
been decimated. Less than one in five black people survived the slave ships. Most of them 
slaved in the gold mines and plantations. The rich colonial families rented the rest of us out 
as labourers and prostitutes 
 
14. Director of one of the main Colombian newspapers (El Espectador)  
 
El Espectador was founded in times of intense conflict between the Conservatives  and 
Liberals. Its founder, Luis Cano was imprisoned and ex-communicated by the Catholic 
Church. At the time of the Frente Nacional – the coalition between the two main political 
parties – the newspaper was one of the official national political voice of the Liberals. After 
the coalition it no longer represented mainstream Liberal values. This is the main difference 
between El Espectador and its main Liberal competitor, El Tiempo. The founders of both 
papers, Eduardo Santos and Luis Cano, defended the same Liberal principles - human 
rights and freedom of speech – but these values changed after the Frente Nacional. 
Members of the Santos family occupied and occupy government posts and El Tiempo has 
become an ‘official’ paper in the sense that it represents the interests of the Colombian 
State and status quo.  
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El Tiempo represents the revolving door syndrome: political favours are exchanged for 
political propaganda. El Expectador on the other hand continues to represent human rights 
and social issues.      
 
The financial problems of El Espectador began in 1982 when the newspaper investigated 
corruption in El Grupo Grancolombiano. This conglomerate provided 90% of the 
newspaper’s advertising revenue but cancelled its financial support as a reaction to our 
investigation. In the 1980s, the conflict between El Espectador and the Medellin drug cartel 
commenced. El Espectador was founded at the time of ‘la guerra de los mil dias’ (‘the war 
of the thousand days’) and has always fought with ‘ideas’ rather than ‘arms’. But the 
Medellin cartel was ruthless. Members of the Cano family were murdered, including the 
director, Guillermo Cano; the main lawyer, journalists, advertisers and distributors in 
Medellin were also assassinated; one of the columnists was gang-raped in Bogotá. All of 
this coincided with a period of intense financial competition between the mass media, 
regional and local newspapers. At the end of the 1990s the newspaper hit a financial crisis 
and had to sell out to El Grupo Santo Domingo. El Tiempo on the other hand was much 
more discrete in its criticism of the drug cartels. El Espectador has its roots in Antioquia, a 
region of astute entrepreneurs, but this regional stereotype has been undermined by the 
failure of the paper. 
 
Three branches of the Cano family still own 15% of the shares but none of them writes for 
the newspaper. The Santo Domingo group blames the demise of El Espectador on the 
financial mismanagement of the Cano family: but this paper has always placed ideas and 
ideals above business. Santo Domingo sees news as a product rather than a mission. In 
order to maximize its profits El Espectador has been turned from a daily newspaper into a 
Sunday paper. However, it still maintains part of its polemical nature: during the previous 
presidential campaign, El Espectador ran an article entitled ‘the Lord of the Flies’ (‘El 
Senor de las Moscas’) that criticised the intimate relationship between the current 
Colombian president, Alvaro Uribe Gomez and the Medellin drug cartel. It has to be critical 
in order to maintain its readership and compete against daily newspapers. At the same time 
in order to maximize its profits the newspaper has descended into sensationalism. This year 
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it claimed that the government of Venezuela had used a Colombian military helicopter to 
transport the leader of the FARC to a meeting in Caracas. The story was based on false 
information – military propaganda – that had come from the Colombian Ministry of 
Defense.  
 
The Colombian press faces stiff competition from the other media: the visual attraction of 
television stations, the deep geographical penetration of mainstream and community radio 
stations, the immediacy of the news that they produce and the targeting of local audiences 
and interests.  
 
There is a repetition and saturation of decontextualised news and a failure of creativity in 
the representation and narration of events. In order to compete, mainstream newspapers 
have to be critical but political and economic domination makes this impossible and 
dangerous. El Espectador refuses to adopt tabloid methods and thus occupies a very small 
intellectual niche. El Tiempo readers are mainly interested in the classified section: job 
vacancies and advertisements. El Espectador still differs from its main rival, El Tiempo 
because it still sees news in terms of ideas rather than business. Its journalists are aware of 
the dangers inherent in investigative journalism but assume these professional risks and 
have an intuition about what they can and can not safely write. There are however ‘suicidal’ 
journalists who write dangerous stories and flee to other countries.       
 
The main problem in mainstream Colombian journalism is in the incestuous relationship 
between news organisations and political, economic and armed groups. Mainstream 
Colombian journalists are ‘autonomous’ in the sense that they represent their own personal 
interests but are not ‘independent’ because their personal interests coincide with the 
political and economic interests of mainstream Colombian news organisations. These 
organisations represent ‘official’ government lines and aim to increase the revenue from 
advertisers. Their journalists do not offer unique personal visions of – or fresh political and 
social insights into - the Colombian nation and armed conflict. The same journalists 
produce different types of news for different news organisations. The ‘great’ Colombian 
journalists also direct publicity agencies. Poor labour conditions and low salaries 
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exacerbate this trend. Colombian journalists tend to be social climbers and to adopt the 
same political social prejudices as the higher social classes that they attempt to emulate. 
This is reflected in the news that they produce. The threat of violence is the final factor that 
has eliminated resistance to the Colombian propaganda machine.          
 
15. Demobilised EPL commander 
 
He became a member of the EPL (the Maoist guerrilla group) in 1975 in his fifth year of 
high school and fought until his demobilisation in 1991. He enlisted at a time of 
revolutionary romanticism, during the effervescence of the Cuban revolution and the 
consolidation of Maoism in China. Being a student in a public high school or university 
meant being a radical revolutionary. In the 1970s the Colombian communist party split into 
factions based on different forms of struggle and he enlisted in the EPL. In the mid 80s he 
commanded a force of 250 EPL guerrillas and controlled the rich strategic region from 
Norte Santander (the North East of Colombia - the border with Venezuela) to 
Barrancabermeja (the transnational oil town on the Magdalena River in the center of 
Colombia).  
 
In the history of guerrilla warfare in Colombia only the M-19 and the EPL attained the level 
of organisation that he commanded: the discipline and ‘elasticity’ required to attack, retreat, 
regroup, and advance again. The EPL at that time had a total of 2,000 soldiers, eight or ten 
urban groups and two rural groups, 1,000 popular leaders, its own radio station and an 
international front. The EPL had its own elite corps of commandos, modeled on the special 
Vietnamese forces who had resisted the North American invasion. They were camouflaged, 
had explosives strapped to their sides, and were trained to infiltrate heavily guarded enemy 
installations at night. Survivors swore that they literally sprang from the Earth. They 
sincerely believed they were about to seize control of the Colombian State. But the Armed 
Forces and the paramilitaries annihilated their urban networks, assassinated political leaders 
and civilian allies, ordered mass detentions and mopped up resistance in the regions. The 
turning point in his commitment to the armed struggle was in Norte de Santander. He had 
been ordered to demolish an entire village including the Church. But he refused.  
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Problems in the Colombian Left 
 
The first problem is that the Colombian Left has never managed to unite. The Polo 
Democratico (the newest Leftist coalition) is yet one more example. Here we can see a 
mishmash of different personal interests, of opportunists, of supporters of Uribe allied to 
Leftists. There is a lack of coherence. The Colombian Left has always suffered from 
sectarianism and radicalism. In the 1970s for example the FARC annihilated the PLA (an 
offshoot of the EPL) in rural regions and in the capital: there were 50 or 60 victims in the 
department of Meta alone. The FARC is hegemonic in its territory. The FARC and the ELN 
are currently fighting each other to the death in Arauca and Narino at this moment. Each of 
these factions considers that its doctrines are the Truth. They are sects: they have posters of 
their leaders and adorn them like images in the Church. One of the members of the EPL 
complimented Lenin in a meeting; his comrades accused him of being disloyal.         
 
The second problem is the lack of coherence between the political ideals and ideas of these 
groups and their actions. They are playing with words. There is no real difference between 
‘kidnap’ and ‘capture’. They promised the people a revolution that the people didn’t even 
want. If the people are not behind the revolution it can never be won: and even if it is won, 
who or what has it been won for? The end does not justify the means. In any case the poor 
are sons of bitches as well: they are ignorant and they are marginalised.  
 
The third problem is that no war can be eternal and that those that suffer most are the 
people that are trapped between two armies. This is a war of cowards. The FARC has a 
hierarchical military structure. It has always been an armed campesino movement. The 
FARC has never evolved from its blinkered concept of armed rural struggle. But this war 
will never be won in the jungle. Only the M-19 incorporated different forms of struggle and 
planned for the future. The leaders of the armed groups are soldiers not statesmen. If these 
people seized power they wouldn’t know what to do with it. They would sit in Congress, 
looking at one another, eyes shifting around the big room, saying, ‘shit, what do we do 
now?’ Good soldiers are not good in peace time: intellectuals are very different from 
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fighters; many of the soldiers had no formal education, were miserably poor, came from the 
countryside, and were illiterate. These wars are games that reflect the childish nature of the 
Left. War has its own barbaric logic and is therefore the problem in itself rather than the 
solution to our problems. It also expensive: one simple armed operation cost 100 million 
pesos (50 thousand dollars) in the 1980s.          
 
The final problem is socio-psychological. People enlist in these groups for different reasons 
and have different motivations: some are attracted by the armed struggle; others have been 
abused by members of their families; some are attracted by the clandestine nature of the 
groups. For many the war is a party. The collective annihilates the individual and individual 
creativity. In that sense these groups are the easiest option because everything – the clothes 
you wear, the food you eat, even decisions about your married life and family – all your 
problems are decided by your superiors. The problem is that our movements need strong 
leadership – there are so many conflicts between and inside our groups - but many of our 
leaders betray us. People form committees and help themselves to the cash. But we are in a 
process of evolution and strong leaders can create strong movements and can stimulate 
progress.  
The future 
 
This is the most important question that can be asked after demobilisation: was it, was all 
this sacrifice of human life and all this death, was it worth it? It was in the sense that now 
the members can express themselves through legal political expression. Demobilised 
people have created strong, integrated social movements and educational programs, to plan 
and implement their social programs. But war is not the solution; humanity has to change 
and transcend. The problem is not that we are not capable of realizing our dreams; the 
problem is that we dream badly. Our country is not so hopeless. It is a nation in 
construction – in a state of evolution - whereas the rich countries have stagnated and died. 
Their people are cold and indifferent to other people and to life. At least we are still alive. 
Our problem is that we have to create new forms of resistance and revolution because our 
lives are shit: we live in poverty - not only material but also spiritual – almost animals, 
nearly vegetables. We need to develop the politics of being human, to return to primary 
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sources, to the most basic natural and basic elements, to be ethical and to respect life. This 
is the basis of indigenous resistance. Any social group or movement that resuscitates this 
fundamental human principle of respecting life and other people is positive. On the other 
side we have capitalism and globalisation: a rhinoceros (of consumption and destruction) 
that will die as a result of its own momentum. We need to make a new social contract: to 
respect differences rather than manufacture consensus                     
 
16. Demobilised coordinator of militant communist groups 
 
Peace negotiations 
 
The peace negotiations between the government and the EPL were based on a central 
confusion in the concept of peace: that if we don’t surrender everything we are going to 
lose everything. The authorities said that our forces were depleted, that we lost the war and 
that we’re pathetic soldiers; they defeated us and they had us on our knees. Our 
negotiations were different from the so-called negotiations between the paramilitaries and 
their allies, the government. They didn’t offer us political posts and land; they offered us 
their condolences and their charity. It was the fault of the EPL leaders; they didn’t approach 
the negotiations with the seriousness that they merited. There was a kind of romanticism 
that surged at this time among the members of the EPL: that we were going to reinsert 
ourselves in civilian society, and that we were going to create democracy. We spent the 
following fifteen years running around in circles and chasing our tails either in the centre of 
political power or on the peripheries. EPL proposals were related to waging war rather than 
political or civil power struggles.  
 
After demobilisation I moved to the countryside. On one occasion the head of DAS (the 
Department of State Security) was changed to a woman and I received an urgent summons 
to her office. We started to chat – ‘how’s it going and what’s happening and how are you 
and what have you been doing and who knows what?’ – and it turned four and she still 
hadn’t said anything. Finally I said it had been great and what was the time and what did 
she want to know? She replied that I must never tell anyone about our meeting - as I’m 
375 
 
 
doing now – but that she had never met a guerrilla woman before. She had called our 
meeting out of curiosity.  
 
This is the main problem in creating social change. The public see us – the Left - as 
demons: as the manifestation of the devil. The media demonize us in order to justify loans 
of billions of dollars, arms and helicopters. How many millions of dollars were spent to 
ensure the re-election of Alvaro Uribe? How much money do they spend on Leyva’s 
helicopter that flies over him all day and goes to bed with him at night. It’s the same with 
Pastrana and Uribe and all the presidents and ex-presidents. Gaviria promised to stop 
spending millions of dollars on personal security but didn’t do anything about it. People 
voted for President Pastrana because they thought he would make a difference in the peace 
process with the FARC. But the government refused to sit down with guerrilla as equals. 
They were too angry to talk to each other. At the same time they told the media that they 
were committed to the peace process, that they had the interests of the nation and of the 
people at heart and that they were organising a national assembly.                        
 
Background 
 
I finished high school five centuries ago but I didn’t have the chance to do the final tests. I 
was good at school; I studied with nuns and besides I was pretty conscientious. It was a 
pedagogical high school; after I graduated I was qualified to teach in high school up to 6
th
 
grade. At school I discovered that I have a photographic memory. I didn’t only remember 
all my notes but also the position of the information on the page. I remember the 
appearance of my great grandmother who died when I was two and a half. But my memory 
is a curse. It’s full of drawers of information. I stored so many telephone number in my 
clandestine period. Most of these numbers have expired. Last year the rules of the high 
school exams were changed; they are based on the capacity to read, interpret and analyze 
information. I did the test 30 years after I graduated from high school and the results 
supported my idea that I had been a really good student. I didn’t revise before the 
examination but I won a half scholarship. If I’d studied I would have won the full 
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scholarship. The woman in the office was surprised to see me. She was expecting a 
seventeen year old.         
 
Memory is important in a society such as ours, to prove that our struggles have not been in 
vain, that it was all worth it, all the sacrifices, and that we lived full, sensitive and 
responsible lives. My decision to demobilise was totally political. The only thing we didn’t 
have at that time was political power. These decisions must be political and the only way 
out must be political. The present war is not the way out of the war. As Lenin said, the 
masses of people that do not understand democracy can never embrace socialism. We 
should have read that before we demobilised.  
 
Why didn’t I do that? Why did I believe in the demobilisation? Veira (communist leader) 
was once asked why he made an error in some aspect of the internal organisation, why he 
had done one thing rather than another. He replied that it is easy to be wise after the event. 
The politics of war and peace are very different. In times of peace, politics is about making 
decisions between and for everyone. In times of war the only important thing is the enemy 
casualties. The number of enemy casualties is crucial because the only thing that justifies 
the war is winning it.           
 
The nature of the EPL 
 
The structure of the EPL was based on the three classic elements of communist party, 
military wing and masses. The party provides political direction through political leaders 
that have a clear vision of the way forward and the future. These leaders – that determine 
the course of the armed social revolution – have passed through a process of ideological 
formation and pre-militancy that tests their capacity as leaders. The importance of the 
military wing is related to the role of violence in historical processes and social change. 
Substantial social changes have always been preceded – and precipitated - by violence. 
Elites will not give up their positions; they will not fight for us especially if they promise 
to. The military wing is responsible for waging this war against the elites. The last element 
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is the masses that sympathize with our cause and participate in the revolution and the 
seizure of power.  
 
Party leaders (such as her) also participated in the militancy, in the social movements, in 
the communities, in public protests and labor unions. The purpose was to rise to a position 
of power in these social movements and unions in order to implement communist party 
policy, the problem being that the political cause submerged the original goals of these 
organisations and created inner conflicts that caused violence and deaths. One communist 
faction had control of one banana union in Uraba for example; another faction had control 
of the other. These two groups created ghettos in the main towns in the region. It was 
dangerous to cross the lines into enemy territory. Families were massacred for living on the 
wrong side of the line. Communist leaders lived semi-clandestine lives until the State 
authorities burnt them out: burnt meant they had unmasked your identity and that it was 
time to get out. In the meantime you could live in the city, country or society in a certain 
degree of tranquility. The most dangerous relationships were inside the movements and 
unions because people did not announce their political affiliation. These meetings were 
scenes of intense ideological struggle. Conflicts intensified until one of the instigators was 
recalled, raped or killed. It was more dangerous than a military situation where your 
comrades may protect you: ‘you are armed; we are armed; bang, bang’. But in the 
movements it is like this: ‘I don’t know who you are; I don’t know what you represent’. 
The only thing that protects you is the solidarity of your companions in the movement.       
 
Her role 
 
My role was to ‘open up’ – to infiltrate and to influence – the labor unions. My strength lay 
in the anonymity of my appearance. People see me in the street and think they have seen 
me somewhere before. I look like someone they know: ‘you lived in Segovia five centuries 
ago, didn’t you? You worked in the famous tobacconists’. Perhaps it’s true or maybe it’s a 
lie but I have met people that I’ve never seen before in my life and they have asked, ‘how 
are you? How have you been? How long has it been? What have you been doing? Do you 
remember that I was fighting with my husband all the time? Well, I got divorced and I’m 
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living with another man’. They talk about these kind of things and then they leave. So 
people think they know me – I seem familiar to them, like someone they’ve seen around - 
and this helps me build a normal relationship with people. When the Communist party sent 
me to Barranca[-bermeja] in 1984 – at the time of the strongest military and paramilitary 
occupation in all its history - I blended in. I was a pre-school teacher. I met the parents – 
mostly from DAS (State Security) or MAS (paramilitaries of the cartel of Medellin) – 
through the children that I taught. The children were great but I didn’t like the parents 
because they represented the enemy to me and at that time they were committing countless 
massacres and assassinations in the region. I moved around the region with a pistol and a 
pile of political propaganda but the authorities never stopped and searched me. As well as 
being a teacher and married to a union leader in Ecopetrol, I organised and captained the 
women’s regional basketball team and coached the wives of the managers and staff of 
Ecopetrol. This cover gave me the confidence to do the things I had to do. Sure I was 
scared but the fear didn’t paralyze me. It’s the fear that leaps up inside of you and tells you 
to be careful. I was half animal in the beginning but I soon became all animal because the 
danger at that time was terrible although the fear always told me if something was about to 
happen. It’s the feeling that something is in the air; the air doesn’t feel right; it isn’t 
harmonious. For example after mobilisation we lived in Santa Marta. Someone broke into 
our apartment. They stole the fan. We found bits of it on the floor. But they didn’t steal the 
checks that we left on the bed and something was strange. It’s like a strange energy. As 
soon as we opened the door we said to each other at the same time: ‘something strange is 
going on; something strange is happening’. We left the house at once and talked about the 
robbery that wasn’t a robbery: ‘Who could it be? Who knows who we are and where we 
are? Why did they steal the fan and nothing else? Because they didn’t know it was broken?’  
 
Finally we got back to the flat. There were ambulances outside and a neighbour told us that 
two men armed with submachine guns had killed nearly all the people that lived on our 
floor. Only two had managed to save themselves. One had jumped out the window.       
 
On another occasion we nearly got caught out because we didn’t read the signs right. Do 
you remember when Uribe took possession for the first time? I woke up at about one in the 
379 
 
 
morning and he was rolling around in bed telling me he couldn’t sleep. I rubbed his back 
and calmed him down until he got to sleep and meantime I kept guard. I was anxious, a bit 
worried. He woke up at five o’clock saying, ‘let’s go; let’s go’. We got dressed, grabbed 
something to eat, and got into the car. At seven in the morning we were walking around 
Parque Simon Bolivar. At eleven o’clock we were still there. It started to rain. We sheltered 
in a restaurant and we had something to eat. Then, ‘let’s go; let’s go’. We had an 
appointment with someone in Calle 7, Carrera 24. As we crossed the 7
th
 we saw the 
stampede. That afternoon in La Calera some companions told us what had happened: that 
the bombs had fallen they didn’t know where; that someone had died here and another one 
over there. We asked about two friends of ours and we found out that they had also died. 
They tripped and the crowds trampled them underfoot. We hadn’t read the signs right.      
 
Paramilitaries 
 
On 13
th
 May 1995 they assassinated one of my companions who was also my bodyguard. It 
took me only about a week to find out the names of the four people who had done it. They 
were paramilitaries. But instead of creating a scandal because I don’t believe in scandals 
what I did was I went looking for the leader of their group of paramilitaries to find out what 
they were up to. Three months later I discovered who he was and where and how to get in 
touch with him. I telephoned and arranged to meet him.    
 
I arrived at his camp at seven o’clock at night and in pitch darkness because he had 
arranged to cut the power. He didn’t even permit a candle. As soon as I sat down he started 
to speak. He told me he thought I was very brave to walk all the way up to his camp in the 
darkness.  
 
I replied – or rather lied – that I’d come because I had heard that he was a man of honour, a 
man of his word and that if at any time I felt the need I understood that I could merely turn 
my back and head down the hill and that nothing bad would happen to me because I could 
trust his word. His intermediary was a government official. I had met him before in the 
governor’s office. He explained that his paramilitary boss hadn’t sent instructions to 
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assassinate my bodyguard. The money had come from a private source and some of his 
men had accepted the job of killing me but that he, the leader, did not have anything to do 
with it. I asked him to arrange a peace negotiation between us – the EPL - and the regional 
authorities.    I talked to him like this for two hours. I had eaten very little that day and the 
adrenalin was going to my head. At some point in the proceedings he said, ‘make yourself 
at home’. I was hungry so, as I would do if I were in my own home, I asked him if I could 
have something to eat. One of his men – out of the 15 bodyguards he had around him –
disappeared and came back with two tins of sardines on a plate, packets of crackers and 
lemonade. The chief served me the sardines out of the can.  
 
‘Do you know that you resemble one of my companions, one of our commanders?’  
 
‘How come?’ he replied angrily. I told him that his men serve him faithfully, that he is the 
only one that gives orders around here, and that only he has the right to lose control of his 
temper. The paramilitaries and the guerrilla think differently - the guerrilla think we should 
do away with private property; the paramilitaries think we should support it – and these are 
the reasons for our conflict. But I wasn’t in the conflict any more; I had demobilised. Why 
did he have to kill me? The chief jumped to his feet, totally furious and yelling that his job 
was to kill all the guerrilla that he could lay his hands on. I calmed him down by asking 
him how old he was.  
 
‘I’m 78; so what?’  
 
I told him that my comrade, the guerrilla commander, had turned 78 on the 15
th
 of January 
that same year. He asked me to tell him the point of all this was but didn’t let me speak. 
Finally I got a word in. I told him that I had the right to talk, that he had the right to talk, 
that he even had the right to lie to me but that he had to listen to me in the first place in any 
case. The two of us talked in circles like this for hours. Things got tense every now and 
then but I always brought him round by describing small personal things. He didn’t use his 
lighter until at around 11.30 at night he suddenly flashed it in my face. I asked him how he 
had imagined a female guerrilla commander to be. He told me he imagined them to be 
381 
 
 
macho, curly hair, big, not wearing a belt, hands on their hips, bad mannered in the manner 
of men, giving orders rather than speaking. ‘But not like you.’  
 
Then he ordered a jeep, his best driver, and a bodyguard and instructed them to take me to 
the bottom of the hill. His driver was fast asleep and drunk but they woke him up and told 
him what to do. As we were on our way down the hill the driver wanted to know my name. 
The bodyguard told him, ‘she’s one of their commanders’. Here I was in the middle of 
nowhere where anything could happen to me and no-one would ever find out what. ‘Have 
you never given a lift to the guerrilla before?’ he insisted. The driver replied that he had 
been given his orders, that he had been told to drive someone, that it didn’t matter who that 
person was, and that in any case I seemed fine to him and that he had been instructed to 
make sure that I arrived safe and sound at my destination. We started talking. They told me 
that they knew the two men who were supposed to kill me and promised me that if I needed 
bodyguards they would oblige. ‘Tell them to look after me please if you see them around,’ I 
suggested. As we approached the main road, one of them told me he wanted something to 
remember me by. ‘I like your bag,’ he said. ‘No, not my bag, please not my bag.’ It is an 
indigenous handmade bag made of seeds. But how could I say no, here at half past 12 in the 
middle of nowhere, and totally at their mercy? Tell me to refuse. But I managed to persuade 
him that a chewed pencil that I’d been carrying around with me for years would do just as 
well.                 
 
By the time we said goodbye it was like, ‘whatever you need, whenever you need it, just 
get in touch with me. Please look after yourself’. That is the terrible thing about war: it’s 
not so much about fear as about whether you get on well or badly with another person. 
Social relations should be on this level. I’d like to be the parent of the children of the 
paramilitaries. Does it matter who is the tallest, the strongest or the toughest? Do all the 
people that oppose Uribe support the FARC? That irrationality stops us from being human. 
The policeman that met me on the corner as I was walking up the street this afternoon with 
a bag of groceries smiled at me and said, ‘good afternoon, madam’. I wanted to give him a 
hug. He looked me in the eyes and spoke from the heart and said, ‘good afternoon’. 
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Danger 
 
I’m talking about a skill; it’s intangible; you meet people that seem very nice, very polite, 
but something is missing. You recognize unusual characteristics; unsaid things that help 
you identify friend or foe. It’s saved my life on various occasions.    
 
After I arrived in Barranca I became a leader of the teachers’ union but was called back to 
Bogotá on Communist party business. The party distanced itself from the labor unions at 
that time but I returned to Barranca as a ‘companion in the struggle’. Because I was the pre-
school teacher I was such a familiar person in the community that people told me all their 
news, what people were saying in their private meetings and what decisions had already 
been made. I distributed communist propaganda and robbed from supermarkets to raise 
funds for the cause. They caught me twice. The first time they let me go. The second time 
one of the employees caught me red-handed. The guards called the police who arrested me 
for pilfering. I arrived at the police station at ten o’clock. My stomach’s turning circles just 
telling you about it. Remember, these were blood-soaked times. I was still there in the 
station at 4.30 in the afternoon. But by that time they had given me money and the police 
commander had offered me his services as legal adviser. How did I manage that? If you 
give them the story straight away no one’s going to believe you. You have to pause – hold 
back – play with their imaginations. Tell them the fantasies that they want to believe in. 
Create a project that is supposed to be your life. I explained that I was pregnant. That part 
was definitely true; it had only happened a month and a half before but my belly was so big 
I looked about five months gone. They looked at me to make sure: ‘Please don’t hit me’.     
 
I told them another bit of my story - also true – that they’d thrown me out of my job as high 
school teacher because I was pregnant and that was why I’d been working in the 
supermarket. They believed me: how could a pregnant woman teach in a high school? Then 
I had to lie because I used the place where I stayed to store dynamite, propaganda and 
weapons. There was no way I could tell them about this place so I said I was staying in the 
house of a friend of mine, an old woman. They phoned the school and the friend and 
‘verified’ that part of the story. The other problem was that they had brought me to the 
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police station with a bag of beans and a handful of figs. My companion had handed me 
other things too but the police didn’t connect them to me. The policemen just looked at the 
beans and the figs and said, ‘that poor kid. This is terrible’.   
 
Still I felt bad. I had already wasted an hour and a half in this dreary place answering loads 
of questions, on eof them sitting in front of me and the other pacing around the table, 
gazing into my face and pacing again. Once he even asked the other policeman to 
accompany him to the door and whispered something behind his hand about me. The first 
policeman returned to his place and asked me the same questions all over again.  
 
Finally they changed places. The second policeman then asked me if I had ever worked in 
another supermarket: ‘Yes, for a while’. Something happened that’ll make you laugh. I 
worked in the security team of the other supermarket about a year before and only at the 
weekend. The second policeman had been pacing round the room because he had 
recognized me but he couldn’t remember from where. He had been the head of security and 
we had mutual friends. ‘You don’t know me because I had to monitor you through the 
glass. I remember now; I remember.’ He was full of happiness because his memory had 
returned. First, came the recognition; then, the kindness and tenderness. They got me a 
coffee because it was noon. They told me what a shame it was that I was in prison and on a 
Friday. They told me what to say to the judge and that I could have what I wanted for 
lunch. The captain had gone for lunch also and the judge but I met the first of them at 2.00 
and the other at 4.00 pm.  
 
‘Do you know what happened?’ I said to the captain as soon as I walked into his office. ‘I 
had a bag of beans in my hand and a few figs and the police came along and arrested me.’ 
‘Did you have money to pay?’ he asked. I explained that my companion had the money but 
as soon as she saw the police she panicked and ran. The captain told me to tell the judge 
that I hadn’t robbed anyone because I was still inside the shop when the police came. He 
gave me some money and said, ‘if the judge asks you if you had money to pay, you should 
show him this. If the judge asks you if you have a job you should say you are a teacher and 
an honorable person and that I can confirm this’. At 4.30 I passed through a cordon of 
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policemen and into the courtroom. They were all patting me on the back, telling me not to 
worry and that, you’re one of us. The captain had filled all the forms for me; the judge said 
he would take care of the papers personally. As I was leaving the court the clerk stopped 
and asked me if I was still looking for a job. I told him I was and he handed me a scrap of 
paper with an address on it, This is my cousin. He has a small business. Tell him I sent you 
and he’ll give you work. The captain refused to take his money back. 
 
That skill of getting on with people, as you may imagine, coupled with the belief - the 
certainty - that I was doing the right thing, helped me to open space in the labor unions.  
 
The labour union 
 
After I got married to a union leader I got a job myself in the labor union of Ecopetrol. My 
role was to build communist structures in different areas of production. I managed to get 
myself elected to the committee in charge of all forms of energy in the region: petrol, 
electricity, gas and coal. The committee was dominated by men – and by machismo 
because men perform most of the labor. There were only five women among the 100 
communist party militants in Ecopetrol. Out of the 95 men and five women I was the only 
one appointed to be a director of the regional energy committee. That statistic spelled the 
end of my marriage because my husband had been in the company far longer than I had and 
couldn’t stand having me as his superior in the union meetings. Besides I had to leave 
Barranca. It was getting too dangerous living that kind of life with two kids, one of them 
five at that time – 1984 – and the other only four. One time I was out distributing EPL 
pamphlets and the kids had face paint on and were holding bunches of flowers and singing 
one of the Leftist chants of that era – ‘que vive, que vive, que vive el EPL’ – and there was 
a basketball game in the street. One of the kids tripped on the kerb and fell inside the main 
DAS office still singing, ‘que vive …         
 
I had a lot of energy in those days and I believed in our cause. I arranged the first 
communist meeting in the USO only three months after I arrived. I captained both North 
Santander and Ecopetrol in women’s basketball; a year and a half after I got there we won 
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the zonal championship. I was a teacher so it was less dangerous for me to stick up posters. 
At that time the leaders and members of the unions protected us.  
 
There was a move to expel me from the union but it failed. The first time I argued that since 
I wasn’t in fact a member of the union they couldn’t get rid of me. The second time two of 
my opponents had looked after my kids while I was out risking my life getting checks 
signed during a paramilitary siege. ‘As soon as the danger is over,’ I sneered, ‘all the heroes 
emerge from the shadows’. This is one of the two main problems that arise in all alternative 
political and social movements. One problem occurs as leaders manipulate the 
organisations that they are supposed to represent and betray the principles that they never 
had in the first place. The other problem is the illusion that the organisations are apolitical. 
But all organisations are political; all our attitudes are political. If a neighbor complains that 
the price of public services is going up that is also a political statement. The consequence of 
that attitude depends on the individual.  
 
People don’t believe in what they are doing; that was the main problem in the unions that I 
was in. The inertia sets in as soon as union members start to see themselves as superior to 
the other employees. They end up being the laziest workers, the drunks, the ones that hide 
in the corner because their work is so bad, the ones that steal. The Colombian unions have 
failed and the conglomerates and monopolies are stronger than ever.  
 
I used labor unions to fight big business through control of production. In 1987 I arranged a 
regional power cut as a representative of the energy union. It was a total black out. You 
couldn’t even use the phones to call for help. I got caught up in the romanticism of it all. A 
neighbor had complained about the size of her gas bill and I had tried to help her.  
 
Demobilisation 
 
There was so much innocence around at that time; our solutions were the banners, the 
ideals, and the chants. There was so much mysticism but so little clarity about the future. 
Communist leaders dominated the peace negotiations and drowned the voices of the other 
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members. Our members stopped attending meetings; we weren’t prepared for peace. The 
fighting did not stop in any case. The FARC hit the EPL hard in Uraba: ‘bang, bang, bang’. 
No-one remembers that. The Union Patriotica suffered genocide, massacres, betrayal – 
everyone knows about that – but the FARC inflicted mortal wounds on other communist 
groups. The problem is that we are human beings: we repeat what we ourselves have lived 
through. The moment a victim of the violence becomes a father he says to himself, ‘now 
it’s my turn’. He beats each one of his little kids saying, ‘I’m not even hitting you hard and 
in any case it didn’t do me any harm …         
 
I felt happy at the start of the peace negotiations. I didn’t feel pain as others did. I thought 
that everything that had happened before – everything that we had done – had been for this. 
I didn’t realise that our leaders had mounted this farce in order to betray us. The truth sank 
in as I listened to ex-comrades making speeches in the public squares and saying that I had 
betrayed them and made a deal with the paramilitaries 
 
17. Ex-coordinator of Colombian communist party communications 
 
The most important publication of the EPL, the militant Maoist group was Revolucion. This 
newspaper was the national organ of the Communist party and its regional voice in Uraba, 
Cordoba and Antioquia. Revolucion published and defended party policies and included 
homages to fallen comrades. In 1990 it became a weekly newspaper and had regular 
columnists such as myself who analysed important issues in depth. After the demobilisation 
of the EPL in 1993 publication stopped because of the lack of infrastructure and funds. The 
second most important publications inside the armed communist groups were the bulletins 
that passed on military information and strategies. The EPL had support among local 
authorities and communities of campesinos in the zones of conflict. The most important 
publication that circulated among these ‘patriotic’ committees (‘las juntas patrioticas’) was 
a magazine called Avancemos: Let’s advance. Other publications that circulated inside the 
armed groups included Orientacion: a theoretical magazine that presented the official 
Communist party line and that had to be studied and analysed by all members of these 
armed groups.  
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Communications 
 
In the 1960s the Colombian Communist party was affiliated to international communist 
groups in Spain, in Ecuador (where the party was legal and nearly gained power but their 
leader was assassinated), and in the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Brazil. They 
broadcast the Spanish-language programs of the Colombian Communist party on Radio 
Tirana in Albania, on a national Chinese station (Peking Informa) and in the former 
Spanish colonies of Ethiopia and the Western Sahara.  
 
They used other media such as occupations of companies and factories, kidnappings of high 
profile politicians and big businessmen, murals daubed in tar that promoted the Colombian 
communist movement, posters printed in stencil and banners that were carried on marches 
or draped across the mountains or around campuses. Other forms of communication were 
cultural: they published books of poetry and stories and broadcast revolutionary songs.  
 
In the 1980s they occupied army radio stations and broadcast their own political messages 
and used sympathetic journalists to promote their cause. Their radio communication 
systems and ciphered messages were more sophisticated than those of the Armed Forces. 
The ELN also set up their radio station, Patria Libre that broadcast nationwide. During the 
negotiations between the EPL and the government in the second half of the 1980s, the EPL 
had its own press agency – SERVIPRENSA - that had an office in Bogotá. The director 
was threatened; journalists were assassinated; and the office was closed. Between 1990 and 
1991 the EPL had its own radio station, Radio Resistencia.                    
 
Educating the masses 
 
The most important form of communication was through ‘working with the masses’. In the 
60s the EPL lived and worked with campesinos, in farming cooperatives and in social 
programs, mostly in the regions of Uraba, Cordoba, Antioquia, Santander and Putumayo. 
Their members tended to be students with rural roots. Members of the EPL continued to 
live in these zones, had intellectual connections with the local inhabitants, and shared their 
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experiences with representatives of other regions. Between 1970 and 1975 they taught 
teachers and students in high schools and universities most of all in the regions of La 
Guajira (in the north-eastern desert region) and in Putumayo (in the southern jungle). 
Members of the EPL on the coast tended to be graduates from high school and universities. 
The EPL infiltrated the labor unions in the late 70s and early 80s and concentrated on the 
poor urban districts and civil protests and mobilisations from 1983 onwards. The EPL had 
its strongest civilian influence in Medellin; in 1984 the EPL, the M-19 and the government 
signed a ceasefire; 30,000 civil sympathizers and collaborators – members of fronts in 
factories, universities, high schools and hospitals – participated in the main square.             
Conflict 
 
The FARC entered Uraba in 1976. one of the FARC leaders decided to unite with one of 
the EPL groups. The central FARC command considered this to be a betrayal of their 
principles because the FARC are territorial and oligarchic in their regions. Their vision is 
sectarian and they see other armed revolutionary groups as their enemies. Ricardo Franco 
who murdered hundreds of his own soldiers for alleged betrayal is the classic example of 
their ruthlessness. Gilbert, the supposed traitor was assassinated and five FARC fronts were 
ordered to exterminate the EPL in the region. Hundreds of EPL sympathizers and 
collaborators were assassinated. In the second half of the 1970s the EPL entered a political 
crisis because although the leaders of the Colombian Communist party supported armed 
struggle, their representatives in the campesino associations and social movements 
advocated peaceful protest. Rural mobilisations at that time carried EPL banners; the EPL 
had a strong influence in high schools and universities; and there were plans to legalize 
their movement. In 1980 the five leaders of the Communist party supported armed struggle 
and expelled their critics – regional politicians and leaders of communities – from the party.  
 
In 1982 a faction of the EPL, the Revolutionary Democratic Union (La union democratica 
revolucionaria) legalised itself and modernised its communication system: investing in 
schools of journalism and state of the art media technology. In 1983 President Betancur 
called a truce between the EPL, the M-19 and the government. The regime promised to 
implement an unbiased electoral system and to call a national assembly to create a new 
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constitution. Revolucion was legalised. In 1985 the main Communist groups formed  a 
committee (La coordinadora nacional guerrillera Simon Bolivar) to negotiate peace with 
the government. The FARC signed an agreement subtitled, ‘Not a shot (to be fired) 
between revolutionaries’      
 
 
18. Demobilised leader and member of the main armed communist groups: ELN and FARC  
 
He associates his first interest in armed political and social struggle in the early 1970s with 
the revolutionary Christian vision of Camilo Torres and the ideals of Liberation theology. 
His father was sick and he had access to his library. He started to read about the Frente 
Unido (the socialist movement of Camilo Torres) and he discovered that his father had been 
a militant member of ANAPO (the popular movement that gave rise to the M-19).  
 
In the mid 70s he enlisted in the ELN for sentimental Christian reasons and through the 
influence of a local Baptist minister. There are three levels of commitment to the ELN 
cause: sympathy, collaboration and militancy. He passed through these levels in the rural 
south of Bogotá and learnt military intelligence: to tail his targets, to collect information 
and to blackmail them. At that time the ELN had collaborators in the labor unions and in 
Catholic missions. The ELN attracted the most brilliant students in the public universities, 
the best doctors and the best lawyers. The alternative political theatre groups in the 1970s 
supported them. The main inspirations behind the ELN were Antonio Galan and Che 
Guevara. The ELN was a group of social reformers, an armed labor union rather than an 
armed revolutionary group, but the regimes of President Michelsen and Turbay 
marginalised them, infiltrated the movement, tortured their members, hunted them down 
and assassinated them publicly in the streets.  
 
The murder of one of their leaders radicalised the movement in the late 70s.       He himself 
started to participate in military operations: ‘collecting finance’ (robbing) and ‘retaining’ 
(kidnapping) high profile corrupt businessmen on the grounds that they should pay for their 
crimes against the Colombian people. At the end of the year he accompanied a group of 
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fourteen militants, twelve of them women, to ‘work with the masses’ in the sparsely 
populated rural regions of the north of the Valle de Cauca. The local population consisted 
of poor colonial campesinos and indigenous peoples.  
 
The main problem that the group faced in their attempts to create a revolutionary political 
consciousness was that unlike the FARC the ELN had urban intellectual rather than 
campesino roots. They gained the confidence of the local people through evangelical 
Christian discourse but they never won their respect because that could only be gained by 
machismo and physical superheroes. The members of the ELN had few arms and were 
vulnerable in a hostile region where the main foods were iguana and wild birds and the 
indigenous peoples caught fish with harpoons. They were terrified of other armed groups in 
the region but were ordered to seize a police station guarded by eight men. Fortunately it 
was already in the hands of the M-19. Six months later he fell ill and had to return home.                    
 
In 1981 his best friend was killed in an operation and two more ELN leaders were 
assassinated by the Armed Forces. That caused retaliation in the form of sabotage and the 
demolition of the houses of Conservative and Liberal elites. He was one of only twelve 
militants in the capital, two of whom were assassinated. He on the other hand was captured 
as he attempted to storm a police station. He was beaten, hung up by the fingers and 
tortured. Ten days later he was cross-questioned in the military prison. He didn’t betray the 
cause because he gave them useless information that could easily be verified and because 
he had had a strong ideological upbringing’. He was later sent to prison where he met 
members of other armed Communist groups. Together they formed a new alliance, El 
Frente Unido de Camilo Torres, and as a result he was expelled from the ELN.          
 
From 1982 to 1985 he participated in the negotiations with the Betancur regime but in 1985 
after the massacre of the M-19 and of the magistrates in the Palace of Justice he faced three 
choices: to return to the ELN, to create a new movement or to enlist in the FARC. In 1986 
he attended a FARC training school and enlisted in an urban unit. He was responsible for 
communications, for coordination between urban and rural units and for the collection of 
funds. The FARC is more centralised than the ELN. The regional units of the FARC have 
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to collect predetermined sums of money that must be transferred on time to the central 
command. The FARC are pragmatic in this sense: the end justifies the means. For this 
reason the FARC tax businesses and landowners and participate in drug traffic and 
kidnapping.  
 
In the 1980s they mainly kidnapped corrupt politicians and the children of the oligarchic 
families: their prisoners paid for their crimes against the people with prison sentences and 
ransoms. Now they kidnap anyone with money. He disagrees with the FARC in this 
respect: kidnapping alienates people who might otherwise participate in the armed struggle. 
That’s why he resigned from the movement in 1992 and started to work with the 
government in the field of negotiation and rehabilitation.  
 
Differences between FARC and ELN 
 
The main difference between the ELN and the FARC is that the ELN has a larger number 
of intellectuals in their ranks; the FARC has always been a predominantly campesino 
organisation because of its origins in Marquetalia and the so-called ‘independent republics’ 
that were self-sufficient farming settlements. The ELN and the FARC also differ in their 
methods of recruitment and resistance: the ELN operates through the labour unions while 
the FARC recruits new members for their armed groups. In 1984, at the time of the 
negotiations with the Betancur regime, the FARC had only 12 fronts; each front had 
between 200 and 400 militants. During the ‘negotiations’, the FARC expanded 
considerably: by 1986 they had doubled in size - into 24 fronts – and expanded into new 
zones such as the Eastern Llanos. The Colombian ruling class, the class of ‘dirigentes’ 
(leaders) or rather ‘delincuentes’ (delinquents) is myopic: during ‘peace negotiations’ they 
have assassinated leaders of the resistance rather than initiate agrarian reform and make the 
structural changes necessary for peace and that’s their way of creating cyclical wars   
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19. Editor of community newspaper 
 
The history of the community 
 
‘The Alliance for progress has now come to the people of Techo. The promise of a better 
life is now a reality for these workers and their families. They will live in these new houses 
as free men, not subjects of despotic governments’ (Inauguration speech of President and 
Jacqueline Kennedy, 17 December 1961)    
 
Most of the first inhabitants of the marginalized districts of Bogotá were displaced from the 
countryside and came here to escape from the violence and to look for education, health 
and job opportunities. They had lost their land because they didn’t have documents to prove 
their ownership but their life was harder in the city because they had to pay for everything; 
in the countryside at least they could eat. The neighborhood was first named Barrio Techo 
after the indigenous ruler, Techotiba. It was presented as part of the Alliance for progress: 
the US plan to counteract the effects of the Cuban revolution in 1959. Barrio Techo was 
presented as a social housing program that would help the poorest people in the city. Its 
name was changed to Barrio Kennedy after his assassination. 
 
The barrio was constructed about 30 kilometers from the centre of the capital, between the 
airport and the racetracks. It was built around ‘la plaza de las banderas’, the circle of 
national flags that had been set up to welcome international delegates to the Panamerican 
conference of 1948 (that ‘coincided’ with the assassination of Gaitan and the start of La 
Violencia). The publicity that surrounded the presidential visit raised the false expectation 
that the US government had paid for the houses. The future inhabitants of  Kennedy had to 
build the houses themselves.  
 
They had to work every day including weekends and public holidays using blocks of white 
cement that you’d never find in the rich neighborhoods. It’s always like that: the poor never 
get the same opportunities. The houses weren’t free: the new owners had to pay four pesos 
per month for fifteen years; if they missed ten months of payments they lost the house. The 
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inhabitants had to prove that they were poor before they could move in but most of the 
houses ended up in the hands of rich landlords. Houses were raffled and six months after 
construction the State still hadn’t provided adequate public services: there was no running 
water in the houses; only one water tap every two blocks; and the only roads were the 
asphalt runways of the airport. Businessmen rapidly moved in from other neighborhoods to 
set up their shops and monopolies and construct more houses without permission or public 
services and sell them off.                  
 
Foundation of Patio Bonito 
 
The foundation of this barrio began in 1974 because Jose Samudio, the owner of the local 
farm (‘Los pantanos’) decided to sell off his land in lots of 6 by 12 meters to construct 
houses. In the first three months he sold off 1,050 lots at a price of 14,000 pesos each. He 
sold off the last of this land at 35,000 pesos per lot and he used the money that he made 
from all this to buy up more farmland and sell off more lots. The State refused to provide 
the services that Samudio had promised his customers: there was no electricity, running 
water or sanitation. Individual households had to dig four meter deep septic tanks but in 15 
days they filled up and overflowed creating a serious risk of epidemics. This forced the 
inhabitants to form a social action committee (‘junta de accion comunal’) to organise the 
construction of a sewage system and a school for the children. The neighboring farm – that 
bred the horses that were used in the racecourse – opposed the pipe that carried the sewage 
system to the outflow in the River Bogotá but the communist party pushed for the rights of 
the local community and permission was granted. In 1979 the river flooded and the sewage 
contaminated the neighborhood. The next struggle that faced the social action committee 
revolved around the construction of a school on the land that members of the community 
had offered the Church. The local priest – an ex-officer in the Armed Forces – opposed the 
construction of the school and accused the members of the committee of being communists 
but once again the committee prevailed.  
 
In 1980 the municipal authorities and their economic allies devised a plan to clear the poor 
people out of Patio Bonito: they decided to place the city garbage dump in the centre of the 
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barrio. Once again the local priest supported the municipal authorities and the committee 
opposed them. In 1988 the committee organised a public protest to block the construction. 
The authorities sent in the army – fifty soldiers arrived in two trucks – but they were faced 
by a multitude of 3,000 inhabitants backed by FARC militants. The mass media reported 
the crisis and the authorities retreated once again.     
 
Sources of violence 
 
The violence in the barrios of Bogotá tends to be on the level of cartels of ‘pandillas’ 
(gangs). The larger cartels have more than fifty members. The veteran leaders (‘los 
antiguos’) distribute the guns. These cartels fight for control of different barrios around the 
city and for the right to rob in the barrio and sell drugs or control prostitution. They also 
liaise with local authorities, businessmen and police to implement ‘social cleansing 
programs’ (the culling of ‘down-and-outs’). Their main business is contraband: dealing in 
stolen or counterfeit goods. The conglomerates have monopolized the production and sale 
of legal products; only people in the North of the city can afford them so most goods are 
contraband. These cartels also control sectors in the prisons which are small cities where 
the same rules and businesses – murder, theft, drugs, and prostitution – apply. Prison 
guards collaborate: the cartel inside in the prison is supported by the cartel outside and the 
bosses live better inside and out.                  
 
The newspaper 
 
This paper differs from community publications that represent or accept funds from 
political parties such as the Polo Democratico (that supports the mayor, Lucho Garzon) or 
from the local administration or from mainstream newspapers such as El Tiempo or from 
local businesses. The majority of community newspapers mostly contain political 
propaganda or advertisements. This paper on the other hand refuses to accept funds: the 
members fund the newspaper themselves. It therefore has a strong political and social 
message; it runs articles on the problems of the current regime, public services, local 
businesses, street children; it attempts to present local problems in the context of more 
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general issues that are of interest to people that live outside the locality of Kennedy. It also 
promotes participation in protests and marches.  
 
Hundreds of inhabitants marched from Patio Bonito to the main square, Plaza Bolivar to 
protest against the TLC; but someone – perhaps an infiltrator – threw a firecracker; the 
ESMAD waded in and half the protesters fled.        
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Appendix 3 
 
Instruction manual for content and frame analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
Only news stories which refer to and name the guerrilla or the FARC (las Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia) and/or the paramilitaries or the AUC (las Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia) are coded from eight Colombian news organisations on the dates and 
at the times specified in Research Plan I. This instruction manual is divided into 8 
categories - 1. number, 2. news organisation, 3. date, 4. faction, 5. topic 1, 6. topic 2, 7. 
source and 8. attribution of responsibility - which correspond to the 8 main sections on the 
coding sheet. This manual defines these 8 categories and contains instructions on how to 
code and interpret the stories.  
 
Categories 
 
1. NUMBER: Each news story from each news organisation is treated as a separate item 
and numbered as such  
 
2. NEWS ORGANISATION: Each news organisation corresponds to a code from 01 to 08 
as follows  
 
01 El Tiempo 
02 El Colombiano 
03 El Pais 
04 El Espacio  
05 El Cambio 
06 La Voz 
07 Caracol TV 
08 RCN radio 
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3. DATE: This is the date of the publication or the broadcast of each of the news stories. 
The 1
st
 November, 2003 for example is coded as 01.11.03    
 
4. FACTION: The main faction represented in each of the stories is coded. If the main 
faction is unclear, the code is 04 Other 
 
01 This story mainly refers to issues and events associated with the guerrilla or the 
FARC (las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and their representatives 
02  This story mainly refers to issues and events associated with the paramilitaries or the 
AUC (las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) 
03 This story mainly refers to representatives of the guerrilla and the paramilitaries in 
more or less equal measure 
04 Other 
 
5. TOPIC 1: These are the codes of the main topic or topics of the news stories. Topics are 
listed in alphabetical order for ease of reference 
 
01 Accident/disaster  
 This refers to accidents which involve the FARC and/or the AUC. It includes 
accidents which result in injuries or death, stories of rescues or rescue attempts, and 
accidental occurrences such as fires or floods 
02 Agriculture/farming  
 This includes the influence of the FARC and/or the AUC on the livelihood of 
farmers, on food production and shortages 
03 Business/finance   
 This refers to their influence on banking, investment and share prices  
04 Business/industry/retail  
 This includes the influence of the FARC and/or the AUC on named national 
industries and on named retail organisations, on their profits and losses, and on 
privatisation and consumer issues 
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05 Business/local  
 This refers to their influence on local businesses 
06 Charities  
 This includes named charities and their appeals for aid in support of - or in response 
to - FARC and/or AUC activities 
07 Conscription/military recruitment  
 This refers to cases of forced and unforced conscription and cases of military 
recruitment 
08 Displacement   
 This includes cases of the forced displacement of local populations or of internal 
refugees as a result of FARC and/or AUC incursions and to the forced emigration of 
Colombian citizens  
09 Drugs 
 This refers to their alleged involvement in all aspects of the drug trade and to the 
economic and social consequences of drug-related activities 
10 Hostages/detention  
 This includes the capture of prisoners in combat, detention of suspected members of 
armed groups, kidnapping of civilians, negotiations between kidnappers and the public and 
non-governmental groups, the treatment and release of hostages, and ransom demands. 
Negotiations between representatives of the present government and the FARC and/or the 
AUC are coded as 20: Negotiations   
11 Mental stress 
 This refers to harassment, threats, and mental stress that results from FARC and/or 
AUC activities 
12 Physical assault/casualties  
 This includes the threat or the implication of physical assault, child abuse, sexual 
abuse, torture, manslaughter, murder and massacre in addition to casualties which result 
from military operations, occupation of land or military blockades   
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13 Property/confiscation   
 This refers to all incidents of accidental or consequential or intentional destruction of 
public buildings and public property, houses and personal property; to theft and extortion 
attributed to the FARC and/or the AUC; and to the confiscation of weapons and explosives  
14 Economy  
 This includes the influence of the FARC and/or the AUC on inflation, interest rates, 
taxation, imports and exports, international trade and national budgets  
15 Education  
 This refers to FARC and/or AUC influence on schools and universities, on 
educational policies and expenditure and on educational standards  
16 Employment  
 This includes issues of employment or unemployment related to FARC and/or AUC 
policies or activities 
17 Environment 
 This refers to ecological issues (such as conservation of - or damage to - the natural 
environment), animal rights issues and heritage issues (such as preservation or destruction 
of historical monuments) 
18 Infrastructure  
 This includes maintenance or disruption or destruction of the national infrastructure, 
road blocks, and the sabotage of oil pipelines and radio masts 
19 National security 
 This refers to national defence budgets, to the threat which the FARC and/or AUC 
pose to the security of the Colombian nation, to their role in the arms trade, and to 
espionage  
20 Negotiation  
 This includes news on the state or status of negotations between the present 
government or its representatives and the FARC and/or the AUC 
21 Other  
  
6. TOPIC 2: A story which has more than one main topic should be coded as above. TOPIC 
2 may or may not be less important than TOPIC 1  
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7. SOURCE: The use of ten separate sources in each of the news stories - foreign sources, 
representatives of the Colombian government, of the official Colombian opposition, of 
Colombian academic institutions, of Colombian business or retail organisations, of the 
Church, of the public, the Colombian Armed Forces, the AUC and the FARC - should be 
coded. 01 means that the source is referred to. 02 means that the source does not appear. 03 
means that the reference is unclear. Representatives can be past or present members of 
these organisations. Sources are coded separately in order to measure the permutations of 
sources which appear in each of the news stories 
 
S 1 Foreign source/s 
S 2 Representative/s of the Colombian government  
S 3 Representative/s of the official Colombian opposition 
S 4 Representative/s of Colombian academic institutions 
S 5 Representative/s of Colombian business or retail organisations 
S 6 Representative/s of the Church 
S 7 Representative/s of the Colombian public 
S 8 Representative/s of the Colombian Armed Forces or police 
S 9 Representative/s of the FARC 
S 10 Representative/s of the AUC  
 
8. ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: This refers to news stories which attribute 
responsibility for a particular problem or range of problems to representatives of the AUC 
or the FARC or the guerrilla in general or to the Colombian government or Armed Forces 
or police for their failure to maintain law and order. 01 means that responsibility is 
attributed to that particular faction. 02 means that it is not attributed to that faction. 03 
means that there is no attribution of responsibility or that the faction is not specified or that 
the attribution is unclear  
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AUC: RESP 1  
 
01 Attributes responsibility to the AUC or its representatives 
02 Does not attribute responsibility to the AUC or its representatives 
03 There is no attribution of responsibility to the AUC or the faction is not specified or the 
attribution is unclear  
 
FARC: RESP 2  
 
01 Attributes responsibility to the FARC or its representatives  
02 Does not attribute responsibility to the FARC or its representatives 
03 There is no attribution of responsibility to the FARC or the faction is not specified or the 
attribution is unclear  
 
Colombian government and/or Armed Forces: RESP 3  
 
01 Attributes responsibility to the Colombian government (national, regional or local) 
and/or Armed Forces or police or their representatives  
02 Does not attribute responsibility to the Colombian government and/or its representatives 
03 There is no attribution of responsibility to the government or the faction is not specified 
or the attribution is unclear  
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Appendix 4 
 
Sample spreadsheet 
 
ORG DATE FACT TOP1 TOP2 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 RESP1 RESP2 RESP3 
1 30-Sep-2003 1 20 21 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
1 30-Sep-2003 2 12 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
1 30-Sep-2003 1 13 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
1 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 
1 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 3 20 12 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 3 20 9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 3 12 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 2 20 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 3 12 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
2 30-Sep-2003 3 20 12 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
3 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
3 30-Sep-2003 1 12 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
3 30-Sep-2003 3 20 21 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
3 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
6 30-Sep-2003 3 20 10 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
6 30-Sep-2003 2 20 12 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
6 30-Sep-2003 1 12 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
6 30-Sep-2003 2 12 20 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
6 30-Sep-2003 2 20 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
6 30-Sep-2003 2 10 13 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 
7 30-Sep-2003 3 20 10 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
7 30-Sep-2003 1 10 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 
7 30-Sep-2003 1 10 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
8 30-Sep-2003 1 20 10 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
8 30-Sep-2003 1 20 9 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
8 30-Sep-2003 2 10 9 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
8 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
8 30-Sep-2003 3 20 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
8 30-Sep-2003 1 12 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
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Appendix 5 
 
Sample of editorials and news stories related to the current armed conflict 
collected from El Tiempo, El Colombiano and El Pais  
on 30 September 2003 
 
1. ‘Uribe explains alternative to United Nations’ (El Tiempo) 
 
He will say that his government is open to opinions on the project to release authors of 
atrocities from prison. Today President Alvaro Uribe will refer, before the general assembly 
of the United Nations, to the right of countries to find judicial solutions to resolve serious 
internal problems, although his government does not reject the debate on the project to 
release authors of atrocities from prison. The mandate will meet with Kofi Annan, secretary 
general of the UN in the morning and will travel to Washington in the afternoon to talk 
with the Secretary State Colin Powell, leader of the House and president of the Senate 
commission of International Affairs … 
 
2. ‘8 combatants die’ (El Tiempo) 
 
An injured girl of 12 and five paras presumed to be dead were the results of the combat 
between the 14
th
 Brigade and the central unit of Bolivar de Caracoli in the North-east of 
Antioquia. This group had caused the displacement of 216 families because of internal 
conflict … 
 
3. ‘Deactivated cylinders’ (El Tiempo) 
 
Anti-explosive technicians in Cauca deactivated three cylinder bombs that members of the 
FARC had launched against the police station in Jambalo last Thursday when adherents of 
the insurgent group attempted to occupy the district. The attack left five people injured, 
amongst them a minor, and ten demolished houses. 
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4. ‘Yesterday the victims of the bomb in Florencia were buried’ (El Tiempo) 
 
A displaced child of nine, a taxi driver, a student, an adolescent and his mother appeared 
among the victims. They for pleasure or for work were at the site of the explosion. In a 
house of unpolished strips of wood and cement floors, in the third road of the Angel 
Ricardo Acosta barrio in Florencia, Caqueta, eleven women and five children keep vigil 
over the tiny corpse of Jefferson Alexander Yague Castro, a child of nine who died at three 
o’clock in the morning on Sunday when a bomb hidden in a motorcycle blew up in the 
middle of the entertainment zone as the neon lights were being put out and the weekend 
party-goers were getting ready to go home. Meanwhile, Roberto Murcia, had pulled taxi 
number XYC 716 up at the house in the first sector of Barrio Las Malvinas to pick up his 
keys. ‘I’m going to be a little late and I don’t want to wake up mum,’ he explained to one of 
his sisters. An hour later he called again to say that his car had broken down, that he had 
put it in a parking place, and that he had gone for a bite to eat in the entertainment zone.  
At the same time Juan Carlos Soto, the 26 year old owner of the Sound Factory had left his 
house, located less than thirty metres from the taxi driver’s, a little before six. By fatal 
coincidence all these people and seventy more were gathered together at three in the 
morning in the Sound Factory and Bongho bars when the bomb in the Suzuki motorcycle 
Viva 115 went off. It had been parked there even though policemen Robinson Ospina and 
Anderson Garcia had asked why the machine was violating the regulation that prohibited 
vehicles between one and five in the morning. The explosion that the authorities attributed 
to the FARC left 12 dead, among them the kid, the taxi driver, the student of engineering, 
the owner of the discoteque, the two policemen and the teenager who had gone looking for 
her boyfriend.               
 
5. ‘Combatants in Cauca’ (El Tiempo) 
 
A presumed FARC guerrillero died in combat between troops of the 27
th
 Jungle Brigade 
and FARC members in Cauca. In the same action, in Yunquillo, seven rifles, 1,646 bullets 
of different calibres, pieces of equipment and insurgency documents were regained       
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6. ‘Security is the theme of Uribe in the UN’ (El Colombiano) 
 
It is hoped that the UN offers the aid that is requested. Today in his statement to the general 
assembly of the United Nations, President Alvaro Uribe will have to use his powers of 
persuasion to regain the international image that he maintained during his first year of 
office, deflect the hard questioning of the ONGs and defend his project of alternative 
penalties. His proposal has already received criticism from 58 US congressmen …l 
 
7. ‘The president in the UN and in Washington’ (El Colombiano) 
 
Uribe will have to take full advantage of his hour in the UN and in the US congress to 
eliminate the uproar that his government has generated. The atmosphere in both scenarios 
not being the best for the first mandate, he will have to act with consummate diplomacy to 
regain the image and support of the global organisation and North American congress. The 
president insists that the UN fulfils its role as regards the illegal armed groups that maintain 
the war in Colombia and questions the information in human rights reports such as 
Colombia, a dead end, recently published by the United Nations. 
 
A certain despair has also been demonstrated as regards the absence of progress in 
negotiations with the guerrilla. On the other hand the UN seems to have little interest in the 
process of negotiation with the paramilitaries, a group that has never been viewed through 
the same lens as the guerrilla groups that maintain their romantic image in spite of drug 
traffic, kidnap, extortion and terrorist acts. The NGOs, many of whom are supported by the 
countries represented in New York speak through members of the United Nations. The 
President will have to be clear in this issue and make a clear distinction between the origins 
and the current objectives [of the guerrilla].  
 
It seems that in spite of such messages New York understands very little of President 
Uribe’s desires. That’s why he must take advantage of the twenty minutes before the 
general assembly of the UN and the forty minutes of private meeting with the secretary 
general, Kofi Annan.  
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In Washington the task is also not so easy. The president will have to respond to the 58 
congressmen who sent him a letter last week objecting to the project of penal alternatives 
on the grounds that it is too soft on atrocious crimes. To all this must be added the fact that 
support for President George W. Bush is scarce, that soon he will initiate a presidential 
campaign, and that his re-election is by no means clear. The criticism of the NGOs will also 
emerge in the US congress and this will be rejected by democrats and some republicans. 
There, as in the UN, Uribe will have to be adept and clear so that congressmen understand 
why he criticises certain NGOs. This moment, in New York and in Washington, is critical 
for the future of Colombia. UN support for the process of negotiation and the financial aid 
of the US congress depends on the diplomatic success of President Uribe. To this is added 
the positive atmosphere that is required both in the Bush administration and in the capitol to 
support the free trade agreement that must be completed in 2004 before the uncertainties of 
the presidential elections. The defeat in Cancun [refusal of other South American countries 
to sign the agreement] is an opportunity for Colombia that must be exploited to the full.               
 
8. ‘Victims and criticism of motorcycle bomb mounts’ (El Colombiano) 
 
Yesterday as more voices criticised and condemned the motorcycle bomb of Sunday 
morning in Florencia, Caqueta, the authorities confirmed that the number of victims had 
risen to 12. The sides involved in this conflict must respect international humanitarian law 
and not use the civilian population as the main target, announced Amnesty International. 
The UN High Commission of Human Rights rejected the attack and insisted that the FARC 
secretary make an official statement on the authority of this atrocious act. It insisted that the 
FARC central command comply with UN recommendations related to respect for the lives 
of civilians. To these recommendations must be added those of Germany which, through its 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joshua Fischer, categorised the attack as brutal. In a note to 
Chancellor Carolina de Barco, Fischer insisted nthat this was an act of terror that provoked 
repugnance and horror. Yesterday another person died because of the gravity of his wounds 
while the number of injured rose to 56, Edilberto Ramon Endo, Caqueta government 
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secretary told the AFP [French newswire service]. The motorcycle bomb exploded at 3 am 
on Sunday in a zone of bars and restaurants in Florencia.  
 
According to the government secretary, one of the dead is a child of nine selling sweets and 
looking after vehicles in this sector, in addition to another five injured minors, including a 
youth whose leg has been amputated and whose health remains unstable. Ramon also stated 
that two police officers who had attempted to remove the motorcycle because they had not 
managed to contact the owner also appeared amongst the deceased. More reactions. The 
public defender, Volmar Perez indicated that it is imperative to subtract the civilian 
population from the conflict. He called on security forces to adopt effective measures to 
protect civilians.  
 
The general fiscal, Juan Camilo Osario labelled the attack as a cowardly and very miserable 
method of making violence and indicated that his organisation had hypothesised that it was 
the work of the FARC. Putting a bomb in a sector with a total presence of the civilian 
population is an act of tremendous cowardice, declared the commander of the Armed 
Forces, General Jorge Enrique Mora. 
 
9. ’12 illegals shot down by army’ (El Colombiano) 
 
Seven FARC and ELN guerrilleros, five paramilitaries and a soldier died yesterday in 
combat with official troops in different regions of the country. According to an army report 
… three FARC insurgents and a soldier died in clashes in Topaipi, Cundinamarca. Five 
self-defences died, downed by troops of the 4
th
 Brigade in the rural zone of Caracoli, 
Antioquia, the official report stated. 
 
10. ‘Montesinos, 20 years for FARC case’ (El Colombiano) 
 
The fiscal in Peru requested 20 years of prison for the ex-presidential assessor, Vladimiro 
Montesinos for having permitted the detour and supply of arms to the FARC, the official 
Andean agency informed yesterday. The senior corruption fiscal, Pablo Sanchez requested 
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that the ex-right arm of President Fujimori not only served the 20 year sentence but also 
paid 2.85 million dollars of civil compensation to the Peruvian State. The 80-page fiscal 
document indicated that Montesino was the intellectual and material author of the detour of 
arms 
 
11. ‘Uribe and the IRA model’ (EFE) 
 
President Uribe is disposed to arrive at a humanitarian agreement with the guerrilla for the 
liberation of hostages and of imprisoned rebels and to table peace negotiations using the 
Northern Ireland model. I am ready to conquer them through military means, but I am also 
open to dialogue if the guerrilla demonstrate good will, said the president to the [German] 
weekly, Der Spiegel. Trust requires evidence, reiterated the president, whose model of 
negotiation will be used by the British government and the IRA. 
 
12. ‘Ecuador will reinforce frontier control’ (AP) 
 
Ecuador will reinforce border security with Colombia owing to the incursion of violent 
groups, the government minister, Felipe Mantilla announced yesterday. The sector north of 
the frontier is problematic because irregular groups, guerrilleros and paramilitaries are 
operating there … 
 
13. ‘The serpent of terrorism is still alive,’ affirms Uribe (El Pais) 
   
The Head of State will make a speech before the United Nations today. Hard response on 
the part of the president to the attack in Florencia. The mandate will speak today before the 
UN assembly and will use his speech to demonstrate that terrorist acts such as that of 
Sunday in Florencia justify a strengthened State   
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14. ‘The President faces the UN’ (El Pais) 
 
In common with all the mandates in the world, today the general assembly of the UN will 
listen to the arguments of the president of Colombia. This journey to the United States will 
also be an opportunity to regain the support that the international community should bring 
to our nation in order to overcome the terrible challenges that the true enemies of our 
human rights, drug traffic and terrorism, have created for decades. Some sectors of our 
country accuse our government of terrorism for some criticisms of NGOs. And they are 
alarmed about the consequences of the continual calls of President Alvaro Uribe to the UN 
to assume a more precise role in order to solve the violence produced by illegal armed 
groups. And they advise the president to lower the tone of the criticism of the international 
organisation that could produce negative reactions. Of course the terrorist actions against 
unarmed civilians in Florencia, Caqueta as well as the kidnapping of eight foreign tourists 
in in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta demonstrate that the president has the right to 
challenge the decisions of the UN. They should protect Colombians rather than support 
official decisions. They should produce something different from the solemn declarations 
and speeches of their delegates in Colombia and they should act against the death that 
surprised the 12 people and the injuries of the 60 or more people in the cowardly attack of 
the FARC in Florencia or the kidnapping of thousands of people in all parts of the national 
territory. Another sensitive theme is the reaction to the project of penal alternatives that the 
government has presented to the congress.  
 
Of course the initiative has to be reviewed and it is necessary to hear world opinion 
including the UN and the 56 representatives to the US House of Representatives who have 
expressed their criticism. But its discussion and definite approval corresponds exclusively 
to the Colombian people. And it is the democratic vocation of the nation, and its sense of 
justice, that will avoid the errors that all of us fear. Neither the speech of Uribe Velez nor 
his visit to the government of the United States will be the unconditional surrender that has 
been presented. The journey should serve to strengthen our ties with the country that 
collaborates most with Colombia in the struggle against its worst enemies. Here we should 
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understand that although we need international aid the solution should come from us and 
the world should not decide our future.                    
 
15. ‘Number of demobilised increases’ (El Pais) 
 
A total of 2,290 members of illegal armed groups – FARC, ELN and self-defences – have 
joined the Reinsertion Program implemented by the national government. During the last 
week, 75 guerrilleros and paramilitaries deserted their organisations. According to the 
report handed in to Ministry of the Interior of the total number of demobilised, 1,370 
belonged to the FARC, 410 to the ELN and 404 to the Self-Defence Units of Colombia 
[AUC]. 404 more were members of dissident groups. During the first nine months of 2003, 
around 1,560 people have demobilised, of whom 844 belonged to the FARC and the rest to 
other organisations     
 
16. ‘Condemnation increases for Florencia attack’ (El Pais) 
 
The UN asks the FARC to make a statement on the authority of the terrorist attack that left 
12 dead. These attacks reveal total contempt for the fundamental rights of the men, women 
and children against whom they are directed, said the office of the High Commission of 
Human Rights of the United Nations. One of the two dead police agents is buried in Tulua. 
The United Nations, the government and the living forces of the country repudiated and 
condemned the terrorist attack committed in the early hours of Sunday in Florencia, 
Caqueta where the motorcycle explosion left a total of 12 dead and 56 injured. According 
to the authorities, the act had been committed by the FARC.  
 
The minister of the interior and of justice, Fernando Londono said that this event ratified 
that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC were defeated and had lost 
all their capacity to confront the Army. In the same way, the public defender, Volmar Perez 
Ortiz manifested that it is an ethical imperative to subtract the civilian population from the 
armed conflict and thus the right to live of male and female civilians should be placed 
above the hostilities and the bands that are in conflict       
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17.  ‘Hard sentence requested for Montesinos’ (El Pais) 
  
The fiscal in Peru requested 20 years of prison for the ex-presidential assessor, Vladimiro 
Montesinos for having permitted the detour and supply of arms to the FARC, the official 
Andean agency informed yesterday. The senior corruption fiscal, Pablo Sanchez requested 
that the ex-right arm of President Fujimori not only served the 20 year sentence but also 
paid 2.85 million dollars of civil compensation to the Peruvian State. The fiscal document 
claims that Montesino was the intellectual and material author of the detour of arms to the 
FARC. It states that the ex-presidential assessor and high authorities of Fujimorismo 
organised the detour of military arms, according to different witnesses who include ex-
FARC members exiled in the United States. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Sample of editorials and news stories related to the current armed conflict 
collected from El Tiempo, El Colombiano and El Pais 
between September, 2003 and May, 2004  
 
1. ‘Procession of a displaced family’, El Tiempo, 21-9-2003 
 
El Tiempo helps a couple and their children to reconstruct the drama  
of being displaced in Bogotá 
 
After 12 hours of travel on a bus, the married couple, Carlos and Cecilia [assumed names] 
and their eight children arrived on Monday in the capital of the country, leaving behind 
their farm in la Meta where they cultivated sweet potato, coffee and sugar cane. 
 
They only brought the clothes they had on and their identity documents. 
 
Natalia, the youngest and hardly six months old was the most unsettled since she still did 
not understand the motive behind this desperate journey. She had red runny eyes that were 
almost shut. Her parents blamed the wind and the pollution. 
 
‘We decided to leave the land because we have a relative in the army and the guerrilla 
doesn’t even permit us to greet him. They threw us out. They also wanted to recruit our 
eldest son,’ cried Carlos Uriel with anguish and a mixture of indignation and hope because 
the ‘Omnipotent [God] will shelter us from harm …     
    
The first station 
 
A big notice points the route to this office and on arrival, big blue letters on a white 
background read, ‘Archdiocese of Bogotá. Office of attention to the migrant’. On the right 
side there are the names of the foundations who will help them, San Antonio and Home of 
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the Young. Sidter Eli Ana Rui of the Missionaries of San Carlos Scalabrinianas, director of 
Brasilian origin receives them.        
 
‘Here come the families that have nowhere to go or do, those who have left behind 
everything they have built up for years. Last year we assisted 703 displaced people and so 
far this year, 477,’ she said sadly. 
 
Then they spoke with Camila Revollo, family organiser … ‘the deported people visit us, 
those who are looking for lost relatives or who need medical treatment, abandoned old 
people, the demobilised, children who run away from home because they are bored with so 
much misery. She assures us that 566 minors have passed through the office this year … 
 
Second station 
 
For three days, Carlos and his family have been in the Centre of Attention to the Migrant of 
Cardinal Mario Revollo, a way station for 60 people.  
 
Sister Teresina Monteiro, executive secretary of the Foundation for Attention to the 
Migrant (Famig) says she has received 22,852 people, this year and the last two years.  
 
‘In the way station the families receive spiritual aid, are given food, clothing and temporary 
accomodation, psychological support and the children can be in a nursery …         
 
Cecilia is hoping to enter the Skills Centre of Famig that provides practical help to people 
who have settled in the city. They have integrated programs in baking, clothing, cleaning 
and the beauty business, administration, simple accountancy, small busienss and catechism. 
 
For her any course is good. Her one hope is to rent a house and make her dream come true: 
to help her children to develop.     
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2. ‘The army liberated Santa Rosa, Cauca’, El Pais, 16-10-2003  
 
Eight days of anguish came to an end for the inhabitants of this municipality. Tuesday at 
dawn and under a mantle of dense cloud the Army moved into Santa Rosa, Botacaucana in 
the south of the Colombian massif putting an end to an eight-day siege that resulted from 
300 guerrillas of the FARC and ELN and 20 years absence of the State and Armed Forces.     
 
It wasn’t easy for the 3,000 soldiers of 6th Mobile Brigade under the command of Colonel 
Ariel Ramiro Gaitan Quiroga, entering territory where the empire of terror reigned in this 
universe of water and vegetation at the entrance to the Amazon basin. The order to recover 
this region from the guerrilla siege might be part of the Plan of Democratic Security of 
President of the Republic, Alvaro Uribe Velez but the reality is that the assassination of the 
the mayor of Bolivar, Jesus Orlando Hoyos Mendez by the FARC precipitated the order 
and put Operation Colombian Massif 1 into motion.  
 
The result could not have been better because the population still without food or energy or 
telephone services greeted the troops with expressions of satisfaction and gratitude. The 
children added the most emotional note to the proceedings, their faces timidly peeping out 
from gaps in the doors of the houses. 
 
For Juan Camilo Botina, a minor of eight years, ‘this brings a lot of happiness because the 
soldiers are good people who have come to do good things for our people.’ 
 
On his side, Jesus Lasso, a long-lived farmer wept as he said, ‘finally has come the 
authority that I have been waiting for for 20 long years … 
 
3. ‘Panic because of the explosions in Bogotá’, El Colombiano, 17-11-2003  
 
Arturo Montano Torres, 26 years of age did not manage to run more than two blocks before 
two young waiters from the zone captured him after witnesses had identified him as the 
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person who threw the bombs against the breweries Bogotá Beer Company and Palos de 
Moguer …  
 
According to the national police director, General Jorge Daniel Castro Castro the attempt 
had been ordered by the FARC, adding that the captured young man had been operating 
practically alone. 
 
‘Hopefully we will have results in three days at the latest,’ said the official. 
 
This terrorist act is the first that the new Bogotá police commander has had to face. General 
Hector Garcia Guzman had only been appointed 48 hours before.  
 
Montano Torres insisted that he was innocent and that he was only one of the many people 
who had arrived in the Zona Rosa to have a beer … 
 
President Alvaro Uribe Velez insisted from Barranquilla that ‘in Colombia we have a 
guerrilla without ideals, in Colombia there is an evil mixture of terrorism and of the drugs 
that feed it. Here what we have to do is to strengthen ourselves in the midst of this pain. I 
pray to God that he gives us the strength and the perseverance that we require to defeat 
these violent groups, this is the only road that the Fatherland has left.’ 
 
4. ‘FARC may be the authors of the attempt in Zona Rosa’, El Pais, 17-11-2003 
 
The President of the Republic, Alvaro Uribe Velez yesterday condemned the terrorist 
attempt that shook the capital of the country on Saturday night and left one dead and 72 
wounded. 
 
‘It hurts in my soul this attempt in Bogotá. More suffering to my compatriots, I I pray to 
God that he gives us the strength and the perseverance to defeat terrorism,’ said the Head of 
State from Barranquilla wher ehe presides over a comunal government committee.  
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Making  a clear reference to the participation of guerrilla groups in the attack, the President 
assured that in the country, ‘we have a guerrilla without ideals, in Colombia there is an evil 
mixture of terrorism and of the drugs that feed it.’ 
 
‘Against terrorism there is only one road, to persevere in the way of defeating it,’ indicated 
the Mandate.  
 
The initial investigations that have been launched indicate that the FARC may be the 
authors of the attack perpetrated at 10.30 pm against the night establishments of Bogotá 
Beer Company and Palos de Moguer, located next to a comercial centre in the exclusive 
northern zone of Bogotá.  
 
According to the authorities two grenades were used in the attack against the two bars and 
launched by a man identified as Arturo Montana Torres, 25 years of age and detained by a 
police patrol in the sector of the attack. (See diagram)     
     
… the authorities do not discount the possibility that in addition to being a terrorist attempt 
it could be some type of retaliation or warning directed at local traders.  
 
‘There are some things that do not add up. Behind all this could be a case of extortion or 
revenge against someone in one of the establishments,’ expressed official sources …    
   
5. ‘Paramilitary incursion displaces 240 people’, El Tiempo, 3-12-2003 
 
‘Something like 60 of them arrived and looted the shop. They tied up Lucho Camel, the 
owner of the shop, one of his daughters and his son-in-law and four more people. We don’t 
know any more about that because because we ran out. Later we heard some shots.’ 
 
This is the tale of a campesino who fled this Monday from his village – La Union Dorada, a 
district in the municipality of Arenal in the south of Bolivar – escaping from the incursion 
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of a group that according to the people we consulted were paramilitaries. Today we find 
them huddled up in a neighbouring village called Micoahumado … 
 
In this zone the Central Bolivar block of the AUC (La Union de autodefensas de Colombia: 
the Union of Colombian paramilitaries) is active. They are currently negotiatng with the 
government … 
 
For the inhabitants of Micoahumado this is the first hard impact of violence after the events 
of 16 December 2002 when they confronted ‘paras’ and guerrilla that wanted to convert the 
people into a battle ground. 
 
In this case the paramilitaries ordered the residents to move out or suffer a massive attack. 
The people met and decided that they would not go and asked the armed groups to move 
out instead. Both bands [paramilitaries and guerrilla] accepted. From there a democratic 
process was born that has inspired the country.  
 
6. ‘The presence of the State,’ El Pais, 6-2-2004    
   
With the presence of the Armed Forces in Miraflores, Guaviare the State will recover a 
population that has endured for six years the rule of violence and drug traffic that the FARC 
practices. After the bloody guerrilla incursion against the military anti-narcotics base in 
1998 where more than 30 unifrmed men died and 100 more were kidnapped the people 
changed into an epicentre of coca-based activities. 
 
In this municipality that was part of the negotiation zone during the peace dialogues with 
President Pastrana in addition to a currency exchange office for euros and dollars there also 
existed an office for tax gathering controlled by the FARC. 
 
There the rights of the inhabitants were submitted to the decisions of this guerrilla group 
that exploited State absence to do their own business. 
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Now Miraflores requires social and economic reinforcement and State support, crucial 
elements to eradicate violence and drug traffic … 
 
7. ‘Humanitarian dead end,’ El Tiempo, 22-2-2004 
 
Tomorrow two years of the infamous kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt will be completed. 
This is a symbolic case because of its political importance and because of the sensitivity 
that it has stimulated in the international community. Beyond that is the drama in which she 
and the families of more than 2000 kidnap victims all around the country live and that 
stokes the complex debate about humanitarian agreements. This debate is complex, among 
other things, because of the passions, the media attention, the opportunism and the political 
interests that surround this issue.  
 
For this reason it is worth it to place the problem in the context where it belongs. To have it 
totally clear where the problem originates – in the kidnappings that the guerrilla have 
perpetrated – and to understand who are responsible for all this: the FARC and the ELN. 
Because, as things stand, there are those that are trying to blame President Uribe for his 
refusal to accept the conditions of the kidnappers. They prefer to criticize and pressure the 
government rather than the perpetrators of this drama. 
 
It shouldn’t be forgotten that this so-called humanitarian exchange is the old obsession of 
Manuel Marulanda (who preferred to talk about a squadron of prisoners as if the civilian 
kidnap victims were combatants and) who does not surrender in his ambition to liberate the 
FARC prisoners. For Presdient Uribe this is no more than a ruse to oblige him to slip up in 
his politics of democratic security …       
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8. ‘Political war,’ El Tiempo, 1-3-2004 
 
Belonging to our army is a sign of blame 
 
Some day, from a historical perspective less passionate and committed, someone wanting to 
sum up Colombian life will gloomily see beside our infinite sorrows that we were victims 
of the cruelest misunderstandings and the lowest interests. Everything seems to have been 
made up in order to ruin us and to treat us without the least trace of objectivity and justice. 
 
The hardest pressure has been directed against our government to accept the exchange of 
innocent hostages for atrocious bandits. People don’t realise that this proposal is not only 
immoral but also illegal and that it implies the liberation of the worst criminals so that they 
can aid their defeated comrades. At the same time and with the same hand they write 
diatribes against the project of bringing to the peace [table], thousands of self-defences 
[paramilitary death squads] because International Human Rights – the same principles that 
advise that we open the doors of our prisons for hardened impenitent criminals – prohibit 
the acceptance of those who promise to live harmlessly and surrender their hatreds and 
guns.  
 
They accuse us of violating human rights although it has emerged that the crimes of high 
social impact – kidnappings, terrorisms, extortions and homicides – have been halved and 
that not a single violent act has been attributed to the government or blamed on its 
omissions. In this land nobody disappears because of the authorities, nor is tortured, nor is 
illegally deprived of liberty, nor is persecuted for their ideas or opinions. The reduction in 
the crimes committed against journalists, union members, defenders of human rights is 
outstanding and none of them can be blamed on the agents of the State. But of course 
neither our UN advisors nor our friends in the US State Department stop their attacks or 
moderate their language. 
 
We are winning the war against drug traffic with fumigations that do no damage and are 
giving our rivers, our forests, our paramos [high altitude plateau] a new lease of life … 
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Our Police, the best in the world in their efficient execution of commands, for their 
devotion to social service and for the cleanliness of their hearts and deeds are victims of the 
most implacable persecution. 
 
In respect to the Army things are no better. Soon we will have to admit the most terrible 
injustice that has been committed against one of the most outstanding soldiers in Colombia 
… we will see the greatest and purest feelings of patriotism converted into – using perverse 
logic – into proof of criminal actions [This ‘outstanding soldier’ is General Rito Alejo del 
Río, commander of 17
th
 Army Brigade and instrumental in the development of 
paramilitarism in Antioquia, www.semana.com, 13-10-2009 ].   
 
The author of this opinion piece - Fernando Londono Hoyos, Ex-Minister of the Interior in 
the Uribe regime – has been accused of embezzling State funds and of passing himself off 
as an employee of ECOPETROL in order to purchase shares in INVERCOLSA (a 
Colombian gas company) and of using his political influence to increase the value of this 
company from around 12 million to 85 million dollars (www.iafogata.org).   
 
9. ‘We are being pressured to produce results,’ El Tiempo, 17-4-2004 
 
Interview with Jorge Alberto Uribe Echavarria, 
Minister of Defence 
 
In his five months as minister of Defence he had never experienced a week as difficult as 
this one. He also says that in all his life he had never had a conversation as tragic as the one 
he had had with the relatives of the four minors and the adult that had died because of 
military error in Cajamarca. 
 
‘It hurts my soul to think of this baby that died, that didn’t even have time to notice that he 
existed,’ said the minister, Jorge Alberto Uribe Echavarria. 
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Uribe admits weaknesses in the Armed Forces in the errors and confused episodes of these 
days but at the same time seems convinced that they know how to win the war. 
 
What happened to the Armed Forces? 
    
Everything in life has its thorns. Simply difficult circumstances have accumulated. Maybe 
this is good training for more difficult times 
 
Can things get worse? 
 
We hope not. But it could happen 
 
How can you explain what happened in Puerto Gaitan? Soldiers that knew each other, that 
knew who was there? Don’t they use codes in the field? 
 
The technology did not work or the instructions were not followed, for this reason we took 
disciplinary measures. The commanders were responsible for this … 
 
Do you think the military can win this war? 
 
Yes. When? I don’t know. We still have to assist rural populations, added to the three 
mountain batallions – now we have two more – of carabineros, of the 25,000 soldiers of the 
people. Undoubtedly there are limitations. Hopefully we can reduce to zero the robbery of 
fuel which has been cut in half, motorcycles and a helicopter for example are still required. 
In the course of this year, compared to the first three months of 2003, there has been a 
reduction – in the destruction of bridges (from 11 to 3) and of transmitters (from 45 to 16) 
and all terrorist actions. The kidnapping percentages of the self defences and the badly-
named guerrilla have diminished …     
[On 10 April 2004, Colombian soldiers murdered a family of five in Cajamarca, Tolima 
including a six-month old baby; the next day three soldiers were killed in ‘friendly fire’ in 
Puerto Gaitian, Meta] 
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10. ‘The calamity of human rights’, El Tiempo, 26-4-2003 
 
The reports on human rights in Colombia are being converted into a true battleground 
between the Government and the NGOs. Teh signals and accusations of partiality, of 
adulteration of information and unscrupulous manipulation of data added to the inflitration 
of obscure elements, of guerrilla or of paramilitaries, are constant. In a country where 
defenders of human rights are assassinated this poisonous atmosphere is highly negative 
and worrying …  
 
Rather than bad faith or malintentioned manipulation of information what we can see is that 
the criteria differ substantially. A few examples are enough. While for some organsiations 
kidnapping is an abuse of human rights for toehr it is a simple crime. While for some 
NGOs the massive detentions are in themselves an attempt on human rights, for the 
government these are the result of a serious and responsible investigation of penal 
responsibilities implemented by the National Procurator Fiscal … 
 
To sum up, it is necessary to pass from the guerrilla warfare between the govenrment and 
the NGOs to a constructive dialogue. The current climate of aggressiveness and conflict 
serves no-one’s purpose: neither the country nor the victims. 
 
The author of this opinion piece - Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez - is professor of political 
studies and international relations in the National University.         
       
11. ‘The army defends its presence,’ El Tiempo, 12-5-2004 
 
The presence of the army in the urban perimeter of Bogotá has become in the four years 
one of the principle objectives of Army Command because, amongst other reasons, of the 
strategic advantage that the Eastern Block of the FARC has attained during the last decade 
in the surrounding municipalities.  
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According to the Army Command, only between 1999 and 2003 seventy attacks were 
attributed to populations near the capital.  
 
In that same period more than 8,000 Bogotá traders, industrialists and businessmen became 
victims of kidnapping and extortion on the part of the 42, 22, 52 and 53 fronts of the FARC 
not counting the actions of other fronts.    
 
According to the soldiers, to this must be added, at the end of 2003, the dawn of the 
paramilitaries that consolidated the presence of the Capital Block in the South of Bogotá 
with a penetration of combatants that generated selective deaths, armed confrontations in 
the streets of popular districts and the so-called debt collecting agencies that still operate 
and that unleash the war between ‘paras’ and guerrilla … 
 
For all these reasons a mobile brigade of the Force of Rapid Deployment, the Battalion of 
the Higher Mountains of Sumapaz, two counter-guerrilla battalions have reinforced security 
and the 13
th
 Brigade has advanced into Ciudad Bolivar.  
 
‘The efforts have been enormous to control the access and actions of the FARC in Bogotá 
and the results are visible: kidnapping has decreased almost 90%, attacks on the population 
have diminished and terrorist acts have been considerably neutralized,’ said another officer. 
 
12. ‘Colombia should keep an eye on Chavez,’ El Colombiano, 12-5-2004 
 
Interview with Juan Manuel Santos (former Minister of the Treasury,  
current Minister of Defence and owner of El Tiempo) 
 
A strong odor of emanates from the news that 88 presumed paramilitaries were captured in 
Venezuela this weekend. This is the judgment of Juan Manuel Santos, the ex-Minister of 
the Treasury and director of the Good Government Foundation, who claims that Venezuela 
is approaching the abyss in the hands of President Hugo Chavez. 
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Why do you speak of fraud in relation to a theme as complex as the presence of Colombian 
paramilitaries in Venezuela? 
 
‘There are too many indications of this above all if one analyses the context and 
background to events in Venezuela … Chavez is launching accusations of a presumed 
conspiracy involving Colombia, the United States, the paramilitaries and a supposed 
invasion, so this is the old strategy of inventing an external conflict in order to divert 
attention from internal conflict. 
 
So how do you interpret the 88 Colombians that appeared in uniform in Venezuelan 
territory? 
 
If they were paramilitaries … why did they permit themselves to be captured so easily with 
new uniforms, recently ironed and without arms in a farm surrounded by Bolivarian militias  
and in the sight of everyone? 
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Glossary 
 
AUC (Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Self-Defence Units of Colombia): The 
latest name of the alliance of paramilitary groups that has officially demobilised but that 
continues to operate on behalf of the current government, big business and drug cartels 
 
Campesinos: Small farmers almost all of whom have been displaced – tortured, massacred, 
assassinated - by large landowners, oil and mineral conglomerates, drug cartels and 
paramilitary groups. Their most powerful initiatives have been ANUC (the association of 
small users that has attempted to provide access to markets) and the peace community of 
San Apartado that has been decimated by army and paramilitary groups: more than 130 
members of the peace community have been assassinated including the leader, Luis 
Eduardo Guerra, his companion and his 11-year old son (21 February, 2005). The latest 
threat to Colombian campesinos is the proposed ‘free trade zone’ in which the US promises 
to flood the Colombian market with cheap agricultural produce (sponsored by the US 
government), sell off land and vital resources such as water to the highest bidder (the US) 
and monopolise (rob) biological property rights such as seeds and sacred medicinal plants        
 
Cimaronismo: Escape from captivity (Afro-Colombian slaves) 
 
CINEP: The main Jesuit human rights organisation 
 
Circulo de abogados: The principal group of Colombian human rights lawyers  
 
Classical Marxism: This theory focuses on ‘coercion’ rather than ‘consent’ (see 
definitions below), defines ‘capitalist accumulation’ as ‘the plunder of continents’ (Chapter 
31, 1955) and describes ‘the history of all hitherto existing society’ as ‘the history of class 
struggles’ between the oppressor and the oppressed: ‘freeman and slave, patrician and 
plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman’ (Marx and Engels, 1955: 2). 
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Classical Marxism suggests that ‘the proletariat’ (‘the workers’) will ‘bring death to’ the 
bourgeoisie and the capitalist system (ibid: 5) 
 
Coercion: This is defined as ‘the application to another of physical or moral force’ 
(www.webster-dictionary.net). This definition is applied to the implementation of armed 
political, social and economic interests and is presented as the main cause and characteristic 
of Colombian armed conflicts  
 
Colombian Armed Forces (official armed groups, DAS, police, drug squads): The 
official armed groups – and instruments of coercion - of the Colombian State, the main 
problem being that they represent the private interests of political and economic 
monopolies and – unofficially allied to the paramilitaries – commit severe human rights 
abuses. The Colombian Armed Forces consist of land, sea and air units, DAS (the 
Department of State Security) and armed police squads because Colombia is in a permanent 
State of Emergency. DAS has been accused of contracting paramilitaries to implement 
political assassinations (Semana, 31/10-7: 26-34). The Armed Forces are fragmented in the 
regions: an army unit massacred a police drug squad in Jamundi in order to defend the local 
cartel (El Pais, 25-5-2006: 1)     
 
Comuneros: Popular rebellion that began in 1781 as a reaction to the oppressive taxes of 
the Spanish Colonial regime, comprised of ‘slaves who desired their freedom to the 
detriment of their masters’, ‘indigenous peoples dispossessed of their land that had been 
confiscated or robbed by landowners’ and ‘artisans, merchants and small owners from the 
region of Santander’ (Tirado Mejía, 1988: 118)   
 
Conquistadors: The Spanish troops who participated in the Conquest and genocide, rape 
and theft in the central amd southern part of this continent in the first half of the 16
th
 
Century   
 
Consent (cf coercion above): This is defined as ‘acquiescence, compliance, approval, 
permission’ (ibid) and is applied to Colombian media organisations that represent and 
427 
 
 
implement armed political, social and economic interests by ‘framing’ the armed conflict 
and attributing responsibility for social ills and violence to ‘the other side’   
 
Conservative party: The Colombian Conservative party appeared in 1849 in the pages of  
La Civilización (the first Conservative paper), promising to defend Spanish colonisation 
(that it portrayed as ‘civilisation’), the Catholic Church, ‘family values’, order, tradition and 
private property  
 
Creols: Descendants of Spanish colonists 
 
ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, National Liberation Army): The guerrilla group 
that arose as a result of the Cuban revolution in 1963. Their leaders argued that ‘popular 
expression had no other choice’ but ‘class struggle’ and ‘prolonged popular war’. Alape 
(1985) suggested that physical threats have inhibited its ‘urban intellectual’ base. The aim – 
or dream – of the ELN is to create an armed popular movement that seizes control and 
reforms the Colombian State     
 
EPL (Ejercito de Liberacion Popular, Popular Liberation Army): The Maoist guerrilla 
group composed of the militant elements that the Colombian communist party had expelled 
in 1962. The main aim of the EPL was to create ‘articulation’ between ‘rural and urban 
guerrilla’, between ‘guerrilla and mass movements’ and between ‘open political struggle 
and armed struggle’ (ibid: 308) 
 
Escuela Nacional Sindical: The National School of Colombian Labour unions 
 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia): The Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group of campesino origins that rose from 
the ashes of the US-sponsored bombing and napalming of Marquetalia in 1964. The FARC 
has defended the rights of campesinos, has precipitated and supported popular political and 
social movements, and launched a radical reform program through the members of the UP 
(their political party) who continue to be massacred by representatives of the Colombian 
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State and by paramilitary allies of the current government. The FARC in turn have been 
accused by other guerrilla groups of being ‘hegemonic in the regions’: massacring members 
of the EPL and ELN    
 
Frente Nacional (National Front): The agreement forged between Conservative and 
Liberal parties between 1958 and 1978 to put an end to – or rather consolidate – the 
Colombian dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla   
 
Fumigation: US-sponsored program that sprays insecticide on illegal drug plantations and 
decimates indigenous land and culture and people     
 
Gramsci: This Italian intellectual focused on ‘consent’ rather than ‘coercion’ (see 
definitions above), defined the State as ‘hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’ 
(2005: 263) and described the relationship between political and civil society in terms of 
the leader and the led (ibid: 144) rather than the oppressor and the oppressed (see Classical 
Marxism above). Gramsci argued that social reform must be based on consent rather than 
coercion  
 
Guerrilla (M-19, EPL, ELN, FARC): Small armed communist groups, the military motor 
of the communist movement  
 
FLIP (Fundacion por la libertad de la prensa, Foundation for freedom of the press): 
Colombian organisation that aims to protect journalists and to help them to protect 
themselves    
 
Internal enemy: The discourse that the US army introduced into the region to promote and 
legitimize armed coercion - brutal and profitable ‘counter-insurgency’ operations - against 
civilian populations in the 1960s and ’70s     
 
Juntas comunales: Popular civic action committees 
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Liberal party: The Colombian Liberal party appeared in 1847 in the pages of El Aviso (the 
first Liberal newspaper), promoting the utopian ideals of the French Revolution and ‘the 
Rights of Man’ and the laissez faire principles of the Manchester school. This party served 
the interests of its leaders, promising social reform but delivering only coercion and conflict  
 
Limpieza social (social cleansing): The euphemism that refers to the daily culling of the 
undesirable or ‘disposable’ elements (los désechables) of Colombian cities: street people, 
drug abusers, prostitutes, displaced populations. Police direct and participate in these 
programs, the most notorious being in Barranquilla in the 1980s. The victims were chopped 
up in the premises of the Universidad Libre and sold to the medical students     
 
M-19: The guerrilla group that arose out of ANAPO: the broad political movement that 
forced the Conservative party of Misael Pastrana to commit electoral fraud in 1970. The 
Em-ee used a series of media events – the theft of Simón Bolívar’s sword (1974) and of 
five thousand weapons (1979), the occupation of the Dominican Embassy (1980) and of the 
Palace of Justice (1985) - to attract popular support. The State tortured and assassinated 
members and finally assassinated its charismatic presidential candidate, carlos Pizarro in 
1990 
 
Minga: Indigenous meetings 
 
Mita: Forced contractual labour 
 
ONIC: One of the main national indigenous organisations 
 
Palenque: Last refuge – and point of resistance - of Afro-Colombian slaves 
 
Paramilitaries (AUC): The unofficial armed groups of the Colombian State that have their 
origins in Conservative militias (las chulavitas, los pajaros), in US counter-insurgency 
operations, in the doctrine of the internal enemy and in the theft of land and resources on 
430 
 
 
behalf of the Colombian government, the conglomerates, the largest landowners and the 
drug cartels  
 
PCDHDD: Platform of Colombian human rights groups 
Plan Lazo, Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota: US-sponsored military and media and public 
relations campaigns that legitimize and promote the interests of big business by killing 
armed and unarmed Colombian people and displacing them from their land and Life    
 
Sinaltrainal: Colombian labour union of food and drinks industries  
 
Sintraminercol: National mining union 
 
Taita: Spiritual representative of indigenous culture  
 
Tribunal Permanente de los pueblos: Popular international tribune that reports human 
rights issues that the State refuses to address 
 
Weber: This German intellectual argued that force (coercion) is ‘certainly not the normal 
or the only means of the State’ - defining the State in terms of consent and the 
legitimisation of coercion – and in terms of ‘a human community that successfully claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (1919)  
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